HISTORf  1 


THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE 

AND 

THE   UNITED    STATES 


THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE 

AND 

THE  UNITED  STATES 

A  REVIEW  OF  THEIR  RELATIONS  DURING  THE  CEN 
TURY  OF  PEACE  FOLLOWING  THE  TREATY  OF  GHENT 

BY 

WILLIAM  ARCHIBALD  DUNNING 

LIEBER    PROFESSOR     OF    HISTORY    AND    POLITICAL    PHILOSOPHY 

IN     COLUMBIA     UNIVERSITY 
SOMETIME    PRESIDENT    OF    THE    AMERICAN    HISTORICAL    ASSOCIATION 


WITH    AN    INTRODUCTION    BY 
THE  RIGHT  HONOURABLE  VISCOUNT  BRYCE,  O.M. 

AND    A    PREFACE    BY 
NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER 

PRESIDENT  OF  COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1914 


COPYRIGHT,  1914,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  October,  1914 


PREFACE 

UNDER  the  happiest  auspices  and  with  the 
hearty  co-operation  of  the  leaders  of  opinion 
throughout  the  British  Empire  and  in  the 
United  States,  plans  have  been  made  for  an 
adequate  and  dignified  celebration  of  the  im 
pressive  fact  that  for  one  hundred  years  the 
English-speaking  peoples  throughout  the  world 
have  been  at  peace  with  one  another.  The 
impressiveness  of  this  fact  is  heightened  by  the 
circumstances  leading  up  to  and  attending 
the  American  Revolution  and  by  those  which 
relate  to  the  War  of  1812.  With  the  exception 
of  the  short  contest  of  1898  with  Spain,  which 
contest  had  its  origin  in  purely  American  con 
ditions,  the  United  States  has  been  not  only 
at  peace,  but  usually  in  the  friendliest  possible 
relations  with  Germany,  France,  Russia,  Italy, 
and  the  other  nations  of  continental  Europe. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  have  been  many  and 
frequent  occasions  when  public  opinion,  either 
in  Great  Britain  or  in  the  United  States,  or  in 
both,  has  been  deeply  stirred  by  some  difference 


vi  PREFACE 

of  view  or  by  some  incident  of  diplomatic  con 
troversy.  There  have  been  more  tempting  oc 
casions  for  misunderstanding  and  armed  con 
flict  between  the  British  Empire  and  the  United 
States  than  between  the  United  States  and 
all  other  nations  of  the  earth  combined.  The 
points  of  contact  between  the  British  Empire 
and  the  United  States  are  many,  and  each  point 
of  contact  is  a  point  of  possible  friction.  Their 
commercial  interests  are  often  in  keen  rivalry. 
In  times  past  theirterritorial  ambitions  have  been 
in  sharp  conflict  with  each  other.  Notwithstand 
ing,  a  full  hundred  years  has  passed  during  which 
war  between  them  has  been  avoided.  This  fact  is 
of  itself  an  eloquent  testimony  to  the  temper  and 
self-restraint  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  and 
a  noble  tribute  to  the  statesmen  who  have  in 
succession  guided  their  policies  and  conducted 
their  international  business.  The  long  invisible 
line  which  separates  the  United  States  and  the 
Dominion  of  Canada  has  been  left  unguarded 
despite  the  fact  that  two  energetic,  rapidly  ex 
panding  peoples  have  been  pushing  steadily  west 
ward  on  either  side  of  it.  This  long,  invisible, 
unguarded  line  is  the  most  convincing  testimony 
that  the  world  has  to  offer  to  the  ability  of 
modern  self-disciplined  peoples  to  keep  the 


PREFACE  vii 

peace.  It  affords  an  example  which  it  is  not 
unreasonable  to  hope  may  one  day  be  univer 
sally  followed. 

As  part  of  the  celebration  of  one  hundred 
years  of  peace  between  the  British  Empire 
and  the  United  States,  the  committees  in  charge 
planned  a  historical  review  of  the  relations  be 
tween  the  two  countries  since  the  signing  of  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent.  This  delicate  and  difficult  task 
was  committed  to  William  Archibald  Dunning, 
Lieber  Professor  of  History  and  Political  Phi 
losophy  in  Columbia  University,  and  at  the 
time  President  of  the  American  Historical 
Association.  With  what  clearness,  cogency,  and 
impartiality  Professor  Dunning  has  fulfilled 
his  task  the  pages  that  follow  amply  testify. 
It  has  been  his  purpose  to 

".  .  .  Nothing  extenuate, 

Nor  set  down  aught  in  malice.  .  .  ." 

He  has  made  no  attempt  to  minimize  or  to 
gloss  over  the  differences  that  have  arisen 
between  the  two  peoples,  the  grounds  or  causes 
for  those  differences,  or  the  errors  of  judgment 
that  may  have  been  committed  in  attempting 
to  resolve  them.  The  result  is  a  survey  of  the 
past  century  which  is  full  of  encouragement 


viii  PREFACE 

for  those  who  are  longing  for  the  day  when 
justice  and  not  force  shall  rule  the  destinies  of 
the  world.  If  disputes  such  as  are  here  traced 
and  recounted  can  be  adjusted  without  war;  if 
differences  of  temperament,  of  ambition,  and 
of  interest  such  as  are  here  described  can  be 
settled  without  armed  conflict;  if  points  of  honor 
and  of  national  pride  like  those  here  presented 
can  be  satisfactorily  met  without  the  shedding 
of  innocent  human  blood,  then  surely  there  is 
no  limit  to  what  may  be  hoped  for  in  the  cen 
tury  that  is  to  come.  The  United  States  has 
sedulously  followed  the  earnest  injunction  of 
Washington  in  maintaining  friendly  relations 
with  all  nations  while  entering  into  alliance 
with  none.  Having  been  itself  carved  by  revo 
lution  from  the  side  of  the  British  Empire,  it 
is  but  natural  that  both  the  bonds  of  friend 
ship  and  the  causes  for  jealousy  should  be  more 
numerous  between  the  United  States  and  the 
British  Empire  than  between  the  United  States 
and  any  other  people.  This  is  a  plain  histor 
ical  fact  which  must  be  accepted  by  those  who 
guide  opinion  and  who  frame  public  policies. 

Friendship,  close  intercourse,  and  peace  be 
tween  the  English-speaking  peoples  involve 
no  antagonism  to  the  interests  or  influence  of 


PREFACE  ix 

other  nations.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  but 
the  beginning  of  a  new  world  order  when  neither 
differences  of  speech,  nor  of  race,  nor  of  creed 
shall  longer  be  permitted  to  sow  dissension 
among  civilized  men,  or  to  arouse  human  pas 
sion  to  an  extent  where  human  reason  cannot 
control  it  and  direct  it  toward  the  goal  of  jus 
tice,  of  human  sympathy,  and  of  a  peace  which 
is  lasting  because  it  rests  upon  a  secure  eco 
nomic  and  ethical  foundation. 

NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY, 
June  4,  1914. 


CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR i 

Signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent — Power  and  importance  of 
Great  Britain — Weakness  and  insignificance  of  the  United 
States — European  expectation  that  the  American  Republic 
would  be  short-lived — Contrasting  views  of  Tories  and  Whigs 
as  to  the  Americans — Peace  the  only  important  matter  settled 
at  Ghent — Rejoicing  over  the  Treaty  in  the  United  States — 
Treaty  attracts  slight  interest  in  Great  Britain — Canadians 
develop  a  patriotic  tradition  of  the  war — Diverse  British  views 
as  to  the  future  of  Canada — Commercial  convention  of  1815 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States — Rivalry  in  fleet- 
building  on  the  Great  Lakes  at  the  end  of  the  war — Proposals 
for  disarmament  discussed  by  Adams  and  Castlereagh — Con 
clusion  of  the  Rush-Bagot  Arrangement  of  1817 — The  rival 
fleets  on  the  Great  Lakes  voluntarily  destroyed — Conciliatory 
attitude  of  Castlereagh  in  London  and  Bagot  in  Washington — 
Conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  1818  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States — Positions  and  proposals  of  the  two  govern 
ments  as  to  the  right  of  search — Draft  agreement  on  the  sub 
ject  fails  ultimately  of  adoption — Peril  to  peace  in  the  opposing 
views  tenaciously  maintained — Agreement  in  the  Treaty  of 
1818  as  to  the  North  Atlantic  fisheries — Nature  of  the  disputes 
on  this  subject — Claims  respectively  of  Americans  and  British 
— Limited  liberty  of  inshore  fishing  recognized  to  Americans — 
Agreement  as  to  boundary  from  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the  Pa 
cific — Oregon  territory  left  open  to  both  British  and  Americans 
— Difficulties  as  to  the  northeastern  boundary  of  the  United 
States  as  defined  in  the  Treaty  of  1783— Progress  in  defining 
the  line  before  1812 — Failure  to  agree  by  commissioners  under 
Treaty  of  Ghent— Arbitration  of  King  of  Netherlands  fails  of 
acceptance — Correct  and  friendly  character  of  diplomatic 
intercourse  after  the  war — Anti-British  feeling  among  Amer 
icans  in  the  Mississippi  valley — Basis  of  this  feeling  in  British 
alliance  with  the  Indians— Disturbing  influence  of  Andrew 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Jackson's  proceedings  in  Florida — Military  execution  of 
Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister — Indignation  in  the  British  press 
and  populace — Cabinet  ultimately  concedes  that  victims  had 
forfeited  right  to  protection — Conflicting  commercial  interests 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States — Americans  favor  free 
dom  of  commerce,  British  maintain  restrictive  system — Agree 
ment  to  abandon  discriminating  duties,  1815 — The  doctrines  of 
Adam  Smith  and  Bentham  promote  economic  and  political 
reform  in  Great  Britain — America  exhibits  these  doctrines  in 
practice — Reform  in  Britain,  therefore,  means  approach  to  the 
American  practice. 


CHAPTER  II 
WHIG  REFORM  AND  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY  .     .      46 

Personality  and  policies  of  John  Quincy  Adams  and  George 
Canning — The  European  situation  that  produced  the  Monroe 
Doctrine — Canning's  suggestion  and  Monroe's  message  as  to 
intervention — Effect  of  Monroe's  pronouncement;  Canning's 
dissatisfaction — Monroe's  message  as  to  colonization;  Canning's 
protest — Influence  and  spirit  of  John  Quincy  Adams  in  the 
matter — Canning's  fear  of  an  American  alliance  against  Europe 
— Tension  between  British  and  American  governments  over 
commerce  in  West  Indies — Improved  relations  after  death  of 
Canning  and  displacement  of  Adams  by  Andrew  Jackson — 
Whig  ministry  of  Earl  Grey  supplants  Tories  in  Great  Britain — 
Movement  for  economic  and  political  reform  in  Great  Britain 
after  the  fall  of  Napoleon:  Whigs  and  Radicals — Liberalizing 
trend  of  Canning's  policy;  Navigation  Laws  relaxed — Restrict 
ive  labor  laws  repealed — Protective  corn  laws  assailed  but  suc 
cessfully  defended  by  Tories — Catholic  emancipation  carried  by 
O'Connell,  1829;  effects  in  Ireland  and  in  Great  Britain — Par 
liamentary  reform  carried,  1832 — American  sympathy  with 
Whig  and  Radical  politics — Abolition  of  West  Indian  slavery 
and  regulation  of  impressment — Futile  negotiations  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  for  joint  action  in  sup 
pressing  the  African  slave-trade — Influence  of  the  claim  to  right 
of  search  and  impressment — Influence  of  British  abolitionism  on 
South  in  United  States — America  adopts  protective  tariff 
for  manufactures — Protectionism  defeated  by  Southern  slave 
holders — Era  of  Andrew  Jackson:  traits  of  the  American  people 
at  that  time — The  democracy  versus  the  expert:  Jackson  versus 
the  Bank — The  democracy  and  the  administration  of  govern 
ment:  the  Spoils  System — Britishliteraryjudgments  oftheAmer- 
icans  under  the  Tory  ascendancy — Less  unfavorable  judgments 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

after  1832:  Harriet  Martineau;  Tocqueville — Richard  Cobden's 
views  in  the  thirties — American  opinions  of  British  formed  by 
observation  of  immigrants — Judgments  due  to  this  fact  and 
to  the  treatment  of  the  Chartists. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  ROARING  FORTIES:  POLK  AND  PALMERSTON     .       88 

Van  Buren  and  Victoria  at  the  head  of  the  governments  in  1837 
— Political  ebullition  in  the  Canadas — Conflict  of  the  races  in 
Lower  Canada — United  Empire  Loyalists  versus  later-comers 
in  Upper  Canada — Insurrections  of  Papineau  and  Mackenzie, 
1837 — Defeated  insurgents  make  raids  from  United  States — 
Steamer  Caroling  destroyed  on  American  side  by  Canadian 
troops — Arrest  of  McLeod  in  New  York  for  complicity,  1840 — 
Extreme  tension  and  ill  feeling  till  his  acquittal,  1841 — Simul 
taneous  grounds  of  ill  feeling  in  Maine,  Texas,  and  Oregon — 
Lord  Durham's  mission  and  report  as  to  Canada — His  com 
parison  of  the  Canadas  and  the  United  States — Views  of  Rad 
icals  and  of  Cobden  as  to  future  of  colonies — Durham  favors 
policy  looking  to  Canadian  nationality — Union  of  the  two 
Canadas  by  constitution  of  1841 — Failure  of  arbitration  and 
negotiation  as  to  the  northeastern  boundary  of  the  United 
States — New  Brunswick  lumbermen  and  Maine  militia:  the 
Aroostook  War — Renewed  diplomacy,  more  surveys,  no  agree 
ment — American  Whigs  in  power  at  Washington;  British 
Whigs  out  of  power  at  London — Webster  secretary  of  state; 
Aberdeen  succeeds  the  truculent  Palmerston — Friction  over 
search  of  American  ships  by  British  slave-trade  patrol — Web- 
ster-Ashburton  Treaty  of  1842:  criticised  by  British,  Americans, 
and  Canadians — Controversies  settled  by  it — Conventional 
line  fixed  between  Maine  and  New  Brunswick — The  red-line 
map  and  other  maps — Joint  patrol  of  the  African  slave  coast 
agreed  to — The  diplomatic  debate  over  search,  visitation,  and 
approach — -The  pcpular  forces  behind  the  diplomacy — Webster 
sets  impressment  over  against  slavery — The  case  of  the  Creole — 
American  expansionist  movements  bring  friction  in  the  South 
and  the  West — British  policy  as  to  Texas — Annexation  to 
United  States  strongly  opposed  by  Aberdeen — Anti-British 
feeling  strong  among  American  annexationists — British  and 
American  fur-traders  in  Oregon — Missionaries  and  settlers 
from  the  East  enter  by  the  Oregon  Trail — Popular  demand  in 
the  United  States  for  the  whole  of  the  Oregon  territory:  "fifty- 
four  forty  or  fight" — President  Polk  indicates  a  positive  atti 
tude — Buchanan-Pakenham  negotiations  for  division  of  region, 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

1845 — Folk's  belligerent  message  of  1845 — His  extension  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine — Joint  occupation  denounced  by  United 
States — Treaty  of  June  15,  1846 — The  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico — Folk's  purpose  to  secure  California  lest 
Great  Britain  acquire  it — Aberdeen  eager  to  keep  it  from  the 
United  States — Mexico  rejects  his  advice  to  refrain  from  war — 
Aberdeen  abandons  California  policy — Idealistic  basis  of  the 
American  movement  to  Oregon  and  California — The  democ 
racy's  sense  of  power  and  craving  for  bigness — Discovery  of 
gold  an  amazing  coincidence,  confirming  destiny — Compara 
tive  population:  Great  Britain,  27,000,000;  United  States, 
20,000,000 — No  need  for  more  territory  for  American  population 
— Dependence  of  British  industry  and  commerce  on  the  United 
States — Danger  of  famine  in  the  United  Kingdom — American 
sentiment  on  O'Connell's  Irish  agitation — Peel's  policy  of 
abolishing  the  protective  tariff — Cobden  and  the  Anti-Corn- 
Law  League — Democratic  agitation  involved  in  the  activity 
of  the  League — Corn  Laws  repealed  in  1846 — The  Tory  min 
istry  gives  way  to  the  Whigs  under  Russell  and  Palmerston — 
The  great  famine  in  Ireland  and  its  effects  on  America. 

CHAPTER  IV 
THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  TO  HARMONY  .     .     149 

Singular  importance  of  the  month  of  February,  1848 — Emigra 
tion  from  revolutionary  Europe  to  Great  Britain  and  America — 
German  immigration  into  United  States  rivals  Irish — The  pop 
ular  foreign  policy  of  Lord  Palmerston — Manchester  school  of 
Cobden  and  Bright  oppose  Palmerston — His  triumph  in  the 
Don  Pacifico  debate  and  after — Contrast  of  Polk  and  Palmer 
ston — Importance  of  transisthmian  communication  after 
Mexican  War — British  protectorate  over  the  Mosquitos  used 
to  control  Nicaragua  route — Treaty  of  1846  with  New  Granada 
gives  United  States  control  of  Panama — Critical  situation  at 
the  island  of  Tigre — Danger  removed  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  April  19,  1850 — Purpose  and  content  of  the  treaty — 
Controversies  over  its  meaning — Settlement  in  1860  by  with 
drawal  of  Great  Britain  from  Mosquito  coast — Joint  guarantee 
of  protection  fails  to  bring  construction  of  canal — Filibustering 
projects  against  Latin  America — British  suggestion  for  stopping 
them  resented  by  United  States — Anti-British  feeling  in 
Democratic  party  due  to  Irish  and  slaveholders — Effect  of  the 
Crimean  War  on  American  opinion — Enlistment  of  recruits  for 
British  army  in  the  United  States — Dismissal  of  Crampton  the 
British  minister — Revival  of  discussion  of  the  right  of  search — 
American  view  formally  accepted  by  the  British  Government — 


CONTENTS  xv 

PAGE 

Effect  of  this  on  the  slave-trade  and  impressment — Canadian 
problems  under  the  constitution  of  1841 — Policy  of  Lord  Elgin 
assures  responsible  government — Conflict  between  French  and 
English  interests — Industrial  and  commercial  depression  in  1849 
— Effect  on  Canada  of  Peel's  free-trade  policy — Agitation  for 
annexation  to  United  States — Party  politics  at  the  basis  of  the 
agitation — American  indifference  to  the  movement — British 
political  leaders  expect  ultimate  separation  of  Canada — Lord 
John  Russell's  speech  on  the  subject — Protest  of  Lord  Elgin — 
Disintegrating  elements  in  the  philosophy  of  the  free-trade 
movement — Canadian  situation  brings  final  repeal  of  British 
Navigation  Laws — Importance  to  Canada  of  trade  with  United 
States — Dissatisfaction  in  United  States  at  limits  upon  the  in 
shore  fisheries — Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854  results  from  this 
situation — Effects  of  the  Treaty  on  relations  between  Canada 
and  America — Comparative  numbers  of  English-speaking  peo 
ples  in  1860 — Economic  leadership  of  Great  Britain — Demo 
cratic  movement  in  British  politics — Effects  of  great  migrations 
on  Britain  and  America — Influence  of  the  Irish  in  America — 
Growth  and  influence  of  American  literature — Harmonizing 
influence  of  the  British  mid-Victorians,  especially  Dickens. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  AND  ITS  EFFECTS      .     199 

Influence  of  slavery  on  British  feeling  toward  the  warring  sec 
tions — Southern  argument  for  independence — Northern  coun 
ter  argument — Difficulty  experienced  by  the  other  English- 
speaking  peoples  in  choosing  between  these  arguments — The 
British  belief  that  a  great  democracy  could  not  endure — Favor 
for  the  South  due  to  this  belief  and  to  the  Southern  preference 
for  free  trade — Slavery  a  source  of  suspicion  toward  the  South 
— Influence  of  British  antislavery  leaders  like  Cobden  and 
Bright — British  proclamation  of  neutrality  and  its  grounds — 
Resentment  in  the  North  at  the  British  position — Attitude  of 
the  British  cabinet  toward  the  Southern  demand  for  recog 
nition — Resentment  of  the  South  at  this  position — The  Trent 
affair  of  November,  1861 — American  rejoicings  at  the  act  of 
Captain  Wilkes — Indignation  and  warlike  fervor  in  England — 
Demand  for  release  of  the  envoys  and  preparations  for  war — 
Surrender  of  the  envoys — Confused  reasoning  of  Seward  and 
Russell  about  the  matter — Hatred  of  British  caused  by  the 
affair — Attitude  of  the  British  cabinet  toward  the  Confederate 
envoys — Increased  irritation  on  the  part  of  the  South — Addi 
tional  causes  of  anger  in  the  North — The  effect  of  blockade- 
running — The  careers  of  the  cruisers,  especially  the  Florida  and 


xvi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

the  Alabama — Grievances  of  the  victorious  North  at  the  end  of 
the  war — Hatred  of  Great  Britain  in  the  South — Ill-feeling 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada — Termination  of  the 
Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854 — The  Fenian  movement  from  the 
United  States  against  Canada — Complaints  as  to  the  treatment 
of  naturalized  Irishmen  in  Great  Britain — Strong  Irish  in 
fluence  in  the  United  States — Cleavage  of  sympathies  accord 
ing  to  social  classes  in  England — Result  of  the  war  discredits 
the  foes  of  democracy — Triumph  of  the  Liberals  in  the  Reform 
Bill  of  1867 — Lincoln's  death  softens  hostility  to  the  United 
States  in  Great  Britain — Absorbing  nature  of  domestic  prob 
lems  after  the  war — Alabama  claims  formally  presented  by  the 
United  States — Basis  and  content  of  the  claims  as  presented 
by  Charles  Francis  Adams — The  reply  of  Earl  Russell — Lord 
Russell  peremptorily  rejects  arbitration  as  well  as  compensa 
tion — Sentiment  in  Great  Britain  against  Russell's  attitude — 
Renewal  of  negotiations  by  Lord  Stanley — The  Johnson-Clar 
endon  Convention  of  January,  1869 — Great  concessions  by  the 
British  Government — Rejection  of  the  Treaty  by  the  American 
Senate — Charles  Sumner's  demand  for  reparation  for  national 
wrongs — His  demand  for  compensation  for  national  losses — 
Anti-British  feeling  greatly  stimulated  by  Sumner's  speech — 
Resentment  caused  by  it  in  Great  Britain — Connection  of 
Sumner's  views  with  those  of  Cobden  and  Bright — Sumner  aims 
to  acquire  British  North  America — Secretary  Fish  begins  ne 
gotiations  with  the  Gladstone  cabinet — Influences  promoting 
success — The  Treaty  of  Washington  of  May,  1871 — The  agree 
ment  as  to  arbitration  of  the  Alabama  claims— Great  conces 
sions  by  the  British  Government  as  to  the  "three  rules" — 
American  concession  on  the  recognition  of  Confederate  bellig 
erency — The  Geneva  Tribunal  and  its  work — Final  exclusion 
of  the  national  claims — The  award  of  the  Tribunal — Amity 
with  America  associated  with  the  liberalizing  projects  of  Glad 
stone — Arbitration  of  the  San  Juan  water  boundary — Arbi 
tration  of  Civil  War  claims  other  than  Alabama  claims — Arbi 
tration  as  to  the  inshore  fisheries — Award  of  the  Halifax 
Commission — Relation  of  the  fisheries  arbitration  to  political 
movements  in  Canada. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS       .     265 

Participation  of  the  Canadians  Rose  and  Macdonald  in  ne 
gotiating  the  Treaty  of  Washington — Influences  making  for 
union  of  the  British-American  provinces — Effect  of  the  Civil 
War  across  the  border — Party  deadlock  in  Canada — Movement 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

for  union  in  the  Maritime  Provinces — General  conference  of 
delegates  at  Quebec,  1864 — Dominion  of  Canada  established, 
1867 — Influence  of  the  United  States  on  the  constitution — 
Extension  of  the  Dominion  to  the  Pacific  and  the  Arctic  Oceans 
— The  problem  of  national  unity  in  the  Dominion — Separation 
of  Ontario  from  Quebec — Projects  for  east-and-west  railways 
— Protectionism  adopted  under  lead  of  Macdonald,  1878 — 
United  States  committed  to  protectionism — Friction-making 
influence  of  these  tariff  policies-^Operation  of  the  agreement  of 
1873  as  to  the  inshore  fisheriesJ-Termination  of  the  agreement 
by  the  United  States,  1885 — Seizure  of  American  fishing-vessels 
by  the  Canadian  coast-guards,  1886 — Retaliation  enacted  by 
Congress — Adjustment  by  temporary  modus  vivendi — Treaty 
for  permanent  settlement  fails  in  American  Senate — Anti- 
British  feeling  caused  by  the  situation — Increased  by  defeat  of 
Irish  home  rule  and  accession  of  Salisbury — And  by  incidents 
in  the  conflict  over  Cleveland's^riff  policy — Dismissal  of  Sack- 
ville-West,  the  British  minister-4-Forebodings  of  trouble  when 
Blaine  became  secretary  of  state — Previous  trouble  over  seal- 
hunting  in  Behring  Sea — British  vessels  seized  in  Behring  Sea 
beyond  three-mile  limit — American  court  decides  Behring  Sea 
to  be  mare  clausum — Secretary  Bayard  seeks  joint  prohibition 
of  pelagic  sealing — Agreement  fails  through  intervention  of 
Canada — Renewed  seizures  of  Canadian  vessels  in  1889 — 
Warm  correspondence  between  Blaine  and  Salisbury — Modus 
vivendi  and  treaty  of  arbitration — Decision  of  the  tribunal 
against  the  United  States — Influence  of  the  episode  on  national 
susceptibilities — Sense  of  growth  and  power  in  the  United 
States — Creation  of  a  modern  fleet — Foothold  secured  in  Samoa 
— British  movement  for  imperial  federation  a  challenge  to  the 
United  States — Canadian  development  of  militia  and  railways 
causes  uneasiness — Agitation  in  Canada  for  commercial  union 
with  the  United  States — Goldwin  Smith  holds  annexation  inevi 
table — Sir  John  Macdonald  wins  election  of  1891  on  protection 
and  loyalty  to  the  British  connection — American  tariff  policy, 
after  fluctuation,  settles  on  high  protection — General  effect  of 
tariff  controversies  on  American  opinion. 


CHAPTER  VII 
VENEZUELA — AND  AFTER 300 

Salisbury's  Liberal-Unionist  ministry  of  1895  and  its  problems 
— The  difference  with  Venezuela  as  to  the  boundary  of  Guiana — 
Early  aspects  of  the  controversy — Tender  of  good  offices  by 
United  States  declined  by  Salisbury — Venezuela  presses  for 


xviii  CONTENTS 


arbitration  of  full  claims;  Great  Britain  declares  Schomburgk 
line  her  irreducible  minimum — Cleveland's  foreign  policy  and 
American  public  sentiment — Secretary  Olney's  despatch  of 
July,  1895 — Extreme  positions  as  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine — 
Salisbury's  replies  of  November  26 — Irreconcilable  views  of  the 
two  governments — Cleveland's  message  of  December  17,  sug 
gesting  war — Excitement  and  approval  in  America — Calming 
effect  of  longer  reflection — British  incredulity  and  amazement — 
Strong  movement  of  unofficial  opinion  against  rupture  with 
America — Jameson's  raid  diverts  attention  to  Africa  and 
Germany — British  Government  agrees  to  negotiate  with  United 
States  as  to  the  disputed  line — Arbitration  with  Venezuela 
arranged  and  carried  out — General  effect  of  the  incident  on 
American  prestige — Effect  on  the  movement  for  arbitration — 
Unratified  Olney-Pauncefote  Treaty  of  1897 — Influences  con 
tributing  to  its  failure — The  war  of  1898  with  Spain  popular 
in  the  United  States — British  sympathy  demonstratively  with 
the  Americans — Anti-British  feeling  dies  out  in  America — 
Reciprocal  sympathy  in  connection  with  the  wars  in  the  Trans 
vaal  and  the  Philippines — Cordiality  leads  to  efforts  to  settle 
outstanding  controversies  especially  with  Canada — The  un 
successful  Herschell  Commission  of  1898-9 — Failure  due  to 
dispute  as  to  the  boundary  of  Alaska — The  opposing  claims  and 
their  relation  to  the  Klondike  gold  mines — Diplomatic  agree 
ments  between  Great  Britain  and  America  effected  by  Secre 
tary  Hay  and  his  successors  and  associates — The  modus  vivendi 
as  to  the  Alaskan  boundary — American  dislike  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty — Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  of  1901  supersedes 
Clayton-Bulwer— Alaskan  boundary  fixed  by  arbitration,  1903 
— End  of  boundary  disputes  confirmed  by  Root-Bryce  con 
vention,  1908 — Other  treaties  of  1908 — Renewal  of  friction 
over  inshore  fisheries — Arbitration,  as  recommended  by  Hague 
Conference,  agreed  to  by  English-speaking  nations,  1908 — 
Northeastern  fisheries  sent  to  arbitration — Decision  of  the 
tribunal,  1910 — Pelagic  sealing  in  Behring  Sea  forbidden  by 
treaty,  1911 — Proposal  for  reciprocity  rejected  by  Canadians 
in  elections — Spirit  and  reasoning  of  the  Canadians  not  repug 
nant  to  Americans — Arbitration  treaty  of  1911 — Transforma 
tion  of  British  and  American  systems  at  end  of  century  of 
peace — American  imperialism  approved  by  British — British 
federative  empire  approved  by  Americans — American  activity 
in  world  politics  under  Roosevelt — Recasting  of  speculative 
equilibrium  as  a  consequence — British  opinion  approves  Amer 
ican  development — Movement  for  imperial  federation  of  Brit 
ish  dominions — The  Colonial  Conference  of  1887 — Develop 
ment  into  the  Imperial  Conference — Results  of  its  consolidating 
activity — Democratic  reaction  of  the  colonies  on  the  mother 
land — Influence  on  the  Irish  Home  Rule  problem — Promotes 


CONTENTS  xix 

PAGE 

harmony  with  the  American  Republic — Changes  of  the  cen 
tury  of  peace  in  the  English-speaking  world — Is  Great  Britain 
still  the  nerve  centre? — Populations  of  United  Kingdom  and 
colonies,  1814  and  1914 — American  Republic  the  home  of  most 
of  the  English-speaking  people — Contrast  with  British  Empire 
geographically — Resemblances  social,  economic,  and  political — 
Cordial  relations  probable  in  the  future. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
CONCLUSION 357 

The  fallacy  of  too  sweeping  generalization  in  international 
affairs — Illustrated  in  the  relations  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States — The  four  periods  of  the  century  of  peace — 
What  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  did  not  do — Progress  and  failure  in 
the  diplomacy  of  the  first  period — Many  causes  of  friction  in 
the  second  period — Influences  making  for  amity  and  their 
triumph — General  disturbance  of  good  feeling  through  the 
American  Civil  War — Pacifying  processes  after  the  war — 
Initial  controversies  of  the  fourth  period — Cause  and  meaning 
of  the  explosion  over  the  Venezuelan  boundary — Effects  of  the 
Spanish-American  War — Far-reaching  progress  in  cordiality — 
The  two  great  political  organisms  of  the  English-speaking 
world — Persistent  consciousness  of  a  special  ground  for  peace 
between  them. 

INDEX 373 


INTRODUCTION 

THAT  the  centenary  of  the  treaty  which  has 
secured  to  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
one  hundred  years  of  unbroken  peace  should 
deserve  a  celebration  might  seem  strange  to 
some  philosopher  in  his  study,  whose  medita 
tions  on  the  folly  and  cruelty  of  war  would  have 
led  him  to  suppose  that  peace  was  natural 
between  two  great  nations  kindred  in  blood, 
both  highly  intelligent  and  highly  civilized. 
Very  different  are  the  feelings  of  the  historian, 
who  remembers  how  often  wars  have  arisen  from 
slight  causes,  or  of  the  practical  statesman, 
who  knows  the  kind  of  motives  by  which  rulers 
who  determine  the  issues  of  peace  or  war  have 
been  and  still  are  governed.  Jealousies,  rival 
ries,  antagonisms  have  still  so  much  power  over 
peoples,  rulers  are  still  so  far  from  trying  to 
apply  as  between  states  that  moral  law  which 
the  better  sort  of  individual  men  recognize  in 
private  social  and  in  business  intercourse,  and 
which  public  opinion  imposes  even  upon  the 
worse  sort,  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  be- 

xxi 


xxii  INTRODUCTION 

tween  neighbor  states  through  three  genera 
tions  of  men  is  a  novel  and  admirable  thing,  fit 
to  inspire  joy  and  deserve  commemoration. 

The  peoples  of  these  two  states  were  no  doubt 
of  kindred  blood.  But  the  quarrels  of  kins 
folk  are  proverbially  bitter,  and  between  these 
there  were  plenty  of  causes  for  quarrel.  The 
separation,  begun  in  1776,  sealed  by  treaty  in 
1783,  had  been  made  by  war,  a  long  war,  which 
left  angry  feelings.  The  behavior  of  some  of 
the  British  forces,  and  especially  of  the  Hessian 
mercenaries,  had  exasperated  colonial  senti 
ment,  while  the  harshness  with  which  the  rev 
olutionary  party  among  the  Americans  had 
treated  those  of  their  fellow  citizens  who  ad 
hered  to  the  British  Crown  had  sown  the  seeds 
of  more  enduring  anger,  especially  among  those 
United  Empire  Loyalists  who  when  expelled 
from  the  United  States  took  refuge  in  Canada. 
For  many  years  afterward  the  offensively  super 
cilious  attitude  of  the  English  and  the  self-assert 
ive  arrogance  of  the  Americans  made  the  aver 
age  man  in  each  people  distasteful  to  the  other, 
and  it  was  only  the  wisest  and  largest  minds  that 
preached  good  understanding  and  good  feeling. 
These  aversions  did  not  die  down  till  the  Civil 
War  of  1861-5,  with  its  display  of  courage  and 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

high  spirit  on  both  sides,  had  brought  Europeans 
to  respect  the  American  people,  and  had  given 
that  people  itself  new  martial  deeds  to  be  proud 
of,  deeds  of  a  valor  which  had  not  been  directed 
against  the  old  country. 

Besides  these  unpleasant  memories  there  were 
also  controversies  over  important  material  in 
terests  that  emerged  from  time  to  time.  The 
northeastern  frontier  of  the  United  States  where 
the  State  of  Maine  borders  on  New  Brunswick 
and  Lower  Canada  had  been  left  uncertain  by 
the  treaty  of  1783,  and  also  by  that  of  1814,  and 
as  the  country  began  to  be  settled  the  disputes 
over  it  became  threatening.  After  this  question 
had  been  disposed  of  by  the  Webster-Ashburton 
treaty  of  1842  another  boundary  quarrel  arose 
for  the  possession  of  the  region  then  called 
Oregon.  Each  nation  had  a  legal  case,  and  for 
many  months  neither  seemed  likely  to  give  way. 
Even  after  the  treaty  of  1846  had  fixed  the 
forty-ninth  parallel  of  latitude  as  the  frontier 
line  all  the  way  to  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  the 
diplomatists  of  both  countries  were  harassed  by 
a  dispute  relating  to  the  ownership  of  the 
island  of  San  Juan  in  the  Straits  of  Juan  de 
Fuca,  and  after  that  dispute  had  been  referred 
to  the  German  Emperor,  and  determined  by 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

him  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  a  larger  issue 
was  raised  over  the  frontier  of  Alaska  and  that 
newly  colonized  extreme  northwestern  region  of 
Canada  which  we  call  the  Yukon.  This  was 
disposed  of  by  a  joint  commission  in  1903. 
There  still  remained  one  small  outstanding  con 
troversy  about  a  tiny  island,  called  Pope's  Folly, 
and  some  fishing-grounds  in  Passamaquoddy 
Bay  (a  large  inlet  from  the  Bay  of  Fundy), 
through  which  the  international  boundary  runs. 
In  1911  an  agreement  was  drafted  to  refer  it 
to  arbitration.  When  the  negotiators,  feeling  the 
absurdity  of  employing  the  elaborate  machinery 
of  a  court  to  determine  so  trivial  a  matter,  agreed 
to  split  the  difference,  they  gave  the  islet  to  the 
State  of  Maine  while  the  fishing-grounds  were 
assigned  to  the  Canadian  province  of  New  Bruns 
wick.  With  this  there  ended  the  long  series  of 
frontier  questions  that  had  so  often  been  a 
source  of  disquiet,  and  now  every  yard  of  the 
nearly  four  thousand  miles  of  boundary  has  been 
marked  out  by  scientific  surveyors.  To  have 
escaped  or  amicably  settled  all  the  grounds  of 
friction  which  might  occur  along  this  line,  far 
longer  than  any  other  frontier  between  civilized 
nations,  is  itself  an  event  without  parallel  in 
history. 


INTRODUCTION  xxv 

Even  after  the  land  boundary  had  been  de 
termined,  the  sea  and  the  creatures  that  make 
the  value  of  the  sea  remained  to  disturb  the 
repose  of  the  two  nations.  In  the  wandering 
waves  one  can  fix  no  boundaries,  and  in  the 
wandering  fish  one  can  assert  no  property,  so 
fishing  questions  have  always  been  a  source  of 
trouble.  Questions  arose  regarding  the  seal 
fisheries  of  the  Pacific.  Controversies  far  more 
intricate  and  far  more  protracted  produced  an 
almost  incessant  irritation  between  the  fisher 
men  who  came  from  New  England  to  the  coasts 
of  Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland  and  the 
native  fishermen  who  plied  their  trade  there 
under  the  British  flag.  Not  till  1910  was  this 
seemingly  endless  dispute  adjusted  by  the  sen 
tence  of  The  Hague  tribunal  which  both  parties 
accepted  without  a  murmur. 

The  two  nations  were  akin  in  blood  and  speech, 
but  a  common  speech  carries  with  it  one  disad 
vantage.  Each  nation  can  read  all  the  ill- 
natured  things  that  are  said  about  it  in  the  other; 
and  there  are  never  wanting  those  who  like  to 
say  ill-natured  things,  sometimes  from  a  vanity 
which  seeks  to  exalt  itself  by  depressing  others, 
sometimes  from  a  wish  to  compel  attention  and 
produce  an  effect — for  in  literature,  and  espe- 


xxvi  INTRODUCTION 

cially  in  journalism,  blame  draws  more  notice 
than  praise — sometimes  from  pure  ill  nature,  the 
love  of  mischief  for  mischiefs  sake.  Thus,  of 
the  many  offensive  words  uttered  on  both  sides 
when  temper  was  up,  a  larger  proportion  reached 
the  eyes  and  ears  of  the  other  than  if  they  had 
spoken  different  tongues,  and  what  was  spite 
fully  said  proved  more  galling. 

There  was,  moreover,  one  exception  to  that 
community  of  ideas  and  traditions  which  was 
fitted  to  draw  Americans  and  Englishmen  to 
gether.  From  the  third  decade  of  the  nine 
teenth  century  there  had  been  a  considerable 
immigration  from  Ireland  to  the  United  States. 
It  increased  largely  after  1845,  but  it  did  not 
begin  to  be  politically  significant  till  the  days  of 
the  Fenian  movement,  when  some  violent  mem 
bers  of  the  insurrectionary  party  escaped  to  the 
United  States  and  placed  there  their  base  of 
operations  against  the  British  Government.  At 
the  same  time  they  sought  to  organize  and  to 
rouse  the  Irishmen  settled  in  America,  a  large 
and  rapidly  growing  element,  against  England. 
Not  only  the  volume  of  the  Irish  vote  but  its 
compactness,  as  well  as  the  prominence  of  Irish 
leaders  in  municipal  government  and  in  the 
party  machine,  made  the  constant  attacks  upon 


INTRODUCTION  xxvii 

England  and  the  constant  pressure  upon  Con 
gressmen  and  on  •  successive  administrations  to 
adopt  an  anti-British  policy,  a  factor  of  some 
moment.  After  the  remarkable  change  of  Brit 
ish  policy  toward  Ireland  which  began  with  Mr. 
Gladstone's  Church  Disestablishment  Bill  of 
1869,  and  reached  its  high-water  mark  in  his 
Home  Rule  Bill  of  1886,  this  anti-English  senti 
ment  gradually  declined,  affecting  an  always 
diminishing  percentage  of  that  part  of  the 
American  population  which  springs  from  an  Irish 
stock  and  cherishes  an  Irish  patriotism.  It  is 
now  confined  to  a  comparatively  small  section, 
and  is  likely  soon  to  disappear.  But  from  the 
end  of  the  Civil  War  till  about  the  end  of  the 
century  it  was  an  obstacle  to  perfectly  good 
relations,  being  one  of  the  many  ways  which 
Irishmen  have  found  of  avenging  the  wrongs 
their  forefathers  suffered  at  the  hands  of  English 
governments. 

Nevertheless,  despite  these  grounds  of  dis 
sension  and  others  which  need  not  be  here  re 
counted,  peace  did  last  unbroken,  and,  though 
there  were  several  strains,  none  came  quite  to  the 
breaking-point.  The  times  at  which  the  risk 
of  a  breach  was  greatest  seem  to  have  been  the 


xxviii  INTRODUCTION 

dispute  about  Oregon  in  1845,  the  Trent  affair 
in  1861,  and  the  years  just  after  the  Civil  War 
(1865  to  1871),  when  the  resentment  over  the 
depredations  committed  by  the  Alabama  was 
acute.  The  Venezuela  incident  at  the  end  of 
1895  was  a  passing  squall,  which  the  English, 
astonished  at  the  vehemence  shown  over  a  mat 
ter  which  not  one  Englishman  in  a  hundred  had 
ever  heard  of,  could  not  be  induced  to  take 
seriously.  In  the  two  former  of  these  instances 
there  was  some  bellicose  sentiment  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic,  in  the  two  latter  such  a 
sentiment  existed  on  the  American  side  only, 
and  few  persons  in  England  could  imagine  war 
as  likely  to  result. 

To  what  causes,  then,  do  we  owe  it  that  all 
the  sources  of  trouble  which  from  time  to  time 
arose,  some  of  which  were  for  the  moment 
formidable,  have  so  passed  away  that  for  more 
than  a  generation  there  has  been  a  growing 
sense  of  concord  and  good  will  ? 

The  cause  which  naturally  occurs  to  most 
minds  is  blood  kinship  and  a  common  speech. 
It  is,  however,  easy  to  overrate  the  value  of  such 
a  tie.  It  has  not  prevented  fierce  wars  between 
communities  of  the  same  nationality.  Athe 
nians  and  Thebans  bore  to  one  another  an  un- 


INTRODUCTION  xxix 

dying  hate.  So  did  Pisans  and  Florentines. 
Bitter  were  the  wars  between  German  prin 
cipalities  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen 
turies.  Tocqueville  said  in  1830  that  he  could 
conceive  of  no  hatred  more  poisonous  than  that 
which  the  Americans  then  felt  for  England.1 
Kinship  alone  would  not  have  been  enough. 
Kinship,  however,  was  reinforced  by  a  sense  of 
the  common  possession  of  a  great  literature  and 
great  traditions.  The  New  Englanders,  bitter 
as  they  often  were  toward  England,  could  not 
forget  that  Milton  and  Cromwell  were  English 
men.  Many  a  Virginian  family  was  proud  of  its 
Cavalier  ancestry.  So  too,  though  it  was  at 
one  time  the  fashion  among  the  English  upper 
and  literary  class  to  treat  the  Americans  as  a 
purely  commercial  people,  and  to  disparage  their 
literature,  each  nation  had  a  genuine  interest 
in  the  other's  performances  and  a  capacity  for 
understanding  the  other  which  neither  possessed 
as  toward  any  other  people.  Each  was  secretly 
proud  of  the  other,  though  neither  would  avow  it. 
The  American  masses  would  from  1814  down  to 
1871  have  felt  less  repulsion  from  the  notion  of 
armed  strife  than  would  the  English,  but  fortu- 

1  One  may,  however,  conjecture  that  in  listening  to  the  sharp  words 
of  his  New  England  friends  he  underrated  an  underlying  sentiment 
running  the  other  way. 


xxx  INTRODUCTION 

nately  there  was  no  standing  army  in  the  United 
States,  and  only  a  small  navy,  so  that  the  country 
was  free  from  that  pernicious  influence  of  a 
professional  military  caste  which  works  such 
frightful  evil  in  Europe,  being  indeed  driven  to 
desire  opportunities  for  practising  the  work  for 
which  the  profession  exists.  In  Britain  the  army 
and  navy  never  wished  to  fight  America.  They 
would  have  felt  wars  with  her  to  be  almost  civil 
wars,  bella  nullos  habitura  triumphos.  And  when 
in  recent  years  America  began  to  have  a  great 
navy,  her  officers  and  sailors,  as  often  as  they 
found  themselves  in  foreign  ports,  always  frater 
nized  with  those  of  British  vessels,  and  found 
the  latter  friends  ready  made. 

The  basis  for  good  will  grew  wider  and 
firmer  with  the  increased  intercourse  of  private 
citizens  which  followed  the  introduction  of 
steam  navigation.  Private  friendships  became 
incomparably  more  numerous,  and  the  interests 
of  commerce  were  more  closely  interwoven. 

Neither  nation  was  drawn  into  war  by  such 
alliances  with  any  other  state  as  we  now  see 
to  be  among  the  most  deadly  sources  of  war. 
Happily  for  herself,  America  has  had  no  entan 
gling  alliances;  that  risk  existed  only  in  1793-5. 
Britain,  not  always  so  carefully  detached,  never 


INTRODUCTION  xxxi 

has  had,  and  it  may  safely  be  said  never  will 
have,  any  that  could  require  her  to  array  herself 
against  America. 

But  the  main  factor  working  for  peace  has 
been  the  good  sense  and  self-control  inherent 
in  the  character  of  the  two  peoples.  Neither 
of  them  suffers  itself  to  be  swept  away  by  pas 
sion,  neither  forgets,  even  when  demagogues  seek 
to  excite  it  by  appeals  to  national  vanity  and 
so-called  "points  of  honor,"  that  there  are,  be 
hind  the  susceptibilities  of  the  moment,  large 
issues  of  permanent  well-being  to  be  considered. 
In  the  days  when  both  nations  claimed  Oregon, 
a  territory  of  great  extent  and  value,  imper 
fectly  as  that  value  was  then  known,  was  in 
dispute.  But  in  both  countries  public  opinion 
recognized  that  the  other  side  also  had  a  case, 
and  that  war  would  be  a  greater  evil  than  the 
loss  of  part  of  its  own  rights.  The  territory 
was  accordingly  divided  and  peace  was  pre 
served.  So  on  other  occasions  also  the  peoples 
came  near  the  brink  of  a  rupture,  but  showed 
their  inborn  quality  by  stopping  on  the  brink. 

The  question  arises — and  it  is  a  question  of 
high  interest — how  much  of  this  self-restraint 
and  underlying  wisdom  is  to  be  attributed  to 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  Government  ever 


xxxii  INTRODUCTION 

since  1814  and  the  British  Government  ever 
since  1832  have  been  popular  governments,  in 
which  the  general  feeling  of  the  nation  has  been, 
though  more  evidently  in  the  United  States  than 
in  Britain,  the  ultimately  decisive  factor  in 
international  relations.  One  would  like  to  as 
cribe  much  weight  to  this  factor,  for  it  would  be 
reassuring  as  to  the  pacific  tendencies  of  democ 
racies  in  general.  But  the  facts  are  not  all  one 
way.  Let  us  consider  them.  It  is  clear  that 
if  the  government  of  Britain  had  been  as  pop 
ular  in  1776  as  it  was  in  1876  the  North  Amer 
ican  colonies  would  not  have  been  alienated  as 
they  unhappily  were,  and  also  clear  that  in  1862 
the  existence  of  a  wide-spread  sympathy  for  the 
Northern  States  among  the  British  masses  im 
mensely  diminished  the  risk  that  the  British 
Government  might  yield  to  the  persuasions  of 
the  French  Emperor  and  might  thus,  in  recog 
nizing  the  independence  of  the  Southern  Con 
federacy,  find  herself  in  a  conflict  with  the 
North.1  But  on  every  occasion  since  1814  in 

1 A  well-known  writer,  General  von  Bernhardi,  observes  in  his  recent 
book,  Germany  and  the  Next  War  (p.  94  of  English  translation) :  "  England 
committed  the  unpardonable  blunder,  from  her  point  of  view,  of  not 
supporting  the  Southern  States  in  the  American  War  of  Secession." 
What  the  Prussian  general  calls  an  "unpardonable  blunder"  was  the 
scornful  refusal  of  the  British  nation — a  practically  unanimous  refusal — 
to  take  advantage  of  the  divisions  in  a  kindred  people  and  set  back  the 
cause  of  human  freedom. 


INTRODUCTION  xxxiii 

which  peace  seemed  to  be  threatened  from  the 
American  side,  popular  feeling  in  the  United 
States  was,  or  seemed  to  be,  so  far  bellicose 
that  the  statesmen  who  directed  American 
policy  thought  they  could  make  political  capi 
tal  out  of  a  menacing  attitude.  Such  was  the 
case  with  Mr.  Polk  and  Mr.  Seward,  and  again 
with  Mr.  Elaine;  and  such  seemed  to  be  the 
case  with  Mr.  Cleveland  in  December,  1895, 
though  the  motives  with  which  he  launched  his 
message  of  that  year  have  never  been  fully 
understood.  If  nothing  similar  happened  in 
Britain,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  ques 
tions  which  arose  between  the  two  countries 
were  all  (except  the  Trent  affair)  remote  from 
the  knowledge  and  interest  of  the  great  bulk  of 
Englishmen,  so  that  it  was  never  worth  the 
while  of  any  politician,  however  free  from  scru 
ples,  to  win  any  popular  favor  by  an  anti-Amer 
ican  policy.  Had  the  controversies  which  arose 
over  Canadian  issues  directly  affected  Britain, 
or,  in  other  words,  had  the  English  been  Cana 
dians,  defending  their  view  of  their  rights  to  dis 
puted  territory  or  to  absolute  control  of  sea- 
fisheries,  the  temper  of  the  British  people  might 
have  been  more  sensitive  and  their  latent  pug 
nacity  more  easily  aroused. 


xxxiv  INTRODUCTION 

One  remarkable  proof  of  good  feeling  and  of 
a  good  sense  which  rises  to  the  level  of  the 
highest  political  wisdom  has  been  of  late  years 
given  by  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
There  was  a  time  when  they  desired  to  com 
plete  their  control  of  the  North  American 
continent  by  absorbing  Canada.  It  was  a 
natural  desire,  for  there  were  geographical  con 
siderations  which  seemed  to  favor  it,  and  it 
would,  if  peaceably  effected,  have  increased 
their  strength  and  wealth.  But  never  since 
1814  have  they  seriously  thought  of  using  force 
against  Canada,  for  they  know  that  just  govern 
ments  are  based  on  the  consent  of  the  gov 
erned,  while  in  recent  years  they  have  frankly 
renounced  the  notion  of  employing  any  kind 
even  of  a  pacific  pressure,  and  have  recognized 
in  a  large-minded  and  friendly  spirit  that  Can 
ada  has  a  patriotic  ideal  of  her  own  and  wishes 
both  to  become  a  great  nation  and  to  maintain 
her  political  connection  with  the  mother-coun 
try  and  those  other  great  dominions  which  re 
gard  the  ancient  crown  of  Britain  as  their 
centre  of  unity.  In  this  matter  at  least  let  us 
stop  to  honor  and  admire  the  spirit  of  Amer 
ican  democracy. 

He  who  reads  this   record  which   Professor 


INTRODUCTION  xxxv 

Dunning  has  set  forth  with  so  much  judgment  as 
well  as  with  a  conspicuous  impartiality,  will  be 
struck  by  the  fact  that  groundless  suspicions 
by  either  nation  of  the  purposes  of  the  other, 
and  the  attribution  by  either  to  the  other  of 
motives  which  did  not  exist  or  were  of  slight 
importance,  played  no  small  part  in  the  imbit- 
terment  of  relations.  Such  suspicions  and  mis 
conceptions  between  states  are  always  to  be 
feared.  They  have  been  fruitful  sources  of 
strife.  That  they  did  not,  as  between  Britain 
and  America,  prove  fatal  in  times  of  strain  may 
be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  there  were  always 
in  both  nations  men  capable  of  correcting  these 
misapprehensions,  and  that  each  knew  enough 
of  its  own  defects  to  be  able  to  make  al 
lowances  for  the  like  defects  in  the  other.  The 
most  serious  misapprehension  was  that  which, 
owing  largely  to  the  unwisdom  of  a  section  of 
the  English  press,  arose  during  the  Civil  War, 
when  most  Americans  supposed  that  a  jealous 
spirit  made  England  desire  the  downfall  of  the 
Republic.  That  was  never  the  case,  as  I  can 
venture  to  assert  from  my  recollection  of  those 
now  distant  days.  There  was  a  good  deal  of 
sympathy  with  the  valor  and  constancy  of  the 
Confederates.  But  the  fact  was,  though  Amer- 


xxxvi  INTRODUCTION 

icans  did  not  then  know  it,  that  the  bulk  of  the 
British  people,  and  most  of  its  intellectual 
leaders,  men  like  John  Bright  and  Goldwin 
Smith,  always  stood  for  the  cause  which  they 
held  to  be  that  of  human  rights  and  of  demo 
cratic  progress.  During  the  years  from  1861 
to  1865  no  meetings  open  to  the  general  public 
were  (so  far  as  I  can  remember)  ever  held  to 
give  support  to  the  Confederate  cause,  because 
it  was  known  that  in  such  an  open  meeting  no 
resolution  adverse  to  the  North  could  have  been 
carried  on  a  vote.  In  the  upper  classes  there 
were  then  some  people  who  would  have  liked 
to  see  a  republic  discredited.  But  the  larger 
heart  of  the  British  nation  as  a  whole  refused 
the  most  favorable  opportunity  it  ever  had  of 
injuring  its  greatest  competitor. 

Though  Professor  Dunning  is  right  in  dwell 
ing  upon  the  fact  that  the  gradual  democra 
tization  of  Britain  tended  to  the  promotion  of 
good  relations,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  neither 
country  was  either  of  the  great  parties  identified 
with  either  an  anti-American  or  an  anti-British 
tendency.  Party  politics  came  but  little  into 
the  matter.  But  men,  that  is  to  say,  the  views 
and  characters  of  individual  statesmen,  did 
come  in,  and  made  an  immense  difference. 


INTRODUCTION  xxxvii 

The  portraits  of  Webster  and  Ashburton  that 
hang  on  the  walls  of  the  State  Department 
at  Washington  commemorate  two  negotiators 
whose  happy  co-operation  solved  a  problem  the 
solution  of  which  might,  in  the  hands  of  lesser 
men,  have  been  remitted  to  the  sword.  On  that 
occasion  both  the  United  States  and  Canada 
were  displeased,  the  press  of  each  declaring  that 
its  representative  had  conceded  far  too  much. 
That  has  almost  always  been  said  in  both  coun 
tries  alike  when  any  compromise  was  made. 
But  the  outer  world  and  posterity  have  ap 
proved  the  compromise.  Neither  American  nor 
British  interests  were  always  in  the  keeping  of 
men  so  tactful  and  prudent  as  Webster  and 
Ashburton.  There  were  moments  when  the 
stiff  and  frigid  attitude  of  the  British  foreign 
secretary  exasperated  the  American  negoti 
ators,  or  when  a  demagogic  secretary  of  state 
at  Washington  tried  by  a  bullying  tone  to  win 
credit  as  the  patriotic  champion  of  national 
claims.  But  whenever  there  were  bad  manners 
in  London  there  was  good  temper  at  Washing 
ton,  and  when  there  was  a  storm  on  the  Poto 
mac  there  was  calm  on  the  Thames.  It  was 
the  good  fortune  of  the  two  countries  that  if  at 
any  moment  rashness  or  vehemence  was  found 


xxxviii  INTRODUCTION 

on  one  side,  it  never  happened  to  be  met  by  the 
like  quality  on  the  other. 

The  moral  of  the  story  which  Professor  Dun 
ning  has  told  so  clearly  is  that  peace  can  always 
be  kept,  whatever  be  the  grounds  of  contro 
versy,  between  peoples  that  wish  to  keep  it. 
Mr.  Root,  the  greatest  of  Webster's  successors  in 
the  office  of  secretary  of  state,  has  well  said  that 
there  is  no  issue  in  diplomacy  which  cannot  be 
settled  if  the  negotiators  sincerely  try  to  settle 
it.  The  questions  that  arose  between  these  two 
countries  were  questions  in  which,  especially  on 
the  American  side,  the  negotiators  could  not  act 
without  having  the  mind  and  will  of  the  people 
behind  them,  because  the  people  had  some 
knowledge  of  the  questions,  a  knowledge  far 
wider  than  European  nations  have  of  the  con 
troversies  that  arise  between  their  governments. 
The  people  could  exert  their  judgment,  and 
their  judgment,  even  in  moments  of  excitement, 
realized  how  frightful  would  be  the  calamities  of 
a  fratricidal  war. 

This  feeling  has  grown  immensely  stronger 
within  the  last  half-century,  as  any  one  whose 
recollection  extends  that  far  back  can  testify. 
It  is  a  guarantee  of  unbroken  peace  for  the 
future.  May  not  that  sense  of  an  unbreakable 


INTRODUCTION  xxxix 

peace  have  effects  going  beyond  the  two  na 
tions  whom  it  blesses  ?  They  understand  one 
another.  The  material  interests  that  unite  them 
are  greater  than  ever  before,  the  private  friend 
ships  more  numerous,  the  reciprocal  knowledge 
of  one  another  more  complete.  Are  they  not 
naturally  fitted  to  act  together  whenever  their 
efforts  can  be  jointly  put  forth  on  behalf  of 
international  justice  and  peace,  confirming  by 
their  influence  the  good  which  their  example 
has  already  done  ?  They  have  given  the  finest 
example  ever  seen  in  history  of  an  undefended 
frontier,  along  which  each  people  has  trusted 
to  the  good  faith  of  the  other  that  it  would 
create  no  naval  armaments;  and  this  very 
absence  of  armaments  has  itself  helped  to  pre 
vent  hostile  demonstrations.  Neither  of  them 
has  ever  questioned  the  sanctity  of  treaties, 
or  denied  that  states  are  bound  by  the  moral 
law. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is,  to  those  who  are  sad 
dened  by  the  calamities  which  the  year  1914 
has  brought  upon  Europe,  a  consoling  thought 
that  the  century  of  peace  which  has  raised  the 
English-speaking  peoples  from  forty  millions 
to  one  hundred  and  sixty  millions  has  created 
among  those  peoples  a  sense  of  kindliness  and 


xl  INTRODUCTION 

good  will  which  was  never  seen  before,  and 
which  is  the  surest  pledge  of  their  future  pros 
perity  and  progress,  as  well  as  of  the  main 
tenance  of  a  Perpetual  Friendship  between 
them. 

JAMES  BRYCE. 

HlNDLEAP,    SUSSEX, 

September  14,  1914. 


THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE 

AND 

THE    UNITED    STATES 

CHAPTER  I 
READJUSTMENT   AFTER   WAR 

IN  the  late  afternoon  of  December  24,  1814, 
the  commissioners  who  had  agreed  upon  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent  signed  their  handiwork  and 
exchanged  conventional  expressions  of  satis 
faction  at  the  conclusion  of  their  labors.  John 
Quincy  Adams,  as  he  tells  us  in  his  diary,  as 
sured  Lord  Gambier  of  his  hope  that  it  would 
be  the  last  treaty  of  peace  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  Two  weeks 
later,  at  a  banquet  given  by  the  citizens  in 
honor  of  the  commissioners,  Mr.  Adams,  pro 
posing  the  culminating  toast  of  the  occasion, 
worded  it  thus:  "Ghent,  the  city  of  Peace; 
may  the  gates  of  the  temple  of  Janus,  here 
closed,  not  be  opened  again  for  a  century!" 


2  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

It  is  not  likely  that  a  conscientious  search  of 
his  heart,  such  as  Mr.  Adams  was  wont  to  en 
gage  in  at  times,  would  have  revealed  any  very 
large  measure  of  the  confidence  that  his  formal 
words  had  implied.  Neither  in  the  course  of 
the  negotiations  nor  in  their  result  could  the 
most  sanguine  observer  have  found  assurance 
of  even  the  lesser  degree  of  permanence  that 
had  been  piously  suggested.  Actual  war  be 
tween  English-speaking  peoples  the  treaty  did 
indeed  bring  to  an  end;  the  causes  of  the  war 
it  did  not  make  the  subject  of  even  a  remote 
allusion. 

By  all  the  canons  of  judgment  that  were  war 
ranted  by  history  and  by  the  conditions  of  the 
times,  the  peace  made  at  Ghent  could  be  merely 
a  truce.  Great  Britain  in  1815  stood  on  the 
pinnacle  of  fame  as  the  mightiest  political  power 
on  earth.  Her  population  of  19,000,000  was 
not  large,  relatively  speaking,  but  it  was  com 
pact.  Included  in  it  were  some  5,000,000  Irish 
men,  who,  though  perpetually  troublesome  in 
some  respects,  could  always  be  depended  upon 
to  furnish  a  goodly  quota  of  both  brains  and 
brawn  in  war.  Her  navy  had  established  an 
undisputed  control  of  all  the  seas.  Her  army, 
under  Wellington,  had  given  the  final  blow  to 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  3 

the  prestige  of  the  greatest  military  genius  of 
modern  times,  if  not  of  all  times.  Her  colonial 
possessions,  largely  increased  by  the  twenty 
years  of  war  just  ended,  covered  vast  areas  in 
every  part  of  the  globe.  Commercially,  no 
other  power  approached  her  in  the  magnitude 
of  her  interests.  In  manufactures  she  was 
slowly  but  surely  forging  to  the  front  on  lines 
that  were  soon  to  revolutionize  industry.  Po 
litically  and  socially  the  forces  that  made  up 
this  mighty  organism  were  centred  in  a  nar 
row  aristocracy.  The  landowners  of  the  United 
Kingdom  ruled  the  British  Empire.  There  was 
indeed  a  monarch;  there  was  a  House  of  Com 
mons;  there  were  courts  and  juries  and  bills  of 
rights  and  all  the  elements  that  had  for  cen 
turies  been  the  vaunted  guarantees  of  English 
liberty.  In  the  actual  working  of  the  complex 
system,  however,  the  decisive  influence  was 
wielded  by  the  landed  aristocracy,  and  more 
particularly  by  the  peers  whose  estates  consti 
tuted  so  significant  a  fraction  of  the  surface  of 
the  islands. 

The  United  States,  when  it  ventured  to  en 
gage  in  war  with  this  huge  empire,  presented  a 
contrast  with  its  adversary  that  was  almost 
ludicrous.  A  population  of  8,000,000,  of  whom 


4  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

some  1,500,000  were  negro  slaves,  was  scattered 
along  a  thousand  miles  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard, 
with  a  few  straggling  lines  of  settlement  in  the 
Mississippi  valley.  For  military  power  this  na 
tion  could  boast  a  dozen  half-filled  regiments  of 
regular  troops,  distributed  in  small  detachments 
over  the  whole  territory,  and  a  navy  so  insig 
nificant  in  size  as  to  evoke  roars  of  laughter 
when  the  number  of  its  ships  was  mentioned 
in  the  House  of  Commons.  Before  the  end  of 
the  war  this  minute  navy  had  given  such  an 
account  of  itself  as  no  longer  to  be  a  cause  of 
mirth  at  Westminster,  and  even  the  army,  after 
bitter  humiliation,  had  won  somewhat  of  dis 
tinction.  Yet  in  no  sense  could  the  United 
States  be  reckoned  as  of  much  significance 
among  the  powers  of  the  civilized  world.  Its 
foreign  commerce  had  assumed  some  impor 
tance  during  the  long  Napoleonic  wars,  but 
could  expect  no  great  development  in  the  com 
petition  with  Great  Britain  after  peace  had  been 
made.  In  manufacturing,  a  little  impetus  had 
been  given  by  the  exclusion  of  British  goods 
through  embargo  and  war;  but  here  again  the 
restoration  of  peace  would  put  the  Americans 
under  the  crushing  weight  of  competition  from 
England  and  would  end,  for  the  time  at  least, 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  5 

any  likelihood  that  the  United   States  would 
figure  among  the  important  industrial  powers. 

The  one  aspect  in  which  the  American  Re 
public  attracted  serious  attention  among  en 
lightened  nations  was  the  political  and  social. 
Here  was  to  be  found  in  practical  operation  on 
a  large  scale  the  democracy  that  the  French 
Revolution  had  threatened  to  impose  upon  all 
Europe.  Liberty  and  equality  of  a  kind  and 
degree  portentously  suggestive  of  the  ideals  of 
1789  and  1792  prevailed  throughout  the  United 
States  and  were  watched  with  some  anxiety  by 
the  dominant  classes  in  the  Old  World.  It  was 
a  cardinal  maxim  of  conservative  political  phi 
losophy  in  Europe  that  republican  government 
could  not  be  adapted  to  the  needs  of  a  great 
territory  and  population.  The  career  of  the 
American  Republic  was  expected  therefore  to 
be  stormy  and  brief.  War  with  the  United 
States  in  1812  had  not  been  desired  by  the 
British  governing  aristocracy;  it  involved  an 
annoying  diversion  of  attention  and  resources 
from  the  serious  business  of  the  hour.  Only 
because  it  might  in  some  measure  hasten  the 
inevitable  failure  and  downfall  of  the  American 
system  was  it  regarded  with  any  equanimity. 
The  attitude  of  the  New  England  Federalists 


6  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

during  hostilities  had  confirmed  this  feeling  in 
the  class  among  whom  it  prevailed,  and  the 
feeling  was  manifest  in  the  negotiations  by 
which  the  war  was  brought  to  an  end. 

It  would  indeed  be  a  serious  error  to  as 
sume  that  the  feeling  here  referred  to  was  very 
general  in  England.  Party  divisions,  though 
dimmed  by  the  national  solidarity  that  was  de 
veloped  by  the  exigencies  of  the  long  war  with 
France,  still  marked  the  line  of  cleavage  in  po 
litical  thinking,  and  the  Whigs,  for  decades  in 
a  hopeless  opposition,  still  bore  the  tradition 
of  admiration  and  pride  concerning  the  branch 
of  the  English  race  which  Tory  policy  had  sev 
ered  from  the  parent  stem.  Conspicuous  fea 
tures  of  American  constitutional  practice  were 
the  goal  of  Whig  aspiration  and  this  fact  tended 
to  produce  tolerance  of  other  features  that  were 
abhorrent.  Thoroughgoing  democracy  such  as 
was  manifest  in  the  United  States  was  no  more 
attractive  to  the  Whigs  than  to  the  Tories. 
The  Tories,  however,  feared  it,  while  the  Whigs 
looked  indulgently  upon  it  as  a  pathetic  error 
that  would  in  time  correct  itself.  To  the  Tory 
the  American  people  was  a  brawling,  disrepu 
table  loafer,  who  had  disgraced  his  family  by 
plundering  it  and  had  by  his  character  and 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  7 

conduct  put  himself  beyond  the  possibility  of 
toleration  by  any  member  of  respectable  soci 
ety.  The  Whig,  on  the  other  hand,  felt  toward 
the  United  States  much  as  the  upper-class  col 
lege  man  feels  toward  the  freshman,  the  jour 
neyman  toward  the  apprentice,  the  old  and 
sophisticated  in  any  occupation  toward  the 
newcomer.  The  strong  points  of  the  new  man 
were  duly  appreciated  and  admired;  there  was 
satisfaction  that  the  English-speaking  group 
should  include  a  stout,  smart,  likely  young 
fellow,  and  there  was  shrewd  calculation  of 
what  he  could  contribute  in  a  competition  or 
fight  with  a  rival  group;  but  there  was  a  feel 
ing  that  within  his  own  group  he  must  learn 
his  place  and  keep  it,  and  must  submit  peace 
ably  to  the  hazing  and  fagging  that  were  the 
prerogative  of  his  elders. 

It  was  the  Tory  point  of  view  that  dominated 
the  British  approach  to  the  negotiations  at 
Ghent.  For  their  temerity  in  undertaking  the 
conquest  of  Canada  the  Americans  must  be 
required  to  surrender  enough  territory  to  make 
a  renewal  of  that  enterprise  very  difficult;  and, 
moreover,  they  must  refrain  from  all  discussion 
of  the  practice  of  search  and  impressment, 
which  they  held  to  be  the  cause  of  the  war. 


8  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

The  announcement  of  these  terms  by  the  British 
commissioners  at  Ghent  suspended  negotiation 
abruptly.  Peace  on  any  terms  involving  ces 
sion  of  territory  by  the  United  States  was 
promptly  shown  by  the  attitude  of  the  Amer 
icans  to  be  impossible;  the  Britons  at  the  same 
time  were  unyielding  as  to  search  and  impress 
ment.  Accordingly,  peace  pure  and  simple  was 
agreed  to.  The  Treaty  of  Ghent  embodied, 
in  addition  to  the  articles  necessary  to  end  the 
war,  only  certain  provisions  for  determining  the 
northern  boundary  of  the  United  States  as  fixed 
by  the  treaty  of  1783,  and  an  agreement  to  pro 
mote  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade.  Matters 
of  grave  and  pressing  importance,  the  right  of 
search,  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and 
the  Saint  Lawrence  Rivers,  the  rights  of  inshore 
fishing  on  the  Atlantic  coast — all  were  broached, 
but  were  dropped  from  consideration  in  order 
to  insure  the  one  great  end  of  peace. 

In  the  United  States  peace  was  greeted  with 
universal  rejoicing.  The  chagrin  of  those  in 
authority  at  the  failure  of  a  far-reaching  settle 
ment  found  no  place  in  popular  feeling.  In  the 
dazzling  glamour  of  McDonough's  victory  on 
Lake  Champlain  and  Jackson's  final  achieve 
ment  at  New  Orleans,  the  humiliation  of  De- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  9 

troit  and  Washington  and  Chrystler's  Farm  was 
lost  to  sight  entirely,  and  the  belief  hardened 
into  century-long  tradition  that  in  a  second  war 
for  independence  the  Americans  had  won  as 
decisive  a  triumph  as  that  which  was  crowned 
at  Yorktown. 

In  Great  Britain,  meanwhile,  the  conclusion 
of  peace  with  the  United  States  was  scarcely 
noted,  and  the  very  fact  that  there  had  been  a 
war  was  forgotten.  The  news  that  the  Treaty 
of  Ghent  had  been  ratified  reached  London 
almost  simultaneously  with  the  report  that 
Napoleon  had  returned  from  Elba.  Already 
for  months  the  progress  of  affairs  at  the  Con 
gress  of  Vienna  had  enlisted  the  anxious  atten 
tion  of  all  Europe.  Lord  Castlereagh,  the  Brit 
ish  foreign  secretary,  on  his  way  to  Vienna 
with  a  train  of  twenty  coaches,  as  John  Quincy 
Adams  casually  noted,  had  stopped  at  Ghent 
long  enough,  in  August,  1814,  to  give  the  Brit 
ish  negotiators  the  instructions  that  made  the 
conclusion  of  the  treaty  possible.  The  con 
flicting  interests  and  cross-purposes  that  were 
in  play  at  Vienna  had  made  a  renewal  of  wide 
spread  war  among  the  great  European  powers 
not  unlikely;  the  astonishing  reception  of  Na 
poleon  in  France  made  it  practically  certain. 


io  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

In  the  presence  of  such  a  prospect  it  was  not 
to  be  expected  that  the  petty  affair  of  American 
relations  should  excite  any  interest.  Then  fol 
lowed  the  Hundred  Days,  Waterloo,  and  Saint 
Helena.  These  furnished  engrossing  material 
for  British  reflection,  both  popular  and  official, 
and  all  things  American  faded  from  view  and 
from  memory. 

No  such  oblivion  enveloped  the  recent  events 
in  that  group  of  loyal  Britons  who  dwelt  in 
the  provinces  north  of  the  United  States.  Of 
the  half-million  inhabitants  of  these  provinces 
some  fifty  per  cent  were  English-speaking,  and 
of  this  fifty  per  cent  the  most  influential  ele 
ment  consisted  of  the  families  who  had  been 
driven  from  the  United  States  by  the  result  of 
the  Revolution.  New  Brunswick  and  Upper 
Canada  were  peopled  almost  exclusively  by  these 
exiles.  In  them  the  memories  and  traditions 
of  the  civil  strife  that  had  caused  them  such 
hardships  nourished  undying  bitterness  toward 
the  Americans.  Toward  the  thriving  democ 
racy  to  the  south  the  attitude  of  the  British 
Canadian  was  that  of  the  English  Tory.  When 
war  broke  out  in  1812,  with  the  loudly  pro 
claimed  purpose  of  Henry  Clay  and  other  san 
guine  spirits  to  sweep  over  Canada  and  dictate 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  11 

peace  at  Quebec  or  Halifax,  both  French  and 
British  subjects  rallied  faithfully  to  the  colors 
of  the  King,  but  there  was  a  special  ardor  in 
the  response  of  the  British.  Those  who  recalled 
the  proceedings  of  the  triumphant  party  in  New 
York  and  other  States  at  the  end  of  the  Revo 
lutionary  War  could  not  be  lured  to  welcome 
the  invaders  by  any  call  to  escape  from  oppres 
sion.  It  happened  that  the  brunt  of  the  fight 
ing  on  land  fell  upon  the  scattered  communities 
of  Upper  Canada,  where  anti-American  feeling 
was  strongest,  and  the  loss  and  suffering  inev 
itable  in  even  minor  hostilities  were  greatest 
along  the  shores  of  Lakes  Erie  and  Ontario  and 
the  marvellous  river  that  connects  them.  This 
region,  destined  to  become  the  leading  province 
of  the  British  dominion  in  America,  was  per 
meated  thus  with  the  stories  of  heroic  effort, 
sacrifice,  and  triumph  in  resistance  to  invasion. 
To  the  original  Loyalist  hatred  of  the  American 
Republic  was  thus  added  the  confirming  force 
of  a  patriotic  tradition,  and  no  little  impulse 
was  given  to  the  influence  that  was  working  to 
develop  a  proud  and  prosperous  English-speak 
ing  state  on  the  northern  half  of  the  continent. 
That  the  hope  and  wish  for  such  a  future  de 
velopment  were  less  prevalent  in  England  than 


12  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

among  the  Loyalists  in  Canada  is  manifest  in  a 
remark  of  Alexander  Baring  (later  Lord  Ash- 
burton)  to  John  Quincy  Adams  in  1816:  ".  .  . 
it  is  in  vain  for  us  to  think  of  growing  strong 
there  [in  Canada]  in  the  same  proportion  as 
America.  ...  He  wished  the  British  govern 
ment  would  give  us  Canada  at  once.  It  ... 
was  fit  for  nothing  but  to  breed  quarrels." 
Baring's  pessimistic  observation  was  made  in 
the  course  of  a  conversation  on  the  question 
of  disarmament  on  the  Great  Lakes,  and  was 
premonitory  of  a  feeling  among  British  pub 
licists  that  was  to  become  wide-spread  and  no 
torious  by  the  middle  of  the  century.  At  the 
time  when  Baring's  private  opinion  was  re 
vealed  and  was  recorded  with  grim  satisfaction 
by  Adams,  the  feeling  that  gave  rise  to  it  was 
probably  shared  by  very  few  leaders  of  Brit 
ish  policy.  Yet  the  events  of  the  war  had 
served  to  give  the  officials  of  the  Colonial  De 
partment  much  uneasiness  about  the  exposed 
condition  of  Upper  Canada  and  had  thus  led 
to  the  demand  for  territorial  readjustments  that 
should  bar  the  Americans  from  the  shores  of 
Lakes  Erie,  Huron,  and  Superior.  The  demand 
was  peremptorily  rejected,  but  the  purpose 
behind  it  remained  active.  When,  therefore, 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  13 

the  peace  had  been  made  and  the  British  Gov 
ernment  had  sufficiently  recovered  from  its 
Napoleonic  distractions  to  give  some  attention 
to  American  affairs,  it  came  to  pass,  happily 
enough,  that  the  situation  on  the  frontier  of 
Upper  Canada  was  the  first  of  the  many  dis 
turbing  questions  at  issue  that  was  satisfac 
torily  adjusted  by  diplomacy. 

The  work  of  the  diplomats  on  the  problems 
left  unsettled  by  both  the  war  and  the  treaty 
of  peace  was  begun  in  the  middle  of  1815,  with 
the  negotiation  of  a  convention  of  commerce 
and  navigation  at  London.  John  Quincy  Ad 
ams,  Clay,  and  Gallatin  wrestled  again  with  the 
Britons  who  had  been  at  Ghent,  but  made  no 
progress  toward  securing  for  the  United  States 
the  eagerly  sought  privileges  of  trade  with  the 
British-American  colonies.  The  treaty  signified 
practically  nothing  beyond  the  formal  resump 
tion  of  reciprocal  commerce  as  it  had  existed 
before  the  war,  the  East  Indies  becoming  again 
the  only  transmarine  dependencies  of  Great 
Britain  with  which  American  vessels  were  per 
mitted  to  carry  on  trade. 

The  matter  of  the  armaments  on  the  Great 
Lakes  was  formally  entered  upon  diplomatically 
only  at  the  beginning  of  1816.  Under  instruc- 


14  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

tions  from  Washington,  John  Quincy  Adams, 
now  minister  of  the  United  States  at  London, 
proposed  to  Lord  Castlereagh  that  both  gov 
ernments  set  a  limit  to  their  respective  naval 
forces  on  the  Lakes.  The  actual  situation  there 
had  given  much  concern  to  American  and  Brit 
ish  authorities  alike.  The  termination  of  hos 
tilities  came  in  the  midst  of  energetic  efforts  by 
the  commanders  on  both  sides  of  the  frontier 
to  complete  and  equip  new  and  larger  vessels. 
Especially  on  Lake  Ontario,  where  the  supe 
riority  of  the  Americans  was  less  clearly  estab 
lished  than  elsewhere,  the  rivalry  in  naval  con 
struction  was  most  energetic  and  ambitious. 
The  primitive  processes  by  which  a  few  acres 
of  forest  had  been  turned  almost  overnight 
into  fleets  of  small  but  sufficient  war-ships  were 
now  being  developed  and  extended  to  more 
pretentious  designs.  At  Kingston,  on  the  Ca 
nadian  side,  Sir  James  Yeo  was  pressing  to 
ward  completion  one  ship-of-the-line  that  should 
mount  no  guns  and  two  that  should  mount 
74,  and  across  the  lake  at  Sacketts  Harbor  two 
rival  74' s  were  on  the  stocks.  Many  lesser 
craft  were  in  various  stages  of  construction. 
The  cessation  of  hostilities  naturally  did  not 
end  the  strenuous  rivalry.  The  same  reason- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  15 

ing  that  was  destined  a  century  later  to  fill  the 
oceans  and  the  scrap-heaps  of  all  the  world 
with  gigantic  masses  of  steel,  operated  to  keep 
at  full  tension  the  workers  on  the  puny  wooden 
structures  that  embodied  the  hope  of  triumphant 
sea-power  in  the  earlier  day.  Only  when  the 
actual  strain  on  the  finances  of  the  govern 
ments  overcame  the  care  for  a  contingent  future 
of  naval  glory,  was  a  halt  called  in  the  extrava 
gant  proceedings  on  the  Lakes. 

The  proposition  of  Adams  for  disarmament 
met  with  no  satisfactory  response  at  first  from 
Lord  Castlereagh.  His  Lordship  freely  ad 
mitted  the  ruinous  consequences  that  were 
threatened  by  the  competition  in  fleet-building, 
but  urged  that,  because  Great  Britain  was  at 
a  great  disadvantage  as  compared  with  the 
United  States  in  respect  to  facilities  for  defen 
sive  equipment  in  that  remote  region,  any  re 
striction  of  force  should  apply  to  the  Americans 
only.  The  truth  was  that  the  British  cabinet 
were  seriously  divided  on  the  policy  to  be  pur 
sued  in  this  matter.  A  party  headed  by  Lord 
Bathurst,  the  colonial  secretary,  insisted  that 
an  overwhelming  naval  force  should  be  created 
on  the  Lakes,  so  as  to  render  forever  out  of  the 
question  any  American  aggression  upon  Upper 


16  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

Canada.  Demands  for  this  policy  were  strongly 
urged  in  both  Parliament  and  the  press  during 
the  winter  and  spring  of  1816,  and  gave  Adams 
much  anxiety.  Ultimately,  however,  the  bel 
ligerent  faction  was  overcome  by  the  pacifists 
of  the  government,  and  Adams,  much  to  his 
surprise,  was  informed  by  Castlereagh  in  April 
that  the  proposal  for  disarmament  would  be 
taken  up  for  discussion. 

The  detailed  discussion  of  the  business  was 
transferred  to  Washington,  where  it  was  handled 
by  Monroe,  the  secretary  of  state,  and  Bagot, 
the  British  minister.  Final  action  was  not 
reached  without  considerable  delay.  On  both 
sides  of  the  water  there  prevailed  in  military 
and  naval  circles,  and  was  reflected  in  the  press, 
the  usual  post-bellum  irritation  and  bluster, 
making  the  diplomats  cautious.  Adams  re 
ported  his  fear  that  the  sudden  change  in 
Castlereagh's  attitude  concealed  some  treach 
ery,  and  Bagot  was  suspicious  of  an  ulterior 
motive  behind  Monroe's  earnestness  in  seeking 
a  settlement.  All  the  clouds  were  dissipated, 
however,  and  at  the  end  of  April,  1817,  a 
formal  agreement  was  effected  by  an  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington.  By  this  date  Monroe 
had  become  President  of  the  United  States,  and 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  17 

the  State  Department  was  under  the  charge  of 
Richard  Rush,  pending  the  return  from  abroad 
of  the  new  secretary,  John  Quincy  Adams. 
The  notes  were  signed,  therefore,  by  Rush  and 
Bagot  respectively,  and  the  arrangement  em 
bodied  in  them  became  known  as  the  Rush- 
Bagot  Agreement.  By  its  terms  each  govern 
ment  bound  itself  to  limit  its  naval  force  on 
the  frontier  to  four  vessels,  each  not  exceeding 
one  hundred  tons  burthen  and  armed  with  one 
1 8-pound  cannon,  one  vessel  to  be  stationed 
on  Lake  Ontario,  two  on  the  Upper  Lakes,  and 
one  on  Lake  Champlain.  All  other  war-ships 
on  these  lakes  were  to  be  forthwith  dismantled, 
and  no  others  were  to  be  there  built  or  armed. 

In  conformity  with  this  arrangement  the 
British  authorities  disposed  of  their  three  ships- 
of-the-line,  six  medium-sized  vessels,  and  many 
smaller  craft,  while  the  Americans  dismantled, 
sold,  or  scuttled  and  sank  a  number  consider 
ably  larger.  So  long  as  the  good  faith  of  the 
two  governments  endured,  it  was  thus  insured 
that  the  Great  Lakes  should  be  free  from  the 
martial  ardor  that  is  inevitably  inspired  by  the 
parade  of  rival  forces.  The  future  was  to  show 
that  even  more  important  than  this  direct  in 
fluence  was  the  indirect  effect  of  the  adjustment 


1 8  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

in  setting  the  standard  of  peaceful  methods  for 
the  determination  of  the  vexatious  problems 
that  arose  along  the  whole  long  boundary  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  British  America. 

The  comprehensive  consideration  of  the  ques 
tions  at  issue  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  in  connection  with  the  late  war 
was  taken  up  in  1817  at  London.  Two  years 
of  general  peace  had  by  this  time  cleared  up 
many  cloudy  matters  of  domestic  and  foreign 
politics  and  the  British  cabinet  could  devote 
some  leisurely  attention  to  the  issues  which 
the  Americans  were  so  insistent  on  bringing 
forward  for  settlement.  It  could  not  be  said 
that  the  slow  progress  toward  a  settlement  was 
due  to  any  ill  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Government  toward  the  United  States.  So  far 
as  Castlereagh's  conduct  at  the  Foreign  Office 
was  concerned,  not  even  John  Quincy  Adams, 
temperamentally  indisposed  to  approval  of  an 
adversary,  could  find  much  to  criticise,  while 
Richard  Rush,  who  in  1817  succeeded  Adams 
as  minister  at  London,  positively  and  warmly 
proclaimed  the  conciliatory  disposition  of  the 
secretary.  Charles  Bagot  was  sent  to  Wash 
ington  with  imperative  instructions  to  promote 
cordial  relations  with  the  American  Govern- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  19 

ment,  and  his  success  in  accomplishing  this  was 
understood  to  be  the  condition  of  his  future 
advancement  in  his  diplomatic  career.  He  did 
not  anticipate  much  pleasure  from  his  task. 
He  was  an  intimate  of  George  Canning,  whose 
antipathy  to  Castlereagh  and  all  his  works  made 
much  scandal  in  the  circles  of  the  ruling  aris 
tocracy.  "Your  plan  of  treatment,"  wrote 
Canning  to  Bagot  just  after  his  appointment 
in  1815,  "may  or  may  not  succeed  with  the 
Yankees,  but  it  is  obviously,  for  your  sake, 
the  proper  one.  I  am  afraid,  indeed,  that  the 
question  is  not  so  much  how  you  will  treat  them 
as  how  they  will  treat  you,  and  that  the  hard 
est  lesson  which  a  British  Minister  has  to  learn 
in  America  is  not  what  to  do,  but  what  to  bear. 
But  even  this  may  come  round.  And  Waterloo 
is  a  great  help  to  you,  perhaps  a  necessary  help 
after  the  (to  say  the  least)  balanced  successes 
and  misfortunes  of  the  American  war." 

Despite  all  the  obstacles,  however,  Bagot  suc 
ceeded  in  his  undertaking.  Though  he  was 
fully  impressed  with  the  fact  that  ill  feeling 
toward  Great  Britain  was  a  controlling  influence 
in  the  predominant  party  in  the  country,  he  was 
tactful  and  far-sighted  enough  to  establish  at 
Washington  the  same  official  cordiality  that 


20  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

Rush  reported  at  London.  Under  such  favor 
able  conditions  the  negotiations  that  were  in 
tended  to  define  the  results  of  the  war  pro 
ceeded  to  a  conclusion  in  the  treaty  that  was 
signed  at  London  October  20,  1818. 

This  convention  fell  far  short  of  what  the 
Americans  had  hoped  for.  Its  omissions  were 
almost  as  significant  as  those  of  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent.  In  particular,  there  was  no  reference 
to  the  right  of  search  and  impressment.  This 
subject  had  naturally  been  put  first  in  impor 
tance  of  the  long  list  on  which  Rush  was  in 
structed  to  seek  an  agreement.  His  efforts 
revealed  at  the  very  outset,  so  far  as  the  funda 
mental  principle  at  issue  was  concerned,  the 
same  hopeless  impasse  that  had  existed  for 
twenty  years.  Great  Britain  stood  absolutely 
immovable  on  her  right  to  search  foreign  mer 
chantmen  on  the  high  seas  for  British  seamen; 
the  United  States  declared  categorically  that 
she  would  never  admit  the  right  of  any  foreigner 
to  muster  the  crew  of  an  American  vessel  on 
their  own  ship.  In  view  of  this  unpromising 
antagonism  on  fundamental  principle,  the  ne 
gotiations  made  a  degree  of  progress  that  was 
highly  significant  of  the  conciliatory  spirit  on 
both  sides.  Castlereagh  freely  conceded  that 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  21 

the  practice  of  visitation  and  search  by  the 
British  commanders  had  been  attended  with 
serious  abuses,  and  he  was  ready  to  do  every 
thing  possible  to  prevent  their  recurrence. 
Rush  ultimately  agreed  that  the  best  way  to 
attain  this  end  was  to  keep  British  seamen  out 
of  American  ships.  Accordingly,  a  draft  treaty 
was  actually  formulated  in  which  Great  Britain 
abandoned  the  visitation  of  American  ships  ex 
cept  for  purposes  recognized  by  both  govern 
ments  as  justifiable  by  international  law,  while 
the  United  States  undertook  to  exclude  from 
service  in  its  merchant  marine  all  natural-born 
subjects  of  Great  Britain,  even  those  who 
should  in  the  future  become  American  citizens 
under  the  naturalization  laws. 

This  project  eventually  was  dropped,  on  ac 
count  of  disagreements  on  subsidiary  points 
concerning  ratification  and  administration.  It 
probably  involved  rather  too  large  concessions 
for  the  time  and  circumstances  on  both  sides. 
America  had  already  become  as  tenacious  of 
her  claim  concerning  the  rights  of  her  natural 
ized  citizens  as  Britain  was  concerning  the 
right  of  her  navy  to  recruit  its  forces  wherever 
it  could  find  British  seamen.  The  points  on 
which  the  treaty  came  to  grief  were  so  rela- 


22  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

tively  insignificant  as  strongly  to  suggest  that 
they  were  merely  a  cover  for  retreat  from  a 
too  advanced  position  on  the  main  questions. 
Whatever  was  the  truth  in  this  matter,  the 
failure  of  the  project  left  active  a  serious  men 
ace  to  the  peace  of  the  two  nations.  The  peril 
was  destined  to  endure  until  the  progress  of 
ideas  had  undermined  the  British  conviction 
that  the  brutal  practice  of  impressment  was  the 
only  adequate  means  by  which  to  insure  naval 
pre-eminence,  and  until  the  growth  and  prestige 
of  the  United  States  had  made  respect  for  her 
claims  as  to  the  rights  of  her  citizens  a  neces 
sity  in  practice  if  not  in  theory. 

Of  the  subjects  on  which  agreement  was 
actually  embodied  in  the  convention  of  1818, 
the  majority  involved  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  British  possessions  to 
the  north  of  it.  Most  important  was  the  ad 
justment  of  the  differences  as  to  the  fisheries 
on  the  Atlantic  coast.  By  the  treaty  of  peace 
in  1783  Great  Britain  recognized  the  right  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  take  fish 
on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland,  in  the  Gulf  of 
Saint  Lawrence,  and  at  sea  in  general,  and 
further  accorded  the  "liberty"  of  fishing  on 
practically  all  the  coasts,  bays,  and  creeks  of 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  23 

British  America,  with  the  additional  "liberty" 
of  drying  and  curing  fish  on  certain  unsettled 
parts  of  the  shore.  By  these  provisions  a  prom 
inent  American  industry  was  made  very  pros 
perous  and  profitable.  The  excessive  generos 
ity  of  the  British  negotiators  was  severely 
criticised  by  their  compatriots  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic.  At  Ghent,  in  1814,  there  was  an 
opportunity  to  correct  the  error  of  the  earlier 
treaty.  Accordingly,  the  British  commission 
ers  took  the  position  that,  under  a  familiar 
principle  of  international  law,  the  fisheries 
article  of  1783,  like  all  the  rest  of  that  conven 
tion,  had  been  abrogated  by  war  between  the 
signatory  governments.  The  Americans  were 
fully  equipped  with  reasons  why  this  principle 
did  not  apply  to  the  fisheries  article.  The 
debate  reached  no  conclusion,  however,  on  ac 
count  of  the  agreement  to  treat  of  peace  only. 

After  hostilities  ceased  friction  naturally  arose 
in  the  fishing  regions.  The  Americans  resumed 
their  accustomed  pursuit  of  the  herring  and  cod 
in  the  accustomed  places;  the  British  author 
ities  in  the  Maritime  Provinces  manifested  a 
purpose  to  protect  their  coast  from  the  intru 
sion  of  the  Americans.  A  zealous  naval  com 
mander  even  warned  an  American  fisherman 


24  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

who  was  plying  his  vocation  out  of  sight  of  land 
not  to  venture  to  do  so  within  sixty  miles  of 
the  shore.  Protests  on  these  incidents  evoked 
from  the  British  Foreign  Office  at  last  the 
formal  declaration  that  it  claimed  no  right  to 
interfere  with  fishing  on  the  high  sea,  but  that 
it  would  treat  as  extinct  the  liberty  once  recog 
nized  to  Americans  to  take  and  cure  fish  on  any 
British  coasts  or  bays.  It  was  obviously  high 
time  for  serious  effort  to  remove  so  disagree 
able  a  situation  as  was  thus  created. 

In  the  negotiations  on  the  subject  the  case 
of  the  Americans  was  almost  hopeless.  The 
inshore  privileges  long  enjoyed  were  vital  to 
the  prosperity  of  a  great  industry  that  cen 
tred  in  Massachusetts.  To  maintain  these 
privileges,  however,  it  was  necessary  to  sus 
tain  two  contentions  that  were  desperately 
weak,  namely,  that  the  "liberty"  accorded  by 
the  treaty  of  1783  was  in  reality  a  right  under 
the  law  of  nature  and  of  nations,  and  that  this 
liberty  or  right  had  not  been  abrogated  by  the 
war.  Gallatin  and  Rush,  the  American  pleni 
potentiaries,  as  well  as  Secretary  Adams,  who 
directed  them,  were  adepts  in  the  diplomatist's 
art  of  extracting  from  the  hazy  realms  of  nature 
and  history  the  particular  principle  or  prece- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  25 

dent  that  happened  to  be  useful  to  their  cause; 
but  their  skill  availed  little  against  the  stiff 
British  dogma  that  territorial  jurisdiction  was 
absolute  as  against  the  claims  of  any  foreign 
power,  especially  one  that  had  recently  failed 
of  success  in  war. 

The  result,  however,  in  the  actual  treaty  pro 
visions  was  more  favorable  to  the  American 
interests  than  had  prima  facie  seemed  possible. 
Great  Britain  again  made  substantial  conces 
sions.  The  liberty  of  inshore  fishing  was  as 
sured  forever  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  United 
States  on  certain  limited  stretches  of  British 
coast,  namely,  in  Newfoundland,  the  whole 
western  shore  and  an  important  piece  of  the 
southern;  in  Labrador,  from  a  designated  point 
in  the  Gulf  of  Saint  Lawrence  eastward  and 
northward  indefinitely;  and  all  the  shores  of 
the  Magdalen  Islands.  In  Labrador  and  the 
south  of  Newfoundland  drying  and  curing  fish 
on  shore  was  also  permitted.  Besides  the  solid 
gain  contained  in  these  provisions,  the  American 
commissioners  flattered  themselves  that  they 
had  saved  their  face  in  the  very  terms  in  which 
the  fishing  privileges  were  abandoned  as  to  all 
the  other  British  coasts.  "And  the  United 
States  hereby  renounce  forever  any  liberty 


26  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

heretofore  enjoyed  or  claimed"  as  to  fishing 
within  three  miles  of  coasts,  bays,  creeks,  or 
harbors  outside  of  the  foregoing  limits.  This 
wording  was  held  to  imply  that  the  inshore 
privileges  recognized  in  the  treaty  were  not 
newly  granted  or  ever  granted  by  Great  Britain, 
but  were  part  of  a  natural  heritage  possessed 
by  the  United  States,  of  which  another  and 
larger  part  was  voluntarily  renounced. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that,  despite  the 
meticulous  care  which  the  Americans  devoted 
to  the  phrasing  of  the  article,  with  a  view  to  its 
more  or  less  metaphysical  implications,  there  re 
mained  in  it  the  germ  of  a  long  and  vexatious 
dispute  on  a  most  practical  point  of  interpre 
tation.  Within  twenty  years  of  the  signing  of 
the  treaty  the  British  Government  took  the 
position  that  the  "bays'*  from  which  the  Amer 
icans  were  excluded  embraced  great  expanses 
of  deep  sea  where  fishermen  could  ply  their 
vocation  on  the  largest  scale  without  coming 
within  three  miles  of  the  shore.  If  any  one 
concerned  in  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  in 
1818  suspected  the  possibility  of  such  a  view, 
he  left  no  record  of  his  insight. 

In  addition  to  the  settlement  as  to  the  fish 
eries,  this  treaty  dealt  with  the  delimitation  of 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  27 

territory  from  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  No  serious  controversy  devel 
oped  over  this  matter,  not  because  the  views 
of  the  two  parties  were  entirely  harmonious, 
but  because  the  occupation  of  the  vast  wilder 
ness  concerned  was  as  yet  on  too  limited  a  scale 
to  raise  any  immediate  issue.  From  the  Lake 
of  the  Woods  to  the  summit  of  the  Rocky  Moun 
tains  it  was  easily  agreed  that  the  forty-ninth 
degree  of  latitude  should  be  the  boundary.  As 
no  one  knew  the  position  of  the  lake  with  refer 
ence  to  the  parallel,  but  all  felt  sure  that  a 
meridian  from  the  lake  would  cross  the  parallel 
somewhere,  it  was  provided  that  from  the 
northwestern  point  of  the  lake  a  north  and 
south  line  should  be  run,  if  necessary,  to  inter 
sect  the  parallel,  and  this  line,  with  the  paral 
lel,  should  mark  the  boundary.  West  of  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  however,  the  Oregon  coun 
try,  with  its  great  rivers  and  its  long  and  much 
indented  Pacific  coast,  presented  problems  and 
possibilities  of  such  obvious  magnitude  that 
neither  party  was  especially  eager  to  press  for 
a  definitive  adjustment  till  fuller  knowledge 
was  forthcoming.  Both  British  and  American 
merchants  had  established  fur-trading  stations 
on  the  coast,  and  from  the  opposite  direction 


28  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

the  Oregon  country  had  been  penetrated  by 
the  hardy  and  enterprising  agents  of  great  com 
mercial  interests  centring  respectively  at  Saint 
Louis  and  Montreal.  All  that  was  provided 
by  the  treaty  was  that  the  whole  region,  so  far 
as  claimed  by  either  Great  Britain  or  the  United 
States,  should  for  ten  years  be  free  and  open  to 
the  vessels,  citizens,  and  subjects  of  the  two 
powers. 

The  most  satisfactory  feature  of  the  conven 
tion  of  1 8 1 8,  so  far  as  concerned  delimitation  of 
territory,  was  the  provision  by  which  a  thou 
sand  miles  of  the  boundary  was  made  dependent 
upon  the  fairly  certain  mechanical  processes 
of  the  surveyor.  An  astronomical  line  will  in 
deed  vary  with  the  personality  of  the  men 
and  the  precision  of  the  instruments  employed 
in  determining  it,  but  it  is  certainty  itself  as 
compared  with  most  other  customary  means 
of  demarcation.  A  -priori  one  might  suppose 
that  geographical  features,  such  as  rivers  and 
mountains,  fixed  by  nature  beyond  the  ordinary 
power  of  man  to  change,  would  furnish  the 
most  satisfactory  boundaries.  Experience  has 
proved,  however,  that  this  is  very  far  from  the 
truth.  Not  until  the  present  century,  when 
almost  every  mile  of  the  thousands  in  North 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  29 

America  where  British  and  American  posses 
sions  are  contiguous  has  been  marked  by  mon 
uments  erected  by  human  hands,  have  contro 
versies  over  territorial  limits  been  set  finally 
at  rest. 

At  the  time  when  the  convention  of  1818,  by 
the  provision  for  the  joint  occupation  of  Oregon, 
postponed  a  dangerous  dispute  concerning  the 
western  side  of  the  continent,  a  serious  but 
unsuccessful  effort  was  in  progress  to  adjust 
a  threatening  difference  at  the  far  eastern  end 
of  the  line.  The  treaty  of  peace  in  1783  had 
been  singularly  unsuccessful  in  the  attempt  to 
make  clear  the  northern  boundary  of  the  United 
States.  Difficulties  in  running  the  line  made 
their  appearance  all  the  way  from  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  The  start 
ing-point  was  set  forth  with  much  apparent 
particularity  in  the  treaty:  "From  the  north 
west  angle  of  Nova  Scotia,  viz.,  that  angle 
which  is  formed  by  a  line  drawn  due  north  from 
the  source  of  Saint  Croix  River  to  the  High 
lands;  along  the  Highlands  which  divide  those 
rivers  which  empty  themselves  into  the  river 
Saint  Lawrence,  from  those  which  fall  into  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  to  the  northwesternmost  head 
of  Connecticut  River  .  ."  But  no  one  knew 


30  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

or  ever  discovered  the  whereabouts  of  the 
"northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia";  the  "High 
lands"  referred  to  could  not  be  identified;  the 
rivers  "which  fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean" 
might  or  might  not  include  those  that  reached 
their  destination  by  way  of  the  great  gulfs  and 
bays  that  abounded  in  the  neighborhood,  and 
much  depended  on  which  alternative  was  se 
lected;  the  "northwesternmost  head  of  the 
Connecticut  River"  was  doubtful  and  undeter 
mined.  Most  important  of  all  at  the  outset, 
moreover,  was  the  fact  that  the  two  govern 
ments  disagreed  as  to  what  stream  was  meant 
by  the  Saint  Croix  River.  As  the  middle  of 
this  river,  from  mouth  to  source,  completed,  in 
the  treaty,  the  long  circuit  of  the  boundary  as 
there  described,  and  separated  Maine  from  New 
Brunswick,  it  early  became  imperative  to  settle 
on  the  identity  of  the  Saint  Croix.  Only  after 
fifteen  years  of  controversy  was  an  agreement 
reached.  In  1798  a  joint  commission  provided 
for  in  Jay's  Treaty  found  that  the  Schoodic 
River  was  what  the  treaty  meant  by  the  Saint 
Croix,  and  determined  by  survey  its  mouth  and 
its  source. 

This  was  the  limit  of  the  progress  made  prior 
to  the  War  of  1812.     In  the  Treaty  of  Ghent 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  31 

the  boundary  question  was  taken  up  in  earnest, 
and  three  distinct  commissions  were  provided 
for,  with  recourse  to  arbiters  in  case  of  disagree 
ment  between  the  commissioners. 

The  whole  undetermined  line  from  the  At 
lantic  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  was  parcelled 
out  to  these  bodies  for  final  survey  and  indica 
tion.  Only  one  of  the  commissions  was  suc 
cessful  in  its  task:  the  course  of  the  line  among 
the  islands  in  Passamaquoddy  Bay  and  the 
Bay  of  Fundy  was  agreed  upon  without  much 
trouble.  At  the  other  end  of  the  boundary,  be 
tween  Lake  Huron  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods, 
some  points  were  presented  on  which  the  com 
missioners  could  not  reach  an  agreement,  but  no 
pressing  necessity  for  a  settlement  arose.  The 
task  of  the  third  commission,  namely,  to  run 
the  line  from  the  head  of  the  Saint  Croix  to  the 
point  where  the  Saint  Lawrence  is  intersected 
by  the  forty-fifth  parallel  of  north  latitude, 
proved  to  be  wholly  beyond  its  power.  The 
commissioners  toiled  for  five  years,  from  1816 
to  1821,  only  to  reach  a  hopeless  disagreement. 
As  the  "northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia"  the 
opinions  of  the  two  commissioners  designated 
respectively  points  that  were  105  miles  apart; 
their  views  as  to  the  "  highlands/'  etc.,  left  a 


32  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

region  of  over  ten  thousand  square  miles  in  dis 
pute  on  the  frontier  of  Maine  and  New  Bruns 
wick;  and  further  the  discovery  was  made,  much 
to  the  discomfort  of  the  Americans,  that  what 
had  for  fifty  years  passed  for  the  forty-fifth 
parallel  and  served  as  the  boundary  between 
New  York  and  Vermont  on  the  one  side  and 
Canada  on  the  other,  was  in  fact  so  far  from  the 
true  parallel  as  to  leave  on  British  soil  a  costly 
fortress  under  construction  by  the  United  States 
at  Rouse's  Point. 

The  progress  of  settlement  and  development 
made  this  situation  a  cause  of  great  concern  to 
the  two  governments.  Arbitration  was  ar 
ranged  in  1827  and  the  King  of  the  Netherlands 
was  chosen  as  umpire.  His  opinion,  pronounced 
in  1831,  frankly  declared  the  impossibility  of 
deciding  which,  if  either,  of  the  conflicting 
claims  conformed  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
1783,  and  proposed  a  line  that  divided  the 
region  in  dispute.  This  proposal  was  not  ac 
cepted  by  either  government,  and  the  matter 
remained  to  be  the  source  of  ever-increasing 
friction,  as  we  shall  see,  until  1842. 

If  the  character  of  their  formal  diplomatic 
intercourse  were  a  conclusive  criterion  of  the 
general  feeling  of  two  nations  toward  each  other, 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  33 

cordial  respect  and  friendship  would  be  said  to 
have  prevailed  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  in  the  years  immediately  follow 
ing  the  end  of  the  war.  Even  when,  as  in  re 
gard  to  the  right  of  search,  differences  of  view 
were  obstinate  and  irreconcilable,  the  debate 
had  involved  no  display  of  bitterness.  All  the 
negotiations  had  been  correct  and  amicable 
according  to  the  most  exacting  requirements 
of  the  diplomatist's  art.  The  technique  of  this 
art,  however,  consists  largely  in  devices  through 
which  good  manners  shall  cover  feelings  of  quite 
another  sort.  A  model  plenipotentiary  may  be 
an  indifferent  index  of  the  national  spirit  which 
he  represents.  Like  the  second  in  an  affair  of 
honor,  he  must  guide  his  principal  along  the 
lines  of  the  established  proprieties,  however 
deeply  he  may  sympathize  with  the  principal's 
impulse  to  slay  the  adversary  out  of  hand.  In 
the  period  with  which  we  are  dealing  there  is 
no  room  for  doubt  that  the  statesmen  chiefly 
concerned  with  Anglo-American  relations  re 
garded  one  another  with  sincere  respect,  and 
were  earnest  in  their  desire  for  harmony  between 
the  peoples.  They  were  all  aware,  at  the  same 
time,  of  deep  feelings  and  powerful  interests 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  that  worked  inces- 


34  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

santly  in  the  opposite  direction.  In  1818,  in 
the  midst  of  the  negotiations  for  the  convention 
of  that  year,  a  disconcerting  illustration  of  this 
fact  was  brought  before  the  public  by  the  pro 
ceedings  of  the  American  general  Andrew  Jack 
son  on  the  Spanish  soil  of  Florida. 

In  the  United  States  the  most  particular 
abode  of  hostility  to  all  things  British  was  the 
valley  of  the  Mississippi — the  frontier  region 
where  population  was  sparse  but  now  rapidly 
growing.  Of  the  causes  which  nourished  this 
hostility,  the  most  active  was  probably  the  tra 
ditional  relations  between  the  British  and  the 
Indians  in  both  the  Northwest  and  the  South 
west.  Practically  every  village  and  settlement 
between  the  mountains  and  the  Mississippi  con 
tained  inhabitants  who  had  suffered  personally 
from  the  ghastly  incidents  of  savage  warfare. 
That  the  Indians  who  butchered  and  burned 
and  scalped  throughout  the  West  had  been  sys 
tematically  inspired  and  sustained  in  their  acts 
and  methods  by  British  authorities,  was  an  in 
grained  conviction  among  the  American  people. 
The  open  alliance  of  the  army  in  Canada  with 
Tecumseh  during  the  late  war  confirmed  this 
conviction  for  generations.  Long  after  the  war, 
Indian  bands  from  the  remoter  regions  of  the 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  35 

Northwest  made  annual  pilgrimages  to  Maiden, 
the  Canadian  garrison  town  across  the  river  from 
Detroit,  and  there  received  the  long-custom 
ary  gifts  from  the  commander.  The  American 
authorities  in  Michigan  viewed  this  proceeding 
with  much  anxiety  and  protested  to  Washington 
against  its  continuance.  It  was  firmly  believed 
by  many  in  the  United  States,  including  so 
hard-headed  a  personage  as  John  Quincy  Ad 
ams,  that  the  continued  distribution  of  gifts  to 
the  Indians  was  deliberately  calculated  to  insure 
the  support  of  the  savages  in  future  hostilities. 
In  the  southern  part  of  the  United  States  the 
Creek  Indians,  during  the  war  with  Great 
Britain,  had,  more  or  less  under  the  inspiration 
of  Tecumseh,  opened  war  of  the  usual  kind  on 
the  whites.  The  ruthless  energy  of  Andrew 
Jackson  soon  crushed  the  savages,  many  of 
whom  sought  safety  across  the  boundary  in 
Florida,  where  Spanish  authority  held  feeble 
sway.  So  feeble  was  this  sway  that  a  British 
force  had  ventured  to  occupy  Pensacola,  the 
capital  of  the  province,  as  a  base  of  operations 
against  the  Americans.  Jackson  pursued  his 
Indian  foes  into  Florida,  and  did  not  aban 
don  Spanish  territory  till  he  had  captured  Pen 
sacola  and  driven  the  British  force  out  of  the 


36  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

neighborhood.  The  utter  inability  of  Spain  to 
maintain  a  semblance  of  effective  sovereignty 
in  Florida  was  made  perfectly  clear  by  these 
events.  After  the  peace  of  Ghent  her  weakness 
continued  to  be  manifested  in  the  threatening 
activities  of  hostile  Indians,  runaway  slaves, 
and  many  varieties  of  outlaws  along  the  Amer 
ican  frontier.  The  Spanish  governor,  in  reply 
to  complaints,  acknowledged  that  he  could  not 
keep  these  people  in  order.  In  1817  Seminole 
Indians  attacked  United  States  troops  on  the 
border  and  Jackson,  with  the  prestige  of  suc 
cess  in  the  defence  of  New  Orleans  about 
him,  was  sent  to  take  charge  of  the  situation. 
His  procedure  was  characteristic.  He  marched 
straight  into  Florida,  scattering  the  Indians  as 
he  advanced,  and  seized  the  Spanish  town  of 
Saint  Mark's.  Among  the  captives  taken  here 
was  a  substantial  trader  named  Arbuthnot,  a 
British  subject,  whose  home  was  the  island  of 
Nassau.  He  was  well  known  to  the  American 
commander  as  a  man  of  influence  with  the  In 
dians,  and  as  one  who  believed  that  the  Semi- 
noles  had  been  unjustly  treated  by  the  United 
States.  Garrisoning  Saint  Mark's,  Jackson  set 
out  for  the  chief  town  of  the  Seminoles,  a  hun 
dred  miles  away,  but  on  reaching  it  after  a  dif- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  37 

ficult  march,  found  it  deserted,  and  thus  was 
unable  to  deliver  the  crushing  blow  that  he  had 
planned.  From  a  white  man  whom  he  cap 
tured  he  discovered  that  a  letter  from  Arbuth- 
not  had  warned  the  Indians  of  the  impending 
danger  and  prompted  their  escape.  Robert 
Ambrister,  an  employee  of  Arbuthnot  and  also 
a  British  subject,  was  captured  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Indian  town.  All  the  circumstances 
seemed  to  Jackson  to  call  for  summary  proceed 
ings.  Returning  to  Saint  Mark's,  he  brought 
the  luckless  Britons  before  a  court  martial,  con 
victed  them  of  various  offences  under  the  laws 
of  war,  and  had  Arbuthnot  hanged  and  Ambris 
ter  shot. 

The  doughty  general's  vigor  did  not  end  with 
these  achievements.  A  little  later  he  felt  obliged 
to  go  and  capture  Pensacola  again,  and  teach 
the  Spanish  governor  the  error  of  his  ways. 
This  incident  was  not  necessary,  however,  to 
set  the  wheels  of  international  controversy  in 
motion;  they  were  spinning  at  top  speed  already. 
The  summary  execution  of  two  British  subjects 
by  an  American  general  at  a  place  where  the 
right  of  the  victims  to  be  secure  was  more  ap 
parent  than  the  right  of  the  commander  to  be 
at  all,  caused  a  great  explosion  of  wrath  in 


38  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

England.  At  the  very  first  reports  of  what 
had  occurred,  the  press  flamed  with  demands 
for  the  vindication  of  Britain's  outraged  honor. 
The  cabinet  were  much  embarrassed  to  refrain 
from  serious  action  before  the  arrival  of  full  and 
official  information  as  to  the  affair.  War  might 
have  been  brought  about,  Castlereagh  later 
told  Rush,  "if  the  ministry  had  but  held  up  a 
finger/'  When  all  the  facts  were  known,  how 
ever,  the  government  was  fully  justified  in  its 
caution;  for  on  the  evidence  submitted  it  was 
obliged  to  admit  that  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister 
had  by  their  relations  with  the  Indians  forfeited 
the  right  to  protection  by  the  British  Govern 
ment  against  the  military  power  of  the  United 
States.  Jackson's  high-handed  proceedings  in 
Florida  were  in  the  long  run  more  violently 
assailed  in  his  own  country  than  abroad.  The 
Monroe  administration  only  with  much  dif 
ficulty  agreed  upon  sustaining  him,  and  rival 
politicians  in  Congress  attacked  him  without 
mercy.  Popular  feeling,  however,  especially  in 
the  West,  was  enthusiastically  in  his  favor,  and 
eventually  made  him  President  of  the  United 
States.  Not  least  among  the  influences  that 
worked  to  bring  him  this  distinction  was  the 
wide-spread  tradition  that  in  executing  Arbuth- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  39 

not  and  Ambrister  he  had  deliberately  flouted 
and  defied  Great  Britain. 

The  correct  and  friendly  attitude  of  the 
British  Government  was  manifested  in  other 
incidents  during  this  period.  Even  on  so  stub 
bornly  contested  a  point  as  the  right  of  search 
Rush  had  reason  to  believe  that  an  agreement 
would  have  been  reached  if  Castlereagh  had 
been  able  to  remain  in  personal  supervision  of 
the  negotiations.  The  foreign  secretary  was 
called  away  to  the  Continent  at  a  critical  stage 
of  the  discussion,  after  having  given  very  clear 
indications  of  his  individual  disposition  to  go 
far  in  yielding.  In  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty 
of  commerce,  also,  Frederick  John  Robinson, 
the  chief  British  representative,  intimated  a 
feeling  that  the  American  demands  were  too 
early  in  time  rather  than  too  objectionable  in 
substance  to  be  conceded. 

It  was  inherent  in  the  general  condition  of 
world  politics  that  America  should  be  seeking 
new  things  and  Great  Britain  should  be  stand 
ing  by  the  old.  Especially  was  this  the  case 
in  regard  to  commerce  and  navigation.  The 
newcomer  among  maritime  powers  found  her 
self  barred  in  every  direction  from  profitable 
trade  by  the  existing  system  under  which  every 


40  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

nation  protected  its  own  merchants  and  ship 
ping  interests  by  excluding  foreigners  from  its 
jurisdiction  save  under  heavy  burdens.  To  the 
Americans  it  seemed  something  like  a  violation 
of  natural  justice  that  they  should  be  forbidden 
to  sell  a  cargo  of  goods  in  Halifax  or  Jamaica; 
yet  such  was  British  law.  It  was  hard  to  ques 
tion  the  right  of  a  government  to  exclude  for 
eigners  from  its  ports;  but  the  desperate  eager 
ness  of  the  Americans  for  certain  kinds  of  trade 
led  them  at  times  to  take  the  ground  that  free 
dom  of  commercial  intercourse  was  so  pro 
foundly  an  interest  of  all  mankind  as  fairly  to 
be  within  the  domain  of  natural  law.  Such  a 
trend  of  argument  could,  of  course,  have  no 
practical  effect  in  any  concrete  case;  the  Brit 
ish,  entrenched  in  commanding  commercial  sites 
all  over  the  globe,  could  and  did  merely 
inquire  what  the  Americans  could  offer  for  the 
privileges  they  sought.  Bargaining  of  the  kind 
thus  suggested  was  a  very  unsatisfactory  proc 
ess  where  there  was  such  disparity  between 
the  two  parties  in  actual  possessions.  It  was 
like  the  freedom  of  contract  in  a  later  day  that 
was  alleged  to  be  a  sufficient  principle  on  which 
to  base  the  relations  of  wage-earner  and  wage- 
payer. 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  41 

In  the  treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation  of 
1815,  which  was,  as  stated  above,  a  recurrence 
to  ante-bellum  conditions,  there  was  one  pro 
vision  that  proved  to  be  influential  in  breaking 
down  the  ancient  system  of  commercial  restric 
tion.  For  the  first  time  on  record,  two  nations 
agreed  by  treaty  to  abandon  the  recourse  to 
discriminating  duties,  Great  Britain  limiting 
her  concession  to  her  European  territories. 
Commodities  produced  in  these  territories  and 
the  United  States  respectively  were  to  pay  as 
favorable  customs  duties  as  were  paid  by  the 
products  of  any  other  nation,  and  tonnage 
duties  were  to  be  precisely  the  same  on  British 
and  American  ships  in  the  ports  of  both  powers. 
As  discrimination  in  duties  was  a  favorite  means 
of  carrying  out  the  old  restrictive  policy,  this 
reciprocal  concession  of  equality  was  a  dis 
tinct  step  toward  a  different  system.  It  be 
came,  in  fact,  a  model  for  a  long  line  of  later  con 
ventions  by  which  the  nations  advanced  in  the 
path  of  commercial  freedom.  The  treaty  of 
1815  was  tentative  only,  being  limited  by  its 
terms  to  four  years.  It  was  renewed  for  ten 
years  by  the  treaty  of  1818,  and  later  was  re 
newed  indefinitely. 

It  is  not  to  be  gainsaid  that  the  motive  of 


42  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

the  powers  in  promoting  as  they  did  the  cause 
of  freedom  of  commerce  was  mainly  a  shrewd 
calculation  of  immediate  self-interest  rather 
than  any  devotion  to  an  abstract  ideal.  Equally 
beyond  question  is  it  that  the  ideals  that  per 
vaded  the  intellectual  atmosphere  of  the  day 
were  wholly  adverse  to  the  old  system.  After 
the  Napoleonic  storm  had  subsided,  doctrines 
that  had  played  a  large  part  in  producing  the 
French  Revolution,  but  had  been  driven  to 
cover  by  the  course  taken  by  that  convulsion, 
began  to  assume  prominence  in  England.  The 
economic  theories  of  Adam  Smith  and  the  legal 
and  political  dogmas  of  Jeremy  Bentham  won 
adherents  if  not  yet  respectability.  These  sys 
tems,  in  all  their  implications,  were  hostile  to 
the  existing  institutions  of  Great  Britain.  Un 
derlying  both  philosophies  was  the  concep 
tion  of  man  as  a  free  and  intelligent  being, 
working  out,  each  individual  for  himself,  the 
mode  and  content  of  his  welfare.  British  com 
merce  and  industry  were  based  upon  a  complex 
of  regulations  and  restrictions  designed  to  favor 
particular  kinds  of  business  and  special  classes 
of  people;  and  the  government  which  dis 
tributed  the  favor  was  itself  controlled  by  a 
particular  business  and  a  special  class  of  people. 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  43 

Between  the  two  political  parties,  Tory  and 
Whig,  the  only  important  difference  was  as  to 
what  interests  and  classes  should  be  preferred; 
neither  contemplated  a  political  or  economic 
system  in  which  preference  should  have  no 
place.  This  latter  idea  found  expression,  how 
ever,  through  the  radical  reformers  who  began 
about  1820  to  exert  a  perceptible  influence  on 
British  thought.  Between  that  date  and  1850 
a  far-reaching  transformation  was  effected  in 
economic  and  political  conditions,  chiefly  by 
the  Whigs.  Much  as  this  party  detested  the 
Radicals,  the  general  character  of  the  reforms 
that  it  effected  followed  the  lines  laid  out  by 
the  acute  reasoning  of  the  Benthamite  school — 
the  two  Mills,  Ricardo,  Grote,  Joseph  Hume, 
Austin,  and  Molesworth. 

In  America  the  conditions  which  the  British 
approached  as  far-distant  ideals  were  conspic 
uous  facts.  Within  the  vast  region  controlled 
by  the  United  States  commercial  and  industrial 
freedom  was  complete.  No  legal  barriers  re 
stricted  a  man's  choice  among  the  opportuni 
ties  for  self-betterment  that  beckoned  in  every 
direction.  Whether  he  devoted  his  energies  to 
farming  or  to  manufacturing  or  to  trade  was 
determined  solely  by  his  judgment  as  to  the 


44  READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR 

profit  to  be  expected;  and  what  he  should  raise 
on  his  farm,  what  he  should  make  in  his  work 
shop,  or  to  whom  he  should  sell  the  products 
of  his  labor,  was  a  question  to  be  settled  by 
no  different  criterion.  Politically,  the  freedom 
of  the  individual  was  only  less  complete.  Prop 
erty  qualifications  for  the  suffrage  and  for  hold 
ing  office  generally  prevailed,  but  were  of  con 
sequence  only  in  the  eastern  States.  In  the 
growing  West,  where  differences  of  wealth  were 
as  slight  and  rare  as  all  other  marks  of  social 
inequality,  distinctions  in  political  rights  were 
from  the  outset  unknown  in  fact  and  were  early 
banished  from  the  law. 

Thus  it  was  true  that  despite  the  enormous 
differences  between  the  two  great  societies  of 
English-speaking  people,  a  subtle  force  was 
operating  to  bring  them  together.  Every  step 
in  Great  Britain  toward  breaking  down  the 
ancient  system  of  privilege  and  restriction  was 
an  approach,  however  unintended,  toward  the 
democratic  ideal.  Every  step  in  the  United 
States  toward  national  consolidation  involved 
such  development  and  fostering  of  special  in 
terests,  however  reluctantly,  as  to  limit  per 
ceptibly  the  laissez-faire  individualism  of  the 
democratic  fact.  The  progress  of  the  two  na- 


READJUSTMENT  AFTER  WAR  45 

tions  in  the  indicated  directions  was  made  very 
manifest  in  the  history  of  their  internal  devel 
opment  during  the  decades  of  the  thirties  and 
the  forties. 


CHAPTER  II 
WHIG  REFORM  AND  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY 

THE  transition  to  the  full  tide  of  Whiggery 
in  Great  Britain  and  of  Jacksonianism  in  the 
United  States  was  marked  by  the  ascendancy 
respectively  of  George  Canning  and  John  Quincy 
Adams.  Canning  succeeded  Castlereagh  as  for 
eign  secretary  in  1822,  became  prime  minister 
in  1827,  and  after  a  few  months  died  in  that 
office.  Adams  was  secretary  of  state  under 
Monroe  for  eight  years,  1817-25,  and  was  Pres 
ident  from  1825  to  1829.  So  largely  was  the 
interest  of  both  these  statesmen  centred  on 
foreign  affairs  that  something  distinctive  in  the 
relations  of  the  two  powers  could  reasonably 
be  expected  at  this  time.  Nothing  novel  oc 
curred,  however,  in  connection  with  the  familiar 
subjects  of  debate:  the  right  of  search,  com 
merce,  navigation,  fisheries — all  remained  sub 
stantially  as  before.  Yet  the  distinctive  some 
thing  did  not  fail  to  appear.  In  1823  the  group 

of  policies  famous  collectively  and  individually 

46 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  47 

as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  promulgated  in 
the  President's  annual  message,  and  the  fact 
and  form  and  time  of  the  announcement  re 
flected  in  no  small  measure  the  influence  of  both 
Canning  and  Adams. 

Canning  did  not  like  the  American  democ 
racy.  The  attitude  of  the  Foreign  Office  after 
he  took  charge  was  significantly  different  from 
what  it  had  been  under  Castlereagh.  If  the 
latter  in  his  soul  felt  a  Tory  contempt  for  the 
Americans,  he  took  pains  to  keep  it  from  af 
fecting  his  diplomatic  intercourse  with  them. 
Canning  was  not  so  successful  in  this.  The 
truth  seems  to  be  that  Castlereagh  regarded  his 
policy  in  European  affairs  as  requiring  that 
America  be  kept  quiet  and  contented,  so  as  not 
to  interfere  with  the  progress  of  really  impor 
tant  matters.  To  him  the  great  American  Re 
public  gave  no  concern;  to  Canning  it  was  the 
object  of  distrust  and  fear.  Yet  Canning  did 
not  hesitate  to  make  the  United  States  an 
instrument  of  his  own  policy.  When  engaged 
in  the  operations  through  which,  as  he  elo 
quently  boasted,  he  "called  the  New  World 
into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the 
Old,"  he  sought  the  co-operation  of  the  Amer 
ican  Government.  President  Monroe's  mes- 


48  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

sage  of  1823  signified  to  a  certain  extent  the 
success  of  Canning's  advances.  Its  pronounce 
ments  as  a  whole,  however,  were  widely  at 
variance  with  the  British  secretary's  desires 
and  expectations,  and  caused  him  annoyance 
and  vexation  that  he  ultimately  took  no  pains 
to  conceal.  He  was  confirmed  in  his  feeling  of 
dislike  and  distrust  of  the  Americans  and  in 
his  foreboding  of  danger  from  their  rivalry  with 
British  interests  in  the  future. 

The  European  situation  that  produced  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  familiar  history.  A  revo 
lution  in  Spain  that  jeoparded  the  throne  and 
life  of  the  King  brought  military  intervention 
by  France,  supported  by  Russia,  Prussia,  and 
Austria.  The  Spanish  monarch  was  restored 
to  his  authority  at  home,  but  found  himself 
wholly  unable  to  regain  control  of  his  continen 
tal  colonies  in  America,  which  had  declared  and 
were  successfully  maintaining  their  independ 
ence.  Accordingly,  he  applied  to  the  powers 
that  had  assisted  him  for  like  assistance  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  The  British  Govern 
ment  had  refused  to  join  the  other  powers  in 
the  intervention  in  Spain,  and  had  viewed  with 
great  uneasiness  the  proceedings  of  the  French 
army.  Tories  were  unpleasantly  reminded  by 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  49 

the  situation  of  the  days  when  Napoleonic 
France  had  possession  of  Spain;  Whigs  and  the 
liberalizing  element  of  the  Tories  were  dis 
gusted  with  Bourbon  absolutism  wherever  it 
appeared.  British  commerce  with  the  insur 
gent  Spanish  colonies  was  much  harassed  by 
the  irregular  privateering  and  ineffective  block 
ades  through  which  the  Spaniards  maintained 
the  semblance,  with  but  little  of  the  substance, 
of  war.  This  commerce  had  attained  large  pro 
portions  and  all  its  advantages  would  be  lost  if 
Spanish  authority  should  be  restored;  for  Spain, 
like  Britain  herself,  regarded  colonial  trade  as  an 
exclusive  privilege  of  the  mother  country. 

Under  all  the  circumstances  Canning  was 
readily  able,  at  the  first  manifestation  of  a  proj 
ect  for  intervention  in  behalf  of  Spain  in  Amer 
ica,  to  gain  substantial  support  for  his  purpose 
to  thwart  it.  An  indication  of  interest  in  the 
general  subject  by  Rush,  the  minister  at  Lon 
don,  was  promptly  made  by  Canning  the  oc 
casion  of  a  suggestion  for  a  joint,  or  at  least  a 
simultaneous,  declaration  by  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  of  their  hostility  to  the  threat 
ened  intervention.  The  idea  was  received  with 
the  liveliest  interest  at  Washington  and  was  the 
subject  of  the  most  serious  consideration  by 


50  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

the  President,  the  cabinet,  and  even  Jefferson 
and  Madison,  whose  opinions  were  confidentially 
sought  by  Monroe.  Abundant  reasons  were 
perceived  for  refraining  from  formal  association 
with  Great  Britain  in  a  declaration  of  policy, 
but  the  wisdom  of  some  pronouncement  was 
not  questioned  by  any.  Accordingly,  the  fa 
miliar  paragraphs  were  inserted  in  the  Presi 
dent's  annual  message  to  Congress  in  December. 
After  a  general  expression  of  sympathy  with 
the  peoples  of  Europe  in  their  struggles  for  lib 
erty  and  happiness,  and  of  a  purpose,  never 
theless,  to  abstain  from  taking  part  in  any  wars 
there,  the  momentous  declaration  was  made: 

With  the  movements  in  this  hemisphere  we  are,  of 
necessity,  more  immediately  connected,  and  by  causes 
which  must  be  obvious  to  all  enlightened  and  impartial 
observers.  The  political  system  of  the  allied  powers  is 
essentially  different  in  this  respect  from  that  of  America. 
The  difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists  in  their 
respective  governments.  And  to  the  defence  of  our  own, 
which  has  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much  blood 
and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom  of  their  most 
enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which  we  have  enjoyed 
such  unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation  is  devoted. 
We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor,  and  to  the  amicable  re 
lations  existing  between  the  United  States  and  those 
powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  51 

the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European 
power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere. 
But  with  the  governments  who  have  declared  their  inde 
pendence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we 
have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles,  ac 
knowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the 
purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other 
manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  any 
other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly 
disposition  toward  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

...  It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  powers  should  ex 
tend  their  political  system  to  any  portion  of  either  con 
tinent  without  endangering  our  peace  and  happiness;  nor 
can  any  one  believe  that  our  southern  brethren,  if  left 
to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is 
equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such 
interposition,  in  any  form,  with  indifference. 


So  far  as  concerned  the  particular  subject 
that  evoked  these  paragraphs,  they  were  en 
tirely  efficacious.  No  possibility  was  left  of 
intervention  in  America  by  the  allied  powers. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  the  project  was  dead  before 
the  President  spoke;  for  Canning  had  secured 
assurances  from  the  French  Government  that 
it  would  not  take  part  in  the  proposed  action, 
and  without  French  aid  the  powers  would  be 
as  helpless  as  the  Spanish  King  himself.  This 
situation  was  not  known  outside  of  diplomatic 
circles  when  Monroe's  message  appeared.  In 
consequence,  the  public  announcement,  in  such 


52  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

uncompromising  terms,  of  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  appeared  very  decisive  and  made 
a  prodigious  sensation  both  at  home  and  abroad. 
That  so  weighty  a  judgment  on  a  question  of 
world  politics  should  emanate  from  Washington, 
satisfied  the  spirit  of  the  most  ardent  patriots 
in  America;  in  England  the  Whigs  and  Radicals 
rejoiced  at  the  alliance  of  the  two  English-speak 
ing  nations  for  the  defence  of  liberty  against 
the  despots  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  even  the 
Tories  found  something  to  approve  in  the  aid 
given  by  the  Americans  to  a  keen  stroke  of 
British  policy.  The  press  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  teemed  for  a  time  with  expressions  of 
amicable  feeling. 

Canning  accepted  with  complacency  the  flat 
tering  tributes  to  his  skill  and  astuteness  in 
bringing  America  to  the  aid  of  Britain.  He 
had,  however,  no  illusions  about  the  realities  of 
the  case.  He  perceived  at  first  sight,  in  the 
salving  ointment  of  Monroe's  message,  a  very 
unpleasant  and  dangerous  insect.  In  the  par 
agraphs  that  have  been  quoted  there  was,  he 
saw,  a  conspicuous  lack  of  care  to  discriminate 
precisely  among  the  "European  powers,"  so  as 
to  exclude  Great  Britain  from  the  warning 
addressed  to  them.  It  was  not  hard  to  read 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  53 

the  document  as  embodying  the  claim  that  the 
American  continents  were  to  be  reserved  for 
republican,  as  contrasted  with  monarchic,  in 
stitutions  —  a  reservation  that  would  shut  out 
George  IV  of  Great  Britain  as  effectively  as  it 
would  Ferdinand  VII  of  Spain.  In  another  part 
of  the  message,  moreover,  quite  unrelated  to 
that  which  dealt  with  the  matter  of  the  Euro 
pean  intervention  on  behalf  of  Spain,  a  pro 
nouncement  was  made  that  revealed  with 
distinctness  the  spirit  suspected  by  Canning. 
Apropos  of  negotiations  with  Russia  concern 
ing  the  respective  claims  to  the  Pacific  coast, 
this  passage  occurred : 

.  .  .  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting 
as  a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by 
the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  as 
sumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European 
powers. 

Here  again  was  a  warning  to  all  European  pow 
ers,  and  in  connection  with  a  matter — coloniza 
tion — that  was  a  specialty  of  Great  Britain. 
Canning  was  assured  that  the  reference  in  the 
passage  was  to  a  reported  project  of  Russia  for 
a  southward  extension  of  her  settlements  on 


54  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

the  Pacific  coast  of  America.  He  took  pains 
to  declare,  however,  that  his  government  did 
not  accept  the  principle  laid  down,  and  he 
emphasized  his  protest  by  withdrawing  from 
association  with  the  United  States  in  the  nego 
tiations  at  Saint  Petersburg  by  which  the  limit 
of  Russian  claims  in  America  was  fixed. 

Canning  was  right  in  restraining  his  enthu 
siasm  over  Monroe's  message.  It  was,  in  fact, 
the  pronunciamento  of  a  great  democracy  just 
arrived  at  aggressive  self-consciousness.  Its  un 
derlying  spirit  was  in  very  truth  antagonism, 
so  far  as  concerned  affairs  of  the  Western  Hemi 
sphere,  to  all  monarchic  Europe,  Great  Britain 
included.  The  significant  passages  in  the  doc 
ument  owed  their  phraseology,  in  great  part, 
to  John  Quincy  Adams;  and  he  has  left  on  rec 
ord  abundant  evidence  that  no  sentiment  of 
attachment  to  Great  Britain  would  ever  in 
fluence  him  to  except  her  from  the  sweep  of 
a  policy  devised  to  promote  the  interest  and 
glory  of  his  own  government.  Canning  in 
stinctively  resented  the  spirit  of  which  Adams 
was  the  particular  embodiment.  Hence  the 
marked  subsidence,  after  1823,  of  the  demon 
strative  warmth  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
of  that  year  temporarily  produced  between  the 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  55 

two  governments.  They  had  become  serious 
rivals  for  the  controlling  interest  in  American 
affairs. 

During  the  last  two  years  of  Canning's  life, 
1825-27,  the  diplomatic  situation  in  general  was 
very  unpleasant.  What  he  had  tried  most  dil 
igently  to  prevent,  when  he  summoned  the  New 
World  to  solve  the  problems  of  the  Old,  seemed 
near  to  realization,  namely,  the  confronting  of 
monarchic  Europe  by  a  solidly  republican  Amer 
ica.  The  establishment  of  monarchy  in  Brazil 
he  had  regarded  with  much  satisfaction,  and 
Iturbide's  imperial  enterprise  in  Mexico  seemed 
to  him  likely  to  provide  a  useful  counterpoise 
to  the  influence  of  the  United  States.  The 
melancholy  failure  of  Iturbide  confirmed  the 
disappointment  that  Monroe's  message  created. 
It  only  remained  to  oppose  at  every  point  the 
ambition  of  the  United  States,  and  to  be  un 
ceasingly  watchful  against  the  development  of 
her  claims.  In  a  familiar  letter  to  Bagot,  now 
ambassador  at  Saint  Petersburg,  of  July  29, 
1824,  Canning  urged  haste  in  concluding  with 
Russia  a  convention  assuring  to  Great  Britain 
the  right  of  navigation  in  Behring  Sea  and 
Straits.  " There  is  very  nice  'bobbing  for 
whale'  they  tell  me,  ipsis  Behringi  in  faucibus, 


56  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

which  must  be  guarded."  And  then  he  added, 
with  a  prophetic  vision  that  the  future  was  re 
markably  to  verify:  "We  shall  have  a  squabble 
with  the  Yankees  yet  in  and  about  these 
regions." 

The  most  explicit  revelation  of  Canning's 
feelings  and  policy  at  this  time  is  seen  in  a 
secret  despatch  to  Vaughan,  the  British  minister 
at  Washington,  recently  brought  to  light  by  Pro 
fessor  E.  D.  Adams.  It  is  dated  February  8, 
1826,  and  relates  to  certain  discussions  con 
cerning  Cuba. 

The  general  maxim  that  our  interest  and  those  of  the 
United  States  are  essentially  the  same,  etc.,  etc.,  is  one 
that  cannot  be  too  readily  admitted,  when  put  forward 
by  the  United  States. 

But  we  must  not  be  the  dupes  of  this  conventional  lan 
guage  of  courtesy. 

The  avowed  pretension  of  the  United  States  to  put 
themselves  at  the  head  of  the  confederacy  of  all  the 
Americas,  and  to  sway  that  confederacy  against  Europe, 
(Great  Britain  included),  is  not  a  pretension  identified 
with  our  interests,  or  one  that  we  can  countenance  as 
tolerable. 

It  is  however  a  pretension  which  there  is  no  use  in  con 
testing  in  the  abstract;  but  we  must  not  say  anything 
that  seems  to  admit  the  principle.1 

When  this  note  was  penned,  the  two  gov 
ernments  were  in  the  midst  of  a  long  and 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  November, 
1912,  p.  234. 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  57 

disagreeable  controversy  over  the  trade  with 
the  British-American  colonies.  Parliament,  en 
gaged  in  revising  the  Navigation  Laws,  opened 
the  colonial  ports  in  America  to  foreign  vessels 
on  certain  conditions  in  1825.  The  United 
States  refused  to  accept  the  conditions,  and 
took  ground,  both  through  the  Department  of 
State  and  in  Congress,  that  seemed  to  question 
the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  impose  restrictions 
at  her  discretion  on  commerce  in  her  own  col 
onies.  To  Canning  and  his  party  this  was  but 
another  exhibition  of  the  "forwardness,  not  to 
say  impudence, "  that  was  typical  of  the  Amer 
ican  policy,  especially  when  directed  by  Adams. 
It  was  met  therefore  by  an  open  and  unmis 
takable  snub.  An  Order  in  Council  closed  the 
West  Indian  ports  absolutely  to  American  ships. 
The  order  was  issued  while  Gallatin  was  on  his 
way  to  England,  for  the  special  purpose  of  set 
tling  by  negotiation  this  and  other  questions 
between  the  two  governments.  On  his  arrival 
he  was  met  by  a  flat  refusal  to  discuss  in 
any  way  the  matter  of  the  West  Indian  trade, 
and  was  left  entirely  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
reason  for  the  unexpected  attitude  of  the  gov 
ernment. 

Gallatin's    despatches    after    his    arrival,    in 


58  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

August,  1826,  indicate  very  well  the  impression 
made  by  the  Canning  administration. 

There  is  certainly  an  alteration  in  the  disposition  of 
this  government  since  the  year  1818,  when  I  was  here 
before.  Lord  Castlereagh  and  Mr.  Robinson  had  it  more 
at  heart  to  cherish  friendly  relations  than  Mr.  Canning 
and  Mr.  Huskisson.  The  difference  may,  however,  be 
in  the  times  rather  than  in  the  men.  Treated  in  general 
with  considerable  arrogance  till  the  last  war,  with  great 
attention,  if  not  respect,  during  the  years  that  followed  it, 
the  United  States  are  now  an  object  of  jealousy;  and  a 
policy  founded  on  that  feeling  has  been  avowed. 

This  was  written  to  Clay.  To  Adams  Gallatin 
wrote : 

...  it  is  impossible  for  me  not  to  see  and  feel  the  temper 
that  prevails  here  toward  us  ...  quite  changed  from 
what  it  was  in  1815-1821;  nearly  as  bad  as  before  the 
last  war,  only  they  hate  more  and  despise  less,  though 
they  still  affect  to  conceal  hatred  under  the  appearance 
of  contempt. 

This  diplomatic  irritation  did  not  penetrate 
deeply  into  the  national  tissues.  Its  cause  lay 
largely  in  the  personalities  of  Canning  and 
Adams.  Party  politics  on  both  sides  of  the 
ocean  contributed  somewhat  to  increase  and 
prolong  the  inflammation.  But  Canning  died 
in  August,  1827;  and  it  is  probably  more  than 
a  mere  coincidence  that  in  that  month  and  the 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  59 

following  no  less  than  three  conventions  were 
signed  for  the  provisional  settlement  of  ques 
tions  at  issue  between  the  two  governments. 
By  these  conventions  the  joint  occupation  of 
Oregon  and  the  commercial  treaty  of  1815  were 
renewed  indefinitely,  subject  to  abrogation  by 
either  party  on  twelve  months'  notice,  and  the 
northeastern  boundary  was  referred  to  arbitra 
tion.  The  West  India  trade  situation  was  thus 
left  the  sole  disturbing  feature  of  the  rela 
tions  between  the  governments.  It  played  a 
part  in  the  presidential  campaign  of  1828,  in 
which  Adams  failed  of  re-election.  The  suc 
ceeding  administration,  that  of  General  Jackson, 
with  Martin  Van  Buren  as  secretary  of  state, 
promptly  reversed  the  policy  of  the  United 
States,  dropped  the  contentions  that  Adams  had 
sustained,  and  came  to  an  agreement  with  Great 
Britain  on  her  own  terms.  In  the  autumn  of 
1830  commerce  between  the  United  States  and 
the  British  West  Indies,  with  some  limitations 
still  remaining,  was  reopened,  and  the  contro 
versy  over  the  subject  ceased  to  trouble  the 
intercourse  of  the  governments. 

Pending  the  final  disposition  of  this  question 
the  long  domination  of  the  Tory  party  in  Great 
Britain  came  to  an  end.  Incompatibilities  of. 


60  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

personality  and  principles  between  Canning 
and  his  friends  on  one  side  and  the  ultra-Tory 
element  led  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  on 
the  other,  hastened  this  event.  In  1830  the 
Whigs,  headed  by  Earl  Grey,  assumed  the 
reins  of  power  and  entered  upon  a  famous  era 
of  internal  reform.  Domestic  politics  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  assumed  an  absorbing  im 
portance,  and  the  diplomatic  relations  became 
cordially  calm. 

The  far-reaching  transformation,  industrial, 
social,  and  political,  that  marked  the  decade 
of  the  thirties  in  the  United  Kingdom  had  its 
culmination  rather  than  its  inception  under 
the  regime  of  the  Whigs.  The  forces  making 
for  change  became  very  manifest  immediately 
upon  the  restoration  of  peace  in  1815.  A  sud 
den  shift  from  the  condition  of  general  European 
war  to  that  of  universal  peace  was  necessarily 
accompanied  by  a  vast  displacement  and  read 
justment  in  the  field  of  trade  and  industry. 
British  commerce  and  manufactures  had  flour 
ished  greatly  during  the  war,  thanks  to  the 
immunity  of  the  United  Kingdom  from  the  rav 
ages  of  contending  armies,  and  to  her  unques 
tioned  control  of  the  sea.  With  peace  the 
peoples  of  the  Continent  resumed  their  normal 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  61 

productive  activities  and  British  trade  heavily 
declined.  Prices  fell;  complications  in  the  cur 
rency,  due  to  the  suspension  of  specie  payments, 
aggravated  the  troubles;  bad  harvests  recurred 
at  unfortunate  intervals;  and  the  great  change 
in  progress  in  the  methods  of  manufacturing, 
owing  to  the  introduction  of  machinery,  con 
tributed  in  its  turn  a  quota  of  evil.  The  gen 
eral  result  was  unsettlement,  discontent,  and 
from  time  to  time  severe  distress  among  the 
working  classes,  both  agricultural  and  indus 
trial.  Into  the  field  thus  well  prepared  came 
agitators  of  the  political  type,  Radicals,  preach 
ing  the  doctrines  of  the  French  and  Americans, 
and  demanding  universal  suffrage,  voting  by 
ballot,  and  other  reforms  of  a  sort  to  shock  the 
Tories  beyond  expression. 

To  the  governing  classes  these  popular  move 
ments  were  but  a  manifestation  of  the  subver 
sive  spirit  that  had  animated  the  French  Revo 
lution  and  was  still  troubling  the  Continental 
rulers.  In  1819,  after  a  fatal  conflict  between 
the  people  and  the  military  at  Manchester, 
Parliament  enacted  the  "Six  Acts,"  which  im 
posed  severe  restrictions  on  the  press  and  on 
the  holding  of  public  meetings.  These  were 
the  methods  of  suppressing  political  opposition 


62  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

that  were  in  use  on  the  Continent,  and  they 
were  felt  by  the  less  reactionary  element  in 
Great  Britain  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  tra 
ditions  of  English  liberty.  Whether  because  of 
the  odium  thus  incurred,  or  because  of  their  very 
effectiveness  itself,  the  Six  Acts  marked  prac 
tically  the  culmination  of  the  policy  of  aggres 
sive  severity  against  the  Radical  agitation. 
It  became  increasingly  clear  to  Whigs  and  lib 
eral  Tories  alike  that  the  recurring  popular  dis 
turbances  were,  due  quite  as  much  to  deep- 
lying  economic  causes  as  to  the  mere  idealism 
and  ambition  of  visionaries  and  Radicals.  The 
advent  of  Canning  to  the  position  of  chief  in 
fluence  in  the  government  in  1822  contributed 
to  the  change  in  the  trend  of  official  feeling. 
Under  Castlereagh's  dominance  the  cordiality 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  allied  monarchs 
of  the  Continent  in  foreign  policy  promoted  a 
correspondence  in  domestic  policy.  Canning's 
spectacular  and  defiant  break  with  the  powers, 
and  his  open  support  of  insurgents  in  Europe 
and  in  America,  gave  inspiration  and  hope  to 
those  who  were  looking  for  extensive,  if  not 
technically  Radical,  changes  in  ancient  British 
institutions. 

The  anticipated  process  of  reform  promptly 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  63 

made  its  appearance.  Huskisson,  brought  by 
Canning  to  the  presidency  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  was  deeply  imbued  with  the  doctrines 
of  Adam  Smith  as  to  keeping  the  hands  of  the 
government  off  commerce  and  industry.  The 
ancient  restrictions  through  which  business  was 
parcelled  out  among  particular  groups  and  se 
cured  to  them  at  all  hazards,  were  incompat 
ible  with  Huskisson's  principles  and  were,  more 
over,  at  present  working  to  the  disadvantage  of 
the  favored  classes  and  producing  the  disturb 
ances  that  were  so  significant  signs  of  the  times. 
First,  the  shipping  industry  received  Huskisson's 
attention.  The  Navigation  Laws  had  for  a  cen 
tury  and  a  half  given  monopolistic  protection 
to  British  merchant-vessels  and  had  secured 
for  them  a  clear  control  of  the  carrying  trade 
of  the  world.  The  United  States  was  now 
contesting  that  control  and  was  using  in  the 
competition  the  same  methods  by  which  Great 
Britain  had  secured  it,  namely,  a  monopolistic 
protection  of  American  shipping  against  all 
foreign  rivals.  Parliament  dropped  in  1823 
the  rigidity  of  the  old  policy  by  authorizing  the 
government  to  suspend  the  application  of  the 
laws  through  agreements  with  other  govern 
ments  for  reciprocal  advantages.  This  was  the 


64  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

beginning  of  the  end  of  the  old  system.  A 
quarter  of  a  century  elapsed  before  the  final 
step  was  taken  that  opened  the  ports  of  Great 
Britain  without  restriction  to  the  shipping  of 
all  the  world. 

In  the  next  two  years  laws  were  passed  giving 
recognition  to  the  new  conditions  in  manufac 
turing  that  the  industrial  revolution  had  brought 
into  prominence.  Labor  troubles  in  the  mod 
ern  sense,  contests  over  wages  between  factory- 
owners  and  employees,  had  become  a  conspic 
uous  element  in  the  popular  agitations  of  the 
time.  Under  the  ancient  legal  system  the  em 
ployers  had  every  advantage  in  the  chronic 
struggle.  Great  as  was  the  fear  in  Parliament  of 
the  working  classes,  it  gave  way  before  clear 
evidence  that  the  law  imposed  upon  them 
something  near  to  the  lot  of  the  slave.  To 
help  himself  was  a  right  that  the  spirit  of  the 
day  regarded  as  inherent  in  every  British  free 
man.  Hence  the  old  statutes  were  repealed 
which  prohibited  meetings  and  associations  of 
workmen  for  getting  increase  of  wages,  and 
even  forbade  artisans  absolutely  to  leave  the 
country. 

The  progress  of  this  reforming  legislation 
was  followed  with  deep  concern  and  covert  hos- 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  65 

tility  by  the  extreme  Tories.  It  did  not  so 
directly  affect  the  ruling  aristocracy  as  a  whole, 
however,  as  to  excite  a  decisive  opposition. 
Quite  otherwise  was  the  case  with  the  Corn 
Law,  on  which  the  rents  of  the  landowners 
were  believed  absolutely  to  depend.  Protec 
tion  to  the  domestic  grain-growers  was  by  this 
legislation  ingeniously  complete.  Duties  on  im 
ported  grain  varied  with  the  price  in  England; 
importation  was  prohibited  so  long  as  the  price 
was  under  a  maximum  figure;  and  exportation 
was  stimulated  by  bounties  when  the  price  fell 
below  a  minimum  figure.  Despite  the  guar 
antee  thus  apparently  established  that  Great 
Britain  should  produce  the  food  for  her  own 
people  at  a  fair  and  steady  cost,  there  was 
continual  friction  over  the  matter.  Prices 
fluctuated  disastrously  with  variations  of  the 
weather,  and  were  never  low  enough  for  the 
consumers  or  high  enough  for  the  farmers  and 
the  landlords.  Parliament  was  called  upon 
repeatedly  to  consider  exceptional  modifica 
tions  of  the  system,  in  order  to  check  distress 
among  the  farmers  or  the  working  classes.  De 
mands  became  frequent  and  loud  for  a  radical 
change  that  should  do  away  with  the  high  pro 
tection  to  grain-growers;  but  here  the  aristo- 


66  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

cratic  landed  interest  by  which  both  parties 
were  controlled  stood  firm  and  unyielding. 
The  Corn  Law  was  to  prove  the  last  strong 
hold  of  the  old  system  to  be  carried  by  the  ris 
ing  middle-class  industrial  interest.  After  the 
death  of  Canning  in  1827  his  powerful  patronage 
was  seen  to  have  been  indispensable  to  the  re 
forming  projects  of  Huskisson;  for  there  soon 
came  open  rupture  between  the  Canningites 
and  the  ultra-Tories  headed  by  the  Duke  of 
Wellington.  Differences  about  the  Corn  Law 
had  much  to  do  with  this  dissension,  though 
two  other  subjects  took  precedence  in  practical 
consideration  when  the  reforming  influence  got 
the  upper  hand. 

The  first  of  these  subjects  was  Catholic  eman 
cipation.  In  1829  the  general  disqualification  of 
Catholics  for  holding  office  or  sitting  in  Parlia 
ment  was  finally  removed.  This  action  had 
long  been  sought  by  enlightened  statesmen, 
and  had  failed  of  realization  in  law  only  through 
the  dogged  resistance  of  royalty  itself.  The 
relief  act  of  1829  was  significant  less  from  its 
content  than  from  the  means  through  which  its 
passage,  despite  the  sullen  opposition  of  the 
King  and  a  few  bigoted  advisers,  was  made 
unavoidable.  Daniel  O'Connell,  between  1823 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  67 

and  1829,  made  Catholic  Ireland  self-conscious 
and  strong  enough  to  paralyze  entirely  the 
authority  of  the  legal  government.  He  did 
this  without  bloodshed  and  without  giving  a 
chance  to  his  adversaries  to  use  against  him 
with  any  success  the  processes  of  the  ordinary 
law  or  to  find  ground  for  resort  to  exceptional 
measures.  His  method  was  agitation,  of  a 
species  so  astutely  controlled  and  regulated  as 
to  make  the  maximum  impression  with  the 
minimum  opportunity  for  lawlessness.  The 
feature  of  his  triumph  that  caused  the  deepest 
alarm  in  the  ruling  class  was  the  severance  of 
the  Irish  tenantry  from  almost  slavish  depend 
ence  on  their  landlords.  The  creation  thus  of 
an  independent  spirit  in  the  mass  of  the  Irish 
population  was  destined  to  produce  most  revo 
lutionary  results  in  the  long  run  on  the  relations 
between  England  and  Ireland;  its  immediate 
influence  on  the  political  movements  in  Great 
Britain  was  of  the  utmost  concern  to  the  class 
that  was  opposing  the  onward  sweep  of  reform. 
The  removal  of  disabilities  from  the  Catholics 
was  effected  while  the  Tory  cabinet  of  Welling 
ton  and  Peel  was  still  in  power.  A  year  later, 
in  1830,  the  Whigs,  led  by  Earl  Grey  and 
Brougham,  came  into  control  for  the  first  time 


68  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

in  a  quarter  of  a  century,  and  at  once  opened 
the  famous  struggle  for  Parliamentary  reform. 
The  demand  for  this  reform  received  a  great 
impulse  from  the  revolutionary  wave  that  swept 
over  the  Continent,  and  the  popular  agitation 
in  Great  Britain,  reflecting  the  methods  of 
O'Connell's  late  operations  in  Ireland,  assumed 
a  very  threatening  aspect.  The  Tories  fought 
with  dogged  energy  to  retain  the  ancient  power 
and  privilege  of  the  landed  interest.  Two  years 
of  violent  political  strife  resulted,  however,  in 
the  enactment  of  the  reform.  Through  its  pro 
visions  the  House  of  Commons  ceased  to  be 
under  the  control  of  the  landed  aristocracy  and 
became  fairly  representative  of  the  industrial 
class  that  was  assuming  such  importance  in  the 
growing  towns.  The  apportionment  of  seats 
among  the  constituencies  was  based  in  some 
measure  upon  the  number  of  the  population, 
thus  recognizing  a  principle  that  was  dear  to 
the  democratic  reformer.  Moreover,  while  the 
landed  aristocracy  still  retained  its  control  of 
the  House  of  Lords,  the  passage  of  the  Reform 
Bill  had  finally  been  effected  by  a  proceeding 
that  showed  how,  in  a  contest  between  the  two 
houses,  the  Commons  could  constitutionally 
carry  the  day. 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  69 

The  Parliamentary  reform  of  1832  did  not 
make  Great  Britain  a  democracy,  but  it  put 
in  a  very  clear  light  a  trend  of  social  and  polit 
ical  progress  that  must  narrow  the  distance 
between  the  British  and  the  American  systems. 
All  the  reforming  movements  that  have  been 
noticed  promoted  liberty,  in  the  sense  of  re 
moving  from  some  class  of  the  population  re 
strictions  which,  however  valuable  at  one  time, 
had  lost  their  utility.  In  the  United  States  the 
restrictions  had  never  existed,  because  they 
had  never  been  useful;  and  for  that  reason  and 
in  the  sense  suggested  America  had  led  Great 
Britain  in  respect  to  liberty.  The  era  of  the 
Reform  Act  was  signalized  by  the  appearance 
of  political  practices  that  were  new  and  terrify 
ing  in  England.  Associations  for  partisan  agi 
tation  among  the  townspeople  were  larger, 
wealthier,  and  better  organized  than  had  ever 
been  the  case  before.  Both  leaders  and  follow 
ers  in  these  political  unions  displayed  a  high 
degree  of  genuine  skill  in  the  game  of  politics 
and  beat  the  aristocracy  in  the  field  where  it 
claimed  to  be  alone  qualified  to  appear.  The 
repressive  legislation  of  1819  was  no  longer  in 
effect,  so  far  as  its  most  rigorous  features  were 
concerned,  and  the  British  people  enjoyed  in 


70  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

far  larger  measure  than  any  other  European 
nation  the  liberty  to  organize  and  assemble 
for  peaceful  discussion  and  to  express  opinions 
in  speech  or  print.  Popular  sentiment  was 
readily  articulate.  Doctrines  much  too  radi 
cal  for  the  possibility  of  adoption  were  never 
theless  freely  canvassed.  The  periodical  press 
was  expanded  and  cheapened  to  correspond  to 
the  widening  of  political  interest  and  intelli 
gence.  In  all  these  conditions  there  was  a 
fundamental  bond  of  sympathy  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  The  progress 
ive  Radicals  in  England  were  conscious  of  this, 
and  systematically  adduced  American  examples 
in  support  of  their  demands  for  reforms.  Across 
the  Atlantic  the  Americans,  so  far  as  they  were 
informed  of  British  conditions,  threw  their  sym 
pathy  with  the  Radicals.  The  Whig  species 
of  reform  aroused  but  a  qualified  enthusiasm 
in  the  United  States.  It  was  Whig  reform,  how 
ever,  that  was  alone  destined  to  be  practically 
feasible  in  Great  Britain  for  many  decades  to 
come. 

After  1832  the  reformed  Parliament,  under 
Whig  control,  continued  the  process  of  remov 
ing  inveterate  abuses.  With  many  of  its  great 
est  measures,  such  as  Poor-Law  reform  and  the 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  71 

rationalizing  of  municipal  government,  our  con 
cern  is  too  slight  for  more  than  passing  men 
tion.  Other  legislation,  however,  had  a  defi 
nite  bearing  on  relations  with  the  United  States. 
In  1833  an  act  was  passed  abolishing  slavery 
in  the  British  West  Indies,  by  a  process  that 
became  actually  complete  five  years  later.  In 
1835  the  ancient  methods  of  impressment  in 
recruiting  for  the  navy  were  practically  ended 
by  legislation  regulating  the  procedure  and  at 
the  same  time  encouraging  voluntary  enlist 
ment  by  bounties  and  pensions. 

The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  West  In 
dian  colonies  marked  the  triumph  of  a  long 
agitation,  begun  by  Wilberforce  and  continued 
by  the  Quakers  and  Buxton.  The  African  slave- 
trade  had  been  prohibited  by  Parliament,  largely 
through  Wilberforce's  efforts,  as  early  as  1807, 
only  a  year  before  a  like  prohibition  was  enacted 
by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  British 
and  American  vessels  were  thus  excluded  from 
a  very  lucrative  business,  but  the  humanitarian 
purpose  of  the  legislation  was  not  in  any  large 
measure  achieved,  for  the  trade  continued  to 
flourish.  Under  the  continuous  pressure  of  the 
Abolitionists  the  British  Government  sought 
to  arrange  by  treaty  for  the  co-operation  of 


72  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

other  governments  in  suppressing  the  traffic. 
The  subject  was  repeatedly  brought  up  in  con 
ference  with  the  representatives  of  the  United 
States,  and  a  treaty  was  actually  agreed  to  in 
1824,  but  failed  through  the  unwillingness  of 
Great  Britain  to  accept  amendments  made  by 
the  Senate.  The  difference  between  the  two 
governments  over  the  right  of  visitation  and 
search  was  the  real  cause  of  the  failure.  It  was 
clear  that  the  slave-trade  could  never  be  ex 
tinguished  save  by  some  arrangement  for  an 
international  patrol  of  the  coasts  and  seas  where 
the  traffic  was  carried  on.  Such  arrangement 
would  necessarily  involve  the  examination  by 
a  war-ship  of  suspected  vessels  flying  colors 
other  than  those  of  the  overhauling  cruiser. 
A  reciprocal  authorization  of  such  procedure 
as  between  American  and  British  cruisers  the 
United  States  would  never  consent  to;  since 
it  was  held  to  admit  the  right  of  a  British  cap 
tain  to  search  a  ship  bearing  the  American  flag, 
and  this  the  United  States  was  firm  in  its  reso 
lution  never  to  concede.  The  British  were 
equally  tenacious  in  opposing  any  kind  of  ar 
rangement  that  might  be  construed  as  an  aban 
donment  of  the  right. 
The  long-standing  tension  over  the  right  of 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  73 

search  thus  prevented  the  two  great  English- 
speaking  peoples  from  uniting  for  the  effective 
suppression  of  a  business  that  was  admitted  by 
both  to  be  a  scandal  to  civilization.  Nor  was 
the  situation  improved  when  Parliament  enacted 
the  laws  that  practically  put  an  end  to  impress 
ment,  of  which  the  right  of  search  was  an  inci 
dent.  Nothing  in  this  legislation  formally  abol 
ished  the  old  system  of  recruiting,  and  the 
Foreign  Office  remained  as  tenacious  of  the  claim 
to  take  British  sailors  from  foreign  ships  as  Par 
liament  was  of  the  undoubted  right  to  take 
them  by  force  wherever  the  royal  jurisdiction 
extended.  Whatever  the  era  of  reform  effected 
in  respect  to  the  practice,  the  time  had  not  yet 
come  when  the  theory  of  personal  liberty  for 
Britons  would  extend  to  that  class  on  whose 
service  the  safety  of  the  empire  was  believed  to 
be  in  a  special  way  dependent. 

Conditions  in  the  United  States  also  contrib 
uted  to  prevent  the  harmony  of  the  gov 
ernments  in  respect  to  the  slave-trade.  The 
slaveholding  interest,  concentrated  in  the  cot 
ton-growing  States,  became  a  powerful  factor 
in  politics  during  the  twenties  and  thirties. 
Though  there  was  no  important  sentiment  in 
favor  of  the  African  slave-trade,  there  was  al- 


74  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

ways  a  base  and  lawless  element  in  the  South 
ern  population  who  were  ready  to  take  part  in 
the  illicit  operations  through  which  small  num 
bers  of  negroes  were  often  introduced.  In  1820 
a  violent  political  contest  arose  in  Congress 
over  an  issue  of  internal  policy  respecting 
slavery,  and  thenceforth  the  Southern  politi 
cians  were  very  sensitive  to  any  movements 
affecting  the  institution.  Abolitionism  of  a 
vehement  type  made  its  appearance  in  the 
North  in  the  early  thirties,  almost  simultane 
ously  with  a  barbarous  insurrection  of  slaves 
in  Virginia.  The  two  events  combined  to  cause 
deep  alarm  in  the  South,  and  the  feeling  made 
the  discussion  of  any  phase  of  the  slavery  ques 
tion  highly  inexpedient  to  politicians.  Then 
came  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  of  the 
British  West  Indies.  This  action,  hailed  with 
joy  by  the  Abolitionists,  confirmed  the  uneasi 
ness  in  the  Southern  States  of  the  Union.  Re 
sentment  toward  the  British  was  increased  by 
a  series  of  cases  in  which  the  colonial  authorities 
of  the  Bahamas  and  the  Bermudas  forcibly 
liberated  the  slaves  who  happened  to  be  on 
American  coasting  vessels  that  came  within 
British  jurisdiction  through  stress  of  weather, 
wreck,  and  mutiny.  That  the  feeling  aroused 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  75 

by  these  various  occurrences  had  an  influence 
in  making  futile  the  efforts  to  agree  concern 
ing  the  slave-trade  cannot  be  doubted;  yet 
the  difference  as  to  the  right  of  search  on  the 
high  seas  was  the  vital  cause  of  failure. 

The  growth  and  self-consciousness  of  the 
slaveholding  interest  in  the  United  States  had 
a  close  relation  to  other  phases  of  the  develop 
ment  of  the  American  democracy.  I  have  said 
above  that  in  the  Jacksonian  era  there  was  a 
narrowing  of  the  interval  which  separated  the 
American  from  the  British  ideals  of  social  struc 
ture  and  policy.  In  Great  Britain  the  trend 
was  steadily,  as  has  been  noted,  toward  removal 
of  the  restrictions  that  sustained  established  in 
terests  and  privileges.  In  the  United  States, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  pronounced  movement 
appeared  toward  the  creation  of  similar  restric 
tions.  The  powers  of  the  general  government 
had  already  been  devoted,  through  diplomacy 
and  legislation,  to  vigorous  efforts  for  the  pro 
tection  and  promotion  of  foreign  trade  and  the 
mercantile  marine.  During  the  twenties  a  sys 
tematic  agitation  was  begun  for  a  like  degree  of 
governmental  activity  in  behalf  of  the  nascent 
manufactures  of  the  Union.  Henry  Clay,  a 
statesman  of  extraordinary  popularity,  led  this 


76  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

movement  on  its  political  side,  and  sustained  it 
by  fervent  appeals  for  an  "American  system" 
that  should  make  the  United  States  in  all  re 
spects  economically  self-sufficient,  and  independ 
ent  of  foreign,  especially  British,  producers. 
The  result  was  tariff  legislation,  culminating 
in  1828,  by  which  heavy  protective  duties  were 
imposed  on  textiles,  iron,  and  other  leading  com 
modities. 

Protectionism  of  this  species  was  not  destined, 
however,  to  be  permanent.  Accepted  with  much 
misgiving  in  the  North  and  West,  it  aroused 
violent  hostility  in  the  slaveholding  States  of 
the  South.  Their  sole  commercial  product  was 
cotton,  and  three-fourths  of  the  crop  was  ex 
ported,  mostly  to  Great  Britain.  To  them, 
therefore,  the  high  tariff  meant  only  a  disas 
trous  increase  of  taxation,  for  the  benefit  of 
the  manufacturers  of  the  North.  A  bitter  op 
position  to  the  new  system  was  carried  on  by 
the  State  of  South  Carolina,  involving  serious 
threats  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  The 
policy  that  was  proclaimed  as  necessary  to  the 
free  life  and  full  development  of  the  republic 
thus  proved  fraught  with  peril  to  its  very  exist 
ence.  Clay  himself  bowed  before  the  storm 
that  he  had  evoked,  and  took  the  lead  in  legis- 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  77 

lation  through  which,  by  stages  beginning  in 
1833,  the  tariff  was  so  reduced  that  the  protect 
ive  features  entirely  disappeared.  The  slave 
holders  whose  system  exemplified  the  extreme 
of  curtailment  of  personal  liberty  thus  proved 
the  successful  champions  of  a  policy  that  in 
sured  the  fullest  freedom  in  respect  to  property. 
The  failure  of  protectionism  was  a  feature  of 
the  era  of  Andrew  Jackson.  It  is  with  good 
reason  that  this  President's  name  has  become 
descriptive  of  a  period  of  American  history. 
Jacksonian  democracy  designates  a  psycholog 
ical  phase  in  the  growth  of  the  republic.  It  was 
the  phase  in  which  a  people  became  fully  aware 
of  its  freedom,  unity,  and  power,  and  began  to 
strive,  with  pathetically  crude  and  ineffective 
means,  to  make  a  useful  application  of  these 
qualities.  Jackson  was  the  first  President  from 
west  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains.  With  him 
began  the  conspicuous  influence  of  the  Missis 
sippi  valley  in  the  American  Government.  That 
vast  region  was  by  1830  making  great  strides 
in  population  and  prosperity.  Steam  trans 
portation  on  its  innumerable  rivers  and  lakes 
gave  a  great  stimulus  to  settlement  and  trade. 
The  social  type  still  remained,  however,  that  of 
the  frontier,  slightly  refined,  and  this  was  the 


78  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

type  that  Jackson  exemplified  and  impressed 
upon  the  nation  as  a  whole.  Abounding  phys 
ical  vigor,  courage,  self-confidence,  resourceful 
ness,  fervid  patriotism,  Mosaic  morality  with 
a  primitive  interpretation,  a  narrow  intellec 
tual  horizon — these  were  the  characteristics  that 
were  predominant.  The  problems  of  social  life 
in  the  simple  conditions  that  generally  pre 
vailed  were  readily  enough  solved  by  a  people 
of  this  type.  Where  circumstances  called  for 
the  settlement  of  questions  of  some  complexity, 
such  as  the  growth  of  the  nation  brought  to  the 
front,  the  popular  feeling  was  often  that  of 
irritability  and  suspicion  toward  those  who  pro 
fessed  to  be  able  to  furnish  answers  on  the  basis 
of  a  scientific  knowledge  that  was  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  average  man. 

This  democratic  distrust  of  the  expert  played 
a  large  part  in  the  conflict  between  President 
Jackson  and  the  United  States  Bank,  a  conflict 
that  most  clearly  exhibited  the  tendencies  of  the 
times.  The  bank  was  chartered  by  Congress 
and  had  since  1816  served  a  useful  purpose  as 
an  agency  for  the  fiscal  operations  of  the  treas 
ury  and  also  for  providing  a  currency  by  its 
note  issues.  Jackson  formed  the  opinion  that 
the  bank  was  a  dangerous  institution,  of  a  mon- 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  79 

opolistic  character  and  repugnant  to  the  Con 
stitution  and  to  sound  public  policy.  On  the 
question  of  renewing  its  charter  the  financial 
and  commercial  interests  of  the  nation  rallied 
strongly  to  the  support  of  the  bank  and  were 
sustained  by  a  majority  in  Congress.  The  Presi 
dent  was  able,  however,  after  a  spectacular 
struggle,  to  defeat  the  renewal  and  to  destroy 
the  bank.  His  economic  reasoning  was  crude 
and  primitive,  but  his  appeal  to  the  people 
against  the  moneyed  class  that  he  said  was 
oppressing  them  struck  a  responsive  chord, 
especially  in  his  native  West.  In  a  campaign 
that  was  fought  chiefly  on  the  issue  of  the  bank 
Jackson  was  re-elected  in  triumph  to  the  presi 
dency.  In  popular  estimation  his  patriotic  serv 
ice  in  destroying  the  bank  took  rank  with  that 
performed  when,  as  was  commonly  believed,  he 
saved  his  country  from  the  yoke  of  the  British 
by  the  victory  at  New  Orleans. 

The  democratic  trend  in  the  political  opera 
tions  of  the  Jacksonian  era  might  be  traced  in 
many  phases  of  public  life.  One  only  may  be 
referred  to  here.  It  was  in  Jackson's  time  that 
the  so-called  "spoils  system,"  not  unknown  to 
the  practice  of  the  politicians  before,  became 
openly  and  on  principle  employed  in  manning 


8o  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

the  civil  service  of  the  National  Government. 
Many  influences  united,  of  course,  in  producing 
this  result.  What  never  failed  to  win  support 
for  the  system,  however,  was  the  contention 
that  it  was  democratic — that  it  was  based  on 
the  idea  that  where  equality  was  the  order  of 
the  day  there  must  be  no  permanent  tenure, 
no  monopoly,  in  the  service  of  the  people,  but 
every  individual  must  be  presumed  equally 
qualified  for  the  service,  every  one  must  have 
the  chance  in  rotation  to  perform  the  duties  of 
office.  Just  as  the  business  of  banking  was  to 
be  open  to  all  without  restriction,  so  the  offices 
of  the  government  must  be  open  to  all.  And 
no  safer  test  was  available  of  the  people's  will 
as  to  the  tenant  of  appointive  office  at  any  par 
ticular  time  than  the  result  of  a  contest  for 
the  great  elective  offices.  The  voice  of  the 
successful  party  was  the  voice  of  the  people, 
and  the  choice  of  the  party  leader  was  the 
sufficient  index  in  any  particular  case  of  the 
party's  wish  as  to  the  tenant  of  an  office.  In 
vain  was  it  pointed  out  by  the  well-informed 
that  patronage  of  this  type  was  a  conspicuous 
feature  of  the  British  governmental  system  and 
a  mainstay  of  aristocratic  ascendancy.  Amer 
ican  public  opinion  was  incredulous  or  un- 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  81 

daunted  before  this  argument,  and  sustained 
the  spoils  system  without  flinching  in  the  face 
of  the  evils  that  it  increasingly  involved. 

The  era  of  Jacksonism  in  America  and  Whig 
reform  in  Great  Britain  was  marked  by  a  sig 
nificant  change  in  the  character  and  extent  of 
the  information  about  the  republic  that  was 
embodied  in  the  British  literature  of  the  day. 
For  a  decade  and  more  after  the  Treaty  of  Ghent 
Tory  sentiment  had  predominated  in  both  trav 
ellers'  books1  and  the  periodical  press  whenever 
the  United  States  was  the  subject  of  discus 
sion.  Radicals,  humanitarians,  agriculturists, 
interested  in  the  conditions  among  the  com 
mon  people,  found  somewhat  to  commend  in 
the  bounty  of  nature  and  the  material  comfort 
and  prosperity  of  man.  Social,  intellectual,  and 
spiritual  conditions  generally  impressed  the 
Briton  as  repulsive  and  intolerable.  Politics 
and  government,  so  far  as  they  were  at  all  in 
telligible,  seemed  unbalanced,  incoherent,  and 
corrupt.  These  views  of  the  United  States 
were  systematically  and  repeatedly  set  forth, 
with  all  the  effect  of  skilled  literary  massing  and 
polish,  in  the  great  Tory  organ  of  the  day,  the 
Quarterly  Review.  Its  distinguished  Whig  rival, 


the  valuable  article  by  E.  D.  Adams,  "The  British  Traveler  in 
America,"  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  June,  1914. 


82  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

the  Edinburgh  Review,  was  less  harsh  in  judg 
ment  on  things  social  and  political,  but,  be 
cause  of  its  patronizing  irony,  not  less  offensive 
to  the  Americans.  In  1820  Sydney  Smith  pub 
lished  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  his  famous  series 
of  questions  concerning  the  culture  of  Jonathan 
as  compared  with  that  of  John:  "In  the  four 
quarters  of  the  globe,  who  reads  an  American 
book?  or  goes  to  an  American  play?  or  looks  at 
an  American  picture  or  statue?  .  .  .  Finally, 
under  which  of  the  old  tyrannical  governments 
of  Europe  is  every  sixth  man  a  slave,  whom  his 
fellow  creatures  may  buy  and  sell  and  torture?" 
The  North  American  Review  and  other  pub 
lications  took  up  the  cudgels  for  the  Americans 
with  spirit,  and  a  wordy  warfare  raged  through 
many  years.  By  the  judicious  the  controversy 
was  deprecated;  for  it  obviously  stirred  up  ill 
feeling  and  misunderstandings  on  both  sides 
of  the  ocean.  The  great  British  reviews  were 
regularly  reprinted  in  the  United  States,  and 
though  their  circulation  was  small  and  confined 
chiefly  to  the  towns  of  the  seaboard,  all  criti 
cism  of  the  Americans  was  diligently  reproduced 
in  the  local  periodicals,  and  the  exasperation 
was  spread  to  the  remotest  regions  of  the  Union. 
In  Great  Britain  the  influence  of  the  quarterlies 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  83 

was  chiefly  with  the  ruling  class;  but  here  again 
their  ideas  penetrated  to  the  lower  social  strata, 
especially  through  the  clergy,  and  confirmed  the 
impression  that  the  Americans  were  an  anarchic, 
godless,  brutal  crew.  In  many  cases  the  deter 
rent  effect  of  such  impression  was  welcomed  by 
authorities  of  church  and  state  whose  charges 
sought  to  escape  the  misery  of  recurrent  agri 
cultural  distress  by  emigration.  Piety  and 
patriotism  both  required  that  the  emigrant 
should  seek  a  home  on  British  rather  than 
American  soil — should  turn  to  the  Canadas  and 
avoid  the  United  States. 

After  the  accession  of  the  Whigs  to  power, 
and  while  their  reforms  were  in  progress,  British 
literary  judgments  about  America  began  to 
reflect  a  less  hostile  spirit.  Travellers  reported 
more  that  was  tolerable  in  the  working  of 
democratic  customs  and  institutions,  while  the 
reviews  conceded  the  existence  of  a  rudimen 
tary  literature  in  the  writings  of  Irving,  Bryant, 
Cooper,  Simms,  and  a  few  others.  Harriet 
Martineau's  descriptions  and  estimates  of  social 
and  intellectual  tendencies,  while  none  too 
flattering,  differed  much  in  sympathy  and  ac 
curacy  from  most  that  had  preceded.  Tocque- 
ville's  profound  study,  appearing  in  1835  and 


84  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

attracting  wide-spread  attention  at  once  in 
Great  Britain,  gave  strong  support  to  the  revi 
sion  of  opinion  concerning  the  American  democ 
racy.  On  the  other  side  Mrs.  Trollope's  "Do 
mestic  Life  of  the  Americans/'  published  in 
1832,  with  its  clever  and  cattish  caricatures, 
inflamed  the  old  animosities,  which  a  never- 
ending  train  of  Tory  travellers,  with  far  less  of 
vivacity  and  of  malice,  contributed  to  keep 
glowing.  Finally,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  1835 
appeared  the  first  important  literary  produc 
tion  of  Richard  Cobden,  treating  the  economic 
forces  of  the  United  States  with  much  analytic 
power  and  from  a  novel  point  of  view.  His 
vision  of  the  transforming  influence  of  American 
agriculture  and  commerce,  as  well  as  of  manufac 
tures  when  once  the  initial  obstacles  should  be 
overcome,  was  not  confused  by  suspicions  as 
to  the  religious,  moral,  or  political  soundness 
of  the  people.  He  was  by  training  one  of  the 
middle  class  of  English  society,  a  Manchester 
manufacturer,  and  the  lack  of  culture  that 
disturbed  so  many  British  observers  in  America 
did  not  affect  Cobden's  perception  of  the  eco 
nomic  strength  that  was  developing.  The  thesis 
of  his  essay  was  that  Great  Britain's  leading 
position  among  the  powers  of  the  world  was  in 


REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY  85 

far  greater  peril  from  the  economic  competition 
of  the  United  States  than  from  the  diplomatic 
or  military  rivalry  of  any  European  govern 
ments.  War  with  the  Americans  he  regarded 
as  impossible.  In  commerce  and  manufactures, 
however,  he  believed  they  were  destined  to 
take  the  lead,  because  of  their  enormous  popu 
lation  and  resources.  His  conclusion  was  that 
British  policy  should  be  directed  more  with 
reference  to  American  conditions  than  along 
the  ancient  lines  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Eu 
rope.  The  size  of  Russia's  army  or  of  France's 
navy  should  be  of  less  interest  to  the  govern 
ment  than  the  number  of  cotton  looms  in  the 
United  States  or  the  statistics  of  her  merchant 
marine.  All  restrictions  that  hampered  the 
fullest  development  of  British  commerce  and 
industry  must  be  abolished,  and  the  first  of 
these  to  go  must  be  that  main  bulwark  of  the 
aristocratic  ascendancy,  the  Corn  Law. 

Thus  Cobden  made  the  United  States  the 
text  of  his  earliest  sermon  against  militarism 
and  protectionism.  Through  the  thirty  years 
that  were  to  follow  of  successful  agitation  and 
of  profound  influence  on  English  policy,  he 
never  deviated  from  cordial  appreciation  and 
sympathy  for  the  institutions  and  ideals  of  the 


86  REFORM  AND  DEMOCRACY 

American  Republic.  His  influence  became  im 
portant,  however,  only  somewhat  later  than 
the  period  with  which  we  are  now  dealing. 
The  Anti-Corn-Law  League  took  shape  and 
position  under  his  leadership  in  the  late  thirties, 
and  achieved  its  crown  of  success  in  1846.  It 
is  more  than  a  coincidence  that  this  was  the 
year  that  saw  the  last  element  of  protection 
banished  from  the  tariff  law  of  the  United  States. 
That  part  of  British  public  opinion  con 
cerning  America  which  was  based  upon  the 
printed  accounts  of  travel  and  personal  obser 
vation  had  no  counterpart  in  American  public 
opinion  concerning  Great  Britain.  Few  Amer 
icans  visited  the  United  Kingdom,  and  of  those 
who  did  so  the  number  who  published  their 
impressions  was  negligible.  Some  opportunity 
to  form  judgments  of  the  British  individually,  if 
not  in  the  mass,  was  afforded  by  those  who  came 
and  settled  in  the  United  States.  There  was 
in  the  twenties  and  thirties  a  continuous  stream 
of  immigration  from  all  parts  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  dimensions  of  the  stream  can 
not  be  known  from  any  trustworthy  statistics. 
A  sprinkling  of  English,  Scots,  and  Irish  was 
to  be  found  throughout  the  Union.  The  Cath 
olic  Irish  congregated  clannishly  in  the  towns 


REFORM   AND   DEMOCRACY  87 

and  were  already  exciting  the  antagonism  that 
was  to  be  so  serious  in  the  middle  of  the  cen 
tury.  The  other  elements  nowhere  became 
numerous  or  assertive  enough  to  produce  a 
perceptible  impression.  They  were  mostly  arti 
sans  or  farmers,  Presbyterians  or  English  dis 
senters,  well  adapted  to  conform  without  fric 
tion  to  the  social  conditions  into  which  they 
came.  A  large  proportion  of  them  had  left 
their  homes  under  pressure  of  social  or  economic 
discontent  and  distress,  and  so  far  as  they  gave 
a  basis  for  opinion  as  to  Great  Britain  they 
confirmed  the  conviction  that  the  people  there 
were  a  very  decent  body,  shamefully  oppressed 
by  a  haughty  group  of  peers  and  clergy.  This 
opinion  derived  new  support  from  the  fate  of 
the  Chartist  movement  in  the  late  thirties.  The 
demands  of  the  Chartists  were  to  Americans 
elementary  political  rights;  and  the  summary 
treatment  of  the  agitation  strengthened  the 
notion  that  English  liberty  under  Whig  domina 
tion  was  as  unreal  as  under  the  Tories. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ROARING  FORTIES:  POLK  AND 
PALMERSTON 

IN  1837  Martin  Van  Buren  succeeded  Andrew 
Jackson  as  President  of  the  United  States  and 
Victoria  succeeded  William  IV  on  the  throne  of 
the  United  Kingdom.  These  changes  did  not 
signify  any  open  reversal  of  governmental  pol 
icy  in  either  case.  Van  Buren  was  Jackson's 
own  choice  for  the  succession  and  was  thor 
oughly  identified  with  the  Democratic  Party 
that  followed  Jackson;  the  Whig  cabinet  of 
Lord  Melbourne  continued  to  direct  affairs 
under  the  Queen  as  they  had  done  under  the 
King.  Yet  from  this  date  the  relations  among 
the  English-speaking  peoples  lost  the  tone  of 
cordiality  that  had  characterized  them  for  a 
decade,  and  entered  upon  a  protracted  period 
of  hostility  and  tension,  approaching  more  than 
once  to  the  verge  of  war. 

First  among  the  conditions  that  revealed 
the  new  trend  of  things  was  a  political  ebul 
lition  of  serious  proportions  in  Canada.  In 

83 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  89 

neither  of  the  two  provinces  bearing  this  name 
had  the  development  of  political  and  economic 
life  since  1815  been  calm  and  satisfactory. 
Party  strife  was  keen  on  lines  that  strongly 
suggested  the  history  of  the  United  States  just 
before  it  broke  away  from  Great  Britain.  The 
chief  organs  of  government  in  each  province  were 
a  governor  appointed  by  the  crown,  a  legislative 
council  likewise  appointed,  and  an  assembly 
elected  by  the  people.  In  both  the  Canadas  the 
central  point  of  constitutional  strife  was  the  ten 
ure  and  powers  of  the  legislative  council.  When 
in  1791  the  existing  province  of  Quebec  was  di 
vided  into  the  two  provinces  of  Lower  Canada 
and  Upper  Canada,  it  was  expected  that  the 
one  should  be  distinctively  the  centre  of  a  policy 
adapted  to  the  character  and  feelings  of  the 
French  population,  and  the  other  the  particular 
home  of  the  English.  In  the  course  of  time, 
however,  the  English  element  in  Lower  Canada 
gained  largely  on  the  French  through  immigra 
tion.  In  the  thirties  the  ratio  of  English  to 
French  was  possibly  as  high  as  one  to  three. 
Compared  with  the  conservative,  easy-going 
French  element  the  newcomers  were  radical 
and  aggressive  and  they  aroused  strong  misgivings 
in  their  compatriots.  Political  parties  tended 


90  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

steadily  to  follow  the  lines  of  race.  In  the 
assembly  the  numerically  stronger  French  easily 
maintained  the  ascendancy,  but  the  members  of 
the  legislative  council  were  selected  by  the  gov 
ernors  chiefly  from  the  English  element.  Hence 
a  persistent  demand  from  the  assembly  that  the 
council  should  be  made  elective.  On  all  sub 
jects  of  party  contest  the  antagonism  between 
the  two  houses,  with  the  governor  sustaining 
the  council,  was  intense,  and  the  hostility  was 
but  the  central  point  of  a  far-reaching  race 
conflict. 

In  Upper  Canada  there  was  no  difference  of 
nationalities  to  fix  the  lines  of  the  party  con 
flicts.  The  issues  here  turned  chiefly  on  the 
rivalries  between  the  original  settlers  and  the 
later  arrivals,  the  latter  being  almost  entirely 
British,  with  only  a  small  though  active  ele 
ment  of  immigrants  from  the  United  States. 
The  Loyalists  by  whom,  at  the  end  of  the 
American  Revolution,  the  colony  was  practically 
created,  became  by  their  landed  wealth,  their 
substantial  character,  and  their  political  ex 
perience,  as  well  as  by  the  deliberate  recogni 
tion  of  the  home  government,  a  social  and 
political  aristocracy  in  the  province.  By  the 
thirties  a  relatively  narrow  group  of  this  class 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  91 

had  firmly  in  their  control  all  branches  of  the 
administration  save  the  assembly.  The  oppo 
sition  party  consisted  of  the  later  immigrants, 
whose  origin  and  characteristics  were  much  like 
those  of  the  people  who  were  filling  up  the 
neighboring  borders  of  the  United  States.  They 
were  of  the  dissenting  creeds,  for  example,  while 
the  aristocratic  party,  known  commonly  as  the 
United  Empire  Loyalists,  preserved  in  general 
a  connection  with  the  Church  of  England.  This 
matter  of  ecclesiastical  attachment  had  no  lit 
tle  influence  in  the  critical  politics  of  the  time; 
for  profound  issues  of  educational  and  fiscal 
policy  turned  on  the  conflicting  interests  of  the 
various  sects. 

The  aspect  of  affairs  in  Lower  Canada  as 
sumed  a  threatening  character  in  1836.  For 
four  years  prior  to  that  date  the  assembly  had 
refused  to  vote  the  money  for  the  judicial  and 
administrative  service.  The  British  home  gov 
ernment  was  much  embarrassed  by  the  situa 
tion;  for  the  Whig  traditions  of  the  cabinet 
pointed  to  sympathy  with  the  ostensible  prin 
ciples  of  the  popular  party,  and  both  the  English 
Radicals  and  the  Irish  followers  of  O'Con- 
nell  vigorously  sustained  the  cause  of  the  dis 
contented  French  as  the  cause  of  liberty  and 


92  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

democracy  against  aristocratic  privilege.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  conservative  element  of  the 
Whigs  stood  out  stiffly  for  the  protection  of  the 
English-speaking  minority  in  Canada,  and  this 
position  was  taken  also  by  a  special  commis 
sion  sent  out  to  examine  the  situation.  Some 
concessions  offered  by  this  commission  had 
merely  the  effect,  however,  of  evoking  a  fresh 
manifestation  of  recalcitrance  by  the  majority 
in  the  assembly  at  Quebec,  and  the  British 
cabinet  was  forced  to  appeal  to  Parliament  for 
decisive  action.  Accordingly,  a  series  of  reso 
lutions  was  passed  in  May,  1837,  authorizing 
the  governor-general  to  pay  the  arrears  due 
for  the  public  service  without  waiting  for  the 
vote  of  the  assembly,  declaring  it  inexpedient 
to  make  the  legislative  council  elective,  and 
denying  other  important  demands  of  the  French 
party. 

The  result  of  this  action  was  insurrection. 
In  November,  after  a  period  of  violent  agita 
tion  led  by  the  Frenchman  Papineau  and  a 
few  British  sympathizers,  armed  uprisings  took 
place  in  several  French  communities.  There 
was  little  organization  and  no  discernible  co 
operation  in  the  various  movements,  and  they 
were  all  quickly  suppressed,  with  trifling  blood- 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  93 

shed.  At  the  same  time  the  popular  party  in 
Upper  Canada  were  led  to  venture  on  revolt, 
headed  by  a  Scottish  editor  named  Mackenzie. 
An  attack  was  made  by  a  disorderly  body  of 
the  disaffected  on  Toronto,  but  it  had  no  more 
effect  than  the  rising  in  the  lower  province. 
The  insurgent  leaders  who  escaped  death  and 
capture  succeeded  in  crossing  the  line  into  the 
United  States.  Papineau  and  Mackenzie  were 
both  among  the  number.  Many  of  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  insurgents  also  took  refuge  across  the 
border,  and  found  there  a  measure  of  sympa 
thy  and  support  that  had  serious  consequences. 
For  a  year  or  more  the  Canadian  frontier  was 
harassed  by  a  series  of  petty  but  exasperating 
raids  organized  and  directed  in  the  States  of 
Vermont,  New  York,  and  Michigan. 

The  most  important  of  these  border  forays 
was  that  conducted  from  Buffalo  as  a  base  in 
December,  1837.  A  force  of  several  hundred 
men  took  possession  of  an  island  on  the  Canadian 
side  of  the  international  boundary,  as  a  first 
step  toward  attack  on  the  mainland.  Supplies 
for  the  invaders  were  drawn  from  the  Amer 
ican  side  by  means  of  the  small  steamer  Caro 
line.  Canadian  troops,  sent  to  destroy  the 
steamer,  found  her  lying  at  a  wharf  on  the  Amer- 


94  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

ican  shore,  cut  her  loose,  and  burned  her.  In 
the  slight  skirmish  that  accompanied  the  sei 
zure  of  the  vessel  an  American  was  slain.  No 
further  progress  was  made  by  the  invading 
party  on  the  island,  but  the  destruction  of  the 
Caroline  by  British  troops  in  American  territory 
caused  a  fierce  wave  of  indignation  to  sweep 
through  the  United  States.  To  this  incident, 
more  perhaps  than  to  any  other  cause,  was  due 
the  prolongation  of  active  movements  against 
Canada  across  the  border.  Popular  feeling  was, 
of  course,  no  less  wrathful  on  one  side  of  the 
boundary  than  on  the  other;  for  the  Canadians 
were  deeply  irritated  at  the  sympathy  and  con 
nivance  given  by  the  Americans  to  the  insur 
gents. 

Diplomacy  was  prompt  to  take  up  the  affair 
of  the  Caroline,  and  urgent  demands  for  repa 
ration  for  the  violation  of  American  territory 
were  made  by  the  United  States  upon  the 
British  Government.  The  latter  assumed  re 
sponsibility  for  the  act  as  a  regrettable  but 
necessary  proceeding  of  defence  in  time  of  insur 
rection  and  flagrant  war,  during  which  the  United 
States  was  a  base  of  supplies  for  the  enemy. 
Negotiations  dragged  according  to  their  wont 
until  a  fresh  incident  gave  an  exciting  impulse 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  95 

to  their  movement.  In  November,  1840,  three 
years  after  the  burning  of  the  Caroline,  Alex 
ander  McLeod,  a  British  subject,  was  arrested  in 
New  York  State  on  a  charge  of  arson  and  mur 
der  in  connection  with  the  affair.  Indignation 
flamed  high  in  Canada  and  Great  Britain  at 
this  action,  and  the  authorities  at  Washington 
were  pressed  to  release  McLeod,  whose  offence, 
if  any,  had  been  committed  as  a  soldier  under 
orders  for  which  the  British  Government  had 
assumed  responsibility.  The  situation  was  most 
difficult  for  the  American  Department  of  State; 
for  it  involved  an  awkward  conflict  of  jurisdic 
tion,  only  too  familiar,  between  the  Federal 
Government  and  the  government  of  New  York 
State.  The  latter,  backed  by  a  demonstrative 
popular  sentiment,  insisted  that  its  courts  must 
enforce  its  criminal  law.  The  right  to  do  so 
could  not  be  questioned  by  the  Federal  Govern 
ment,  though  the  latter  alone  had  to  confront 
the  threatening  demands  of  Great  Britain  for 
the  release  of  McLeod.  A  way  out  was  found 
by  Daniel  Webster,  who  became  secretary  of 
state  in  March,  1841.  He  on  the  one  hand 
moderated  the  urgency  of  the  British  demands 
and  on  the  other  moved  all  possible  influences 
to  insure  that  McLeod  should  not  be  convicted 


96  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

by  the  State  court.  In  October  the  accused 
man  was  duly  acquitted  by  a  jury,  and  was 
hastily  sent  out  of  the  State. 

The  period  of  McLeod's  detention  was  one 
of  great  bitterness  of  feeling  among  all  three  of 
the  English-speaking  peoples.  While  exciting 
conditions  of  internal  politics  served  to  temper 
somewhat  the  prevailing  international  antip 
athies,  there  was  little  doubt  that  the  gravest 
results  would  have  followed  the  conviction  and 
punishment  of  the  man.  The  Canadian  revolt 
was  indeed  only  one  of  several  matters  that 
combined  to  produce  the  tension  of  the  time. 
While  the  two  Canadas  were  in  the  throes  of 
civil  war  New  Brunswick  was  on  the  verge  of 
hostilities  with  the  State  of  Maine  over  the  old 
question  of  the  disputed  northeastern  boundary. 
On  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  Texas  was  fighting  for 
independence  from  Mexico,  and  was  receiving 
from  sympathizers  in  the  United  States  an 
amount  and  kind  of  assistance  that  had  not  been 
without  effect  on  the  expectations  of  the  in 
surgent  Canadians.  Finally,  on  the  far-distant 
Pacific  coast  the  late  thirties  saw  the  beginning 
of  an  immigration  from  the  United  States  into 
the  valley  of  the  Columbia  River  that  foretold 
trouble  over  the  Oregon  country.  The  Amer- 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  97 

ican  people  were  indeed  showing  in  every  direc 
tion  a  disposition  to  burst  the  territorial  bonds 
that  confined  them,  easy  as  those  bonds  had 
been.  And  the  far-flung  interests  of  the  British 
Empire  need  no  more  striking  illustration  than 
the  fact  that  in  whatever  direction  the  Amer 
icans  sought  to  expand  their  bounds,  whether 
on  the  Atlantic  or  on  the  Pacific,  in  the  Gulf  of 
the  tropics  or  under  the  Arctic  circle,  they  found 
subjects  of  the  Queen,  with  vested  rights,  oppos 
ing  the  movement. 

The  risings  in  Canada  gave  a  healthy  shock 
to  British  interest,  which  had  been  languid  in 
respect  to  the  American  branch  of  the  empire. 
Parliament,  early  in  1838,  passed  an  act  sus 
pending  the  constitution  of  Lower  Canada,  and 
in  the  spring  the  Earl  of  Durham  was  sent  out 
as  governor-general,  armed  with  dictatorial 
powers.  His  stay  was  short,  but  its  influence 
was  lasting;  for  it  gave  occasion  for  the  famous 
report  that  furnished  the  mother  country  with 
her  first  clear  ideas  as  to  the  causes,  facts,  and 
tendencies  of  the  situation  in  North  America. 
He  showed  that  in  every  one  of  the  North 
American  provinces  there  was  a  standing  polit 
ical  antagonism  between  the  elected  popular 
assembly  and  the  executive  officers  appointed 


98  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

by  the  crown — such  antagonism  as  had  pro 
duced  the  revolution  of  1688  in  England  and 
that  of  1776  in  America.  This  condition,  dan 
gerous  everywhere,  became  disastrous  in  Lower 
Canada,  where  it  brought  to  a  head  the  race 
animosity  that  was  the  basis  of  all  the  trouble 
there.  The  general  remedy  for  the  evils  con 
cerned,  in  Lord  Durham's  opinion,  was  the  in 
troduction  of  responsible  government,  that  is, 
responsibility  of  the  executive  to  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  people  in  the  assembly.  As 
to  the  Canadas,  his  Lordship  saw  no  hope  of 
stability  and  peace  save  through  the  union  of 
the  two  provinces  under  a  single  legislature  and 
executive.  By  such  a  system  the  French  ele 
ment  would  be  deprived  of  the  hope  of  an  inde 
pendent,  or  at  least  autonomous,  government, 
and  the  English-speaking  people  would  be  as 
sured  of  the  political  predominance  to  which  they 
were  entitled  by  their  numerical,  economic,  and 
intellectual  superiority. 

Lord  Durham's  outspoken  project  for  sub 
merging  the  French  in  Canada  was  equalled  in 
candor  by  his  discussion  of  the  relations  of  the 
British  provinces  with  the  United  States.  The 
enterprise  and  material  prosperity  on  the  re 
publican  side  of  the  boundary,  as  compared  with 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  99 

conditions  on  the  British  side,  he  set  forth  in 
terms  that  were  bitterly  resented,  especially  in 
Upper  Canada.  He  appraised  in  a  spirit  of  ju 
dicial  detachment  the  sympathy  and  support 
given  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Canadian  malcontents,  and  the  expectations  of 
the  latter  as  to  the  possibilities  of  escape  from 
British  rule  by  incorporation  into  the  republic. 
He  estimated  with  care  the  strength  of  the 
traditional  antipathy  with  which  the  aristo 
cratic  dominant  class  in  Upper  Canada  regarded 
the  democracy  across  the  border.  As  against 
the  force  of  this  feeling  he  considered  the  influ 
ence  that  contiguity,  with  identity  of  problems 
and  interests,  would  exert  for  the  promotion 
of  respect  and  amity.  The  general  deduction 
from  his  calculation  was  that,  in  default  of  a 
very  wise  and  considerate  policy  on  the  part 
of  the  home  government,  union  with  the  United 
States  might  become  a  popular  demand  among 
both  the  French  and  the  English  elements  in 
the  Canadas. 

The  importance  of  Lord  Durham's  discussion 
of  this  point  was  conspicuous  in  view  of  ideas 
that  were  freely  broached  by  British  politi 
cians  of  prominence  at  this  time.  A  calculus 
of  the  value  of  colonies  and  dependencies  was 


ioo  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

becoming  a  rather  common  feature  of  debate. 
Ultra  Radicals  like  Roebuck  and  Hume,  and 
less  violent  ones  like  Brougham,  contended  that 
the  connection  of  the  Canadas  with  Great 
Britain  either  already  was,  or  in  the  near  fu 
ture  would  be,  irrational  and  adverse  to  the 
true  interests  of  both  parties.  Cobden  and  his 
anti-Corn-Law  followers  assailed,  in  the  name  of 
economic  and  political  liberty,  the  system  under 
which,  for  the  sake  of  imperial  glory,  the  nat 
ural  law  of  freedom  in  trade  and  navigation 
was  set  at  naught.  Lord  Durham  himself  had 
been  identified  with  the  Radicals,  but  on  the 
question  of  colonies  he  did  not  join  the  ultras. 
The  burden  of  his  contention  in  his  great  report 
was,  that  the  North  American  provinces  should 
be  so  administered  as  to  grow  into  a  unified 
nationality,  attached  to  the  British  Empire, 
and  sharing  by  give  and  take  in  the  civilization 
and  progress  of  which  that  empire  was  the 
home. 

Under  an  act  of  Parliament  that  went  into 
effect  in  1841  a  new  constitution  for  Canada 
became  operative.  It  joined  the  two  provinces 
in  a  legislative  union,  with  many  features  that 
Lord  Durham  had  recommended.  The  new 
system  did  not  bring  at  once  the  tranquillity 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  101 

that  had  been  hoped  for.  It  included,  however, 
provisions  through  which  the  popular  element 
in  the  legislature  could  grow  in  relative  influence, 
and  it  became  thus  instrumental  in  the  develop 
ment  of  responsible  government  and  an  increas 
ing  autonomy. 

Just  at  the  time  when  the  popular  excitement 
along  the  border  was  at  its  height  in  connection 
with  the  insurrection  in  Canada,  it  was  unfor 
tunate,  but  scarcely  surprising,  that  the  friction 
over  the  unsettled  boundary  of  Maine  and  New 
Brunswick  should  have  become  acute.  The 
King  of  the  Netherlands  had  failed,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  find  any  geographical  facts  that  he 
would  judicially  warrant  to  embody  the  line 
described  in  the  treaty  of  1783.  After  the  fail 
ure  of  this  arbitration,  desultory  negotiations 
were  carried  on  by  the  two  governments,  but 
with  little  progress  toward  agreement;  so  that 
in  1838  the  "northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia" 
and  the  "highlands"  were  eluding  the  diplomats 
and  surveyors  as  successfully  as  at  any  time 
during  the  previous  half-century.  It  had  been 
informally  agreed  by  the  two  governments  that 
neither  should  seek  to  strengthen  its  position 
in  the  disputed  territory  pending  the  determina 
tion  of  the  boundary.  Despite  this  agreement 


102  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

vexatious  incidents  occurred  from  time  to  time. 
The  authorities  of  Maine  and  New  Brunswick, 
while  professing  to  conform  with  exactness  to 
the  agreement  not  to  strengthen  their  respect 
ive  positions,  were  at  no  less  pains  to  see  that 
their  positions  were  not  weakened.  Settlers, 
both  British  and  American,  and  for  the  most 
part  of  no  very  desirable  character,  drifted  into 
the  region;  local  officials  of  the  neighboring 
jurisdictions  extended  their  activities  and  ar 
rested  each  other  as  intruders;  lumbermen, 
with  or  without  color  of  right,  plied  their  enter 
prise  in  the  rich  forests  of  the  no-man's-land. 
In  the  summer  of  1838  an  unusually  large  force 
of  British  lumbermen  carried  on  extensive 
operations  on  the  Aroostook  River.  Ordered 
off  by  an  American  official,  they  refused  to  go, 
and  assembled  in  considerable  numbers  to  main 
tain  their  position  by  force.  The  government  of 
Maine  thereupon  sent  a  strong  body  of  militia 
to  enforce  its  authority,  and  the  government 
of  New  Brunswick  responded  by  procuring  the 
despatch  of  a  detachment  of  British  regulars 
to  the  neighborhood. 

No  bloodshed  resulted  from  this  threatening 
situation.  Popular  and  official  excitement,  of 
course,  ran  high  along  the  border,  and  contrib- 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  103 

uted  to  increase  the  wide-spread  ill  feeling  al 
ready  caused  by  the  incidents  of  the  rebellion 
in  Canada.  The  British  and  American  foreign 
offices  quickly  took  charge  of  the  affair  and 
soothed  the  inflamed  susceptibilities  of  Maine 
and  New  Brunswick.  President  Van  Buren  felt 
obliged  to  rebuke  the  rather  high-handed  way 
in  which  the  governor  of  Maine  had  begun  to 
make  war  on  the  British  Empire.  It  was  clear 
in  this  matter,  however,  as  became  even  clearer 
a  little  later  in  the  case  of  McLeod,  that  the 
constitutional  partition  of  authority  between 
the  States  and  the  Federal  Government  in  the 
American  system  must  often  cause  great  em 
barrassment  to  the  United  States  in  its  rela 
tions  with  foreign  powers. 

The  most  important  practical  result  of  this 
so-called  "Aroostook  war"  was  the  impulse  it 
gave  to  serious  efforts  toward  the  settlement  of 
the  boundary.  Negotiations  had  lagged  in  a 
spiritless  way  ever  since  the  failure  of  the  arbi 
tration.  Maine  was  justified  at  least  in  her 
complaints  on  this  score.  The  administrations 
of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  on  the  one  side,  and 
the  cabinet  of  the  Melbourne  Whigs  on  the 
other,  found  subjects  much  more  to  their  taste 
than  the  exhausted  and  exhausting  question  as 


104  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

to  where  the  northwest  angle  of  eighteenth- 
century  Nova  Scotia  was  situated.  The  gov 
ernor  of  Maine,  with  his  militia,  stirred  up  the 
diplomats  as  effectually  as  he  did  the  lumber 
men.  Palmerston,  the  British  foreign  secre 
tary,  and  Forsyth,  the  American  secretary  of 
state,  after  some  despatches  manifesting  more 
acerbity  than  had  characterized  the  correspond 
ence  since  Canning's  time,  agreed  in  a  recog 
nition  of  each  other's  highly  correct  and  amicable 
intentions,  and  proceeded  to  institute  a  new 
series  of  surveys  and  a  new  set  of  commis 
sioners  to  guess  out  the  location  of  the  elusive 
angle  and  highlands.  For  three  years,  1839-42, 
there  was  great  activity  in  the  search  for  the 
boundary  and  vast  ingenuity  was  displayed  in 
the  construction  of  new  theories  about  the  mean 
ing  of  the  treaty  and  the  topography  of  the  dis 
puted  region.  The  country  was  so  covered  with 
hills  that  a  surveyor  who  knew  it  well  could 
construct  a  chain  of  highlands  in  nearly  any 
direction  that  suited  his  taste  or  his  instruc 
tions,  and  was  as  free  to  indulge  his  fancy 
about  the  boundary  as  were  the  negotiators 
in  1783,  who  knew  nothing  whatever  about  the 
facts. 

In  1841  there  was  a  change  of  administration 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  105 

in  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
At  Washington  in  March  the  American  Whigs 
assumed  control  of  the  government;  at  London 
in  September  the  British  Whigs  fell  from  power. 
Daniel  Webster  became  American  secretary  of 
state,  and  Lord  Aberdeen  became  foreign  sec 
retary  in  place  of  Palmerston.  The  relations 
of  the  English-speaking  peoples  with  one  an 
other  could  scarcely  have  been  more  unpleasant 
than  they  were  at  the  time  of  these  changes. 
The  McLeod  incident,  with  the  other  friction 
due  to  the  Canadian  insurrection,  was  at  the 
most  critical  stage,  and  the  boundary  dispute 
was  as  far  as  ever  from  settlement.  Added  to 
these  came  a  fresh  revival  of  the  old  and  ex 
tremely  inflammatory  issue  about  the  right  of 
search.  Slave-traders  of  various  nationalities 
were  freely  using  the  American  flag  to  protect 
themselves,  and  British  cruisers  on  the  African 
coast,  in  trying  to  stop  the  trade,  now  and  then 
visited  and  examined  a  vessel  whose  right  to 
carry  the  American  flag  was  beyond  question. 
The  complaints  of  merchants  whose  business 
was  thus  interfered  with  led  to  energetic  pro 
tests  to  the  British  Government,  and  one  of  the 
last  acts  of  Palmerston  before  his  retirement 
from  the  Foreign  Office  was  to  send  in  reply  to 


io6  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

such  a  protest  a  despatch  that  raspingly  refused 
to  concede  the  American  demand. 

With  Aberdeen  at  the  Foreign  Office  the  tone 
of  the  correspondence  between  the  two  govern 
ments  underwent  a  notable  change.  Webster, 
after  seeing  the  McLeod  affair  peacefully  set 
tled,  went  earnestly  to  work  on  the  boundary 
question.  His  plan  was  to  drop  all  the  great 
mass  of  surveyors'  and  historians'  data,  to  give 
up  trying  to  find  out  the  meaning  of  the  treaty, 
and  to  reach  an  agreement  by  direct  negotia 
tion  on  a  conventional  line.  It  was  deemed 
necessary  first  to  obtain  the  assent  of  Maine 
and  of  Massachusetts  (within  whose  jurisdic 
tion  Maine  was  originally  included)  to  this 
method  of  settlement.  Though  the  govern 
ment  of  Maine  had  declared  in  the  most  formal 
way  that  it  would  never  consent,  it  consented, 
and  Massachusetts  raised  no  difficulties.  The 
British  Government  showed  its  sense  of  the  im 
portance  of  the  whole  situation  by  announcing 
that  it  would  send  a  special  envoy  to  deal  with 
the  pending  questions,  and  manifested  its  ami 
cable  spirit  by  designating  for  the  mission 
Alexander  Baring,  Lord  Ashburton,  whose  fit 
ness  was  signified  equally  by  his  distinguished 
public  services  in  England  and  his  well-known 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  107 

cordiality  toward  the  United  States.  Ash- 
burton  reached  Washington  in  April,  1842,  and 
on  the  9th  of  August  the  famous  Webster- 
Ashburton  treaty  was  signed.  It  was  savagely 
attacked  in  the  British  provinces,  in  Great  Brit 
ain  itself,  and  in  the  United  States.  These 
attacks  were  for  the  most  part,  however,  mere 
ebullitions  of  partisan  spite  or  of  that  queer 
conception  of  public  duty  which  requires  fault 
to  be  found  with  every  achievement  of  the 
administration  for  the  time  being. 

So  far  as  it  went  the  Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty  was  an  extremely  important  step  in 
the  development  of  pacific  relations  among  the 
English-speaking  peoples.  The  convention  it 
self  provided  definitely  a  settlement  of  all  open 
questions  about  the  boundary  from  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  to  the  Rocky  Mountains;  it  established 
an  unobjectionable,  if  not  supremely  efficient, 
system  of  co-operation  for  the  suppression  of 
the  slave-trade;  and  it  embodied  an  agreement 
for  the  extradition  of  criminals  that  was  urgently 
demanded  by  the  disturbed  conditions  along 
the  Canadian  frontier.  In  the  published  corre 
spondence  between  the  negotiators  were  incor 
porated  a  satisfactory  expression  of  regret  by 
Great  Britain  for  the  violation  of  American  ter- 


io8  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

ritory  in  the  affair  of  the  Caroline,  and  an  ex 
change  of  views  that  was  interpreted  by  Web 
ster  as  a  substantial  abandonment  of  the  ancient 
claim  to  the  right  of  search  and  impressment. 
In  regard  to  the  case  of  McLeod,  Webster  re 
newed  the  admission  by  the  United  States  of 
the  British  contention  that  a  private  citizen 
could  not  be  punished  for  an  act  for  which  his 
government  assumed  the  responsibility,  but 
amicably  forbore  to  point  out,  as  his  predeces 
sor  had  done,  the  awkward  position  in  which 
the  British  Government  would  be  put  by  this 
contention  in  connection  with  certain  incidents 
of  Palmerston's  aggressive  policy  in  the  af 
fairs  of  continental  Europe.  The  forbearance  of 
Webster  in  this  matter  was  typical  of  the  gen 
eral  tone  of  the  correspondence  and  of  the  whole 
negotiation.  A  spirit  of  friendliness  and  cour 
tesy  was  manifested  at  every  stage,  and  an 
almost  ostentatious  avoidance  of  ideas  or  ex 
pressions  that  could  irritate.  Whatever  of 
soothing  effect  was  produced  by  the  mission  of 
Lord  Ashburton  was  probably  due  as  much  to 
this  characteristic  of  the  negotiations  as  to  the 
treaty  itself. 

The  boundary  fixed  by  the  treaty  gave  to 
Maine  a  little  more  than  half  of  the  area  claimed 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  109 

by  her,  and  a  little  less  than  what  was  assigned 
to  her  by  the  rejected  arbitration  of  the  King 
of  the  Netherlands.  As  a  solace  she  received 
from  the  United  States  the  sum  of  £150,000, 
a  like  sum  going  to  Massachusetts.  The  line 
dividing  Canada  from  Vermont  and  New  York, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  erroneously 
run  by  the  surveyors  to  the  substantial  advan 
tage  of  the  United  States,  was  fixed  by  the 
treaty  in  accordance  with  the  now  long-estab 
lished  error. 

The  consent  of  Maine  to  the  negotiation  of 
a  conventional  line  was  secured  largely  through 
means  that,  when  later  disclosed,  became  the 
focus  of  a  heated  controversy.  Just  when 
Webster  was  getting  his  plans  for  the  negotia 
tion  under  headway  his  attention  was  called 
to  a  map  recently  discovered  in  the  French 
archives  which  might  be  the  one  which  Frank 
lin  was  known  to  have  sent  to  Vergennes  in 
1782  with  the  bounds  of  the  United  States,  as 
agreed  upon  by  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty  of 
peace,  marked  upon  it  by  a  strong  red  line. 
The  new-found  map  bore  no  evidence  as  to  its 
identity,  but  the  boundary  of  the  United  States 
was  marked  on  it  with  a  strong  red  line,  and  the 
line  in  the  region  of  Maine  followed  very  closely 


I  io  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

that  claimed  by  the  British  as  designated  by 
the  treaty  of  1783.  Webster  showed  a  copy  of 
this  map  to  the  governor  of  Maine,  suggesting 
how  awkward  it  would  be  to  go  into  a  new  arbi 
tration  with  the  possibility  that  the  map  might 
come  before  the  arbiter.  Maine  gave  in  her 
adhesion  to  the  project  of  a  conventional  line. 
Webster  refrained  from  showing  the  red-line 
map  to  Lord  Ashburton,  and  further  directed 
Everett,  the  minister  at  London,  to  abandon  all 
searching  for  maps  that  might  have  been  used 
in  the  negotiations  of  1782-3. 

Under  all  the  circumstances,  this  abstention 
from  further  map-hunting  was  a  dictate  of 
elementary  prudence.  It  was  made  ridiculous 
by  what  became  known  a  little  later.  In  the 
British  Museum  lay  the  actual  map  used  in 
the  negotiations  of  1782  by  Oswald,  one  of  the 
British  commissioners,  and  on  this  map  the 
boundary  agreed  to  was  marked  by  a  line  that 
followed  very  closely  what  was  claimed  by  the 
United  States.  If  Everett  had  continued  his 
search  and  happened  upon  this  map,  Webster's 
way  with  Great  Britain,  if  not  with  Maine, 
would  have  been  materially  smoothed. 

Neither  the  red-line  map  nor  Oswald's  map 
came  forth  from  retirement  till  Webster  and 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  in 

Ashburton  had  concluded  their  treaty.  Then, 
in  connection  with  the  debate  in  the  Senate  on 
the  ratification,  the  fact  of  the  discovery  in 
Paris  became  public,  and  from  this  followed  the 
disclosure  of  Oswald's  map,  which  had  been 
removed  to  the  British  Foreign  Office.  The 
opponents  of  the  treaty  found  in  these  incidents 
good  material  for  their  attacks  upon  it.  Web 
ster  was  accused  of  trickery,  and  Ashburton  of 
imbecility.  The  whimsical  fortune  that  gave 
to  each  party  exclusive  control  of  evidence 
strongly  sustaining  its  adversary  made  the  sit 
uation  most  interesting,  and  promoted  a  dili 
gent  re-examination  of  the  boundary  issue  on 
its  merits.  A  furious  cartographic  controversy 
developed,  in  official  and  non-official  circles. 
Maps,  rumors  of  maps,  traditions  of  maps,  bear 
ing  on  the  line  described  in  the  treaty  of  1783, 
came  forth  in  impressive  but  perplexing  num 
bers.  Long  before  the  debate  assumed  its 
greatest  dimensions,  however,  the  treaty  of  1842 
was  duly  ratified.  To  the  layman  the  argu 
ments  of  the  cartographic  and  historical  ex 
perts  were  reciprocally  annihilating,  and  the 
wisdom  of  the  negotiators  in  discarding  the  whole 
method  was  confirmed.  All  of  ill  feeling  from 
the  treaty  that  survived  into  later  years  was 


H2  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

that  on  the  part  of  the  British-Americans, 
who  were  debarred  by  the  Webster-Ashburton 
boundary  from  the  most  direct  and  practicable 
line  of  communication  between  Halifax  and 
Quebec.  They  long  continued  to  feel  that  their 
interests  and  plain  rights  had  been  sacrificed 
to  the  mother-country's  exaggerated  fear  of  a 
breach  with  the  United  States. 

The  provisions  of  the  treaty  touching  the 
slave-trade  avoided  all  reference  to  the  right 
of  search.  It  was  agreed  that  each  govern 
ment  should  maintain  on  the  coast  of  Africa 
a  considerable  naval  force  to  apply  its  own  laws 
against  the  trade.  The  two  forces  were  to 
work  in  co-operation  with  each  other  for  the 
common  end,  under  orders  from  their  respect 
ive  governments  adapted  to  make  this  co-opera 
tion  most  effective. 

This  article  was  the  best  that  could  be  de 
vised  to  end  the  dangerous  controversies  that 
arose  from  time  to  time  over  the  activities  of 
the  British  cruisers  on  the  African  coast.  It 
insured  a  more  positive  and  definite  participa 
tion  by  the  United  States  in  the  suppression  of 
the  slave-trade,  and  at  the  same  time,  by  pro 
viding  for  the  presence  of  an  American  squad 
ron  in  the  most  troublesome  neighborhood,  gave 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  113 

some  guarantee  that  slavers  who  misused  the 
flag  and  traders  who  lawfully  used  it  should  be 
judged  by  its  natural  protectors  rather  than  by 
the  officers  of  a  foreign  power.  The  article  in 
this  shape  was  designed  to  leave  wholly  un 
touched  the  controversy  over  the  right  of  search, 
and  merely  to  reduce  the  frequency  of  the 
incidents  that  might  raise  anew  that  contro 
versy. 

At  this  date  the  discussion  of  the  right  of 
search  by  the  publicists,  official  and  unofficial, 
had  assumed  new  phases  in  connection  with  the 
matter  of  the  slave-trade.  How,  it  was  asked, 
could  the  nefarious  traffic  ever  be  interfered 
with,  if  a  vessel  loaded  with  slaves  could  escape 
examination  by  the  simple  expedient  of  running 
up  a  flag  other  than  that  of  the  cruiser  that 
wished  to  examine  her?  There  must  be  at 
least  such  examination  as  will  determine  whether 
the  suspected  ship  has  a  right  to  the  colors 
which  she  displays.  Irrespective,  thus,  of  any 
serious  search,  there  must  be  a  right  of  visitation 
as  to  a  merchantman  concerning  which  there 
is  any  ground  for  suspicion. 

Not  so,  was  the  reply.  Visitation  would  be 
futile  without  such  a  degree  of  examination  as 
would  constitute  all  that  is  involved  in  the 


114  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

practice  of  search.  The  claim  of  the  lesser 
right  is  no  more  tenable  in  law  and  reason  than 
the  ancient  pretension  to  the  greater.  The 
utmost  that  can  be  conceded  is  the  right  of 
approach.  A  cruiser  may  regard  from  a  respect 
ful  distance  and  in  a  peaceful  manner  a  ship 
flying  an  innocent  flag,  but  any  attempt  by 
force  to  stop  such  a  ship  or  to  interfere  with  her 
course  is  a  violation  of  the  flag  and  of  that  free 
dom  of  the  seas  on  which  the  civilization  and 
progress  of  mankind  so  closely  depend. 

But  what  if  the  suspected  vessel  is  a  pirate? 
Shall  a  pirate  be  allowed  to  roam  the  seas  at 
will,  guaranteed  against  interference  by  the 
possession  of  a  few  lockers  full  of  flags  that  she 
has  taken  from  the  victims  of  her  lawlessness? 
Far  from  it,  was  the  answer.  A  pirate  has  been 
from  time  immemorial,  under  the  law  of  nations, 
hostis  humani  generis — at  war  with  all  mankind. 
No  one  pretends  that  the  right  of  search  is  not 
possessed  by  a  belligerent  in  time  of  war,  as  a 
reasonable  precaution  against  the  rendering  of 
aid  to  the  enemy.  Only  in  time  of  peace  is  it 
wholly  without  justification.  But  as  to  pirates 
there  is  never  a  time  of  peace.  War  is  perma 
nent  and  coextensive  with  the  human  race. 
Therefore,  as  to  pirates  the  right  of  search  on 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  115 

the  high  seas  belongs  to  the  ships  of  all  na 
tions  at  all  times. 

These  various  arguments  were  iterated  and 
reiterated,  amplified  and  fortified  with  the  in 
genuity  and  historical  learning  that  the  experts 
in  diplomacy  and  international  law  were  readily 
able  to  supply.  The  practical  outcome  so  far 
as  concerned  Great  Britain  and  America  was 
determined,  however,  by  popular  feelings  that 
were  independent  of  the  reasoning  on  abstract 
principles.  In  the  United  Kingdom  the  hu 
manitarian  sentiment  against  the  slave-trade 
pervaded  all  classes  and  demanded  insistently 
that  the  great  naval  power  of  the  government 
should  be  freely  used  for  the  suppression  of  the 
evil.  In  the  United  States  the  memory  of  con 
ditions  during  the  Napoleonic  wars  was  un 
ceasingly  active  and  prohibited  any  semblance 
of  recognition  to  the  exercise  of  British  juris 
diction  for  any  purpose  on  American  vessels 
on  the  high  seas.  There  was  a  wide-spread 
belief  in  the  United  States  that  the  British 
enthusiasm  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave- 
trade  covered  a  greater  enthusiasm  for  main 
taining  the  right  of  search  as  the  unmistakable 
token  of  her  naval  supremacy.  Nor  was  this 
belief  without  foundation;  for  in  some  centres 


Ii6  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

of  surviving  high  Toryism  the  sufferings  of  the 
Africans  were  notoriously  of  little  concern  in 
comparison  with  the  maintenance  intact  of 
British  rule  on  the  seas  as  against  the  aspira 
tions  of  the  upstart  republic  of  the  West.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  was  a  feeling  among  the 
liberals  in  England  that  the  obstinate  refusal 
of  the  Americans  to  join  with  whole  soul  in  the 
operations  against  the  slavers  was  dictated  less 
by  fears  and  scruples  about  the  right  of  search 
than  by  unavowed  indifference  to  the  existence 
of  the  traffic.  And  this  again  was  not  without 
foundation;  for  the  trend  of  events  during  the 
past  ten  years  in  relation  to  slavery  had  markedly 
strengthened  a  feeling  in  the  South  that  war 
on  the  slave-trade  was  too  closely  associated 
with  abolitionism  to  be  wholly  free  from  peril 
to  the  institutions  of  the  section. 

In  the  negotiations  of  1842  Webster  secured 
an  opportunity  to  put  his  government's  views 
correctly  on  the  record,  by  asking  that  the  right 
of  search  in  connection  with  impressment,  rather 
than  with  the  slave-trade,  be  taken  up  for  dis 
cussion.  Ashburton  declared  that  his  instruc 
tions  did  not  permit  him  to  enter  upon  that 
subject.  Webster  made  use  of  the  occasion  to 
enlarge  with  eloquence  and  force  upon  the  views 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  117 

of  his  government.  The  most  significant  fea 
ture  of  his  plea  was  probably  not  his  solemn 
declaration  that  the  United  States  would  no 
longer  permit  the  impressment  of  seamen  from 
American  vessels,  but  the  attention  that  he 
gave  to  the  remarkable  change  of  conditions 
since  the  practice  was  last  resorted  to.  He  ad 
verted  to  the  extraordinary  proportions  at 
tained  by  immigration  from  the  British  Isles, 
much  of  it  encouraged  by  the  British  Govern 
ment,  and  he  pointed  out  the  disastrous  conse 
quences  that  would  ensue  if,  in  time  of  future 
war,  any  attempt  should  be  made  to  assert  the 
doctrine  of  indefeasible  allegiance  among  these 
swarming  myriads  and  to  force  them  into  the 
service  of  the  government  that  had  encouraged 
them  to  leave  its  soil. 

Ashburton's  answer  was  of  the  soft  species 
that  turneth  away  wrath.  He  declined  to  enter 
into  argument  and  merely  deprecated  the  dis 
cussion  of  a  topic  that  was  so  full  of  difficulty 
in  the  abstract  and  so  happily  remote  from  any 
practical  importance.  He  freely  admitted,  how 
ever,  that  a  serious  question  "has  existed,  from 
practices  formerly  attending  the  mode  of  man 
ning  the  Biitish  navy  in  times  of  war."  This 
form  of  expression  indicated  a  belief  that  im 
pressment  was  a  matter  of  the  past. 


Ii8  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

It  is  not  unlikely  that  Webster,  when  inject 
ing  the  discussion  of  impressment  into  the  cor 
respondence  with  Ashburton,  was  conscious  of 
the  influence  it  might  have  as  a  set-off  against 
the  attacks  of  the  anti-slavery  agitators  upon 
the  United  States.  In  America,  at  least,  forced 
service  in  the  navy  was  regarded  as  not  much 
different  in  principle  from  forced  service  in  the 
cotton-field.  So  long  as  the  British  Govern 
ment  insisted  on  the  right  to  drag  freemen  away 
into  such  servitude,  its  interest  in  mitigating 
the  woes  of  the  African  slave  savored  of  hypoc 
risy.  The  utility,  if  not  the  validity,  of  this 
kind  of  reasoning  was  rendered  obvious  by  an 
incident  that  threatened  serious  consequences 
just  at  the  time  of  the  Webster-Ashburton  ne 
gotiations. 

In  November,  1841,  the  brig  Creole  was 
bound  from  Hampton  Roads  to  New  Orleans 
with  a  few  passengers  and  135  slaves  on  board. 
On  the  way  the  slaves  rose  in  revolt,  slew  one 
of  the  passengers,  wounded  many  of  the  crew, 
and  took  the  vessel  into  the  British  port  of 
Nassau,  in  the  Bahamas,  where  the  local  au 
thorities,  after  arresting  those  of  the  slaves  who 
were  implicated  in  the  mutiny,  forcibly  took  the 
rest  from  the  ship  and  set  them  free.  This 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  119 

action  caused  intense  exasperation  in  the  United 
States,  especially  in  the  South.  The  feeling 
was  not  softened  by  the  fact  that  Northern 
abolitionists  rapturously  applauded  the  free 
ing  of  the  slaves.  The  case  was  indeed  only 
the  culmination  of  a  series  in  which,  since  the 
emancipation  of  the  blacks  in  the  West  Indies, 
the  Bahama  officials  had  rigorously  applied  the 
principle  of  English  law  that  a  slave  on  enter 
ing  the  jurisdiction  of  Great  Britain  became 
ipso  facto  free.  Webster  felt  obliged  to  inject 
this  matter  also  into  the  correspondence  with 
Lord  Ashburton,  contending  that  under  the 
law  of  nations  jurisdiction  over  a  foreign  ship 
brought  into  a  port  against  its  will  did  not 
extend  to  the  divesting  of  property  rights  on 
board,  and  that  on  the  general  principles  of 
international  comity  rigorous  procedure  under 
such  circumstances  as  those  that  brought  the 
Creole  into  port  was  barbarous,  and  destructive 
to  all  hope  of  amicable  relations.  Here  again 
Ashburton  disclaimed  authority  to  go  at  large 
into  the  question,  but  engaged  that  the  govern 
ors  of  the  British  colonies  near  the  slave  States 
should  be  cautioned  against  "officious  interfer 
ence  with  American  vessels  driven  by  accident 
or  by  violence  into  those  ports." 


120  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

The  pacific  adjustment  of  the  boundary  on 
the  northeastern  border  of  the  United  States 
was  the  most  decisive  and  satisfactory  feature 
of  the  treaty.  There  had  been  high  hopes  in 
British  governmental  circles  that  all  the  old 
questions  at  issue  between  the  two  nations 
would  be  set  at  rest.  Not  only  did  these  hopes 
fail,  but  almost  before  the  ink  was  dry  on  the 
treaty  the  unsettled  issues  took  on  a  threaten 
ing  aspect.  American  aspirations  were  directed 
with  new  earnestness  to  territorial  expansion 
on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  on  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  British  interests  were  supposed  to  re 
quire  that  such  expansion  should  be  thwarted. 
Out  of  this  situation  arose  serious  ill  feeling, 
both  governmental  and  popular,  in  relation  to 
Texas,  Oregon,  and  California. 

Texas  was  in  1842  an  independent  republic, 
recognized  as  such  by  the  leading  powers  of  the 
world,  though  not  by  Mexico.  British  interests 
in  Mexico  were  very  large,  chiefly  through  the 
extensive  holdings  of  Mexican  bonds  in  Great 
Britain.  Texas  freed  herself  from  Mexican  rule 
in  the  later  thirties,  largely  through  the  aid 
given  by  immigrants  and  adventurers  from  the 
United  States.  The  British  Government  at  first 
used  its  influence  to  bring  about  the  reunion 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  121 

of  the  revolted  state  to  Mexico.  In  1839,  how 
ever,  the  policy  was  changed,  and  systematic 
pressure  was  brought  to  bear  to  induce  Mexico 
to  recognize  the  independence  of  Texas.  Palm- 
erston,  then  at  the  British  Foreign  Office,  was 
convinced  that  the  Texans  were  too  strong  to 
be  reconquered,  and  that  further  efforts  in  that 
direction  would  only  bring  the  Americans  in 
overwhelming  numbers  to  the  aid  of  Texas,  with 
annexation  to  the  United  States  as  the  inev 
itable  result.  For  Mexican  welfare  it  was  im 
portant,  he  argued,  that  there  should  be  a 
strong  buffer  state  to  hold  the  ever-aggres 
sive  Americans  in  check.  For  British  interests 
a  great  cotton-growing  community,  competing 
with  the  United  States,  promised  signal  advan 
tages  in  commerce  and  industry.  This  reason 
ing  failed  to  win  Mexico,  and  Great  Britain, 
abandoning  the  hope  of  harmony  with  the 
Mexican  Government,  conceded  the  long-with 
held  recognition  of  Texan  independence. 

The  treaties  that  embodied  this  recognition 
were  ratified  only  in  the  middle  of  1842.  One 
of  them  was  directed  to  the  suppression  of  the 
slave-trade  through  the  reciprocal  grant  of  the 
right  of  search.  The  first  diplomatic  represent 
ative  sent  by  Great  Britain  to  Texas  was  an 


122  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

ardent  abolitionist,  who  began  unofficial  ef 
forts  to  bring  about  the  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  in  Texas  through  money  loaned  by  Great 
Britain.  Thus  there  entered  into  the  situation 
an  influence  that  was  destined  to  have  most 
important  consequences.  In  the  course  of  1843 
Lord  Aberdeen  committed  his  government  def 
initely  to  the  policy  of  promoting  abolition 
in  Texas.  Reports  of  this  proceeding,  however 
inaccurate  and  distorted,  produced  an  imme 
diate  commotion  in  the  United  States.  That 
Great  Britain  should  be  taking  any  active  in 
terest  whatever  in  Texan  affairs,  was  regarded 
all  over  the  land  as  disquieting;  that  she  should 
be  seeking  to  abolitionize  Texas,  was  regarded  by 
the  slave  States  as  a  malicious  attack  on  their 
welfare.  The  long-dormant  project  of  annexa 
tion  was  taken  up  and  pressed  with  energy  as 
the  only  sure  way  of  counteracting  the  insidious 
activity  of  the  British.  Not  that  Aberdeen's 
policy  was  the  sole  basis  of  the  new  agitation; 
but  it  played  an  important  part  in  the  affair 
and  revealed  again  the  peculiar  sensitiveness  of 
the  Americans  in  relation  to  Great  Britain. 

Advances  to  Texas  in  respect  to  annexation 
were  made  by  the  United  States  in  the  autumn 
of  1843,  and  a  treaty  was  concluded  in  April  of 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  123 

1844.  Two  months  later  the  treaty,  after  a 
fierce  struggle,  was  rejected  by  the  American 
Senate.  During  this  whole  period  the  British 
Government,  as  is  known  perfectly  now  but  was 
only  a  matter  of  strong  suspicion  at  the  time, 
labored  earnestly  to  thwart  annexation.  Aber 
deen  sought  the  support  of  France  and  proposed 
to  Mexico  that,  if  she  would  recognize  the  inde 
pendence  of  Texas,  Great  Britain  and  France 
should  jointly  guarantee  the  boundaries  of  both 
Mexico  and  Texas  against  the  United  States. 
This  drastic  project  was  eventually  dropped 
because  France  declined  to  face  a  war  with  the 
United  States,  and  because  the  British  and 
French  ministers  at  Washington  agreed  in  re 
porting  that  the  immediate  result,  if  the  plan 
should  become  known,  would  be  the  carrying 
out  of  annexation  at  all  hazards  by  the  United 
States.  In  the  presidential  campaign  of  1844 
a  demand  for  annexation  was  formally  incor 
porated  into  the  platform  of  the  Democratic 
Party,  and  that  party  triumphed  in  the  election. 
British  "interference"  in  American  affairs  was 
a  conspicuous  theme  of  Democratic  denuncia 
tion  during  the  heat  of  the  canvass,  and  the 
suspicions,  half-truths,  and  downright  fabrica 
tions  that  always  play  so  large  a  part  on  such 


124  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

occasions  evoked  abundant  manifestations  of 
anti-British  feeling  among  the  people.  Under 
the  impulse  of  the  Democratic  victory  President 
Tyler  pressed  upon  Congress  a  plan  for  the 
annexation  of  Texas  by  legislative  act  rather 
than  by  treaty,  and  the  plan  was  adopted  in 
the  ensuing  session  and  put  in  operation  by 
Tyler  before  the  inauguration  of  the  newly 
elected  President,  Polk.  The  formal  consum 
mation  of  the  plan  was  effected  by  the  latter 
late  in  1845.  Aberdeen's  efforts  to  thwart  it 
did  not  cease  till  the  decisive  step  toward  enter 
ing  the  Union  was  definitely  taken  by  Texas 
itself. 

Meanwhile  a  more  open  and  dangerous  con 
troversy  with  the  United  States  had  developed 
in  relation  to  the  interests  of  the  two  nations 
in  the  Oregon  country.  The  region  concerned 
lay  between  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  the  Rocky 
Mountains  and  between  the  parallels  of  42° 
and  54°  40'  north  latitude.  Under  the  treaties 
of  1818  and  1827,  as  we  have  seen,  the  boundary 
in  this  region  was  left  undetermined,  and  the 
country  was  left  "free  and  open  ...  to  the 
vessels,  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  two  Powers." 
The  object  of  this  provision  was  to  permit  the 
natural  course  of  settlement  to  proceed  without 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  125 

interference  and  furnish  some  indication  of  a 
desirable  boundary.  British  occupation  was 
carried  out  by  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company, 
which  established  a  chain  of  posts  along  the 
Columbia  River  from  the  ocean  to  the  moun 
tains,  with  other  posts  to  the  northward  and 
the  southward.  This  famous  company  absorbed 
in  1821  its  rival,  the  Northwest  Company,  of 
Montreal,  and  thereafter  possessed  a  monopoly 
of  all  trade  throughout  British  America  to  the 
west  and  north  of  Canada.  Of  government  for 
this  vast  territory  there  was  none  save  that  fur 
nished  by  the  agents  of  the  company.  As  a 
commercial  enterprise  the  company  was  suc 
cessful.  As  a  promoter  of  colonization  it  was 
worse  than  useless.  Its  interest  lay  obviously 
in  maintaining  the  conditions  that  produced 
the  most  furs;  settlements  and  civilization  were 
not  among  such  conditions.  Hence  all  the 
reports  and  all  the  influence  of  the  great  com 
pany  were  strongly  adverse  to  any  influx  of 
settlers  either*  overland  from  the  provinces  or 
by  way  of  the  ocean. 

American  occupation  of  the  Oregon  territory 
began  with  the  establishment  of  Astoria  as  a 
fur-trading  post  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia 
just  before  the  War  of  1812.  Seized  by  the 


126  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

British  during  the  war,  it  was  restored  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  terms  of  peace,  but  was 
ultimately  abandoned  by  the  American  traders. 
During  the  twenties  the  fur-trade  that  centred 
in  Saint  Louis  extended  its  operations  on  a 
large  scale  beyond  the  Rocky  Mountains.  The 
South  Pass,  through  which  the  first  transconti 
nental  railway  was  destined  to  cross  the  moun 
tains,  was  discovered  and  was  made  the  high 
way  for  a  well-organized  traffic  with  the  Indians 
and  trappers  in  the  extreme  southeastern  part 
of  the  Oregon  territory.  From  the  South  Pass 
access  to  the  head-waters  of  the  Columbia  River 
was,  by  the  standards  of  that  vast  wilderness, 
short  and  easy.  Hence  communication  with 
the  Hudson's  Bay  Company's  posts  soon  be 
came  frequent,  and  the  famous  Oregon  Trail 
entered  into  history. 

Early  in  the  thirties  futile  schemes  for  emi 
gration  to  Oregon  were  essayed  by  restless  and 
visionary  New  Englanders.  Somewhat  later  a 
definite  impulse  to  interest  in  the  region  was 
given  by  the  missionary  spirit  of  the  Methodists 
and  Presbyterians.  Parties  sent  out  under  the 
auspices  of  these  sects  in  1834  and  succeeding 
years  crossed  the  plains  and  the  mountains  in 
company  with  the  fur-traders  who  set  out  in 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  127 

well-organized  caravans  from  Saint  Louis  every 
spring.  The  purpose  of  the  missionaries  was 
to  Christianize  and  civilize  the  Indians,  but  the 
sites  selected  for  the  stations  were  naturally 
determined  by  the  requirements  of  the  white 
man's  life.  The  valleys  of  the  Columbia  and 
its  tributaries  were  found  to  abound  in  rich 
agricultural  lands.  The  climate  was  mild  and 
the  rainfall  copious.  Reports  of  the  attractive 
ness  of  the  region  circulated  through  the  United 
States,  together  with  highly  colored  descriptions 
of  the  establishments  by  which  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company  was  maintaining  and  consol 
idating  the  British  occupation.  As  a  conse 
quence  demands  began  to  be  heard,  in  Congress 
and  out,  for  action  by  the  government  for  the 
encouragement  and  protection  of  an  American 
occupation.  Before  anything  was  done,  how 
ever,  emigration  from  the  settled  States  assumed 
large  proportions.  From  1841  every  spring  saw 
a  numerous  company  start  from  western  Mis 
souri  on  the  long  journey  to  Oregon,  which  they 
were  lucky  to  reach  six  months  later.  Arrived 
in  the  promised  land,  they  found  no  semblance 
of  political  organization  or  authority  save  where 
the  British  flag  waved  over  the  posts  of  the  Hud 
son's  Bay  Company. 


128  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

Resentment  at  such  a  condition  of  affairs 
was  expressed  with  steadily  increasing  volume 
throughout  the  United  States,  but  especially 
in  the  West,  and  was  accompanied  by  shrill 
demands  that  the  American  claim  to  the  whole 
of  the  Oregon  territory  should  be  effectively 
asserted.  In  the  presidential  campaign  of  1844 
the  Democrats  united  this  demand  with  that 
for  the  annexation  of  Texas.  "  Fifty-four  forty 
or  fight"  was  the  alliterative  slogan  that  em 
bodied  the  jingoistic  feeling  as  to  Oregon.  The 
Democratic  convention  recorded  in  the  party 
platform  its  conviction  "that  our  title  to  the 
whole  of  the  territory  of  Oregon  is  clear  and 
unquestionable;  that  no  portion  of  the  same 
ought  to  be  ceded  to  England  or  any  other 
power."  With  all  due  allowance  for  the  insin 
cerities  and  bluster  of  campaign  declamation, 
the  election  of  Polk  on  such  a  platform,  together 
with  the  popular  feeling  exhibited  during  the 
canvass,  gave  strong  evidence  that  the  time 
was  at  hand  for  a  definitive  settlement  of  the 
long-standing  question.  The  inaugural  address 
of  the  new  President,  in  March,  1845,  made  the 
matter  perfectly  clear.  Polk  declared  it  his  duty 
to  "assert  and  maintain  by  all  constitutional 
means  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  that 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  129 

portion  of  our  territory  which  lies  beyond  the 
Rocky  Mountains."  This  declaration  attracted 
much  attention  in  Great  Britain,  where  it  was 
regarded  as  a  bellicose  claim  to  the  whole 
of  Oregon.  Sir  Robert  Peel,  the  prime  min 
ister,  as  well  as  the  leader  of  the  opposition  and 
other  political  chieftains,  felt  called  upon  to 
make  public  counter-declarations  that  British 
claims  to  the  region  would  be  sustained  at  all 
hazards. 

While  this  little  flurry  of  long-range  defiance 
was  in  progress,  with  the  embellishments  that 
the  newspapers  were  able  to  add,  a  more  sig 
nificant  element  in  the  general  situation  showed 
itself  in  the  unusually  large  numbers  that  as 
sembled  in  western  Missouri  to  join  the  annual 
trek  over  the  Oregon  Trail.  The  character  of 
these  emigrants  was  as  a  whole  excellent,  and 
their  purpose  of  making  homes  for  themselves 
in  the  distant  territory  was  guaranteed  by  the 
large  numbers  of  women  and  children  in  every 
party.  To  look  after  the  interests  of  these  peo 
ple,  both  on  their  long  progress  across  the 
plains  and  mountains  and  in  their  new  homes, 
was  a  most  obvious  duty  of  a  government  that 
made  any  pretensions  to  efficiency. 

Folk's  secretary  of  state,  Buchanan,  took  up 


130  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

the  Oregon  question  with  Pakenham,  the  Brit 
ish  minister  at  Washington,  in  the  summer  of 
1845.  Negotiations  as  to  the  northwestern 
boundary  of  the  United  States  had  been  carried 
on  at  intervals  ever  since  the  purchase  of  the 
Louisiana  territory  in  1803  gave  the  United 
States  a  definite  interest  in  the  region.  Diplo 
macy  had  exhausted  all  the  arguments  based  on 
discovery,  exploration,  treaty,  and  occupation, 
without  leaving  any  possibility  that  either  the 
British  or  the  American  Government  could  ex 
clude  the  other  entirely  from  the  tract  in  dis 
pute.  Division  of  the  territory  had  been  pro 
posed  by  both  sides,  the  Americans  offering  the 
extension  of  the  parallel  of  forty-nine  degrees 
from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the  Pacific,  the 
British  insisting  on  the  Columbia  River  from 
the  point  at  which  its  northern  branch  was 
intersected  by  the  same  parallel.  Near  the 
close  of  Tyler's  administration  an  offer  of  arbi 
tration  by  the  British  was  declined.  When 
Buchanan  resumed  negotiations  in  July,  1845, 
he  again  offered  forty-nine  degrees  to  the  Pacific, 
explaining  that  while  President  Polk  believed 
the  American  claim  to  the  whole  region  was 
valid,  he  felt  precluded  by  the  acts  of  his  prede 
cessors  from  insisting  on  it  without  first  trying 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  131 

what  they  had  been  willing  to  concede.  Pak- 
enham  here  made  a  grave  tactical  error.  With 
out  consulting  his  government  he  rejected  the 
proposal,  in  terms  so  peremptory  and  ill-advised 
as  to  give  great  offence  to  the  President.  Polk 
promptly  revealed  a  spirit  that  he  had  not  been 
supposed  to  possess.  Against  the  almost  tearful 
protests  of  the  timid  Buchanan  he  practically 
broke  off  negotiations  by  directing  the  secret aiy 
to  withdraw  his  offer  and  to  refrain  from  all 
further  consideration  of  the  question  until  some 
definite  proposal  should  be  received  from  Great 
Britain.  This  position  the  President  main 
tained  unflinchingly  despite  repeated  efforts  of 
Pakenham  to  induce  a  renewal  of  the  offer;  for 
Lord  Aberdeen  had  disapproved  of  his  course 
in  rejecting  it,  and  Pakenham  was  left  in  a  very 
uncomfortable  position. 

In  his  message  to  Congress  in  December,  1845, 
Polk  confirmed  his  uncompromising  attitude  by 
revealing  the  whole  situation,  claiming  that  the 
conciliatory  policy  of  the  United  States  had  been 
flouted  by  Great  Britain,  and  calling  upon  Con 
gress  for  legislation  to  sustain  the  right  to  all 
Oregon,  and  to  protect  its  citizens  who  should 
settle  therein.  As  against  the  policy  of  Great 
Britain  he  propounded  two  dogmas  that  must 


132  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

prevail  in  relation  to  America:  first,  that  there 
must  be  no  interference  by  European  powers 
with  the  independent  action  of  the  nations  on 
this  continent;  second,  that  no  new  colony  shall 
be  established  by  any  European  power  in  North 
America.  These  principles  he  considered  to  be 
implicit  in  the  celebrated  dicta  of  President 
Monroe  twenty-two  years  earlier,  which  he 
cited  and  reaffirmed.  Folk's  immediate  appli 
cation  of  his  principles  was,  of  course,  to  Texas 
and  Oregon.  If  any  portion  of  the  people  of 
this  continent  should  wish  to  join  with  the 
United  States,  no  European  power  shall  inter 
fere  to  prevent  the  union;  further,  "no  future 
European  colony  or  dominion  shall,  with  our 
consent,  be  planted  or  established  on  any  part 
of  the  North  American  continent."  As  the  first 
of  these  expressions  referred  unmistakably  to 
Aberdeen's  diplomatic  activities  in  Texas,  so 
the  second,  through  the  indefinite  extension  of 
Monroe's  doctrine  implied  in  the  words  I  have 
italicized,  referred  no  less  clearly  to  Oregon. 

This  belligerent  pronouncement  of  Polk  was 
naturally  the  prelude  to  a  long  season  of  war 
like  feeling  and  hostile  recrimination  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic.  As  the  treaty  of  1827 
provided  for  the  termination  of  the  joint  occu- 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  133 

pation  of  Oregon  by  one  year's  notice  from  either 
government,  Polk  asked  Congress  for  authority 
to  give  the  necessary  notice.  After  debates 
lasting  all  through  the  winter,  the  authority  was 
given,  and  Great  Britain  was  duly  notified  in 
April  of  1846.  Long  before  this  date,  however, 
a  way  had  been  found  for  the  resumption  of 
diplomatic  discussion  of  the  question.  Polk 
stiffly  maintained  his  old  position,  but  consented 
to  take  the  advice  of  the  Senate  on  any  propo 
sal  that  should  come  from  Great  Britain.  The 
offer  duly  came  of  the  forty-ninth  parallel,  re 
serving  to  the  British  Vancouver  Island  and 
the  navigation  of  the  Columbia  River.  On  the 
advice  of  the  Senate  Polk  accepted  this;  the 
treaty  was  signed  June  15,  1846,  and  went  into 
effect  in  August.  This  happy  outcome  not  only 
ended  a  dangerous  tension  between  the  two 
great  English-speaking  peoples,  but  by  com 
pleting  a  conventionally  fixed  boundary  from 
ocean  to  ocean,  seemed  to  remove  definitively 
a  prolific  source  of  controversy.  Unfortunately 
a  small  fraction  of  the  line  at  the  ocean  end 
was  defined  in  terms  of  geography  rather  than 
astronomy,  and  thus  a  dispute  was  prepared 
that  was  destined  to  carry  the  history  of  bound 
ary  troubles  over  another  quarter  of  a  century. 


134  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

Before  a  settlement  was  reached  of  this  rather 
insignificant  difficulty  Alaska  had  been  acquired 
by  the  United  States,  with  additional  thousands 
of  miles  of  contact  with  British  territory,  and 
material  was  provided  for  controversy  that  ex 
tended  well  into  the  twentieth  century. 

When  the  Oregon  dispute  was  ended  by  the 
signing  of  the  treaty,  the  United  States  was  at 
war  with  Mexico.  Hostilities  had  been  pre 
cipitated  by  a  collision  between  Mexican  and 
American  troops  on  territory  claimed  by  both 
governments.  War  had  been  practically  cer 
tain  ever  since  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  Polk 
was  on  the  point  of  beginning  it  on  other  grounds 
when  the  destruction  of  a  small  detachment  of 
American  troops  gave  him  an  opportunity  to 
appeal  strongly  to  popular  passion.  The  griev 
ances  of  the  United  States  against  Mexico  were 
neither  new  nor  few,  but  it  was  well  understood 
that  they  could  be  satisfactorily  adjusted  by  a 
cession  of  territory.  California,  extending  some 
ten  degrees  of  latitude  southward  from  Oregon 
on  the  Pacific  coast,  was  on  the  point  of  revolt 
from  the  weak  and  distant  central  government 
of  Mexico.  That  the  Californians  were  in  mor 
tal  terror  of  the  Yankees  was  common  knowl 
edge;  that  British  relations  with  Mexico  were 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  135 

intimate  was  equally  well  known.  The  pre 
dilection  of  Great  Britain  for  coastal  territory 
all  over  the  globe,  especially  where  adorned 
with  so  attractive  a  harbor  as  that  of  San  Fran 
cisco,  had  been  exhibited  for  centuries.  Finally, 
the  British  naval  squadron  on  the  Pacific  coast 
displayed  from  time  to  time  a  kind  and  degree 
of  activity  that  aroused  grave  suspicions  of  sin 
ister  designs.  Out  of  all  these  elements  was 
developed  a  wide-spread  belief  in  the  United 
States  that  California  was  about  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  Great  Britain.  While  the  Oregon 
issue  was  acute,  this  feeling  was  naturally  a 
source  of  much  unhappiness.  Polk  entered  the 
White  House  with  a  firm  purpose  to  settle  for 
all  time  the  California  question  by  acquiring  the 
territory,  with  such  an  additional  tract  in  the 
interior  as  would  neatly  round  out  the  bound 
ary  eastward  to  Texas.  Since  Mexico  refused 
to  listen  to  any  proposition  for  the  purchase  of 
California,  forcible  acquisition  became  an  in 
dispensable  feature  of  Folk's  programme,  and 
the  Mexican  War  would  doubtless  have  taken 
place  regardless  of  all  other  matters  at  issue. 

What  actual  ground  there  was  for  the  fear 
that  Great  Britain  was  seeking  to  forestall  Amer 
ica  in  California  has  become  known  only  in  re- 


136  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

cent  years.  The  gist  of  Lord  Aberdeen's  policy 
was,  not  to  acquire  California  for  Great  Britain, 
but  to  keep  it  out  of  the  hands  of  the  United 
States  by  any  means  short  of  war.  His  posi 
tion  was  the  same  as  in  relation  to  Texas. 
The  interests  of  Great  Britain  required  that  the 
expansion  of  the  American  Republic  be  opposed 
by  every  peaceful  influence.  Aberdeen  would 
have  guaranteed  California  to  Mexico  if  France 
had  been  willing  to  join  in  the  bond.  He  re 
jected  overtures  from  a  revolutionary  party  of 
California  who  suggested  a  British  protectorate, 
but  accompanied  the  rejection  with  a  plain  inti 
mation  'that  if  a  revolt  should  separate  the 
province  from  Mexico,  Great  Britain  would  pre 
fer  to  give  it  protection  rather  than  see  that 
function  undertaken  by  any  other  power.  After 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  when  war  was  clearly 
impending,  he  urged  Mexico  in  the  most  ener 
getic  terms  to  avoid  war,  on  the  ground  that  she 
would  surely  lose  California  also.  He  even  took 
into  apparently  serious  consideration  schemes 
for  the  creation  of  a  British  interest  in  Califor 
nia  by  large  grants  of  land  to  British  holders  of 
Mexican  bonds.  But  this  was  at  the  time  when 
the  Oregon  question  was  in  its  acute  stage,  and 
the  British  cabinet  perceived  easily  enough  that 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  137 

any  such  proceeding  would  be  regarded  as  hos 
tile  by  the  United  States,  and  would  indefinitely 
postpone  the  settlement  that  was  so  eagerly 
desired.  To  keep  open  the  possibility  of  Mex 
ican  aid  in  case  the  Oregon  dispute  led  to  war, 
was  a  most  obvious  duty  of  the  British  Govern 
ment,  and  accordingly  Aberdeen  continued  to 
show  interest  in  California  in  the  winter  of 
1845-46.  After  the  way  to  agreement  with  the 
United  States  became  clear,  and  Mexico  at  the 
same  time  took  the  course  that  made  a  breach 
with  that  nation  certain,  California  and  Mexico 
were  both  left  to  their  fate. 

If  reason  were  anything  like  as  large  a  factor 
in  human  affairs  as  is  often  pretended,  the  fric 
tion  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  in  the  forties  over  Oregon  and  California, 
if  not  over  Texas,  would  never  have  developed. 
There  was  nothing  of  the  rational  in  the  spirit 
that  led  the  American  immigrants  to  Oregon, 
when  much  more  promising  opportunities  for 
welfare  in  every  sense  lay  open  without  a  jour 
ney  of  two  thousand  desert  miles  to  reach  them. 
The  acquisition  of  California  was  projected  be 
fore  any  man  faintly  suspected  its  power  to 
satisfy  the  hunger  for  gold,  and  when  its  enor 
mous  area  could  not  reasonably  be  expected  to 


138  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

be  adequately  peopled  for  centuries.  So  far  as 
suspicion  of  British  designs  on  the  Pacific  ter 
ritory  operated  to  promote  the  American  policy, 
that  policy  was  doubtless  rational;  for  the  his 
tory  of  the  British  Empire  gave  little  assurance 
of  a  dislike  for  expansion,  and  strong  Britain 
would  be  a  less  desirable  neighbor  than  weak 
Mexico.  Yet  it  would  not  have  been  difficult  to 
ascertain  and  publish  the  truth,  that  neither  the 
government  nor  the  people  of  Great  Britain  in 
the  forties  had  any  wish  or  purpose  to  acquire 
any  regions  contiguous  to  the  United  States. 
The  rather  pronounced  trend  of  feeling  was  in 
just  the  opposite  direction,  toward  the  thought 
that  there  was  already  somewhat  more  con 
tact  with  the  republic  than  was  altogether  de 
sirable. 

What  did  most  to  increase  by  two-thirds  the 
already  vast  area  of  the  United  States  was  the 
aggressive  idealism  of  the  American  democracy. 
In  the  forties  this  characteristic  was  probably 
at  its  maximum.  The  nation  was  permeated 
with  a  sense  of  power  and  of  destiny  that  tol 
erated  no  suggestion  of  limit  in  any  direction. 
On  the  cultural  side  indications  of  an  approach 
ing  realization  of  the  ideal  were  scanty;  on  the 
material  side  every  manifestation  of  bigness 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  139 

was  accepted  as  normal  and  inevitable.  The 
addition  of  12,000,000  square  miles  of  territory 
to  their  18,000,000  aroused  no  misgivings  in  the 
mass  of  the  people,  and  there  were  not  lacking 
those  who  felt  that  the  whole  of  Mexico  should 
properly  have  been  taken  over  instead  of  the 
northern  provinces  only.  In  the  very  month 
in  which  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  (Feb 
ruary,  1848),  by  one  of  the  most  astonishing 
coincidences  that  history  records,  the  acquisi 
tion  of  California  was  justified,  in  the  economic 
sense,  by  the  discovery  of  gold  in  its  mountains. 
As  against  this  providential  confirmation  of 
manifest  destiny,  promptly  developed  the  bitter 
strife  over  slavery  in  the  new  territory,  with 
results  so  disastrous  to  the  unity  of  the  nation. 

Between  1815  and  1840  the  population  of 
the  United  States  increased  from  8,000,000  to 
17,000,000.  While  large,  this  gain  was  not 
astounding,  and  it  certainly  gave  no  basis  for 
an  extension  of  territory.  Overcrowding  could 
not  be  considered  imminent  when  the  number 
of  persons  per  square  mile  stood  at  9.73.  As 
compared  with  the  United  Kingdom  the  growth 
of  the  United  States  had  effected  a  significant 
change  in  relations.  The  War  of  1812  was 
fought  by  a  people  numbering  8,000,000  against 


140  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

one  numbering  19,000,000;  a  war  over  Oregon 
would  have  pitted  20,000,000  against  less  than 
27,000,000.  What  these  figures  portended  as 
to  the  future  distribution  of  the  English-speak 
ing  race,  was  not  difficult  to  see.  With  all  its 
growth,  however,  whether  absolute  or  relative, 
the  American  people  sprawled  and  straggled 
over  a  territory  much  too  large  for  its  immediate 
needs,  yet  drew  from  the  excess  only  the  in 
satiable  yearning  for  more. 

In  the  thick  of  the  unpleasantness  over  the 
Oregon  question,  it  was  often  proclaimed  by 
boastful  Americans  that  Great  Britain  would 
not  dare  to  fight  a  people  so  numerous  as  they 
had  now  become.  So  far  as  military  or  naval 
considerations  were  concerned,  this  was,  of 
course,  ridiculous.  In  another  aspect,  however, 
the  growth  of  population  in  America  had  indeed 
raised  up  a  powerful  influence  against  war. 
British  industry  and  commerce  had  become  de 
pendent  in  an  extraordinary  degree  for  their 
prosperity  on  the  United  States.  As  regularly 
as  the  seasons,  three-fourths  of  the  great  cotton 
crop  took  ship  for  England  from  the  ports  of 
the  southern  States  of  the  Union.  Lancashire 
in  the  forties  well  understood  the  danger,  that 
in  the  sixties  became  disaster,  from  the  shutting 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  141 

off  of  the  raw  material  for  the  cotton-mills. 
At  the  earlier  date,  moreover,  the  peril  was 
greater;  for  as  yet  Great  Britain  was  still  feed 
ing  her  people  from  her  own  crops,  and  the 
people  often  went  hungry.  Starvation  on  a 
large  scale  would  have  ensued  very  promptly 
if  the  cotton  supply  had  been  stopped  in  the 
early  forties. 

This  was  one  disturbing  result  of  the  growth 
of  population  in  the  United  Kingdom — a  result 
that  had  no  parallel  in  the  United  States. 
Where  the  food  supply  was  redundant  and  cheap 
any  interruption  of  normal  economic  processes 
by  war  or  other  disaster  produced  loss  and  dis 
comfort  but  not  famine.  Where,  as  in  England 
and  Ireland,  the  food  supply  was  precarious  and 
dear,  any  interference  with  the  normal  condi 
tions  brought  famine  and  revolt.  In  the  early 
forties  recurring  distress  and  agitation  among 
the  working  classes  gave  abundant  warning  to 
the  leading  statesmen  that  so  grave  an  economic 
disturbance  as  would  be  involved  in  a  war  with 
the  United  States  was  not  to  be  risked  so  long 
as  any  way  of  escape  was  open. 

The  task  of  handling  the  delicate  issues  that 
were  presented  by  the  international  and  the 
internal  problems  that  have  been  noticed  fell 


142  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

to  the  lot  of  the  Tory  cabinet  of  Sir  Robert 
Peel,  1841-6.  As  the  one  set  of  problems  cen 
tred  in  the  due  recognition  of  the  American 
democracy,  so  the  other  set  involved  large  con 
cessions  to  the  democratic  movement  in  Great 
Britain.  There  was  a  connection  between  the 
two  that,  while  it  did  not  escape  notice  in  the 
reasoned  debates,  for  the  most  part  lurked  ob 
scurely  in  the  channels  of  popular  feeling. 
Peel's  government  was  called  upon  to  deal  with 
two  questions  of  internal  politics  that  particu 
larly  appealed  to  the  American  interest.  These 
were  the  repeal  of  the  union  with  Ireland  and 
the  abolition  of  the  Corn  Laws. 

O'Connell's  tremendous  agitation  for  the  res 
toration  of  an  Irish  Parliament  such  as  had 
existed  before  1800,  won  sympathy  in  America 
on  various  grounds  other  than  that  unthinking 
joy  which  greeted  every  situation  producing 
trouble  for  the  British  Government.  It  seemed 
to  be  the  demand  of  the  common  people  for 
relief  from  oppression  by  a  privileged  class;  it 
seemed  to  be  a  demand  for  self-government  as 
opposed  to  foreign  rule;  it  seemed  to  be  a  per 
fect  application  of  that  principle  of  nationality 
that  had  been  so  eloquently  proclaimed  by 
Englishmen,  both  official  and  unofficial,  in  sus- 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  143 

taining  the  claims  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Poles 
to  independence.  There  survived,  too,  in  the 
United  States,  the  tradition  of  Grattan's  Par 
liament,  which  received  the  breath  of  life 
through  the  success  of  the  war  that  made 
America  free  from  Great  Britain.  Irishmen  in 
thousands,  many  of  them  high  in  the  esteem  of 
their  communities,  pervaded  the  United  States, 
and  preached  antipathy  to  Britain.  Repeal 
rent,  as  the  funds  were  called  that  sustained 
O'Connell's  cause,  flowed  in  copious  streams 
from  America.  The  suppression  of  the  agita 
tion  by  main  force  in  1843  made  on  more  than 
Irish  hearts  the  impression  that  in  the  govern 
ment  of  Peel  the  hated  forces  of  aristocratic 
tyranny  were  still  clearly  in  the  ascendant. 

The  different  outcome  of  the  popular  move 
ment  against  the  Corn  Laws  in  England  had  some 
effect  in  moderating  the  distrust  of  Peel.  When 
he  came  to  power  in  1841,  every  branch  of 
British  industry,  mining,  manufacturing,  and 
agricultural,  was  protected  by  customs  duties. 
When  he  left  office  five  years  later,  the  whole 
protective  tariff  had  disappeared,  and  Great 
Britain  was  committed  to  freedom  of  trade. 
This  great  revolution  was  a  direct  continuation 
of  the  liberalizing  reforms  that  had  been  in 


144  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

progress  since  1815.  The  immediate  occasion 
for  the  change  was  the  necessity  of  readjustment 
in  the  budget  to  get  rid  of  a  persistent  deficit; 
the  character  of  the  change  was  determined, 
however,  by  the  intellectual  conviction  slowly 
reached  by  Peel  and  his  coadjutors  that  Adam 
Smith's  economic  philosophy  was  sound.  To 
get  rid  of  the  protection  on  manufactures  was 
no  hard  matter.  The  manufacturing  centres 
were  the  abodes  of  Whigs  and  Radicals,  and 
Peel's  Tory  followers  were  not  unwilling  to  see 
them  ruined.  By  1845,  through  successive  re 
ductions,  most  of  the  old  tariff  was  gone.  The 
process  involved  some  changes  in  the  agricul 
tural  items  and  every  step  in  this  direction 
caused  frantic  alarm  among  the  landowning 
aristocracy  who  furnished  the  bulk  of  the  Tory 
party.  It  was  becoming  clear  that  the  Corn 
Laws  were  doomed,  and  it  seemed  likely  that  the 
Tory  leader  himself  was  to  be  the  agent  for 
executing  the  decree.  The  full  meaning  of  this 
situation  to  the  aristocracy  is  to  be  realized 
only  when  attention  is  given  to  the  extra- 
Parliamentary  activities  of  the  Anti-Corn-Law 
League. 

This  organization  was  formed,  as  has  been 
stated,  in  the  later  thirties,  and  was  made  a 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  145 

vital  force  by  Richard  Cobden.  In  1841  John 
Bright  became  formally  associated  with  Cobden 
in  their  famous  partnership  of  agitation.  Under 
the  leadership  of  these  two  men  the  League 
was,  in  object,  in  methods,  and  in  organization, 
the  open  and  determined  foe  of  the  ruling  aris 
tocracy.  Its  members  were  drawn  chiefly  from 
the  working  classes  of  the  towns;  its  branches 
spread  all  over  the  land,  on  the  model  of  the 
associations  which  O'Connell  had  made  so  well 
known;  its  method  was  that  of  unceasing  ap 
peal,  in  speech  and  print,  to  the  thought  and 
the  emotions  of  the  people;  its  object  was  to 
break  down,  not  only  the  protective  system  and 
its  particular  provision  as  to  corn,  but  the  whole 
controlling  influence  of  the  landed  aristocracy 
in  the  public  affairs  of  the  British  nation. 
There  was  no  effort  to  disguise  this  object. 
Cobden's  lucid  reasoning  was  pointed  with 
scorn  of  the  stupidity  of  the  peers  and  squires 
in  failing  to  see  that  free  trade  in  corn  was 
for  their  real  interest;  Bright's  passionate  elo 
quence  went  straight  to  their  selfishness,  cruelty, 
and  oppression  in  fighting  to  keep  up  their 
rents  at  the  expense  of  a  starving  people.  A 
stupid,  selfish,  cruel,  tyrannical  aristocracy,  so 
the  corollary  ran,  must  no  longer  control  the 


146  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

destinies  of  the  nation.  The  despised  common 
people  must  assert  themselves  and  be  free. 
What  Cobden  and  Bright  did  not  say,  though 
the  harried  Tories  were  not  silent  about  it,  was 
that  the  result  of  free  trade  would  be  to  substi 
tute  an  industrial  and  commercial  for  the  old 
agricultural  aristocracy  in  dominion  over  the 
nation. 

From  1842  to  1845  bad  harvests,  industrial 
depression,  strikes,  wide-spread  poverty  and  dis 
tress  in  England  played  perfectly  the  game  of 
the  Anti-Corn-Law  League.  In  the  last  of  these 
years  came  the  frightful  failure  of  the  potato 
crop,  making  imperative  some  drastic  step  to 
mitigate  the  impending  famine  in  Ireland.  Peel 
knew  that  if  he  suspended  the  corn  duties,  as 
had  been  done  twenty  years  before  in  an  emer 
gency,  the  League  would  be  able  to  see  to  it 
that  they  should  never  be  restored.  He  was 
already  convinced  that  protection  was  econom 
ically  and  politically  wrong.  There  was  noth 
ing  for  him  to  do  but  demand  of  his  party 
consent  to  the  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws.  His 
measures  for  this  purpose  passed  Parliament  in 
1846,  but  their  passage  was  the  death-knell  of 
the  Tory  party.  An  embittered  fraction  of  the 
party,  inspired  chiefly  by  the  rising  Disraeli, 


THE  ROARING  FORTIES  147 

seized  an  early  opportunity  to  desert  the  cab 
inet  and  effect  its  downfall. 

The  overthrow  of  the  Peel  government  coin 
cided  in  time  with  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
settling  the  Oregon  dispute.  Aberdeen  an 
nounced  the  agreement  with  the  United  States 
to  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  same  day  that  his 
retirement  from  office  was  announced.  Though 
Cobden  and  Bright,  with  their  middle-class  and 
working-class  followers,  had  played  so  large  a 
part  in  the  politics  that  brought  about  the  crisis, 
it  was  not  for  them  to  take  up  the  responsibil 
ities  of  government.  The  Whigs,  under  Lord 
John  Russell,  assumed  the  governmental  power, 
with  Lord  Palmerston  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
with  little  indication  that  the  democracy  of  En 
gland  was  becoming  self-conscious  and  articulate. 

For  the  first  two  years  of  its  life  the  Russell 
administration  was  absorbed  in  dealing  with 
the  terrible  conditions  due  to  the  potato  blight. 
Famine  effectually  solved  the  problems  of  over 
population  in  Ireland.  At  the  same  time  it 
brought  confusion  into  the  whole  social  and 
political  situation  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
American  interest  in  British  conditions  received 
a  great  stimulus  from  the  disaster  in  Ireland. 
Generous  sums  of  money  and  whole  fleets  of 


148  THE  ROARING  FORTIES 

food-laden  ships  testified  to  the  impression 
made  by  the  pitiable  sufferings  of  the  afflicted 
people.  Then  came  the  great  movement  of 
the  stricken  Irish  to  the  land  of  plenty.  While 
the  South  and  the  West  watched  with  all-ab 
sorbing  interest  the  gleams  of  smudgy  glory 
from  the  war  in  Mexico,  the  eastern  ports  of 
the  United  States  gave  attention  to  the  dismal 
myriads  of  half-starved  Celts  that  poured  in 
from  distracted  Erin.  Economic,  social,  and 
political  problems  of  many  kinds  promptly  ap 
peared  in  connection  with  the  influx  of  aliens 
that  assumed  vast  proportions  first  in  1847. 
The  Irish  were  but  the  largest  element  in  the 
immigration.  Germans  in  large  numbers  also 
fled  from  the  pinch  of  the  potato  famine.  It 
was  through  the  Irish,  however,  that  a  new  and 
most  important  element  was  introduced  into 
the  relations  among  the  English-speaking  peo 
ples.  Canada  and  the  other  British  provinces 
in  America  received  no  insignificant  share  of 
the  immigration,  with  results  that  soon  made 
themselves  noticeable.  Full  half  a  century  was 
destined  to  elapse  before  the  impulse  first  given 
by  the  famine  in  Ireland  ceased  to  be  easily 
distinguishable  among  the  factors  determining 
Anglo-American  relations. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  TO 
HARMONY 

PHILOSOPHICAL  historians  warn  us  against 
over-emphasis  on  particular  units  of  time  or  of 
space  or  of  personality.  To  centre  attention  on 
a  single  date,  a  single  place,  a  single  individual, 
is  to  distort  the  truth  and  misrepresent  the 
general  movements  of  events.  If  disregard  of 
this  wise  warning  may  ever  be  tolerated,  a  fair 
case  for  a  free  hand  is  presented  by  the  year 
1848  in  the  history  of  the  United  States  and 
its  relations  with  Great  Britain.  Even  more 
narrowly  the  month  of  February  in  that  year 
may  be  assigned  to  a  position  of  unique  signifi 
cance.  To  that  month  belong,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  definitive  acquisition  of  vast  Mexican  ter 
ritory  by  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  and 
the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  newly  acquired 
region.  In  the  same  month  Louis  Philippe  was 
dethroned  by  a  revolution  in  France,  and  a 
popular  agitation  was  engendered  that  swept 

over   all   central   and  western   Europe.     Mon- 

149 


150  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

archies  disappeared.  Republics  and  constitu 
tions  and  bills  of  rights  and  new  nationalities 
became  the  order  of  the  day.  An  orgy  of  liber 
alism  convulsed  the  Continent;  even  the  United 
Kingdom  felt  the  delirium,  and  was  forced  to 
deal  with  the  Chartists  demanding  democracy 
and  Young  Ireland  proclaiming  itself  a  nation. 
When  the  tumult,  after  several  feverish  years, 
subsided,  the  most  conspicuous  result  of  it  all 
was,  oddly  enough,  the  revived  Napoleonic  Em 
pire  in  France.  Less  obvious,  but  not  less 
influential  in  the  long  run  on  the  history  of 
human  progress,  was  the  host  of  exiles  from  the 
Continent  who  betook  themselves  to  the  lands 
of  the  English-speaking  peoples.  In  particular, 
a  great  body  of  ardent,  high-spirited,  but  bit 
terly  disappointed  German  liberals  found  refuge 
in  the  American  Republic,  in  whose  democratic 
institutions  they  expected  to  find  a  full  realiza 
tion  of  their  cherished  ideals.  Though  there 
was  naturally  much  disillusionment  when  the 
actualities  were  discovered,  the  new  environ 
ment  did  not  fail  to  prove  attractive,  and  these 
political  exiles  were  followed  by  a  stream  of 
Germans  rivalling  in  volume  that  which  was 
flowing  in  full  current  from  Ireland. 
In  Great  Britain  the  revolutionary  tempest 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  151 

on  the  Continent  gave  occasion  for  new  and 
striking  manifestations  of  the  species  of  foreign 
policy  that  was  already  associated  with  the 
name  of  Lord  Palmerston.  His  Lordship's  sym 
pathy  and  support  went  out  to  those  who  felt 
themselves  to  be  victims  of  oppression  with 
a  degree  of  vehemence  and  ostentation  that 
varied  directly  as  the  square  of  their  distance 
from  London.  The  Italians  and  the  Magyars 
received  strong  encouragement  in  their  efforts 
to  escape  from  the  Hapsburgs;  the  French 
republicans  were  tolerated  in  freeing  themselves 
from  Louis  Philippe,  but  were  relegated  to  the 
clutches  of  Napoleon  III  with  much  satisfaction; 
the  English  Chartists  and  the  Irish  Repealers 
were,  of  course,  summarily  suppressed.  What 
ever  the  defects  or  inconsistencies  of  Palmer- 
ston's  conduct  of  the  Foreign  Office,  it  was 
enthusiastically  supported  by  British  popular 
sentiment.  It  appealed  effectively  to  the  jingo 
istic  spirit  of  a  generation  that  had  known  only 
"little  wars."  It  was  aggressive,  but  with  a 
strongly  liberal  leaning  in  the  immediate  ends 
in  view;  its  heaviest  demonstrations  were  di 
rected  against  the  Russian  Czar  and  the  Aus 
trian  Emperor,  whose  sins  with  respect  to  their 
subjects  were  aggravated  by  a  presumed  hos- 


152  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

tility  of  a  specially  deadly  character  to  British 
interests  in  the  Orient. 

The  Palmerstonian  policy  and  methods  were 
most  violently  antagonized  by  the  Manchester 
School,  as  Cobden,  Bright,  and  their  followers 
were  called.  It  was  the  cardinal  doctrine  of 
this  school  that  internal,  not  international, 
affairs  furnished  the  proper  field  for  govern 
mental  activity  at  this  particular  time;  that 
the  welfare  of  the  people  and  the  due  course  of 
foreign  relations  would  be  best  promoted  by 
the  readjustment  of  taxation,  expansion  of 
trade  and  industry,  and  abstention  from  the 
waste  of  war  and  of  armaments  in  preparation 
for  war.  The  two  theories  as  to  the  policy  of 
the  government  came  to  a  decisive  issue  in  the 
House  of  Commons  in  the  famous  debate  over 
Don  Pacifico  in  the  middle  of  1850.  Against 
an  assault  led  by  Disraeli,  Gladstone,  Peel, 
and  Cobden,  Palmerston  defended  himself  in 
his  most  celebrated  speech,  won  a  decisive  tri 
umph  in  the  vote  of  the  House,  and  thus  com 
mitted  Great  Britain  to  the  policy  associated 
with  his  name.  Only  a  few  months  later  his 
natural  bumptiousness,  accentuated  doubtless 
by  the  sense  of  his  great  victory,  brought  him 
into  conflict  with  his  chief,  Lord  John  Russell, 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  153 

and  with  Majesty  itself,  with  the  result  that 
Palmerston  was  summarily  dismissed  from  his 
place.  Even  this  severe  experience  did  not 
loosen  his  hold  on  popular  admiration  and  sym 
pathy.  The  Whigs  could  not  carry  on  the  gov 
ernment  without  him,  and  fell  from  power;  the 
Aberdeen  coalition  cabinet  drifted  into  the 
Crimean  War  through  the  force  of  the  Palmer- 
stonian  influence,  but  failed  to  develop  the 
vigor  that  the  situation  required.  In  1855, 
sorely  against  her  own  wishes,  but  responsive 
to  an  overwhelming  popular  demand,  the  Queen 
summoned  Palmerston  himself  to  form  a  cab 
inet.  For  more  than  eight  of  the  remaining 
ten  years  of  his  life  he  was  prime  minister,  and 
British  foreign  relations  were  presumed  to  fol 
low  the  lines  associated  with  his  name,  though 
actually  his  policy  and  methods  were  substan 
tially  modified  in  passing  through  the  hands  of 
the  foreign  secretaries,  Clarendon  and  Russell. 
It  was  well  for  the  cause  of  amity  that  Polk 
and  Palmerston  did  not  synchronize  more  pre 
cisely  in  their  political  ascendancy.  A  serious 
clash  between  the  two  would  have  meant 
disaster.  The  crude  and  narrow  Tennessee 
Democrat  offered  a  strange  contrast  to  the 
broad  culture  and  long  experience  of  the  Brit- 


154  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

ish  aristocrat,  but  neither  exceeded  the  other 
in  strength  of  conviction  that  his  people  had 
the  right  and  the  duty  of  asserting  itself  in 
the  world  without  overscrupulous  regard  for 
the  rights  and  interests  of  other  peoples.  It 
was  well  again  that  Palmerston's  chosen  field 
for  manifesting  British  power  was  the  hemi 
sphere  from  which  Polk  deliberately  excluded 
himself.  If  this  division  of  territory  had  worked 
both  ways,  some  friction  between  the  two  great 
promoters  of  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  might  have 
been  avoided.  Folk's  hemisphere  was  too  thor 
oughly  permeated  with  British  interests,  how 
ever,  to  permit  of  any  American  development 
without  touching  them.  Though  Palmerston's 
personal  concern  about  the  Americans  was  of 
the  slightest,  and  he  preserved  to  the  end  the 
attitude  of  his  early  chief,  Canning,  in  regard 
ing  the  United  States  as  a  vexatious  intruder 
in  the  field  of  serious  diplomacy,  yet  his  spirit 
was  active  in  the  subordinates  who  were  on  the 
ground  in  America,  and  trouble  was  an  early 
result. 

The  disintegration  of  Mexico  on  its  northern 
frontier  and  the  great  southward  stride  of  the 
United  States  along  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
Pacific  Ocean  naturally  excited  the  liveliest 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  155 

interest  in  Latin  America  and  the  colonial 
West  Indies.  With  California  a  part  of  the 
United  States,  the  long-discussed  projects  of 
easy  transit  from  ocean  to  ocean  across  Central 
America  assumed  immediate  and  pressing  im 
portance.  The  discovery  of  gold  and  the  ensuing 
movement  of  fortune-hunters  and  settlers  in 
myriads  to  the  Pacific  territory  added  a  prodig 
ious  practical  emphasis.  Before  this  unforeseen 
climax  appeared,  however,  both  British  and 
American  diplomats  had  been  diligently  fishing 
in  the  murky  waters  of  Latin-American  politics 
for  a  controlling  position  in  respect  to  any  pos 
sible  isthmian  canal.  In  the  early  forties  a 
British  official  formally  asserted  that  the  terri 
tory  of  the  Mosquito  Indians  included  the  port 
of  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  which  would  be  the 
terminus  of  any  canal  that  should  be  cut  across 
Nicaragua.  As  the  Mosquitos  were  held  to 
be  a  kingdom  under  the  protection  of  Great 
Britain,  the  bearing  of  the  claim  on  their  behalf 
was  obvious.  In  1848  the  British  officer  came 
to  San  Juan  with  a  war-ship,  captured  the  Nica- 
raguan  garrison,  established  a  British  garrison 
in  possession,  and  changed  the  name  of  the  port 
to  Greytown.  Meanwhile  a  group  of  islands 
off  the  coast,  conveniently  situated  with  refer- 


156  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

ence  to  San  Juan  and  claimed  by  Honduras, 
was  also  occupied  by  a  British  garrison. 

In  New  Granada,  at  about  the  same  time, 
the  American  charge  d'affaires  displayed  a  like 
activity,  and  in  1846,  without  instructions,  con 
cluded  with  the  government  of  that  state  a 
treaty  of  far-reaching  importance.  By  its  pro 
visions  the  government  and  citizens  of  the 
United  States  and  their  property  secured  free 
dom  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
in  return  for  a  guarantee  by  the  United  States 
of  the  neutrality  of  the  isthmus,  and  the  fur 
ther  guarantee  of  the  sovereignty  and  property 
of  New  Granada  in  the  said  territory.  This 
treaty  remained  pending  in  the  Senate  until 
after  the  British  movements  in  Nicaragua  in 
1848.  In  June  of  that  year  the  treaty,  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  was  duly 
ratified. 

With  this  favorable  position  secured  in  respect 
to  the  Panama  route,  the  Polk  administration  di 
rected  its  attention  to  the  situation  in  the  region 
of  the  Nicaragua  route.  A  charge  d'affaires 
was  sent  to  Central  America  to  ascertain  the 
condition  of  affairs.  He  readily  obtained  from 
the  Nicaraguan  Government,  which  was  highly 
indignant  at  the  activities  of  Great  Britain,  a 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  157 

treaty  giving  to  the  United  States  the  exclusive 
right  to  construct  a  canal  or  railway  through 
Nicaragua,  in  return  for  the  guarantee  of  her 
just  limits.  Mr.  Hise,  who  negotiated  this  con 
vention,  was  succeeded  shortly  afterward  by 
President  Taylor's  appointee,  Mr.  Squier,  who 
in  September,  1849,  concluded  a  treaty  with 
Honduras  by  which  the  island  of  Tigre,  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  was  ceded  to  the  United  States. 
This  island  commanded  the  western  end  of  the 
Nicaraguan  route  as  Greytown  commanded  the 
eastern  end.  Less  than  a  month  after  the  con 
clusion  of  this  treaty,  a  British  force  took  pos 
session  of  Tigre. 

The  situation  thus  created  was  a  decidedly 
serious  one.  If  all  the  successive  proceedings 
had  become  public  as  they  occurred,  the  two 
great  English-speaking  peoples  would  doubtless 
have  been  at  each  other's  throats  in  short  order. 
But  communication  with  Central  America  was 
arduous  and  slow,  and  diplomacy  was  able 
to  smooth  out  the  wrinkles  in  the  situation 
before  the  public  was  aware  that  they  existed. 
Clayton,  the  new  secretary  of  state  at  Wash 
ington,  was  of  pacific  disposition,  and  President 
Taylor  had  none  of  the  aggressive  propensities 
of  his  predecessor.  Nor  did  Lord  Palmerston 


158  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

show  any  tendency  to  crabbedness,  regarding 
the  whole  matter  probably  as  a  tedious  trifle. 
The  two  governments  promptly  exchanged  as 
surances  that  no  occupation  or  colonization  of 
Central  America  was  contemplated,  and  no 
exclusive  control  of  a  railway  or  canal  across 
the  isthmus.  Clayton,  on  his  side,  withheld 
from  the  Senate  the  draft  treaties  of  Hise  and 
Squier;  Palmerston  disavowed  the  seizure  of 
Tigre  and  ordered  the  garrison  to  be  withdrawn. 
In  considerable  haste,  lest  new  tempests  should 
issue  from  the  prolific  storm-centre  on  the  Carib 
bean,  the  representatives  of  the  two  govern 
ments  at  Washington  then  concluded  the  famous 
but  ill-fated  treaty  of  Clayton  and  Bulwer, 
signed  April  19,  1850,  and  proclaimed  in  effect 
July  5th. 

The  purpose  of  this  convention,  as  defined 
by  its  own  provisions,  was  to  promote  the  con 
struction  and  maintenance  of  an  interoceanic 
canal  by  the  Nicaragua  route  "for  the  benefit 
of  mankind,  on  equal  terms  to  all."  The  two 
governments  engaged  never  to  obtain  any  ex 
clusive  control  over  such  a  canal,  never  to  erect 
fortifications  or  establish  colonies  in  its  vicinity, 
never  to  use  any  relation  of  protection,  alliance, 
or  intimacy  with  contiguous  states  for  the  pur- 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  159 

pose  of  obtaining  special  privileges  in  the  use  of 
the  canal.  The  two  powers  further  undertook 
a  joint  guarantee  of  the  neutrality  of  the  canal, 
and  of  its  protection  from  interruption,  seizure, 
or  unjust  confiscation. 

The  amicable  and  benevolent  spirit  supposed 
to  be  embodied  in  this  treaty  soon  proved  to 
be  illusory.  Approval  of  its  provisions  in  the 
United  States  had  been  based  in  no  small  de 
gree  upon  the  impression  that  Great  Britain 
was  bound  by  it  to  abandon  all  her  pretensions 
to  a  political  foothold  in  Central  America. 
Article  I  declared  that  neither  party  would  ever 
"colonize  or  assume  or  exercise  any  dominion 
over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito 
coast  or  any  part  of  Central  America,"  or  make 
use  of  any  protectorate  or  alliance  for  the  pur 
pose  of  colonizing  or  exercising  dominion  over 
those  same  carefully  specified  regions.  Under 
what  appeared  to  be  the  obvious  intent  of  this 
article,  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  from  the 
Mosquito  coast  was  awaited  with  impatience 
in  America,  but  no  indication  of  approaching 
withdrawal  appeared.  On  the  contrary,  the 
islands  off  the  coast  were  in  1851  formally  or 
ganized  as  a  crown  colony  of  Great  Britain, 
thus  giving  permanence  and  solidity  to  an  oc- 


160  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

cupation  which  had  hitherto  seemed  tentative. 
Eventually  it  came  to  public  knowledge,  what 
the  foreign  offices  had  known  only  too  well, 
that  the  British  interpretation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  involved  no  obligation  whatever 
to  withdraw  from  Central  America.  The  two 
governments  were,  in  fact,  seriously  at  logger 
heads  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  vaunted  agree 
ment. 

The  British  position  was  this.  Just  prior 
to  ratifying  the  treaty  Sir  Henry  Bulwer,  the 
negotiator,  made  the  formal  declaration  that 
the  British  Government  did  not  understand 
that  the  provisions  applied  to  her  Majesty's 
settlement  at  Honduras  or  to  its  dependencies. 
Clayton  declared  in  reply  that  he  also  under 
stood  that  Article  I  did  not  apply  to  "the  Brit 
ish  settlement  in  Honduras  (commonly  called 
British  Honduras,  as  distinct  from  the  State  of 
Honduras),  nor  the  small  islands  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  that  settlement  which  may  be  known 
as  its  dependencies."  The  guarded  expression 
of  Clayton  indicates  the  gist  of  the  controversy 
that  developed.  Great  Britain  claimed  a  bound 
ary  for  British  Honduras,  or  Belize,  as  it  was 
commonly  called,  that  was  denied  by  the  Cen 
tral  American  states;  she  claimed  further  that 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  161 

the  islands  which  had  been  made  a  colony  were 
dependencies  of  Belize;  and  she  claimed  finally 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  required  her, 
not  to  relinquish  her  protectorate  over  the 
Mosquitos,  but  merely  to  abstain  from  using 
this  protectorate  for  the  purpose  of  control 
ling  the  canal  or  of  establishing  colonies  or 
dominion  in  Central  America.  Any  such  pur 
pose  she  categorically  disclaimed.  She  early 
manifested  a  readiness,  moreover,  to  withdraw 
from  occupation  of  territory  held  in  the  name  of 
the  King  of  the  Mosquitos  as  soon  as  it  should 
appear  that  this  humble  potentate  and  his  sub 
jects  were  assured  of  proper  respect  by  their 
neighbors. 

The  American  contention,  as  fully  developed, 
was  based  upon  not  only  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  but  also  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  de 
nied  the  validity  of  any  claim  of  sovereignty 
by  the  Mosquitos,  who,  as  a  savage,  degraded, 
and  insignificant  tribe  of  Indians,  could  be 
recognized  by  the  public  law  of  civilized  na 
tions  as  enjoying  only  a  qualified  right  of  occu 
pation  in  the  territory  over  which  they  roamed. 
A  "treaty"  with  such  a  tribe  could  not  be  re 
garded  as  vesting  political  authority  in  a  great 
power  like  Great  Britain.  The  alleged  "pro- 


162  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

tectorate"  was,  therefore,  the  diplomatic  equiv 
alent  of  a  fraud.  As  to  Belize,  history  revealed 
that  British  rights  there  were  limited  to  certain 
privileges  of  cutting  mahogany  and  dye-woods, 
and  included  no  political  authority.  This  dis 
posed  of  the  claim  to  power  over  the  adja 
cent  islands  as  dependencies  of  British  Hon 
duras.  The  act  of  Great  Britain  in  erecting 
these  islands  into  a  colony  was  therefore  repug 
nant  to  the  announcement  of  President  Monroe, 
often  since  formally  reiterated,  that  the  United 
States  could  not  recognize  the  American  con 
tinents  as  open  to  colonization  by  European 
powers. 

Controversy  on  the  lines  of  these  widely 
divergent  views  was  active  in  diplomacy  and 
in  popular  debate  for  many  years.  Greytown, 
or  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  assumed  much 
importance  as  a  station  on  the  route  of  the 
thousands  who  were  seeking  California.  Amer 
icans  in  this  adventurous  host  often  took  pains 
to  show  their  disrespect  for  the  officials  who 
were  exercising  de  facto  authority  there,  and 
incidents  occurred  from  time  to  time  that 
caused  popular  indignation  to  flame  high  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  The  troubles  culmi 
nated  in  the  bombardment  and  destruction  of 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  163 

Greytown  by  an  American  war-ship,  as  a  pun 
ishment  for  violence  by  the  townsmen  to  the 
American  minister  to  Nicaragua. 

James  Buchanan  went  as  minister  to  London 
in  1853  with  the  special  mission  of  bringing  the 
serious  situation  to  a  settlement.  Under  the 
pacific  ministry  of  Lord  Aberdeen  it  was  not 
hard  to  reach  the  general  outline  of  an  adjust 
ment.  Great  Britain  was  ready  to  relinquish 
the  Mosquito  protectorate  and  the  Bay  Island 
colony  as  soon  as  it  could  be  done  with  grace 
and  dignity.  The  peculiar  politics  of  Nicara 
gua,  with  the  extraordinary  exploits  of  Walker's 
filibusters,  interposed  serious  obstacles  to  this 
happy  outcome,  and  the  Crimean  War  raised  up 
untimely  diversion  of  the  British  Government's 
attention.  Palmerston's  accession  to  power  in 
1855  brought  a  noticeable  stiffening  up  of  the 
British  attitude.  In  consequence  Buchanan  re 
turned  to  America  in  the  following  year  with 
out  his  mission  attained.  As  President  of  the 
United  States,  however,  he  was  able  to  an 
nounce  in  his  annual  message  of  1860  a  final 
settlement  of  the  subject  in  a  manner  entirely 
satisfactory  to  the  United  States. 

The  settlement  in  which  Buchanan  found  rea 
son  for  solid  comfort  was  embodied  in  treaties 


1 64  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

concluded  by  Great  Britain  in  1859  and  1860 
with  Honduras  and  Nicaragua  respectively.  In 
these  conventions  all  claim  to  a  British  pro 
tectorate  over  the  Mosquito  territory  was  relin 
quished  and  the  sovereignty  over  that  territory 
within  their  respective  frontiers  was  recognized 
to  the  Central  American  states.  The  Bay 
Islands  were  recognized  as  an  integral  part  of 
the  republic  of  Honduras.  In  this  adjustment 
the  contention  of  the  United  States  as  to  the 
effect  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  sus 
tained  in  full.  British  Honduras  was,  indeed, 
left  to  the  dominion  of  Great  Britain;  but  this 
was  in  accordance  with  the  view  adopted  by 
the  Americans  that  the  territory  was  outside 
of  Central  America,  and  therefore  was  not  af 
fected  by  the  provisions  of  the  treaty.  So 
far  as  concerned  control  over  the  expected 
canal  through  Nicaragua,  neither  the  United 
States  nor  Great  Britain  had  a  privileged  posi 
tion  in  Central  America.  The  great  work 
might,  therefore,  be  expected  to  be  brought  to 
completion  promptly  for  the  benefit  of  man 
kind.  Unhappily,  by  the  time  when  the  way 
became  clear,  all  hope  of  progress  in  the  actual 
construction  of  the  canal  had  been  relegated  to 
an  indefinitely  distant  future.  Capital  proved 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  165 

less  enthusiastic  than  diplomacy  over  the  pros 
pects  of  transisthmian  communication;  but, 
however  slowly  the  realization  of  the  great 
dream  approached,  and  with  whatever  of  wile 
and  guile  in  the  lobbies  of  legislation  in  Nica 
ragua  and  at  Washington  the  realization  must 
be  promoted,  the  work  of  Clayton  and  Bulwer 
stood  a  majestic  monument  of  a  union  of  the 
two  great  English-speaking  peoples  for  the  ac 
complishment  and  protection  of  a  great  public 
work  that  should  be  "for  the  benefit  of  man 
kind,  on  equal  terms  to  all." 

While  the  tension  over  the  Central  American 
affairs  was  acute,  its  effect  was  aggravated  by 
various  other  subjects  of  suspicion  and  of  con 
troversy  between  the  two  governments.  The 
craving  for  expansion  of  territory  continued  to 
manifest  itself  in  the  United  States  and  to  take 
a  form  determined  more  or  less  by  the  sectional 
cleavage  of  the  nation  on  the  slavery  question. 
There  was  a  steady  pressure  from  the  southern 
States  for  the  extension  of  influence  and  pos 
sessions  in  Latin  America.  Popular  sympa 
thy  for  the  filibustering  expeditions  of  Lopez 
against  Cuba,  and  Walker  in  Central  America, 
was  strong  enough  to  paralyze  the  efforts  of  the 
Washington  government  to  prevent  them.  But 


1 66  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

the  suggestion  of  a  readiness  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain,  in  conjunction  with  her  good 
ally  Napoleon  III,  to  undertake  a  guarantee  of 
the  threatened  regions  against  the  filibusters 
was  peremptorily  repelled  by  the  United  States. 
This  much  of  interest  in  the  subject  by  Great 
Britain  only  confirmed,  however,  the  appre 
hensions  of  the  extreme  pro-slavery  partisans 
in  the  South,  to  whom  the  avowed  abolitionism 
of  the  British  was  an  ever-present  terror. 

Internal  party  politics  in  the  middle  fifties 
contributed  singularly  to  confirm  the  Amer 
ican  manifestations  of  anti-British  feeling. 
After  1852  the  Democratic  Party  controlled 
the  government.  The  strength  of  this  party 
consisted  largely  of  the  slaveholders  of  the  South 
and  the  masses  of  Irish  immigrants  in  the 
North.  Enmity  toward  all  things  British  was 
a  dominant  passion  in  both  these  classes.  That 
the  administrations  of  Pierce  and  Buchanan 
should,  under  the  circumstances,  have  pre 
served  amity  with  Great  Britain,  is  a  tribute  to 
the  diplomatic  correctness  of  statesmen  whose 
reputations  have  been  dimmed  by  the  malev 
olence  of  later  political  events. 

What  was  probably  the  most  serious  situation 
during  the  period  we  are  discussing  was  pro- 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  167 

duced  by  the  Crimean  War.  The  causes  and 
issues  of  that  strange  conflict,  grasped  only 
with  much  difficulty  by  the  experts  in  Europe, 
were  quite  unintelligible  in  the  United  States. 
Sufficient  for  general  popular  feeling  was  the 
fact  that  Great  Britain  was  a  party  to  the  war, 
in  which  case  the  other  party  must  be  right. 
Such  at  least  was  the  reasoning  of  an  influen 
tial  element  of  American  society.  It  was  ill- 
judged  by  the  British  Government  that  the 
time  should  have  been  selected  for  the  project 
of  raising  a  foreign  legion  in  America  to  serve 
in  the  Crimea.  The  enlistment  of  troops  for 
military  service  against  a  friendly  power  was, 
of  course,  prohibited  by  the  laws  of  the  United 
States.  Success  in  the  enforcement  of  the  laws 
had  not  been  especially  marked  in  the  case  of 
the  filibusters.  Whether  this  fact  was  taken 
into  account  by  the  British,  need  not  be  de 
bated.  At  all  events,  a  systematic  procedure 
was  instituted  through  which  a  large  number 
of  men  were  forwarded  from  the  United  States 
to  Halifax,  to  be  there  regularly  incorporated 
into  the  British  army.  The  procedure  was 
directed  by  her  Majesty's  minister  at  Wash 
ington,  Mr.  Crampton,  and  the  consuls  in  sev 
eral  important  cities.  The  enemies  of  England 


168  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

did  not  fail  to  inform  the  Washington  govern 
ment  as  to  what  was  going  on.  Protests  were 
at  once  made  diplomatically  at  London,  and 
their  result  was  seen  in  an  order  from  the  Brit 
ish  Government  forbidding  the  further  execu 
tion  of  the  scheme.  It  was  asserted  by  Lord 
Clarendon,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  that  no  vio 
lation  of  the  American  laws  had  been  contem 
plated  or  committed,  and  an  interpretation  of 
these  laws  was  presented  under  which  all  that 
had  been  done  was  legal.  Mr.  Marcy,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  declined  to  adopt  this  inter 
pretation  and  demanded  the  recall  of  Crampton. 
Upon  the  refusal  of  this  demand,  Crampton  was 
notified  that  the  President  would  have  no  fur 
ther  intercourse  with  him,  and  the  notification 
was  accompanied  with  his  passport.  At  the 
same  time,  May,  1856,  the  exequaturs  of  three 
British  consuls  were  revoked. 

The  dismissal  of  a  minister  is  likely  to  be 
more  thrilling  in  popular  than  in  official  circles. 
The  whole  progress  of  the  affair  was  attended 
by  violent  declamation  in  the  bellicose  contin 
gent  of  the  press  in  both  England  and  America. 
British  excitement  was  enhanced  by  the  simul 
taneous  reports,  persistently  reiterated,  that  a 
ship  under  construction  at  New  York  was  to 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  169 

be  a  Russian  privateer.  Later  the  ministry 
thought  wise  to  reinforce  the  naval  force  at  the 
Bermudas,  and  this  further  nourished  the  pre 
vailing  war  spirit.  There  was  a  good  deal  of 
sentiment  in  England  that  the  rather  unsatis 
factory  meed  of  military  glory  acquired  in  the 
now  finished  Crimean  War  should  at  once  be 
supplemented  in  a  contest  with  the  aggressive 
Americans.  No  such  feeling  made  any  headway, 
however,  in  the  cabinet.  Crampton's  dismissal 
was  accepted  as  within  the  rights  of  the  Amer 
ican  Government.  But  he  was  knighted  and 
promoted.  A  new  minister,  Lord  Napier,  was 
soon  sent  to  replace  him  at  Washington,  and 
to  Napier's  lot  fell  the  duty  of  confirming  a 
satisfactory  adjustment  of  all  the  outstanding 
controversies  between  the  two  governments. 

The  war  with  Russia  furnished  the  first  sit 
uation  since  1815  that  might  raise  anew  the 
question  of  the  right  to  impress  sailors  into 
the  British  navy  from  American  merchant  ves 
sels.  There  was  some  speculation  as  to  the 
possibility  of  a  revival  of  the  practice,  and  some 
bristling  discourse  in  the  jingoistic  American 
press  as  to  the  dire  consequences  that  would 
follow.  The  generation  that  had  elapsed  since 
the  Napoleonic  wars  had  brought  changes, 


170  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

however,  which,  without  reference  to  the  feeling 
of  the  Americans,  rendered  the  idea  of  resort 
to  the  old  method  of  recruiting  by  the  British 
Government  ridiculous.  Nor  did  the  power  of 
Russia,  as  compared  with  that  of  her  allied  foes, 
suggest  that  Great  Britain  would  be  driven  to 
desperate  devices.  Yet  the  British  Govern 
ment  had  never  formally  abandoned  her  claim 
to  the  right  of  search  and  impressment,  and  the 
memories  and  traditions  of  the  way  in  which 
the  right  had  been  exercised  in  the  old  days 
undoubtedly  sharpened  the  resentment  in  Amer 
ica  at  the  operations  for  the  enlistment  of  re 
cruits  for  the  army. 

The  time  was  now  at  hand  for  the  termina 
tion  of  the  long  diplomatic  difference  between 
the  two  nations  on  the  matter  of  the  right  of 
search.  Complaints  about  the  detention  and 
search  of  American  ships  by  British  cruisers 
led  to  a  renewed  discussion  of  the  procedure 
for  the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade.  This 
was  in  1858,  when  the  American  interests  were 
in  the  hands  of  President  Buchanan  and  Sec 
retary  of  State  Cass,  both  men  of  long  and 
intimate  acquaintance  with  the  diplomacy  of 
this  question.  We  have  seen  that  the  British 
contention  in  the  matter  had  been  reduced  to 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  171 

the  claim  of  a  right  of  visitation,  as  distinct 
from  the  right  of  search,  and  that  the  American 
view  denied  the  validity  of  any  such  distinction. 
Cass  presented  the  American  view  in  an  elabo 
rate  note  to  Lord  Napier  on  April  10,  1858,  deny 
ing  the  "right  of  the  cruisers  of  any  other  power 
whatever,  for  any  purpose  whatever,  to  enter 
their  [United  States]  vessels  by  force  in  time  of 
peace."  Lord  Malmesbury,  Foreign  Secretary 
in  the  cabinet  of  the  Earl  of  Derby,  which 
interrupted  the  domination  of  Palmerston  from 
February,  1858,  to  June,  1859,  declared  in  a 
despatch  to  Napier  that  Great  Britain  recog 
nized  as  sound  "those  principles  of  international 
law  which  have  been  laid  down  by  General 
Cass  in  his  note  of  the  loth  of  April."  This 
formal  abandonment  of  the  claim  that  had  made 
so  much  trouble  between  the  two  countries  was 
publicly  avowed  by  Lord  Malmesbury  soon 
afterward,  who  said:  "We  frankly  confessed 
that  we  have  no  legal  claim  to  the  right  of  visit 
and  of  search  which  has  hitherto  been  assumed." 
So  full  and  frank  a  confession  of  persistent  error 
afforded  ample  ground  for  the  gratification  felt 
and  proclaimed  by  President  Buchanan.  There 
was  involved  in  the  British  action  no  relaxation 
of  vigor  in  the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade, 


172  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

no  abandonment  of  the  claim  to  the  indefeasible 
allegiance  of  the  subjects  of  the  crown  or  of  the 
right  to  force  those  subjects  into  the  service  of 
the  navy.  All  that  resulted  from  the  new  atti 
tude  of  the  British  Government  was  the  addi 
tion  of  that  government's  powerful  support  to 
the  movement  toward  the  freedom  of  the  seas. 
So  soon  as  the  visitation  of  a  vessel  bearing  the 
American  flag  ceased  to  be  claimed  as  a  right 
by  Great  Britain,  the  last  great  obstacle  was 
removed  that  barred  the  most  efficient  co-opera 
tion  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade. 
Within  a  few  years  the  United  States  came  to 
an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  authorizing  the 
cruisers  of  either  nation  to  search  a  suspected 
slaver  bearing  the  colors  of  the  other.  This 
arrangement  had  been  diligently  sought  by  the 
British  Government  for  years,  but  the  United 
States  had  held  off  so  long  as  that  was  claimed 
as  a  right  which  they  were  willing  to  concede 
only  as  a  conventional  impairment  of  a  right. 

While  the  Central  American  situation  and 
the  other  matters  noticed  above  were  dragging 
their  troubled  way  to  a  settlement  and  engag 
ing  the  chief  interest  of  the  two  greater  peoples 
of  the  English-speaking  trio,  the  third  member 
of  the  group  passed  through  a  scries  of  inter- 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  173 

esting  and  somewhat  critical  experiences  in 
both  domestic  and  foreign  affairs.  The  insur 
rectionary  movements  in  Canada  in  the  late 
thirties  were  followed,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the 
establishment  of  a  new  constitution  in  1841, 
under  which  the  two  provinces  were  united 
into  one.  Party  strife  continued  in  the  new 
system  to  centre  about  the  same  question  that 
had  been  the  core  of  controversy  in  the  old, 
namely,  how  far  the  governor-general  and  his 
ministers  should  be  subject  to  popular  control. 
The  problem  was  difficult.  The  administra 
tion  of  the  colony  must  be  subject  to  the  con 
trol  of  the  home  ministry;  how  could  it  be 
subject  at  the  same  time  to  the  direction  of 
the  majority  in  the  legislative  assembly?  How 
could  the  connection  with  the  British  Empire 
be  secure  if  Canadian  policy  must  be  deter 
mined  by  a  majority  that  might  follow  a  Papi- 
neau  or  a  Mackenzie?  So  long  as  the  Tory 
cabinet  of  Sir  Robert  Peel  held  sway  at  West 
minster,  with  Lord  Stanley  at  the  Colonial 
Office,  the  old  system  continued  to  prevail  in 
Canada.  The  popular  opposition  grew  steadily 
stronger  and  more  demonstrative  as  the  fear 
of  renewed  violence  wore  away.  The  Whig 
cabinet  that  succeeded  Peel  in  1846  sent  as 


174  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

governor-general  to  Canada  the  Earl  of  Elgin, 
son-in-law  of  Lord  Durham.  Elgin  at  once 
committed  himself  fully  to  the  principle  of  min 
isterial  responsibility.  The  first  election  after 
his  accession  to  power  resulted  in  a  sweeping 
victory  for  the  Reform  or  Liberal  Party,  and 
to  the  leader  of  this  party's  majority  in  the 
legislature  Elgin  intrusted  the  formation  of  a 
ministry.  In  this  action  the  advance  of  de 
mocracy  in  Canada  was  definitely  recognized, 
whatever  the  effect  might  be  on  the  connection 
with  the  mother  country.  Within  a  few  years 
responsible  ministries  were  conducting  the  af 
fairs  of  the  other  North  American  provinces  also, 
without  visible  peril  to  the  unity  of  the  empire. 
Lord  Elgin's  practical  solution  of  the  chief 
constitutional  issue  did  not  bring  political  calm 
in  Canada.  On  the  contrary,  he  had  to  deal 
with  a  particularly  bitter  revival  of  the  race 
conflict  that  was  latent  in  the  party  alignment. 
The  strength  of  the  Tories  was  in  the  English 
population  of  Upper  Canada,  while  the  Liberals 
had  their  largest  membership  among  the  French 
of  the  lower  province.  With  the  accession  of 
the  Liberals  to  power  the  long  domination  of  the 
United  Empire  Loyalists  ended,  and  the  loss 
of  place  and  privilege  in  the  administration  was 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  175 

attended  by  the  ill  feeling  natural  under  the 
circumstances.  Fear  of  approaching  French  as 
cendancy  was  widely  proclaimed,  and  in  a  less 
degree  actually  felt.  The  disquiet  was  aggra 
vated  by  one  of  the  early  acts  of  the  Liberal 
legislature.  This  was  a  law  giving  compensa 
tion  to  loyal  subjects  in  Lower  Canada  whose 
property  had  been  destroyed  in  the  military 
operations  against  the  rebels  in  the  late  insur 
rection.  A  similar  measure  applying  to  Upper 
Canada  had  been  passed  by  the  Tories  before 
their  fall;  their  view  in  reference  to  the  lower 
province  was,  however,  that  disaffection  had 
been  practically  universal,  and  that  compensa 
tion  for  losses  would,  therefore,  be  a  premium 
on  rebellion.  The  Liberals  pushed  their  bill 
through  in  spite  of  the  bitterest  hostility,  and 
Lord  Elgin,  with  the  assent  of  the  home  gov 
ernment,  gave  it  his  approval.  One  immediate 
result  was  that  his  Lordship  was  stoned  by  a 
mob,  and  the  Parliament  House  was  burned  to 
the  ground. 

This  riotous  outbreak  occurred  in  April, 
1849,  at  Montreal.  Other  causes  co-operated 
with  the  compensation  bill  to  inflame  the  pop 
ular  wrath.  All  Canada  was  suffering  from  a 
serious  industrial  depression.  Montreal  was 


1 76  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

the  chief  centre  of  business  and  the  largest  city 
of  the  colony.  The  distress  among  the  people 
was  peculiarly  severe  at  this  centre,  and  the  ma 
terial  for  a  riotous  assemblage  was  peculiarly 
plentiful.  Montreal  was,  moreover,  the  chief 
seat  of  the  English  interest  in  Lower  Canada, 
and  the  place  in  which  the  fear  of  French 
ascendancy  was  keenest.  In  1849  a  consider 
able  group  of  influential  men  at  Montreal 
were  indicating  a  willingness  to  go  even  so  far 
as  separation  from  the  British  connection  if 
that  should  prove  the  only  means  of  escape  from 
the  evils  that  threatened  or  actually  beset  them. 
To  understand  the  source  of  this  extreme  coun 
sel  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  larger  aspects 
of  the  free-trade  reform  and  of  Manchesterism 
in  general  so  far  as  it  affected  the  English-speak 
ing  world. 

The  protective  system  that  Peel  destroyed 
in  1846  was  based  primarily  upon  the  purpose 
of  benefit  to  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  but 
it  by  no  means  disregarded  the  interests  of 
the  British  subjects  who  lived  in  the  colonies. 
Both  customs  and  navigation  laws  included 
many  and  intricate  provisions  designed  to  give 
to  the  colonists  advantages  over  all  the  world 
save  the  favored  producers  and  merchants  of 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  177 

the  mother  country.  Canada,  owing  to  its 
proximity  to  the  United  States  and  the  identity 
of  its  chief  products  with  those  of  the  republic, 
required  and  possessed  special  preferences  in 
the  British  tariff  in  order  to  maintain  any  sat 
isfactory  position  in  the  competition  with  her 
more  advanced  and  more  populous  neighbor. 
In  1843  the  Peel  government  passed  an  act 
designed  to  aid  agriculture  in  Canada,  by  giving 
to  Canadian  wheat  and  flour  a  much-reduced 
duty  in  Great  Britain.  The  provisions  of  this 
act  applied  to  all  flour  exported  from  Canada, 
regardless  of  the  origin  of  the  wheat.  The 
effect  of  the  law  was  soon  manifest  in  a  great 
development  of  the  milling  industry  in  the  col 
ony,  with  corresponding  activity  in  commerce. 
American  wheat  was  imported  all  along  the 
border,  turned  into  flour,  and  shipped  from 
Montreal  and  Quebec  to  England,  where  the 
tariff  barred  direct  importation  from  the  United 
States. 

The  prosperity  that  followed  the  Canada  Corn 
Act  had  just  become  generally  manifest  when 
in  1846  protection  was  abandoned  and  the  ports 
of  Great  Britain  were  thrown  open  to  wheat 
and  flour  from  all  the  world.  Every  advantage 
enjoyed  by  colonial  produce  in  the  British  mar- 


178  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

ket  was  swept  away  by  free  trade.  The  result 
in  Canada  was  the  prompt  collapse  of  the  in 
dustries  that  had  been  built  up  by  the  act  of 
1843.  The  short  season  of  exaggerated  pros 
perity  was  succeeded  by  a  period  of  depression 
and  distress.  Angry  protests  arose  from  the 
capitalists  and  mercantile  classes  that  they  had 
been  ill  treated  by  the  home  government.  The 
working  class  mobbed  the  governor,  as  we  have 
seen.  In  the  destruction  of  their  business  the 
Canadian  Tories,  who  included  the  leading  mer 
chants  of  Montreal,  found  an  aggravation  of  the 
disregard  for  their  feelings  and  interests  that 
was  manifested  in  the  "compensation  for  rebel 
lion."  Expressions  of  discontent  began  to  take 
on  extreme  form  in  the  press  and  in  the  legis 
lature.  The  cure  for  the  existing  and  threat 
ened  evils  that  was  most  often  proposed  was 
annexation  to  the  United  States. 

During  the  year  1849  an  agitation  for  annexa 
tion  assumed  proportions  that  attracted  serious 
attention.  A  manifesto  issued  at  Montreal  in 
October,  and  signed  by  a  large  number  of  the 
most  substantial  citizens,  set  forth  the  misfor 
tunes  and  distress  of  Canada  in  temperate  but 
convincing  terms,  and  argued  that  of  all  the 
remedies  suggested  the  only  one  that  promised 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  179 

results  was  "a  friendly  and  peaceful  separation 
from  British  connection,  and  a  union  upon  eq 
uitable  terms  with  the  great  North  American 
confederacy  of  sovereign  states/'  The  revival 
of  protection  in  the  United  Kingdom  could  not 
be  depended  on;  a  system  of  protection  for 
Canada  might  create  manufactures  but  would 
furnish  no  market  for  them;  the  same  failure 
would  attend  the  suggested  federation  of  the 
American  colonies  or  their  independence.  Un 
restricted  commercial  intercourse  with  the  great 
population  to  the  southward  was  indispensable 
to  the  economic  welfare  of  Canada,  and  this 
could  be  secured  only  by  incorporation  into  the 
Union.  Political  advantages  also  would  flow 
freely  from  such  a  connection.  With  malicious 
allusion  to  the  late  tension  about  Oregon  and 
the  rising  dispute  over  Central  America,  the 
manifesto  continued: 

Disagreement  between  the  United  States  and  her  chief, 
if  not  only,  rival  among  nations  would  make  the  soil 
of  Canada  the  sanguinary  arena  for  their  disputes.  .  .  . 
That  such  is  the  unenviable  condition  of  our  state  of  de 
pendence  upon  Great  Britain  is  known  to  the  whole  world; 
and  how  far  it  may  conduce  to  keep  prudent  capitalists 
from  making  investments  in  the  country,  or  wealthy  set 
tlers  from  selecting  a  foredoomed  battlefield  for  the  home 
of  themselves  and  children,  it  needs  no  reasoning  on  our 
part  to  elucidate. 


i8o  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

There  was  added  a  comparison  of  the  depend 
ence  and  subordination  of  the  Canadians  in  the 
existing  conditions  with  the  proud  equality  they 
would  enjoy  as  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
The  honors  and  emoluments  of  the  British  Em 
pire  were  denied  them  as  colonials,  while  all  the 
distinctions  of  the  American  Republic  would  be 
within  their  reach. 

The  movement  of  which  this  document  was 
the  pronunciamento  was  in  Canada  to  a  great 
extent  an  episode  of  provincial  party  politics. 
Support  for  it  was  drawn  almost  entirely  from 
two  sources,  the  Tories  and  the  ultra-demo 
cratic  element  of  the  French  Liberals.  Such  an 
alliance  had  no  possibility  of  permanence  or  of 
effectiveness.  What  the  one  party  had  most 
at  heart  in  the  proposed  union  with  the  United 
States  was  wholly  abhorrent  to  the  other.  The 
inner  repugnance  of  the  two  elements  was  kept 
in  abeyance  at  first,  and  for  some  months  agita 
tion  through  associations  and  public  meetings 
was  active  and  to  the  government  disquieting. 
Though  the  annexationists  invariably  declared 
that  the  peaceful  consent  of  Great  Britain  was 
an  absolute  prerequisite  to  the  realization  of 
their  purpose,  Lord  Elgin,  on  the  advice  of  his 
ministry,  took  pains  to  discourage  the  agita- 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  181 

tion,  and  excluded  from  the  public  service  those 
who  identified  themselves  with  the  movement. 
This  was  a  severe  blow  to  the  Tory  element  of 
the  discontented.  The  French  element  received 
a  like  setback  through  the  strong  and  open  con 
demnation  of  the  agitation  by  the  Catholic 
clergy.  Good  harvests  and  a  revival  of  business 
served  to  alleviate  the  economic  situation,  and 
after  some  small  successes  in  the  elections  in 
1850  the  organization  and  activity  of  the  an- 
nexationists  faded  gradually  away. 

In  neither  Great  Britain  nor  the  United  States 
did  the  movement  in  Canada  attract  much 
attention.  Home  politics  in  the  great  republic 
were  just  at  the  time  in  a  state  that  left  little 
room  for  public  concern  with  matters  beyond 
the  border.  Territorial  extension  had  raised  is 
sues  as  to  slavery  that  were  threatening  dis 
ruption  of  the  Union.  Under  the  circumstances 
a  proposal  of  further  extension  could  hardly  be 
expected  to  enlist  much  enthusiasm.  In  some 
of  the  States  contiguous  to  Canada  the  legis 
latures  passed  resolutions  approving  the  idea 
of  reuniting  the  long-severed  members  of  the 
English-speaking  race  in  North  America.  At 
Washington,  however,  there  was  no  manifesta 
tion  of  feeling  by  either  legislature  or  executive. 


1 82  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

Indifference  or  positive  hostility  was  indeed  the 
attitude  assumed  toward  even  the  projects  of 
commercial  reciprocity  that  were  being  urged 
upon  the  attention  of  the  government  by  repre 
sentatives  of  Canada. 

At  Westminster  and  in  England  at  large  the 
growth  of  the  movement  for  annexation  was 
followed  naturally  with  rather  closer  interest. 
There  was  ample  basis  for  the  assertion  of  the 
Canadian  agitators  that  their  proposed  remedy 
for  colonial  ills  had  its  origin  in  Great  Britain. 
Ultimate  separation  had  long  since  been  de 
clared  by  distinguished  Britons  to  be  a  natural 
incident  of  development  in  the  colonies  so  soon 
as  the  union  with  the  mother-land  should  become 
burdensome.  On  this  principle,  it  was  argued, 
the  British  Government's  concern  in  the  matter 
was  limited  to  the  question  of  separation.  As 
suming  that  the  reasons  for  separation  were 
sufficient,  the  determination  as  to  what  shall 
follow  independence  must  be  left  to  the  colonists 
themselves.  Annexation  proper,  therefore,  was 
no  matter  for  discussion  with  Great  Britain. 

During  the  process  of  transition  from  protec 
tion  to  free  trade  the  debates  of  British  politics 
had  furnished  an  impressive  addition  to  the 
list  of  great  names  sustaining  the  idea  of  even- 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  183 

tual  independence  for  the  colonies.  All  shades 
of  party  opinion  contributed  to  the  list.  Pro 
tectionist  Tories  believed  that  the  burden  of 
sustaining  the  colonies  would  be  intolerable 
now  that  the  policy  of  exploiting  them  for  the 
benefit  of  the  mother-land  was  given  up.  The 
Peelites  and  conservative  Whigs  contended  that 
free  trade  would  prove  the  economic  salvation 
of  both  colonies  and  mother-land,  and  would 
thus  strengthen  the  bond  uniting  them,  but  ad 
mitted  that  if  for  any  reason  the  interests  of 
either  clearly  should  demand  separation,  there 
would  be  no  valid  ground  for  opposing  it.  Rad 
icals  proclaimed  the  democratic  dogma  of  the 
people's  will  and  held  that  independence  was 
the  right  of  the  colonists  whenever  and  for  what 
ever  reason  they  demanded  it.  Disraeli,  Peel, 
Gladstone,  and  Lord  John  Russell  all  put  on 
record  their  conviction  that  British  policy  must 
be  shaped  in  contemplation  of  the  gradual  dis 
solution  of  the  empire.  Cobden  was,  of  course, 
the  high  priest  of  this  creed;  but  Cobden  never 
held  the  reins  of  governmental  authority.  His 
luminous  expositions  of  the  creed  lacked  the 
immediate  practical  effect  of  such  words  as  those 
of  Lord  John  Russell,  prime  minister,  in  1850. 
Concluding  his  speech  in  the  Commons  in  which 


1 84  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

he  denounced  the  annexationists  of  Canada,  he 
said: 

I  anticipate  indeed  with  others  that  some  of  the  col 
onies  may  so  grow  in  population  and  wealth  that  they 
may  say:  "Our  strength  is  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  be 
independent  of  England  .  .  .  the  time  is  come  when  we 
think  we  can,  in  amity  and  alliance  with  England,  main 
tain  our  independence."  I  do  not  think  that  that  time 
is  yet  approaching.  But  let  us  make  them  as  far  as  pos 
sible  fit  to  govern  themselves — let  us  give  them,  as  far 
as  we  can,  the  capacity  of  ruling  their  own  affairs — let 
them  increase  in  wealth  and  population;  and,  whatever 
may  happen,  we  of  this  great  empire  shall  have  the  con 
solation  of  saying  that  we  have  contributed  to  the  hap 
piness  of  the  world. 

This  amiable  and  pacific  pronouncement  was 
not  relished  by  the  Canadian  authorities.  It 
involved  a  concession  of  the  chief  principle  of 
the  annexationists  and  limited  controversy  with 
them  to  the  mere  question  of  the  proper  time 
for  putting  their  project  into  effect.  Lord 
Elgin  recorded  a  strong  protest  against  the 
prime  minister's  expressions,  as  seriously  embar 
rassing  to  the  colonial  government.  Russell 
undoubtedly  voiced,  however,  the  prevailing 
political  philosophy  of  his  day.  The  free-trade 
movement  in  Great  Britain  presented  a  com 
bination  of  two  clearly  distinguishable  ele 
ments,  a  refined  and  gentle  idealism  and  a  crude, 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  185 

rough  materialism.  Its  intellectual  supporters 
considered  unrestrained  action  in  commerce  and 
industry  as  but  a  further  realization  of  the 
liberty  that  was  natural  to  a  rational  being;  free 
trade  was  a  right  of  man  like  free  speech  and 
free  worship;  abolition  of  the  protective  tariff 
was  a  step  toward  the  perfection  of  the  indi 
vidual  and  the  race.  In  Cobden's  expositions 
this  philosophy  was  most  skilfully  blended  with 
consideration  of  the  practical  needs  of  the  Brit 
ish  merchants  and  manufacturers.  The  latter, 
however,  were  little  concerned  about  abstract 
liberty  and  the  progress  of  the  race.  Free  trade 
with  them  was  a  matter  only  of  markets.  Ex 
pansion  of  commerce,  new  consumers  of  com 
modities,  enlargement  of  plants  to  the  point  of 
maximum  production  and  profit — these  summed 
up  the  advantages  of  free  trade  from  the  busi 
ness  man's  point  of  view.  To  him  colonists 
were  but  customers;  to  the  idealists  they  were 
but  men,  with  natural  rights.  That  they  were 
Englishmen  and  were  determined  by  that  fact 
from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to  changeless 
political  union  with  other  Englishmen,  was  a 
conception  that  had  no  place  in  the  thought 
of  either  element  of  the  free-traders.  The  fed 
eration  of  the  world  and  not  imperial  feder- 


1 86  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

ation  was  the   key-note  of  British    liberalism 
in  1850. 

Lord  John  Russell's  peremptory  denial  of 
the  claim  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  Canadian 
independence  was  preceded  by  legislation  de 
signed  to  remedy  some  of  the  ills  that  gave  rise 
to  the  claim.  In  1849  Parliament  swept  away 
the  last  remnants  of  the  old  restrictive  com 
mercial  system  by  repealing  the  famous  Nav 
igation  Laws.  The  operation  of  these  laws 
greatly  aggravated  the  misfortunes  that  were 
brought  upon  Canada  by  the  abolition  of 
preferential  duties  in  the  mother  country.  Co 
lonial  commerce  with  Great  Britain  was  limited 
to  British  ships,  and  freight  rates  were  corre 
spondingly  high.  American  competition,  duly 
favored  by  Congressional  legislation,  was  able 
thus  to  make  sad  inroads  on  various  branches 
of  the  trade  with  the  home  country.  Com 
plaints  from  Canada  became  urgent  at  West 
minster,  and  there  was  no  room  to  doubt  that 
they  were  well  founded.  The  Whig  cabinet, 
therefore,  resolved  to  complete  the  work  that 
Huskisson  had  begun  twenty  years  before,  and 
the  carrying  trade  between  the  colonies  and  the 
United  Kingdom  was  thrown  open  to  the  ships 
of  all  the  world. 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  187 

The  abandonment  of  the  restrictive  system 
generally  by  Great  Britain  left  the  North  Amer 
ican  colonies,  and  especially  Canada,  still  in  an 
uncomfortable  plight.  Free  trade  made  their 
prosperity  dependent  on  the  commercial  policy 
of  the  United  States  as  fully  as  protection  had 
kept  it  dependent  on  the  policy  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  From  the  point  of  view  of  pro 
duction  the  northern  part  of  the  United  States 
and  the  British  provinces  were  a  unit;  the  out 
put  of  their  fields  and  forests  was  practically 
the  same.  From  the  point  of  view  of  markets 
the  colonists  were  at  a  great  disadvantage.  In 
the  United  States  population  was  much  denser, 
and  the  facilities  for  transportation  were  vastly 
superior.  The  Canadians  were  not  yet  beyond 
the  stage  of  canals,  while  on  the  other  side  of 
the  border  railways  had  attained  a  remarka 
ble  development.  What  was  necessary  to  the 
prosperity  of  the  Canadians  was  free  access  to 
the  markets  of  the  greater  neighbor.  But  the 
Americans  made  no  haste  to  remove  the  tariff 
barrier  with  which  they  had  met  the  old  policy 
of  restriction.  To  the  advances  of  the  British 
Government  looking  to  reciprocal  free  trade  on 
the  Canadian  frontier  they  presented  the  old 
familiar  question:  What  have  you  to  offer  in 


i88  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

return?  Fortunately  a  now  long-standing  dis 
pute  over  the  ancient  subject  of  the  fisheries 
enabled  Westminster  to  make  an  answer  that, 
after  years  of  consideration,  was  accepted  as 
sufficient. 

We  have  seen  that  in  1818  the  United  States 
renounced  the  liberty  of  taking  fish  "within 
three  marine  miles  of  any  of  the  coasts,  bays, 
creeks,  or  harbors"  of  British  America  except 
certain  clearly  described  portions  of  the  shores 
of  Newfoundland  and  Labrador.  In  the  later 
thirties  complaints  began  to  be  heard  from 
Nova  Scotia  that  the  American  fishermen  were 
disregarding  this  agreement  by  plying  their 
trade  in  the  bays  of  that  colony.  Legislation 
was  enacted  to  punish  the  intruders  and  ulti 
mately  British  naval  vessels  were  sent  to  patrol 
the  coast.  The  Americans  stoutly  denied  that 
they  were  intruding,  and  the  seizure  of  their 
fishing-vessels  gave  rise  to  prolonged  diplo 
matic  proceedings. 

It  appeared  that  certain  most  valuable  species 
of  fish  had,  with  the  disregard  of  human  con 
ventions  that  is  so  characteristic  of  the  lower 
species  of  animate  things,  manifested  their  pres 
ence  in  paying  numbers  much  nearer  land  than 
the  standard  cod  ever  ventured.  In  pursuit  of 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  189 

the  profitable  game  the  Americans  were  brought 
within  what  the  British  claimed  were  "bays/' 
and  as  such  were  barred  to  the  fishermen.  A 
"bay/1  in  the  sense  of  the  treaty,  was,  accord 
ing  to  the  contention  of  the  British,  any  ex 
panse  of  water  designated  by  that  name,  so 
that  an  American  fisherman  was  an  intruder 
even  twenty  miles  from  land,  if  he  was  fishing 
in  water  that  was  called  a  bay.  The  Americans 
claimed  that  the  term  "bay"  applied  with  cer 
tain  qualifications  only  to  an  indentation  of  the 
coast-line  of  such  size  and  shape  that  a  ship, 
when  entering  it,  must  pass  within  three  miles 
of  the  land.  In  its  full  development  the  Brit 
ish  doctrine  held  that  the  "coasts"  from  which 
the  Americans  were  excluded  were  defined  by 
a  broken  line  running  from  headland  to  head 
land,  so  that  there  was  no  right  to  fish  within 
three  miles  of  such  a  line.  The  American 
claim  was  that  British  jurisdiction  extended  no 
more  than  three  miles  from  actual  land,  and 
that  the  geometrical  lines  from  headland  to 
headland  included  often  large  portions  of  the 
high  seas  that  were  free  to  all. 

There  was  abundant  material  in  this  conflict 
for  endless  debate  by  the  experts  of  the  law 
of  nations.  Of  most  importance  to  the  prac- 


190  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

tical  statesman  was  the  simple  fact  that  the 
Americans  were  as  deeply  interested  to  get 
admission  to  the  inshore  fishing  as  the  Cana 
dians  were  to  get  free  access  to  the  markets 
of  the  United  States.  The  quid  pro  quo  ex 
pected  by  the  Washington  government  was  at 
hand,  and  the  bargain  was  formally  struck  in 
the  Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854,  concluded  by 
Lord  Elgin  and  Secretary  of  State  Marcy.  By 
this  agreement  the  Americans  acquired  again 
the  liberty,  renounced  in  1818,  of  taking  fish 
in  the  bays,  harbors,  and  creeks  of  the  British 
provinces  (except  Newfoundland),  without  re 
striction  as  to  distance  from  the  shore.  The 
British  colonists  gained  the  coveted  access  to 
the  American  markets  through  the  provision 
for  the  reciprocal  admission  duty-free  of  enu 
merated  commodities  that  included  the  prin 
cipal  products  of  the  soil,  the  mines,  and  the  for 
ests.  Reciprocity  was  further  applied  through 
the  admission  of  the  Americans  to  the  naviga 
tion  of  the  Saint  Lawrence  River,  and  the  ad 
mission  of  the  Canadians  to  the  navigation  of 
Lake  Michigan. 

The  effect  of  this  treaty  on  the  relations 
between  the  English-speaking  peoples  of  the 
Western  world  was  marked  and  salutary.  Fric- 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  191 

tion  over  the  fisheries  passed  away.  Trade 
increased  by  leaps  and  bounds.  British  Amer 
ica  and  the  United  States  tended  manifestly 
toward  that  economic  solidarity  which  the 
geographic  conditions  seemed  to  make  natural. 
In  1854,  the  last  full  year  before  the  treaty  went 
into  effect,  the  total  trade  between  the  two 
peoples  was  about  $35,003,000;  in  1856,  the 
first  full  year  after  the  treaty  went  into  effect, 
the  total  trade  was  $57,000,000.  This  increase 
signified  more  than  a  mere  enhancement  of 
mercantile  profits.  It  meant  the  promotion  of 
the  neighborly  spirit  and  feelings  between  neigh 
bors.  It  meant  that  those  people  who  lived 
on  opposite  banks  of  the  Detroit  or  the  Niag 
ara  River,  or  on  opposite  sides  of  a  surveyor's 
line,  should  no  longer  meet  with  legal  obstacles 
to  the  free  intercourse  that  proximity  invited. 
It  meant  a  great  multiplication  of  the  social 
and  financial  ties  across  the  frontier  that  are 
sure  to  be  created  by  increasing  trade.  In  any 
estimate  of  the  influences  that  made  for  friendly 
and  sympathetic  relations  among  English-speak 
ing  peoples  in  1860,  the  Reciprocity  Treaty  of 
1854  must  stand  side  by  side  with  the  diplo 
matic  adjustments  already  described  concern 
ing  Central  America  and  the  right  of  search. 


192  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

The  general  international  harmony  and  cor 
diality  that  pervaded  the  English-speaking  world 
at  the  beginning  of  the  sixties  was  destined  to 
disappear  for  more  than  a  decade  through  the 
conditions  produced  by  the  Civil  War  in  the 
United  States.  Before  considering  the  unfortu 
nate  effects  of  that  convulsion,  let  us  note  the 
salient  features  of  the  English-speaking  world  at 
this  period,  as  compared  with  what  the  term 
had  denoted  at  the  date  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent, 
forty-six  years  in  the  past. 

In  numbers  the  United  Kingdom  no  longer 
stood  first.  With  10,000,000  more  inhabitants 
than  in  1814,  its  29,000,000  fell  short  by  2,000,- 
ooo  of  the  population  of  the  United  States. 
British  North  America  showed  a  sixfold  increase 
to  3,000,000,  of  whom  all  but  500,000  were  in 
Canada.  Among  the  scattered  dependencies 
of  Britain  the  vast  spaces  of  Australia  were  be 
ginning  to  fill  up  through  the  thirst  for  gold, 
and  some  half-million  settlers  were  shaping  the 
foundations  of  a  new  English-speaking  com 
monwealth.  In  none  of  these  chief  groups,  how 
ever,  was  there  such  uniformity  of  English 
speech  as  to  prophesy  complete  social  and  po 
litical  concord.  The  brogue  of  the  Irish  Celt,  the 
barbarous  dialect  of  the  African  slave,  and  the 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  193 

patois  of  the  French  habitant  suggested  grave 
problems  of  statecraft  in  Great  Britain  and 
America;  while  Australia  at  this  date  was  so 
little  developed  as  to  make  the  ultimate  triumph 
of  English  still  problematical. 

Economically  Great  Britain  was  in  1860,  as 
she  had  been  in  1814,  the  leading  power  of  the 
world.  In  both  trade  and  manufactures  she 
stood  easily  first.  Her  mercantile  marine  and 
her  navy  still  surpassed  those  of  any  other  na 
tion.  Yet  there  was  no  such  disparity  between 
her  and  the  American  Republic  as  was  so  con 
spicuous  half  a  century  earlier.  In  the  carry 
ing  trade  of  the  world  the  United  States  was 
Britain's  nearest  rival.  In  manufactures  Brit 
ish  supremacy  was  confirmed  by  the  transition 
from  the  domestic  to  the  factory  system,  which 
was  practically  complete  in  England  in  1860. 
This  supremacy  it  was  not  yet  in  the  power  of 
the  sparse  population  of  the  United  States  to 
contest.  For  one  branch  of  textiles,  however, 
and  that  a  most  important  one,  namely,  cotton 
goods,  the  dependence  of  England  on  the  Ameri 
cans  for  raw  materials  was  complete,  as  was  fore 
seen  by  the  leaders  of  the  American  secessionists. 

Politically,  also,  British  and  American  ideas 
and  conditions  were  much  less  remote  from 


194  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

each  other  than  at  the  time  of  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent.  Both  peoples  had  been  moving  to 
ward  democracy.  The  Americans  found  little 
to  obstruct  their  swift  and  steady  advance. 
The  British  moved  sluggishly  on  among  the 
obstacles  of  century-old  institutions  and  preju 
dices,  and  made  certain,  if  less  than  rapid, 
progress.  England  could  not  show  in  1860,  as 
the  United  States  could,  manhood  suffrage,  one- 
year  terms  for  important  executive  officers,  or 
an  elective  judiciary.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Tory  aristocracy  that  had  controlled  British 
policy  in  1814  had  passed  from  power  forever. 
The  Whig  nobles  were  giving  way,  as  a  con 
trolling  political  force,  to  the  liberal  and  radical 
elements  of  their  party,  hot  from  Birmingham 
and  Manchester.  Though  "the  Dukes"  contin 
ued  to  figure  in  the"  councils  of  .the  party,  its 
vital  energy  centred  elsewhere,  and  was  nour 
ished  on  projects  touching  the  suffrage,  the 
church,  education,  and  landlords,  that  could  be 
realized  only  after  Palmerston  and  Russell  had 
passed  from  the  political  stage  and  left  Glad 
stone  to  transform  the  Whig  into  the  Liberal 
Party.  The  ideas  that  were  thus  approaching 
their  triumph  in  Great  Britain  were  ideas  that 
America  claimed  as  peculiarly  its  own.  They 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  195 

embodied  the  aspirations  of  the  working  classes 
and  non-conformists  in  Great  Britain  and  the 
great  mass  of  the  Irish.  These  were  the  classes 
best  known  and  best  understood  in  the  United 
States.  Politics  that  involved  their  point  of 
view  and  their  interests  was  intelligible  to  the 
Americans,  while  the  politics  of  the  aristocracy 
was  unintelligible  and  hence  repulsive.  So  far, 
therefore,  as  the  character  of  British  problems 
changed  in  the  sense  described,  sympathetic  and 
cordial  relations  were  strengthened. 

At  just  the  period  we  are  treating,  moreover, 
the  effects  of  the  vast  migration  of  English- 
speaking  people  that  marked  the  middle  of  the 
century  were  fully  manifest.  In  the  fifteen  years 
ending  with  1860  4,700,000  emigrants  left  the 
United  Kingdom,  of  whom  something  like  three- 
fourths  went  to  the  United  States.  British 
America  was  the  announced  destination  of  a  mil 
lion  of  them;  but  the  drift  of  the  newcomers 
across  the  boundary  from  the  provinces  into 
the  United  States  was  continuous  and  on  a  large 
scale.  The  number  who  set  out  for  the  United 
States  direct  was  2,900,00x3. 

Of  the  total  from  the  United  Kingdom  Ire 
land  furnished,  of  course,  the  very  great  ma 
jority.  A  million  Irishmen  emigrated  to  the 


196  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

United  States  in  the  years  1847-52,  and  a  quar 
ter  of  a  million  went  to  British  North  Amer 
ica.  The  census  of  1860  gave  the  number  of 
natives  of  Ireland  in  the  United  States  as 
1,611,304;  the  number  of  English-born  as  433,- 
494;  of  Scots  as  108,518;  of  Welsh  as  45,763. 
The  Irish  made  an  impression  socially  and  po 
litically  that  was  even  deeper  than  their  excess 
in  numbers  would  warrant.  Their  animosity 
toward  the  English  made  it  imperative  that  a 
politician  who  needed  their  support  should  dis 
play  in  some  form  an  anti-British  feeling.  The 
performances  that  were  elicited  by  this  require 
ment  were  at  times  disheartening  to  those  who 
hoped  for  harmony;  but  the  motive  became 
in  time  so  obvious  and  the  act  so  perfunctory 
that  "twisting  the  British  lion's  tail"  lost  all 
relation  to  serious  thought.  The  tales  of  suffer 
ing  in  the  famine  and  of  heartless  oppression  by 
landlords  doubtless  roused  much  feeling  as  they 
circulated  through  America.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  religion  and  various  racial  traits  of  the  Irish 
tended  to  excite  a  hostility  to  them  that  coun 
teracted  much  of  their  anti-British  influence. 

Among  the  elements  that  co-operated  to  de 
termine  the  relations  between  the  British  and 


THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION  197 

the  American  branches  of  the  English-speaking 
people,  contemporary  literature  was  in  1860 
of  well-defined  importance.  By  that  date  the 
United  States  had  fairly  freed  itself  from  the 
reproach  of  utter  unproductiveness  in  this  field. 
Only  the  most  narrow  and  hidebound  devotees 
of  expiring  English  Toryism  still  failed  to  find 
a  readable  American  book.  Irving,  Cooper, 
and  Poe  had  won  distinct,  if  not  wildly  enthu 
siastic,  recognition  from  the  oracles  of  literary 
taste  in  Britain.  Prescott,  Motley,  and  Emer 
son  were  receiving  attention.  Not  a  few  other 
writers  were  wresting  from  the  cultivated  classes 
of  the  United  Kingdom  the  hesitating  admis 
sion  that  the  American  democracy  might  yet 
mean  something  in  the  life  of  the  spirit.  The 
harmonizing  influence  of  this  feeling  had  its 
complement  in  the  impression  made  by  British 
writers  in  America.  The  stars  of  the  mid- 
Victorian  galaxy  were  glowing  with  meridian 
splendor  in  1860.  Carlyle,  Ruskin,  Tennyson, 
Browning,  Dickens,  Thackeray,  and  George 
Eliot — to  name  but  a  few — were  honored  as 
intensively,  if  not  as  extensively,  in  the  United 
States  as  in  England.  One  of  them,  Charles 
Dickens,  had  vogue  and  popularity  far  above 
all  the  rest  in  the  United  States,  and  this  de- 


198  THROUGH  THREEFOLD  TENSION 

spite  the  lively  resentment  excited  by  the  de 
scriptions  of  Americans  and  their  life  in  his 
American  Notes  and  Martin  Chuzzlezvit.  The 
explanation  lay  in  the  social  stratum  in  which 
he  almost  exclusively  found  his  inspiration, 
The  life,  aspirations,  pleasures,  and  pains  of  the 
common  people  furnished  all  his  material.  These 
things  the  American  masses  could  understand. 
From  his  stories  they  received  a  strong  and 
lasting  impression  of  plain  people  like  them 
selves  in  England,  living  real  and  understand 
able  lives  down  beneath  the  glorious  but  misty 
region  where  moved  the  lords  and  ladies,  and 
the  magnates  of  philosophy,  art,  religion,  and 
politics,  who  were  commonly  the  dramatis  per 
sona  of  other  writers  of  English  fiction.  When 
the  Civil  War  in  America  brought  tension  of  a 
most  threatening  sort  between  the  two  nations, 
the  bonds  of  a  common  literature  like  this  were 
of  the  highest  service  in  averting  rupture. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  AND  ITS  EFFECTS 

DESPITE  repeated  and  notorious  demonstra 
tions  of  their  error,  idealists  will  doubtless  con 
tinue  in  the  future  to  maintain  as  in  the  past 
that  an  omelette  can  be  made  without  break 
ing  any  eggs.  Many  of  the  good  people  who 
preached  ardent  abolitionism  in  the  name  of 
humanity  were  equally  devoted  to  the  propa 
ganda  of  universal  peace.  The  four  years  of 
desperate  war  that  brought  about  the  extinc 
tion  of  slavery  in  the  United  States  presented 
awkward  problems  of  comparative  humanity, 
and  vexed  the  spirits  of  all  the  English-speaking 
people  in  whom  hostility  to  slavery  had  be 
come  strong.  Ill  feeling  toward  Great  Britain 
was  manifested  in  both  the  contending  sections 
in  America  very  early  in  the  war.  Ill  feeling 
toward  both  sections  was  manifested  quite  as 
early  in  Great  Britain.  The  balance  among 
these  various  emotions  at  any  particular  time 
depended  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  relation 
then  seeming  to  exist  between  slavery  and  the 

objects  of  the  war. 

199 


200  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

Fighting  between  South  and  North  began  on 
the  clearly  defined  issue  of  political  independ 
ence.  Seven  states,  organized  in  a  confederacy, 
claimed  the  rights  and  authority  of  a  sovereign 
power,  and  expelled  by  force  a  body  of  troops 
that  refused  to  recognize  that  claim.  The  rea 
soning  by  which  the  claim  was  sustained  had 
as  its  basis  the  familiar  democratic  dogma  that 
government  is  just  only  when  it  rests  upon  the 
will  of  the  governed.  There  was  no  room  to 
doubt,  so  the  Southerners  held,  that  the  peo 
ple  of  the  seven  States  willed  to  be  governed  by 
the  authorities  of  the  Confederacy,  and  not  by 
the  organs  of  the  government  at  Washington. 
Whether  the  manifestation  of  this  will  had 
been  constitutional  or  revolutionary,  might  be 
debatable.  In  either  case,  however,  the  result 
was  unassailable.  No  power  on  earth  could 
justly  dispute  the  authority  of  that  government 
which  the  people  of  the  South  had  set  up. 
President  Lincoln,  when  he  sought  to  assert 
the  power  of  a  government  which  the  people 
had  repudiated,  was  but  treading  in  the  tyrant 
footsteps  of  George  III  in  1776. 

The  logical  strength  of  this  Southern  argu 
ment  could  not  be  disputed.  Nor  could,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  strength  of  the  reasoning  by 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  201 

which  it  was  controverted  on  behalf  of  the 
North.  The  same  dogma  of  popular  sovereignty 
served  the  one  cause  as  the  other.  The  will  of 
the  people  must  prevail.  But  who  were  the 
people?  Since  democracy  became  in  the  later 
middle  age  a  favorite  dogma  of  radical  philos 
ophy,  this  question,  Who  are  the  people?  has 
been  the  source  of  half  the  political  woes  of 
mankind.  In  1861  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  North 
maintained  that  the  people  in  whom  sovereign 
power  inhered  was  the  whole  body  of  inhabit 
ants  of  the  United  States;  that  no  less  aggre 
gate  possessed  any  of  the  attributes  of  sover 
eignty;  that  this  body,  expressing  its  will 
through  a  constitutional  majority,  was  supreme 
as  against  any  individual  or  group  of  individ 
uals  in  the  United  States;  and  that  refusal  to 
recognize  such  supremacy  was  simply  treason. 
The  corroboration  of  this  doctrine  in  the  last 
analysis  was  to  be  found  in  the  dogma  that 
the  United  States  was  a  nation,  and  the  gov 
ernment  at  Washington  was  a  national  govern 
ment.  To  the  contemner  of  nationality  and 
its  representatives  was  ascribed  something  of 
the  ineffable  depravity  that  characterized  him 
who  sins  against  the  Holy  Ghost. 

When  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  the  United 


202  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

States  obliged  the  other  English-speaking  peo 
ples  to  form  some  definite  opinion  as  to  the  right 
and  wrong  of  the  disastrous  situation,  a  judg 
ment  on  the  merits  of  the  political  and  consti 
tutional  arguments  was  naturally  very  difficult. 
That  a  people  possessed  the  right  to  determine 
what  its  government  should  be,  had  been  a 
dogma  of  all  English  political  philosophy  since 
the  Whig  revolution  of  1688.  That  a  nation 
was  entitled  to  independence  and  self-govern 
ment,  was,  with  certain  qualifications  adapted 
to  the  latitude  of  Ireland,  an  accepted  maxim 
of  British  policy.  But  the  application  of  these 
principles  to  the  American  situation  was  effec 
tually  barred  by  the  very  unanimity  with  which 
they  were  accepted  by  the  contending  sections. 
The  South  stood  for  sovereignty  of  the  people 
(excluding  negroes)  and  self-government  for  a 
nation,  and  stigmatized  the  North  as  a  ruthless 
and  bloodthirsty  foreign  invader.  The  North 
stood  for  sovereignty  of  the  people  (also  exclud 
ing  negroes)  and  self-government  for  a  nation, 
and  stigmatized  the  South  as  a  lawless  aggre 
gate  of  rebels  and  traitors.  Elaborate  reason 
ing  from  history  and  law  was  adduced  by  both 
sides  in  support  of  their  respective  contentions; 
but  this  was  even  less  successful  abroad  than  at 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  203 

home  in  producing  a  consensus  of  opinion  on 
the  merits  of  the  case.  Political  and  legal 
theory  was  bankrupt  in  the  presence  of  the 
fierce  passions  that  dominated  the  American 
democracy,  and  recourse  was  had  to  other 
grounds  when  foreign  judgment  and  sympathy 
were  determined. 

In  Great  Britain  the  South  had  from  the 
outset  the  favor  of  the  leading  classes — the 
great  newspapers  and  the  most  eminent  men  in 
politics  [and  society.  This  was  in  some  meas 
ure  due  to  the  almost  universal  acceptance  of 
the  ancient  doctrine  that  a  state  of  great  area 
and  population,  under  democratic  political  in 
stitutions,  could  not  long  endure.  All  think 
ers  of  repute,  for  centuries  in  the  past,  had 
sustained  this  view,  and  it  was  ingrained  in 
the  intellectual  apparatus  of  the  age.  France 
since  1789  was  held  to  have  confirmed  the 
dogma.  For  three-quarters  of  a  century  the 
United  States  had  thrived  in  defiance  of  this 
profound  truth;  but  the  secession  of  the  South 
had  at  last  justified  the  philosophers.  As  the 
South  was  but  fulfilling  the  requirements  of 
ineluctable  fate,  she  was  entitled  to  the  respect 
and  sympathy  of  mankind.  There  was  cur 
rent  at  the  same  time  in  the  upper  circles  of 


204  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

English  society  a  conviction  that  the  democracy 
of  the  South  was  much  less  pronounced  and 
aggressive  than  that  of  the  North — that  the 
Southerner  was  more  likely  than  the  North 
erner,  on  the  average,  to  conform  to  the  stand 
ards  of  the  "gentleman/5  both  in  his  social  and 
his  political  ideas  and  actions.  Of  the  two 
republics,  therefore,  into  which  the  United  States 
was  henceforth  to  be  divided,  the  Southern  was 
to  be  the  more  amenable  to  British  influence. 
Moreover,  the  policy  of  the  South  in  respect  to 
commerce  was  sure  to  be  more  in  accord  with 
the  liberal  views  of  Great  Britain.  Free  trade 
was  the  manifest  preference  and  the  obvious 
interest  of  the  South,  while  the  recent  recur 
rence  of  the  North  to  protection,  in  the  Morrill 
tariff  of  1 86 1,  revealed  a  menace  to  the  pros 
perity  of  British  manufactures. 

The  Achilles  heel  of  the  Southern  case  before 
British  opinion  was  slavery.  Hostility  to  this 
institution  was  immovably  fixed  in  the  feelings 
of  all  classes  of  the  people.  Among  the  aris 
tocracy,  intellectual  and  social,  there  was  appre 
ciation  of  the  hard  problem  of  the  Southern 
whites  in  dealing  with  the  great  mass  of  blacks 
on  their  hands,  and  there  was  corresponding 
toleration  of  the  institution  as  a  transitory 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  205 

solution;  but  there  was  no  sympathy  with  the 
suggestion  of  permanent  utility  in  slavery  and 
of  a  revival  of  the  African  slave-trade,  nor  was 
there  any  approval  of  the  idea  that  the  main 
tenance  of  slavery  was  in  itself  a  sufficient  jus 
tification  of  secession  by  the  South.  Hence 
the  unceasing  vigilance  of  the  most  acute  South 
ern  leaders  to  avoid  all  discussion  of  the  slavery 
question  and  to  put  the  case  of  the  South  on  the 
other  grounds.  This  policy  received  much  sup 
port  from  the  Northern  government  itself  in 
the  early  days  of  the  war;  for  out  of  regard  for 
sentiment  in  the  non-seceded  slave  States  Pres 
ident  Lincoln's  administration  systematically 
kept  abolitionist  doctrine  in  the  background, 
and  based  its  appeal  for  support  on  the  su 
premacy  of  the  nation  over  the  State.  It  is 
not  at  all  surprising  that  foreign  governments 
adopted  at  the  outset  the  view  that  slavery 
was  involved  only  incidentally  in  the  quarrels 
of  the  sections. 

One  powerful  element  of  public  opinion  in 
Great  Britain  adopted  very  early  the  view  that 
slavery  was  the  real  cause  of  the  war  and  that 
it  was  the  duty  of  good  people,  therefore,  to 
give  their  sympathy  to  the  North.  Such  was 
the  conviction  reached  by  Cobden,  Bright, 


206  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

Forster,  and  Mill,  under  the  influence  of  Sum- 
ner  and  other  extreme  antislavery  doctrinaires. 
This  judgment  gained  no  great  support  in  the 
higher  classes  of  society,  but,  through  the  ear 
nestness  and  eloquence  of  Bright  and  Cobden 
especially,  won  a  vast  body  of  adherents  among 
the  middle  and  lower  classes,  and  thus  secured 
for  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the  American  min 
ister,  a  moral  backing  for  which  he  was  pro 
foundly  grateful.  It  was  not  till  after  the 
formal  adoption  of  the  policy  of  emancipation 
by  President  Lincoln,  however,  that  the  maxi 
mum  influence  of  this  particular  element  of 
British  opinion  was  discernible. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Lord  Palmerston 
was  prime  minister,  and  Earl  Russell  was 
foreign  secretary.  When  in  April,  1861,  large 
armies  were  called  into  the  field  by  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Confederacy,  privateers 
were  commissioned  by  the  South,  and  a  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports  was  proclaimed  by  Presi 
dent  Lincoln,  it  was  clearly  time  for  the  British 
Government  to  recognize  the  situation.  Com 
mercial  relations  with  both  sections  were  vast 
and  intricate,  and  with  privateering  in  full  sway 
on  one  side  and  blockade  proclaimed  on  the 
other,  trouble  for  British  merchants  and  mar- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  207 

iners  was  plainly  in  sight.  What  to  do  seems 
not  to  have  caused  any  serious  anxiety  to  the 
cabinet.  The  United  States  had  followed  the 
long-foreseen  course  of  nature  and  had  fallen 
in  pieces.  The  pieces  were  at  war  with  each 
other,  and  it  was  incumbent  on  the  British 
Government  to  assume  promptly  the  attitude 
and  the  duties  of  a  neutral.  Accordingly,  on 
May  13,  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  neu 
trality  was  issued.  In  this  the  proceedings  in 
the  United  States  were  referred  to  as  hostilities 
"between  the  government  of  the  United  States 
and  certain  states  styling  themselves  the  Con 
federate  States  of  America,"  and  all  subjects  of 
the  Queen  were  notified  that  acts  in  violation 
of  neutrality  would  bring  heavy  penalties  upon 
the  offender. 

Here  began  an  Iliad  of  woes  for  the  English- 
speaking  peoples.  By  this  proclamation  the 
British  Government  recognized  the  Confederacy 
as  a  belligerent,  with  the  rights  and  responsi 
bilities  ascribed  to  a  power  engaged  in  inter 
national  war.  To  the  North,  which  considered 
the  Confederates  as  mere  riotous  assemblages 
of  rebels  and  traitors,  the  attitude  of  the  Brit 
ish  Government  appeared  to  be  a  manifestation 
of  open  hostility.  It  gave  to  the  insurgents  a 


208  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

dignity  which  they  had  not  deserved,  and 
encouraged  them  beyond  measure.  Not  only 
in  the  press  and  in  popular  speech,  where  the 
law  and  practices  of  war  were  not  understood 
in  their  details,  but  also  in  the  despatches  of 
Secretary  Seward  and  other  diplomatic  proceed 
ings,  resentment  against  Great  Britain  was  open 
and  bitter.  It  happened  that  the  offending 
proclamation  was  promulgated  on  the  very  day 
that  the  new  minister  from  Washington,  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  reached  London,  and  before 
he  had  entered  upon  his  duties.  This,  to  the 
agitated  North,  proved  that  the  British  Gov 
ernment  hastened  its  action  designedly,  to  avoid 
listening  to  the  arguments  against  it,  and  to 
make  clear  beyond  controversy  a  sympathy  with 
the  Confederacy.  The  distrust  and  hatred  en 
gendered  by  this  proclamation  of  neutrality 
continued  to  determine  for  a  generation  the 
feeling  of  a  great  body  of  influential  Americans 
toward  the  ruling  classes  of  Great  Britain. 

The  alienation  of  the  North  from  the  British 
was  not  accompanied  by  any  marked  growth  of 
friendliness  between  the  British  and  the  South. 
The  Palmerston  cabinet  devoted  itself  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  most  rigid  impartiality 
between  the  two  contending  sections  of  the 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  209 

Americans.  Earl  Russell  consistently  refused 
official  intercourse  with  the  commissioners  sent 
by  the  Confederate  Government  to  England,  and 
the  instructions  as  to  enforcement  of  neutrality 
by  the  local  and  colonial  officials  of  the  empire 
showed  no  special  favor  whatever  for  either  of 
the  belligerents.  The  South  was  indeed  grat 
ified  by  the  proclamation  of  neutrality;  but  its 
chief  hope  of  early  success  in  establishing  inde 
pendence  rested  on  the  expectation  of  a  more 
complete  recognition  by  Great  Britain — a  recog 
nition  through  the  reception  of  its  diplomatic 
representatives  in  their  official  character.  The 
refusal  of  such  reception  in  the  spring  and  sum 
mer  of  1 86 1  caused  mutterings  and  disquiet 
among  the  more  ardent  Southerners,  with  sub 
dued  curses  of  the  abolitionism  that  was  be 
lieved  to  poison  the  sources  of  British  policy. 
After  the  triumph  of  the  Confederates  at  Bull 
Run  in  July,  hope  took  on  a  brighter  hue.  All 
the  reports  from  England  teemed  with  evidence 
of  unofficial  sympathy  with  the  South  and 
confidence  in  its  success.  The  impending  cot 
ton  famine,  which  was  expected  to  force  the 
government  to  action  by  the  ruin  of  Lancashire, 
was  already  beginning  to  make  itself  felt.  To 
be  quite  ready  for  the  change  of  attitude  that 


210  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

seemed  near  at  hand,  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  designated  a  minister  for  Great  Britain 
and  one  for  France,  and  despatched  the  two  to 
their  posts.  Before  they  reached  their  destina 
tions  they  contributed  much  to  the  cause  they 
represented,  but  involuntarily  and  in  a  manner 
that  was  in  no  wise  contemplated  in  their  in 
structions.  After  their  destinations  were  reached, 
their  contributions  to  the  cause  of  the  Confed 
eracy  were  negligible. 

On  November  8,  1861,  the  two  ministers, 
Mason  and  Slidell,  were  forcibly  taken  from  the 
British  mail-steamer  Trent  by  Captain  Wilkes, 
of  the  United  States  man-of-war  San  Jacinto. 
The  captives  were  taken  to  the  United  States 
and  by  order  of  the  government  put  in  con 
finement  as  prisoners  of  war.  Wilkes's  action 
was  entirely  of  his  own  initiative.  Though  it 
was  a  matter  of  general  knowledge  that  the  two 
ministers  were  on  their  way  to  Europe,  and 
though  there  was  a  passionate  desire  in  the 
North  to  prevent  them  from  getting  there,  no 
orders  for  their  capture  had  been  issued.  The 
news  of  their  seizure  was  the  signal  for  a  rap 
turous  outburst  of  rejoicing  in  the  North. 
Wilkes  was  officially  thanked  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  and  by  the  House  of  Represent- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  211 

atives;  his  praises  were  voiced  in  countless 
unofficial  ways  by  countless  unofficial  persons. 
In  the  swelling  chorus  of  popular  approval  the 
dominant  note  was  the  efficient  patriotism  of 
the  commander  in  seizing  the  traitors  and 
thwarting  their  plans.  Here  and  there  was 
clearly  audible,  however,  another  note — the 
shrill,  wild  cry  of  vengeful  joy  that  Wilkes,  in 
doing  his  duty,  had  flouted  the  flag  of  Great 
Britain.  Governor  Andrew,  of  Massachusetts, 
at  a  banquet  given  in  honor  of  Wilkes,  pro 
claimed  it  the  crowning  satisfaction  of  the  whole 
affair  that  the  commander  "fired  his  shot  across 
the  bows  of  the  ship  that  bore  the  British  lion 
at  its  head."  It  is  hardly  doubtful  that  the 
rejoicing  at  the  North  owed  half  its  ecstasy 
to  the  fact  that  the  Trent  was  a  British  vessel. 

There  were  a  few  cool  heads  in  the  North 
that  believed  Wilkes's  action  unwise  and  unjus 
tifiable  by  the  law  of  nations.  By  these  men 
the  course  of  Great  Britain  was  awaited  with 
serious  foreboding.  Their  anxiety  was  not  di 
minished  by  the  news  that  reached  America  on 
December  12  of  the  overwhelming  storm  of 
rage  and  warlike  fervor  that  swept  over  En 
gland  when  the  proceeding  of  Wilkes  became 
known.  Philosophical  observers  were  rare  in 


212  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

those  days,  but  the  situation  must  have  ap 
pealed  with  strange  bewilderment  to  such  as 
there  were.  Americans  were  splitting  their 
throats  with  joyous  approval  of  a  harsh,  crude 
exercise  of  the  right  of  visitation  and  search; 
Englishmen  were  girding  up  their  loins  for  war 
in  defence  of  the  rights  of  neutrals.  The  men 
of  1812 — Castlereagh,  Canning,  Madison,  John 
Quincy  Adams — would  have  been  in  sad  straits 
to  adjust  themselves  to  this  extraordinary  re 
versal  of  national  roles.  What  explained  it 
lay  for  the  most  part  beneath  the  surface.  The 
Americans  exulted  not  more  over  the  capture  of 
two  conspicuous  domestic  foes  than  over  the 
incidental  flouting  of  the  British  flag,  finding 
in  this  latter  a  fitting  retaliation  for  the  hostile 
haste  in  recognizing  the  Confederacy  as  a  bel 
ligerent.  The  British,  for  their  part,  took  high 
ground  on  the  rights  of  the  neutral  flag  less  be 
cause  those  rights  were  apparently  assailed  than 
because  the  apparent  assailant  was  the  Yankees; 
for  there  was  persistently  current  in  England 
a  suspicion  that  the  Lincoln  administration  in 
tended  to  make  trouble  with  her  for  the  sake  of 
improving  its  position  in  home  politics. 

The  course  adopted  by  the  Palmerston  cab 
inet  left  no  room  for  diplomatic  subtleties  or  for 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  213 

political  finesse  in  the  adjustment  of  the  Trent 
affair.  Three  days  after  the  report  of  the  affair 
was  received,  a  despatch  was  sent  to  Lord  Lyons 
at  Washington  instructing  him  to  demand  the 
surrender  of  Slidell  and  Mason,  and  a  suitable 
apology  for  the  affront  to  the  British  flag.  In 
case  the  demand  should  not  be  complied  with  in 
seven  days,  the  minister  was  directed  to  close 
the  legation  and  leave  Washington.  The  trans 
mission  of  these  instructions  was  accompanied 
by  open  and  strenuous  preparations  for  war. 
Exportation  of  military  stores  was  forbidden; 
arsenals  and  dockyards  hummed  with  access  of 
industry;  great  quantities  of  arms  and  ammuni 
tion  were  hastily  shipped  to  the  North  American 
provinces;  most  impressive  of  all,  several  thou 
sands  of  troops,  including  a  regiment  of  the 
Guards,  embarked  for  the  same  destination. 

Confronting  such  a  situation,  the  Lincoln  ad 
ministration  had  no  choice  of  policy.  To  think 
of  conquering  the  Confederates  after  Great 
Britain  should  become  their  ally,  was  beyond 
the  bounds  of  sanity.  Accordingly,  the  cap 
tive  envoys  were  put  at  the  disposal  of  Lord 
Lyons,  and  were  duly  conveyed  by  a  British 
war-ship  back  to  the  West  Indies,  whence  they 
resumed  their  journey  in  triumph  to  England. 


214  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

In  announcing  compliance  with  the  British  de 
mand,  Secretary  Seward  did  what  was  possible 
to  save  the  face  of  the  Americans.  He  wrote 
with  one  eye  on  the  British  fleet  and  the  other 
on  the  Northern  people.  Such  strabismic  ad 
justment  of  the  gaze  does  not  conduce  to  clarity 
of  vision,  and  Seward's  paper  elicited  scant  ap 
plause  from  the  experts  of  international  law. 
His  contention  was  that  Wilkes  was  wholly  jus 
tified  in  stopping  the  Trent  and  searching  her 
for  the  Confederate  envoys,  but  committed  an 
error  when,  having  found  them,  he  omitted  to 
bring  the  ship  into  port  as  a  prize  and  secure  a 
judicial  condemnation  of  her  for  violating  the 
laws  of  war  by  carrying  contraband  persons  and 
despatches.  The  Northern  people  were  as 
sured,  that  is,  that  Wilkes  must  be  disavowed 
not  because  he  insulted  the  British  flag,  but 
because  he  did  not  in  addition  capture  it.  Earl 
Russell's  reply  to  this  despatch  naturally  con 
troverted  this  view  of  the  law  of  the  case,  and 
argued  elaborately  that  there  was  no  warrant 
in  the  law  of  nations  for  the  interruption  of  the 
Trent's  bona  fide  course  from  one  neutral  port 
to  another.  He  reinforced  his  argument  by 
the  discomforting  suggestion  that  the  principle 
by  which  the  act  of  Wilkes  was  justified  would 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  215 

equally  justify  the  search  at  any  time,  by  either 
a  Confederate  or  a  Federal  cruiser,  of  the  Dover- 
Calais  packet,  and  its  conveyance  to  America 
if  agents  or  despatches  of  the  enemy  should  be 
found  aboard.  How  utterly  at  sea  the  experts 
were  in  regard  to  the  law  applicable  to  this  case, 
and  how  little  the  technical  law  had  to  do  with 
the  practical  policy  adopted,  appears  in  the  fact 
that  the  law  officers  of  the  crown,  at  almost  the 
exact  moment  when  Wilkes  threw  his  shell 
across  the  bows  of  the  Trent,  gave  their  opinion 
that  the  course  which  he,  all  unknown  to  them, 
was  actually  pursuing  was  strictly  conformed 
to  the  precedents  of  British  practice.1  Later, 
these  same  legal  authorities  modified  their  opin 
ion  and  solemnly  declared  that  the  law  required 
that  the  offending  neutral  ship  on  which  con 
traband  persons  or  despatches  were  found  must 
be  taken  to  the  captor's  port  and  passed  upon 
by  a  prize  court — the  precise  ground  that 
Seward  took  in  his  despatch  and  that  Russell 
controverted  in  his  reply. 

The  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell  was  so 
clearly  a  case  of  hard  necessity  that  Northern 
opposition  to  it  was  scanty.  The  hatred  of 

1 C.  F.  Adams,  The  Trent  Affair,  in  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts 
Historical  Society,  XLV. 


216  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

Britain  that  it  engendered  was,  however,  gen 
eral  in  prevalence  and  malignant  in  expression. 
Everywhere  the  thought  was  current:  Great 
Britain  has  taken  advantage  of  our  weakness 
to  browbeat  and  humiliate  us.  We  will  settle 
our  domestic  troubles  and  bide  our  time  for 
revenge.  Hamilcar's  classic  procedure  recurred 
to  many  minds;  and  an  inspection  of  London 
clubs  to-day  would  probably  reveal  more  than 
one  elderly  American  dozing  the  pleasant  hours 
away  in  happy  forgetfulness  of  a  Hannibalic 
obligation  of  enmity  to  Albion,  assumed  under 
paternal  direction  at  the  dim  Christmastide  of 
1861. 

The  smart  of  defeat  was  not  diminished  by 
the  taunts  and  jibes  that  issued  in  a  broad,  full 
stream  from  the  British,  Canadian,  and  Con 
federate  press.  "  Swagger  and  ferocity,  built  on 
a  foundation  of  vulgarity  and  cowardice, "  was 
sweetly  declared  by  the  London  Times  to  be  the 
compendium  of  Captain  Wilkes's  characteristic 
qualities,  and  he  was,  it  said,  "an  ideal  Yankee." 
Secretary  Seward  was  described  in  hardly  more 
complimentary  terms,  and  was  credited  with  a 
set  purpose  to  pick  trouble  with  Great  Britain. 
The  secretary's  reputation  as  a  reckless  chau 
vinist  and  an  undisguised  Anglophobe  seems 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  217 

indeed  to  have  had  much  influence  in  official  as 
well  as  in  popular  circles,  and  to  have  played  a 
considerable  part  in  determining  the  ministry 
to  a  hard,  brusque  demand  for  reparation. 
Earl  Russell  was  not  naturally  disposed  to 
harshness,  and  his  assumption  of  so  uncompro 
mising  an  attitude  was  apparently  due  to  a 
purpose  not  to  give  Seward  any  chance  to  win 
popular  applause. 

As  to  the  Southerners,  some  pains  were  taken 
to  show  them  that  British  policy  was  not  chosen 
with  any  least  reference  to  their  interests.  The 
arrival  of  Mason  and  Slidell  in  England  was 
ostentatiously  ignored  by  the  cabinet,  and  The 
Times  served  semi-official  notice  on  them  in 
advance  that  they  were  not  to  assume  the  airs 
or  expect  the  halo  of  martyrs.  They  could  well 
afford,  however,  to  submit  with  cheerfulness 
to  such  snubbing;  for  they  were  cordially  re 
ceived  in  aristocratic  society,  and  they  per 
ceived  on  every  side  the  currents  of  public 
opinion  setting  strongly  in  favor  of  the  Con 
federate  cause.  Throughout  the  year  1862  the 
utter  failure  of  the  North  to  gain  any  deci 
sive  advantage  in  the  field  confirmed  the  con 
viction  that  the  South  could  not  be  conquered, 
and  that  the  vast  sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure 


2i 8  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

in  the  attempt  was  inhuman  and  should  be 
stopped.  In  Lancashire  poverty  and  distress 
among  the  cotton-workers  became  extreme,  and 
added  a  powerful  practical  argument  in  favor 
of  steps  toward  opening  the  ports  of  the  South. 
Yet  the  ministry  persisted  in  its  refusal  to  re 
ceive  Mason  or  to  adopt  the  projects  of  media 
tion  and  intervention  that  were  from  time  to 
time  seriously  considered.  Its  rigidly  correct 
attitude  as  a  neutral  in  this  respect  resulted  in 
a  steadily  growing  hatred  on  the  part  of  the 
South,  which  abandoned  in  the  autumn  of  1863 
all  efforts  at  diplomatic  intercourse. 

The  alienation  of  the  South  from  the  British 
Government  was  not  accompanied  by  any 
access  of  friendly  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
North.  On  the  contrary,  the  angry  passions 
kindled  by  the  proclamation  of  neutrality  and 
the  Trent  affair  found  ever  fresh  fuel  to  main 
tain  the  flame.  During  1862  blockade-run 
ning  between  the  Confederacy  and  the  British 
ports  of  the  Bermudas  and  the  Bahamas  as 
sumed  large  and  spectacular  proportions,  and 
the  cruisers  Florida  and  Alabama  began  their 
destructive  raids  on  the  maritime  commerce  of 
the  North.  Popular  sentiment,  little  versed 
in  the  niceties  of  neutral  obligations,  instinc- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  219 

tively  laid  at  Britain's  door  the  responsibility 
for  all  the  loss  and  humiliation  due  to  these 
proceedings.  Nor  did  the  Lincoln  government 
fail  to  make  an  adequate  and  proper  appeal  to 
the  British  ministry  for  a  more  rigorous  and 
efficient  enforcement  of  its  own  laws  touching 
such  matters.  Charles  Francis  Adams  had  a 
task  more  delicate  and  exacting  than  that  of 
either  his  father  or  his  grandfather  at  the  court 
of  Saint  James's,  and  the  perfect  success  with 
which  he  performed  it  has  been  recognized  in 
full  by  his  adversaries.  He  brought  Earl  Rus 
sell  to  realize  that  the  Alabama  should  not  be 
permitted  to  sail  from  Liverpool,  though  the 
earl's  order  to  detain  her  arrived  too  late  to 
serve  its  purpose.  A  year  later,  when  a  far 
more  serious  menace  to  the  Northern  cause  was 
prepared  by  the  clever  Confederate  agents  in 
England,  and  two  great  ironclads  were  nearing 
completion  by  the  same  firm  that  built  the 
Alabama,  Adams  went  to  the  verge  of  a  hostile 
rupture  before  he  persuaded  Russell  to  seize 
the  vessels.  The  detention  of  the  ironclads 
was  a  sickening  blow  to  the  hopes  of  the  South. 
In  the  North  it  caused  great  elation,  but  it 
served  at  the  same  time  to  evoke  the  truculent 
vow  that  when  the  Union  should  have  been 


220  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

made  secure  the  failure  of  the  British  to  detain 
the  Alabama  also  should  be  put  before  them  for 
explanation  and  settlement. 

Such  was  the  disturbing  spirit  with  which  the 
North  approached  its  triumph  in  1865.  The 
friendship  and  harmony  that  were  conspicuous 
among  English-speaking  peoples  in  1860  had 
been  supplanted  by  as  unprepossessing  an  ag 
gregate  of  evil  emotions  as  the  inferno  of  a  four 
years'  desperate  war  could  be  expected  to  pro 
duce.  The  victorious  people,  with  an  army  of 
a  million  men,  a  navy  of  five  hundred  ships, 
a  crushed  and  helpless  rival  at  its  feet,  looked 
round  to  see  if  any  scores  remained  to  be  set 
tled.  Against  every  other  branch  of  the  English- 
speaking  race  the  flushed  and  angry  conqueror 
believed  that  it  had  a  grievance  to  present.  The 
West  Indian  colonists  had  sustained  and  thrived 
by  the  blockade-runners,  through  whom  the 
Confederacy  had  preserved  its  life  long  after 
the  end  was  assured.  The  Canadians  and  their 
associates  of  the  Maritime  Provinces  had  given 
refuge  to  Confederate  agents  who  had  organized 
expeditions  of  rapine  and  murder  across  the 
Northern  boundary.  In  the  African  and  Asiatic 
colonies  of  England  the  Alabama  and  other 
cruisers  had  received  indispensable  aid  in  their 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  221 

piratical  enterprises.  Even  from  remote  Aus 
tralia  came  eventually  reports  that  the  last  of 
the  Confederate  cruisers,  the  Shenandoah,  had 
been  enabled  by  illegitimate  privileges  allowed  to 
it  at  Melbourne  to  destroy  the  American  whal 
ing  fleet  in  the  Arctic  seas.  Every  item  in  this 
account — and  by  no  means  all  the  items  familiar 
in  1865  have  been  catalogued  here — was  charged 
with  bitterness,  hatred,  and  a  longing  for  re 
venge.  Nor  were  these  emotions  less  conspicu 
ous  in  the  conquered  South  than  in  the  victo 
rious  North.  Recognition  by  Great  Britain  for 
the  sake  of  cotton  had  been  the  rock  bottom  on 
which  Confederate  hopes  were  built.  Refusal  of 
this  recognition  left  a  feeling  that  Great  Britain 
was  wholly  responsible  for  the  ensuing  catas 
trophe,  and  not  a  few  voices  were  heard  from 
the  ruins  of  the  South  declaring  that,  if  a  settle 
ment  of  old  scores  with  that  power  should  be 
undertaken,  Lee's  veterans  would  not  be  slow 
to  join  Grant's  in  the  enterprise. 

The  vindictive  feeling  in  the  United  States 
declined  in  aggressiveness  as  Napoleon's  insolent 
challenge  across  the  Rio  Grande  engaged  atten 
tion,  and  as  the  problems  of  reconstructing  the 
South  became  more  and  more  absorbing.  Yet 
governmental  action,  legislative,  diplomatic,  and 


222  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

administrative,  as  well  as  movements  of  the 
popular  spirit,  continued  to  reveal  the  working 
of  the  latent  hostility.  The  happy  relations 
built  up  by  Lord  Elgin  between  the  United  States 
and  Canada  suffered  hopeless  damage.  Even 
the  ancient  and  indurated  Rush-Bagot  arrange 
ment  came  into  imminent  peril  of  extinction. 
During  1864  Confederates  from  Canada  cap 
tured  steamers  on  Lake  Erie  and  also  made  a 
raid  on  a  town  in  Vermont.  After  these  affairs 
Secretary  Seward  gave  notice  that  the  Rush- 
Bagot  arrangement  would  be  disregarded  after 
six  months.  In  March  of  1865,  however,  he 
withdrew  this  notice  of  abrogation,  and  an 
nounced  that  the  United  States  would  continue 
to  observe  the  terms  of  the  arrangement. 

The  Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854  in  respect  to 
Canadian  trade  met  with  a  less  kindly  fate. 
Complaints  of  unfairness  in  the  working  of  the 
treaty  became  common  in  the  United  States 
only  a  few  years  after  it  went  into  operation. 
These  gained  in  force  and  volume  as  the  be 
ginnings  of  tariff  protection  to  manufacturers 
appeared  in  Canada.  The  revival  of  protec 
tionism  in  the  United  States  in  connection  with 
the  war  strengthened  the  foes  of  the  treaty,  but 
the  impulse  that  was  decisive  of  its  fate  was 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  223 

apparently  due  to  the  anti-British  feeling  en 
gendered  by  the  incidents  of  the  war.  Congress 
directed  by  act  of  January  18,  1865,  that  the 
requisite  one  year's  notice  of  abrogation  be 
given,  and  accordingly  the  provisions  went  out 
of  effect  in  1866.  By  this  action  the  unsatis 
factory  conditions  as  to  the  inshore  fisheries  re 
vived,  and  a  period  of  friction  over  this  trouble 
some  matter  was  prepared. 

Still  more  directly  and  obviously  the  outcome 
of  the  changed  feeling  toward  Great  Britain 
was  the  support  given  to  the  earnest  but  rather 
absurd  undertakings  of  the  Fenians.  Among 
the  millions  of  Irishmen  in  the  United  States 
hatred  of  all  things  British  was  practically 
universal.  Any  project,  however  chimerical, 
for  breaking  the  power  of  the  "Saxon"  was  sure 
of  wide  sympathy  and  support  from  Irish- 
Americans.  In  the  armies  that  fought  the  war 
of  secession  the  Irish  were  conspicuous  in  both 
numbers  and  achievement.  When  the  armies 
were  disbanded  many  of  these  veterans  were 
easily  induced  to  join  the  Fenian  movement — 
an  enterprise  directed  with  rather  ostentatious 
secrecy  to  the  establishment  of  an  independent 
republic  in  Ireland.  It  would  not  seem  likely, 
a  priori,  that  the  first  overt  step  toward  this 


224  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

end  should  be  an  invasion  of  Canada  by  an 
Irish  army.  Yet  such  was  in  fact  what  occurred. 
Considerable  bodies  of  Fenians,  with  some  ru 
dimentary  organization  and  equipment  as  a  mil 
itary  force,  assembled  along  the  northern  fron 
tier  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the  summer 
of  1866  crossed  into  Canada  at  various  points. 
They  were  promptly  chased  back  across  the  bor 
der  by  the  Canadians,  and  were  then  gathered 
up  and  sent  to  their  homes  by  the  authorities 
of  the  United  States.  It  was  not  creditable  to 
the  government  at  Washington  that  such  an 
attack  on  a  neighbor  from  its  territory  was  not 
prevented.  In  explanation  it  could  only  be 
said  that  the  proceeding  was  so  inherently 
fatuous  as  never  to  have  warranted  an  expec 
tation  that  it  would  be  actually  undertaken. 
Beyond  this,  however,  was  the  undoubted  fact 
that  the  minor  officials  from  whom  the  earliest 
reports  of  impending  trouble  should  have  come 
had  very  little  disposition  to  be  vigilant  in 
warding  off  trouble  from  Great  Britain.  The 
conviction  that  the  British  Government  had 
not  overstrained  its  vigilance  in  connection 
with  the  Alabama  was  thus  producing  results. 

Evidence  that  the  grievance  against  Great 
Britain  was  actively  operating  on  the  American 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  225 

mind  at  the  time  when  the  Fenian  disturbance 
was  at  its  height  is  to  be  seen  in  the  action  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  in  relation  to  the 
neutrality  laws.  In  the  summer  of  1866  the 
House  passed  by  a  unanimous  vote  a  bill  to 
repeal  the  prohibition,  in  those  laws,  of  fitting 
out  ships  for  belligerents.  The  bearing  of  this 
is  clearer  when  connected  with  the  suggestion 
made  in  debate  that  the  "Republic  of  Ireland" 
be  recognized  as  a  belligerent.  When,  a  year  or 
two  later,  there  was  war  between  Great  Britain 
and  Abyssinia,  an  Anglophobe  senator  intro 
duced  and  sustained  with  great  vigor  a  resolu 
tion  recognizing  King  Theodore  as  a  belliger 
ent,  and  authorizing  him  to  fit  out  privateers 
in  the  ports  of  the  United  States. 

In  Ireland  and  England  the  Fenians  man 
ifested  their  existence  through  a  long  series  of 
plots  and  ineffective  lawlessness.  Very  many 
of  those  who  were  most  active  in  these  opera 
tions  had  duly  equipped  themselves  with  the 
rights  of  American  citizenship.  At  no  time 
after  the  first  weeks  of  1866  were  the  British 
authorities  in  the  least  danger  from  the  Fenians. 
The  government  had  the  situation  well  in  hand, 
and  the  arrests  of  offenders  went  on  without 
ceasing.  Naturally,  loud  appeals  for  help  came 


226  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

in  an  endless  stream  from  the  unfortunate  Amer 
ican  citizens  to  Mr.  Adams  in  the  legation  at 
London.  The  minister  had  little  taste  for  the 
special  kind  of  duty  that  this  situation  imposed. 
His  chief  function  had  become,  so  he  wrote 
privately  to  Seward,  to  rescue  Irishmen  from 
punishment  which  in  most  cases  they  richly 
deserved.  There  was  often  at  issue,  however, 
in  these  cases  a  principle  that  was  well  worthy 
of  most  serious  diplomatic  attention.  Ever 
since  the  great  immigration  from  Europe  began 
in  the  forties,  the  American  Government  had 
been  under  pressure  to  assert  for  its  naturalized 
citizens  the  same  rights  in  the  land  of  their 
birth  that  were  granted  to  native-born  American 
citizens.  Grave  and  well-founded  objections  to 
this  claim  were  raised  by  foreign  governments, 
who  denied  the  right  of  expatriation.  There 
was  a  very  natural  disposition  in  Great  Britain, 
for  example,  to  manifest  special  rigor  in  the  case 
of  an  Irishman  who  used  an  easily  acquired 
American  citizenship  as  a  cover  for  promoting 
in  Ireland  the  cause  of  the  Fenians.  In  the 
United  States  every  such  instance  evoked  a 
passionate  Celtic  clamor,  whose  influence  ap 
peared  at  every  session  of  Congress  and  in  every 
electoral  campaign.  To  reflecting  and  well-bal- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  227 

anced  Americans  the  qualifications  with  which 
the  claims  of  the  naturalized  citizens  were  to 
be  taken  were  obvious;  yet  the  incessant  de 
nunciation  of  Great  Britain  by  the  Irish  and 
their  friends  inevitably  strengthened  the  cur 
rent  of  ill  feeling  that  derived  its  portentous 
volume  from  other  sources. 

While  American  feeling  and  policy  were  tak 
ing  the  forms  that  have  been  noticed,  what  were 
the  effects  in  Great  Britain  of  the  triumph  of  the 
North?  Sir  George  Cornewall  Lewis,  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Palmerston  cabinet,  recorded  in  the 
midst  of  the  tumult  the  opinion  that  the  civil 
war  in  the  United  States  was  a  phenomenon  of 
world-wide  significance,  not  a  mere  local  fray. 
The  soundness  of  the  judgment  has  been  con 
tinuously  confirmed  as  the  decades  have  passed 
along,  but  it  was  discernible  very  early  in  the 
effect  of  the  conflict  on  the  trend  of  British  home 
politics.  The  division  of  sympathy  in  England 
as  between  the  two  contending  sections  followed 
pretty  closely  the  cleavage  between  the  social 
classes  whose  antagonism  was  crossing  and  con 
fusing  the  old  party  alignment.  The  Duke  of 
Argyll,  sustaining  the  North,  and  Laird  and 
Roebuck,  sustaining  the  South,  were  indeed 
examples  of  deviation  that  served  to  emphasize 


228  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

the  rule;  but  Bright  and  Cobden,  leading  the 
lower  middle  and  working  classes,  with  Glad 
stone  and  Palmerston  speaking  for  the  upper 
middle  class  and  the  titled  aristocracy,  were  the 
typical  exponents  of  the  respective  sympathies. 
When  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  seemed 
to  announce  the  extinction  of  slavery  as  the 
purpose  of  the  North,  a  perceptible  gain  in  favor 
for  that  section  followed,  and  those  humani 
tarians  who  had  committed  themselves  to  the 
South  were  called  upon  to  revise  or  explain 
their  position.  Their  task  was  no  harder  than 
that  of  the  Quaker,  John  Bright,  who  in  1854 
was  full  of  scorn  for  the  idea  that  there  could  be 
any  connection  between  the  slaughter  of  thou 
sands  and  the  cause  of  freedom,  but  ten  years 
later  found  the  slaughter  of  hundreds  of  thou 
sands  abundantly  justified  by  the  liberation  of 
the  blacks.1 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  fundamental  influence 
in  fixing  the  sympathies  of  Britons  was  the 
more  or  less  unconscious  perception  of  a  rela 
tion  between  the  American  problem  and  their 
own.  The  liberalizing  and  democratizing  spirit 
was  steadily  disintegrating  both  the  old  polit 
ical  parties.  Those  who  welcomed  the  work  of 

1  Trevelyan,  Life  of  John  Bright,  226,  3 18. 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  229 

this  spirit  longed  for  the  preservation  intact 
of  the  American  Union  as  the  model  of  a  great 
and  prosperous  democracy.  Those  who  dreaded 
the  approach  of  democracy  were  quick  to  see  in 
the  American  war  a  proof  of  its  weakness  and 
futility. 

When,  in  the  course  of  1864,  the  strangling 
and  crushing  of  the  Confederacy  by  the  terrific 
power  of  the  North  became  pretty  clearly  a 
matter  of  time  alone,  Southern  sympathy  in 
England  ceased  to  manifest  itself.  Politicians 
and  scholars  who  had  portrayed  with  eloquence 
and  learning  the  inherent  vices  of  democracy 
and  the  impossibility  of  its  application  in  the 
government  of  large  populations,  abandoned  in 
silence  the  field  of  political  theory  and  prophecy. 
The  complete  triumph  of  the  North  in  the  spring 
of  1865  was  attended  by  a  great  impetus  to  the 
radical  propaganda  of  Bright  and  his  Manchester 
followers.  The  Whig  and  Tory  aristocracy  were 
badly  discredited,  and  with  the  death  of  Lord 
Palmerston  lost  their  ancient  control  over  the 
government.  For  three  years,  indeed,  Earl  Rus 
sell  and  the  Earl  of  Derby  maintained  the 
nominal  succession  of  the  old  order,  but  Glad 
stone  and  Disraeli  were  the  real  representatives 
of  the  actual  controlling  power,  which  lay  in  a 


230  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

social  stratum  below  that  of  Russell  and  Derby. 
This  new  power  received  its  formal  recognition 
in  the  British  system  through  the  Reform  Bill 
of  1867,  which  gave  a  wide  extension  to  the 
suffrage.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that 
the  Reform  Bill  of  1867  was  a  direct  product 
of  the  Northern  triumph  in  the  American  war. 
Extension  of  the  franchise  was  forced  upon 
ministerial  attention  by  Bright  and  the  radicals, 
was  undertaken  in  vain  by  Gladstone  and  the 
Russell  government,  and  was  actually  enacted 
by  the  Derby  cabinet,  with  the  cynical  Disraeli 
in  the  lead.  This  peculiar  record  of  its  genesis 
shows  the  wide  basis  of  public  opinion  on  which 
it  was  reared,  and  in  this  shows  the  far-reaching 
influence  of  the  American  situation. 

While  the  end  of  the  war  brought  little  abate 
ment  of  the  ill  feeling  in  the  United  States 
toward  the  British,  there  was  in  England  a 
somewhat  pronounced  reaction  toward  amicable 
sentiments  even  among  those  classes  whose  dis 
tress  at  the  success  of  republican  ideas  was 
deepest  and  most  sincere.  The  tragedy  of 
Lincoln's  death  had  much  to  do  with  this  move 
ment.  The  most  stolid  Tory  could  not  re 
sist  the  softening  effect  of  that  most  pathetic 
sequence — the  divinely  humane  inaugural  of 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  231 

March  4,  the  triumph  at  Appomattox  of  April 
9,  and  the  assassin's  bullet  of  April  14.  No 
class  of  British  society  denied  to  Abraham  Lin 
coln  a  high  place  among  the  heroes  of  the  En 
glish-speaking  race,  and  none  could  evade  the 
truth,  proclaimed  by  the  whole  story  of  his 
life,  that  he  was  the  purest  possible  product,  as 
well  as  the  successful  leader,  of  the  American 
democracy. 

For  the  seven  full  years  following  the  end  of 
the  war  in  the  United  States,  diplomacy  found 
engrossing  labor  in  the  task  of  restoring  the 
concord  that  was  so  rudely  shattered  in  1861. 
Domestic  problems  of  highest  significance  di 
verted  popular  attention  in  large  measure  from 
a  dangerous  international  situation.  Recon 
struction  in  the  United  States,  federation  in 
Canada  and  her  British  neighbors,  electoral  re 
form  and  Irish  disestablishment  in  the  United 
Kingdom — these  insured  to  the  foreign  offices 
much-needed  time  for  their  slow  pacific  processes. 
The  ministers  labored  always  in  the  conscious 
ness  of  impending  peril.  It  was  the  heroic 
age  of  the  Hohenzollern  monarchy,  and  German 
unity  was  taking  shape  at  Bismarck's  bidding 
out  of  the  ruin  of  Prussia's  neighbors.  Den 
mark  was  partitioned  in  1864;  Austria,  Han- 


232  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

over,  and  some  of  the  smaller  German  fry  were 
crushed  two  years  later;  all  the  world  knew 
that  war  with  France  was  coming  next.  How 
far  the  unifying  energy  of  the  new  Germany 
would  extend,  was  uncertain.  That  Great  Brit 
ain  might  become  involved  in  war,  if  Holland 
or  Belgium  should  be  proclaimed  indispensable 
to  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  German  or  the 
French  nation,  was  obvious  to  all.  When  Den 
mark  was  attacked  in  1864  it  had  not  been  per 
fectly  easy  to  keep  Great  Britain  out  of  the 
fray,  though  the  non-interference  policy  had 
prevailed.  The  difficulty  of  such  a  policy  in 
connection  with  aggression  upon  the  Low  Coun 
tries  would  be  insuperable.  And  what  was 
clear  to  all  who  stopped  to  think  at  all  on  the 
subject  was,  that  the  day  when  Great  Britain 
declared  war  would  witness  the  adoption  by 
the  United  States  of  a  policy  as  to  neutrality 
that  would  encourage  the  use  of  American  ship 
yards  and  ports  by  the  enemies  of  Britain  for 
the  destruction  of  her  commerce.  Even  in  lack 
of  formal  announcement  of  such  a  policy  Flori- 
das  and  Alabamas  would  be  sure  to  escape  the 
drowsy  vigilance  of  the  authorities,  and  to  pur 
sue  their  devastating  careers  under  guarantee 
of  the  same  non  possumus  with  which  Earl  Rus- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  233 

sell    had    met    the    reclamations    of   Secretary 
Seward. 

From  the  July  day  in  1862  when  the  "No. 
290"  passed  out  of  the  Mersey  on  her  "trial 
trip/'  to  become  the  redoubtable  Alabama, 
responsibility  for  the  damage  done  by  her  to 
American  commerce  was  formally  and  syste 
matically  charged  upon  the  British  Govern 
ment  by  Seward  and  Adams.  The  long  lists 
of  vessels  captured  and  destroyed  that  came  in 
to  the  State  Department  at  Washington  were 
duly  submitted  to  Earl  Russell,  with  intima 
tions  that  indemnity  would  be  expected  from 
Great  Britain.  Because  the  operations  of  the 
Alabama  were  so  far-reaching  and  so  successful, 
they  assumed  very  great  prominence  in  diplo 
matic  as  in  popular  discussions,  and  by  the  end 
of  the  war  the  term  "Alabama  claims"  was 
commonly  used  to  designate  the  whole  mass  of 
complaints  against  the  British  Government  for 
the  favor  that  it  was  alleged  to  have  shown  to 
the  Confederacy  in  violation  of  its  profession  of 
neutrality.  The  use  of  the  term  in  this  broad 
sense  reflected  and  stimulated  a  feeling  in  Amer 
ica  that  British  delinquency  was  of  a  kind  that 
could  not  be  atoned  for  by  mere  financial  com 
pensation  for  the  losses  caused  by  the  Confed- 


234  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

erate  cruisers.  The  existence  of  this  feeling  and 
the  bitterness  with  which  it  was  resented  in 
England  give  a  clue  to  some  of  the  most  seri 
ous  complications  of  ensuing  years. 

While  war  was  flagrant,  claims  based  on  acts 
of  the  Alabama  were  presented  by  Secretary 
Seward,  and  rejected  by  Earl  Russell,  with 
monotonous  frequency.  A  rather  peevish  re 
quest  of  Russell  that  the  annoying  procedure 
be  abandoned  was  followed  by  some  curtail 
ment  of  the  arguments  that  accompanied  the 
claims,  but  not  of  the  lists  of  losses.  In  1865, 
when  the  Confederacy  was  in  ruins  and  the  last 
cruiser  had  abandoned  her  career  of  destruc 
tion,  the  two  governments  girded  themselves 
for  the  diplomatic  contest  that  was  now  pos 
sible  without  the  distractions  of  hostilities. 
The  complete  case  for  the  United  States  com 
bined  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  neutrality 
with  the  government's  derelictions  of  duty  in 
respect  to  the  cruisers  as  a  comprehensive  man 
ifestation  of  partiality  to  the  Confederacy,  and 
a  wrong  to  the  American  nation.  The  procla 
mation  of  neutrality,  Adams  argued,  was  pre 
mature  and  unfriendly.  In  recognizing  the 
insurgents  as  belligerents  on  the  ocean  before 
they  had  a  single  vessel  afloat,  her  Majesty's 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  235 

government  had  acted  in  a  manner  that  was 
without  precedent  in  the  practice  of  nations. 
This  action  in  its  essence  created  an  ocean  bel 
ligerent  instead  of  recognizing  one  that  was 
already  self-created.  Thereafter  the  belliger 
ent  character  on  the  ocean  was  maintained 
exclusively  by  vessels  built,  equipped,  and 
manned  in  British  ports,  in  spite  of  protests  by 
the  United  States  and  demands  that  such  viola 
tions  of  neutrality  be  prevented.  Freely  con 
ceding  the  desire  of  her  Majesty's  government 
to  maintain  a  real  neutrality,  Adams  declared 
that  all  efforts  to  that  end  had  proved  ineffec 
tual,  first  because  the  laws  were  inadequate, 
and  second  because  the  government  did  not 
secure  such  change  in  the  laws  as  would  have 
healed  the  defects.  In  consequence  of  this 
failure  of  real  neutrality,  hundreds  of  American 
ships,  with  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  cargo, 
had  been  destroyed,  and  the  commercial  marine 
of  the  United  States  had  been  transferred  to 
the  protection  of  the  British  flag,  insuring  thus 
to  the  British  people  an  unjust  advantage  from 
the  wrong  committed  against  a  friendly  nation. 
For  such  manifest  injuries,  due  to  the  defects 
in  the  British  law  and  the  failure  of  the  govern 
ment  to  remedy  them,  the  United  States  was 


236  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

entitled  in  reason  and  justice  to  reparation  and 
indemnity. 

Earl  Russell's  response  to  these  representa 
tions  was  in  substance  as  follows.  When  her 
Majesty's  Government,  on  May  13,  1861,  recog 
nized  the  Confederacy  as  a  belligerent  power, 
it  was  in  fact  a  belligerent,  acknowledged  to 
be  such  by  official  act  of  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment.  The  fact  of  belligerency  was  clear 
from  the  great  population  and  territory  con 
trolled  by  the  Confederacy,  its  complete  govern 
mental  organization,  its  large  armies  and  nu 
merous  fortresses,  its  undeniable  exercise  de 
facto  of  all  forms  of  sovereign  authority,  includ 
ing  the  issue  of  letters  of  marque.  The  recog 
nition  of  belligerency  by  the  United  States  was 
equally  clear  from  the  blockade  of  the  Con 
federate  coast  officially  announced  by  President 
Lincoln  before  the  I3th  of  May;  and  this 
view  had  been  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States.  The  British  Govern 
ment,  if  it  did  not  recognize  the  Confederates 
as  belligerents,  would  have  been  obliged  to 
treat  them  as  outlaws  and  pirates,  and  this  the 
government  was  unwilling  to  do  in  the  case  of 
so  large,  well-organized,  and  valiant  a  popula 
tion.  The  demands  of  British  merchants  and 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  237 

ship  captains,  moreover,  for  directions  as  to 
their  rights  and  duties  in  the  circumstances, 
made  the  government's  prompt  action  necessary. 
As  to  later  questions,  Lord  Russell  stoutly  con 
tended  that  his  government  had  enforced  with 
fairness  and  impartiality  the  neutrality  which 
was  proclaimed.  The  Foreign  Enlistment  Act 
authorized  the  seizure  of  a  ship  that  was  proved 
to  be  armed  and  equipped,  wholly  or  in  part, 
in  British  jurisdiction,  for  the  purpose  of  naval 
service  for  a  power  at  war  with  a  power  friendly 
to  her  Majesty.  The  proof  required  by  the  act 
as  preliminary  to  seizure  was  very  difficult  to 
obtain.  Of  nineteen  vessels  complained  of  by 
Mr.  Adams,  however,  only  five  actually  hoisted 
the  Confederate  ensign,  and  of  these  one  never 
got  into  actual  service,  and  another  was  seized 
but  released  after  trial,  for  lack  of  sufficient 
evidence  as  to  her  warlike  character.  Under 
such  circumstances,  Lord  Russell  argued,  it 
was  idle  to  accuse  the  government  of  ineffi 
ciency  in  the  performance  of  its  duties  under 
the  law. 

As  to  the  ships  that  escaped  the  vigilance  of 
the  authorities,  his  Lordship  held  the  methods 
employed  by  the  Confederate  agents  to  have 
been  so  skilfully  adapted  to  their  purpose  that 


238  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

only  the  arbitrary  and  inquisitorial  procedure 
of  despotic  governments  could  have  thwarted 
them.  To  build  a  ship  is  the  undoubted  right 
of  every  Englishman.  To  set  sail  with  a  party 
for  a  foreign  land,  is  equally  the  right  of  all. 
To  ship  cannon  and  munitions  of  war  to  for 
eign  destinations  is  also  a  right  of  Britons. 
When  the  ship  and  the  party  and  the  cannon  and 
munitions,  after  leaving  British  waters,  come 
together  and  coalesce  into  a  Confederate  cruiser, 
the  British  Government  may  feel  deceived  and 
flouted,  but  it  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  in 
efficiency.  On  this  principle  every  case  alleged 
against  Great  Britain  by  the  United  States 
failed  absolutely  except  that  of  the  Alabama. 
In  this  instance  evidence  as  to  her  true  char 
acter  was  pronounced  by  the  law  officers  of  the 
crown  sufficient  to  justify  her  seizure,  and 
orders  to  hold  her  reached  Liverpool  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  day  on  which  she  passed  in 
the  morning  out  to  sea.  Lord  Russell  was 
greatly  angered  at  this  peculiar  coincidence, 
and  there  was  no  room  to  doubt  the  sincerity 
of  his  assurance  of  regret  to  the  American  min 
ister.  Yet  he  was  wholly  justified  in  arguing 
that  the  failure  of  duty  by  subordinates  of  the 
administration  was  no  sufficient  basis  for  the 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  239 

sweeping  charge  of  bad  faith  and  hostile  ani 
mus  against  the  British  Government. 

Lord  Russell's  discussion  in  1865  w^h  Mr. 
Adams  culminated  in  a  rather  brusque  rejec 
tion  of  the  proposal,  submitted  in  a  more  or  less 
tentative  way  by  the  American  some  two  years 
earlier,  looking  to  arbitration.  The  only  ques 
tions  to  be  submitted  to  an  arbiter,  Russell 
said,  would  be,  first,  whether  the  British  Gov 
ernment  had  acted  "with  due  diligence,  or,  in 
other  words,  in  good  faith  and  honesty,"  in 
maintaining  neutrality;  second,  whether  the 
law  officers  of  the  crown  properly  understood 
the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  when  they  gave 
their  opinions  as  to  its  application  to  the  cases 
of  the  Alabama  and  other  cruisers.  To  put 
either  of  these  questions  to  the  representative 
of  a  foreign  government,  would  be  incompatible, 
he  held,  with  regard  for  the  dignity  and  char 
acter  of  the  British  crown  and  the  British  na 
tion.  "Her  Majesty's  government  must,  there 
fore,  decline  either  to  make  reparation  and 
compensation  for  the  captures  made  by  the 
Alabama,  or  to  refer  the  question  to  any  for 
eign  state." 

The  most  that  Lord  Russell  saw  his  way  to  do 
in  the  existing  situation  was  to  set  up  a  joint 


240  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

commission  to  pass  upon  all  claims  arising  on 
either  side  out  of  the  Civil  War,  provided,  as  he 
explained  with  great  care,  that  the  claims  con 
cerned  in  the  exploits  of  the  cruisers  should 
be  excluded.  This  proposition  was  declined 
by  Seward  with  no  less  directness  than  that 
which  Russell  displayed  in  declining  arbitra 
tion. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  the  attitude  as 
sumed  by  Earl  Russell  failed  to  win  the  sup 
port  of  important  elements  of  British  public 
opinion.  The  maritime  commercial  interest  per 
ceived  with  ever-increasing  vividness  the  peril 
to  English  trade  that  was  involved  in  any  re 
laxation  of  neutral  duties.  Party  leaders  were 
embarrassed  by  the  strained  relations  with  the 
United  States.  Respect  for  the  American  Re 
public  was  general,  and  admiration  even  was 
found  in  many  circles  where  only  contempt 
had  appeared  before  Appomattox.  With  a 
realizing  sense  of  the  losses  inflicted  by  the 
Alabama,  and  the  knowledge  that  orders  to 
detain  her  were  actually  issued  by  the  govern 
ment,  many  voices  were  heard  in  high  quarters 
declaring  that  there  was  ground  for  the  com 
plaints  of  the  Americans,  and  that  the  best 
British  policy  would  be  to  reach  a  settlement 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  241 

as  speedily  as  possible,  even  if  it  cost  consider 
able  money. 

Under  the  influence  of  these  conditions  the 
Derby  cabinet,  which  came  to  power  in  June, 
1866,  proposed  a  renewal  of  the  discussion  as 
to  arbitration.  Lord  Stanley,  the  foreign  sec 
retary,  avowed  a  willingness  to  submit  to  an 
arbiter  the  question  whether  the  British  Gov 
ernment  was  so  far  responsible  for  the  depreda 
tions  of  the  Alabama  as  to  be  bound  to  pay  the 
claims  of  those  whose  property  was  destroyed 
by  the  cruiser.  He  declined  absolutely,  how 
ever,  to  include  in  submission  to  the  arbiter 
the  question  as  to  whether  the  recognition  of 
the  Confederacy  as  a  belligerent  on  May  13, 
1861,  was  justifiable.  As  Seward  was  tenacious 
on  this  point  and  insisted  that  the  conduct 
of  Great  Britain  as  a  whole  should  go  into 
the  determination  of  her  responsibility  for  the 
cruisers,  arbitration  failed  again  to  be  adopted 
as  the  way  out  of  the  difficulties. 

To  the  anxiety  of  the  British  cabinet  to 
reach  a  settlement  was  added  in  1867  a  growing 
eagerness  on  the  part  of  Secretary  Seward  to 
make  such  a  settlement  the  capstone  of  his 
long  public  service,  now  approaching  its  end. 
Stimulated  by  these  forces,  diplomacy  overcame 


242  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

the  obstacles  that  had  seemed  insuperable.  In 
1868,  after  Charles  Francis  Adams  had  been 
succeeded  as  minister  by  Reverdy  Johnson,  a 
general  agreement  on  all  the  matters  at  issue 
between  the  governments  was  slowly  worked 
out.  The  Irish  trouble  was  first  cleared  away 
by  a  protocol,  eventually  amplified  into  a 
treaty,  assuring  to  naturalized  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  though  originally  British  sub 
jects,  the  full  rights  in  Great  Britain  of  native- 
born  citizens  of  the  United  States,  that  is, 
recognizing  the  right  of  expatriation  for  which 
the  American  Government  had  long  contended. 
A  second  protocol  referred  to  arbitration  a 
boundary  dispute  in  the  far  northwest  that 
had  been  pending  since  the  last  years  of  Bu 
chanan's  administration.  The  third  and  last  of 
the  agreements,  the  ill-fated  Johnson-Clarendon 
convention  signed  January  14,  1869,  provided 
for  the  Alabama  claims. 

In  this  convention  the  controverted  issues  as 
to  belligerency  and  neutrality  during  the  war 
were  hidden  away  in  a  series  of  general  provi 
sions  for  the  settlement  of  all  claims  upon  ei 
ther  government  for  money  compensation  to  cit 
izens  of  the  other,  on  account  of  transactions 
since  1853.  A  commission  of  four  members, 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  243 

two  appointed  by  each  government,  was  in 
trusted  with  the  power  to  pass  upon  the  claims 
by  majority  vote.  When  no  majority  should 
be  obtainable  an  umpire  should  be  selected,  if 
necessary  by  lot;  or,  upon  the  demand  of  two 
commissioners,  the  umpire  should  be  the  head 
of  a  foreign  state,  to  be  agreed  upon  by  the  two 
governments. 

In  this  convention  the  British  Government 
yielded  all  that  which  it  had  hitherto  held  to  be 
impossible.  Both  its  administration  of  its  neu 
trality  laws,  which  Russell  refused  to  regard  as 
arbitrable,  and  its  recognition  of  Confederate 
belligerency,  which  had  been  reserved  by  Stan 
ley,  were  subject  to  the  judgment  of  the  arbiter 
under  the  Johnson-Clarendon  treaty;  for  in  the 
consideration  of  every  claim  the  commissioners 
and  the  umpire  were  directed  to  base  their 
decisions  on  the  official  correspondence  of  the 
two  governments,  together  with  one  oral  argu 
ment  on  each  side  and  such  papers  as  the  gov 
ernments  should  choose  to  submit.  So  far  as 
concerned  the  Alabama  claims,  these  provisions 
put  before  the  tribunal  every  aspect  of  the  long 
controversy. 

There  was,  however,  little  hope,  from  the 
outset,  that  the  concessive  attitude  of  Great 


244  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

Britain  would  bring  the  desired  settlement. 
The  internal  political  conditions  in  America 
were  decidedly  unpropitious.  A  presidential 
election  in  November  of  1868  resulted  in  the 
choice  of  General  Grant  to  succeed  Andrew 
Johnson  in  the  following  March.  There  was 
extreme  antipathy,  personal  and  partisan,  be 
tween  the  outgoing  and  the  incoming  admin 
istrations,  and  nothing  so  dear  to  Seward's 
heart  as  ratification  of  his  final  treaty  could  be 
anticipated.  More  than  this,  there  was  a  wide 
spread  feeling  in  the  United  States  that  the 
offence  of  Great  Britain  was  not  of  a  kind  to  be 
expiated  by  the  mere  compensation  of  private 
individuals  for  financial  losses.  Seward  had 
once  instructed  Adams  that  the  conduct  of 
Great  Britain  during  the  war  must  be  regarded 
as  "a  national  wrong  and  injury  to  the  United 
States,"  for  which  indemnity  to  private  citizens 
would  be  only  the  lowest  form  of  satisfaction. 
The  spirit  of  this  declaration  was  not  reflected 
in  the  Johnson-Clarendon  convention,  and  the 
omission  had  much  to  do  with  the  fate  of  the 
agreement.  On  the  I3th  of  April,  1869,  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  refused  its  consent 
to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  a  vote  of 
forty-four  to  one. 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  245 

The  practical  unanimity  of  this  vote  was  even 
less  significant  than  certain  incidents  that  ac 
companied  the  Senate's  action.  Though  the 
session  in  which  the  treaty  was  considered  was, 
as  usual  in  such  cases,  secret,  the  Senate  made 
public  the  speech  of  Senator  Charles  Sumner, 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  whose  views  thus  were  impressed  with  a 
quasi-official  character.  In  this  speech  Sumner 
rehearsed  the  tale  of  British  unfriendliness  to 
the  United  States  during  the  war,  much  as  it 
had  been  told  often  in  the  despatches  of  Seward 
and  Adams.  A  shifting  of  emphasis  by  the 
senator,  however,  impressed  a  new  character 
upon  the  discussion.  He  put  in  the  foreground 
of  his  complaint  the  charge  that  the  course  of 
the  British  Government  had  been  a  wrong  to 
the  American  nation,  bringing  upon  it  suffering 
and  humiliation  in  addition  to  vast  expense; 
yet  for  this  public  and  notorious  wrong  to  a 
friendly  and  kindred  people  no  intimation  or 
expression  of  regret  had  come  from  Great 
Britain.  The  injuries  sustained  by  the  United 
States  could  not  be  measured,  Sumner  argued, 
by  the  losses  of  individuals,  nor  be  compensated 
by  payments  to  individuals.  British  respon 
sibility  was  to  the  American  nation,  and  was 


246  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

not  to  be  limited  by  the  property  destroyed  by 
the  Confederate  cruisers.  As  grounds  for  na 
tional  claims  against  Great  Britain  that  were  not 
to  be  ignored  in  any  satisfactory  settlement, 
Sumner  included  the  shrinkage  of  the  American 
mercantile  marine  through  the  transfer  of  ves 
sels  to  the  British  flag  for  protection  against  the 
cruisers;  the  rise  in  the  cost  of  marine  insurance; 
and  the  cost  of  the  war  for  the  two  years  by 
which  it  was  estimated  to  have  been  prolonged 
through  the  acts  and  negligence  of  the  British 
Government.  As  to  the  money  reckoning  of 
the  claims  thus  set  forth,  Sumner  admitted  that 
a  figure  was  difficult  to  arrive  at.  The  direct 
losses  by  the  destruction  of  private  property 
he  thought  might  total  some  $15,000,000;  for 
the  indirect  losses  the  suggestions  that  he  made 
pointed  to  a  sum  of  many  hundred  millions. 

Sumner's  speech  was  received  with  vocif 
erous  joy  by  all  the  Anglophobes  in  the  United 
States.  The  Fenians  were  deeply  gratified  with 
his  exposure  of  British  treachery,  and  prepared 
with  eagerness  for  the  revenge  that  they  thought 
must  be  exacted.  The  great  mass  of  average 
citizens  whose  antipathy  to  the  British  had 
been  dulled  by  the  lapse  of  years  since  the  war, 
were  stirred  with  the  ancient  wrath  through 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  247 

the  artful  and  eloquent  recital  of  the  old  tales 
of  wrong.  The  effect  of  Sumner's  speech  was 
magnified  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  by  the 
fact  that  he  had  always  been  reckoned  the 
chief  among  the  small  number  of  friends  of 
England  in  American  public  life.  That  he 
should  now  be  hailed  in  the  United  States  as 
the  leader  of  the  Anglophobes,  threw  his  En 
glish  admirers  into  consternation  that  was  al 
most  comical  in  its  intensity.  His  suggestion  of 
claims  that  would  run  up  into  the  hundred 
millions  was  unsparingly  denounced  by  all  or 
gans  of  British  public  opinion,  and  it  proved 
a  serious  obstacle  to  the  continuation  of  diplo 
matic  discussion  of  the  general  question.  There 
is  little  doubt,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the 
emphasis  that  he  laid  on  what  he  called  the 
national  claims  and  on  the  national  sense  of 
injury  received,  as  distinct  from  individual 
losses,  was  an  important  influence  in  determin 
ing  the  form  of  the  ultimate  settlement. 

Sumner's  attitude  was,  in  fact,  the  outcome  of 
a  deliberate  purpose,  for  which  British  radical 
politics  was  in  some  degree  responsible.  We 
have  seen  that  for  several  decades  the  feeling 
had  been  common  and  unconcealed  in  high 
quarters  that  the  colonies  were  a  burden  to 


248  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

Great  Britain  and  should  be  got  rid  of  as  soon 
as  possible.  Sumner' s  relations  with  Cobden 
and  Bright,  the  most  convinced  advocates  of 
this  policy,  made  it  very  familiar  to  him.  It 
was  to  Cobden's  speeches,  indeed,  that  Sumner 
was  indebted  for  the  catalogue  of  the  national 
losses  for  which  he  held  the  British  Government 
responsible.  The  great  free-trader,  when  as 
sailing  the  conduct  of  the  Palmerston-Russell 
cabinet  during  the  war,  set  forth  in  full  detail 
the  damage  to  the  American  merchant  marine 
due  to  that  conduct,  and  was  scarcely  less 
specific  than  Sumner  in  justifying  a  claim  by 
the  United  States  for  reparation.  In  1869 
Cobden  was  dead,  but  John  Bright  and  other 
radicals  were  in  the  Gladstone  cabinet,  and  the 
prime  minister  himself  was  well  over  toward 
the  radical  wing  of  the  liberal  line.  Sumner's 
purpose,  then,  was  to  use  Cobden's  views  on 
the  Alabama  claims  to  promote  his  views  as  to 
the  colonies.  The  senator  would  put  the  claims 
at  so  enormous  a  figure  as  to  make  the  settle 
ment  of  them  impossible  except  by  turning  over 
to  the  United  States  all  the  British  possessions 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Such  was  the  prop 
osition  that  he  later  advised  Secretary  Fish  to 
make  the  basis  of  all  further  negotiation,  adding 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  249 

the  profound  suggestion  that  this  simple  ex 
pedient  would  remove  for  all  time  the  tension 
on  the  Canadian  frontier  due  to  the  activities 
of  the  Fenians. 

This  project  of  Sumner's  is  illuminating  as  to 
the  practical  quality  of  his  statesmanship.  He 
assumed  that  the  dismemberment  of  the  British 
Empire,  because  it  was  considered  as  an  ideal 
by  politicians  concerned  in  the  internal  prob 
lems  of  England,  could  be  demanded  with  im 
punity  by  a  foreign  power  as  a  sort  of  war 
indemnity  for  a  purely  constructive  war. 

Hamilton  Fish  became  secretary  of  state  in 
the  spring  of  1869,  and  devoted  himself  from 
the  outset  to  a  serious  but  not  ostentatious 
effort  to  overcome  the  ill  effects  of  Sumner's 
speech  and  bring  the  negotiations  back  to  at 
least  as  hopeful  a  situation  as  that  in  which 
Seward  had  left  them.  The  Gladstone  cabinet, 
with  Lord  Clarendon  at  the  Foreign  Office,  was 
as  eager  as  Fish  to  work  toward  an  adjustment. 
On  both  sides,  however,  the  difficulties  were 
great.  British  susceptibilities  had  been  so  out 
raged  by  Sumner's  extravagant  demands  that 
any  sign  of  concession  to  them  by  Clarendon 
would  destroy  the  Gladstone  government.  On 
the  other  hand,  American  popular  sentiment 


250  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

was  keyed  up  to  the  pitch  set  by  Sumner,  and 
the  senator's  influence  had  to  be  reckoned  on 
in  opposition  to  any  abatement  of  the  extreme 
national  claims.  Nearly  two  years  of  secret 
and  unofficial  negotiations  were  necessary  be 
fore  a  plan  of  adjustment  was  hit  upon  that 
could  be  allowed  to  take  official  shape.  In  the 
interval  the  stars  in  their  political  courses  had 
fought  for  harmony.  Sumner,  through  a  vio 
lent  personal  and  political  quarrel  with  Presi 
dent  Grant,  lost  his  influence  with  the  support 
ers  of  the  administration,  and  was  eventually 
deposed  from  his  powerful  position  as  chair 
man  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions.  The  Franco-Prussian  War,  with  its  cloud 
of  threatening  diplomatic  questions  on  the  Con 
tinent,  gave  a  fresh  impulse  to  the  desire  of 
the  British  leaders  to  be  free  from  the  harass 
ing  burden  of  American  unfriendliness.  Under 
these  conditions  the  agreement  was  reached  for 
the  appointment  of  a  joint  high  commission  to 
meet  at  Washington  and  provide  by  treaty  for 
the  settlement  of  all  the  matters  in  controversy 
between  the  two  governments.  This  commis 
sion,  after  deliberations  lasting  from  February 
27  to  May  8,  1871,  concluded  on  the  latter  date 
the  Treaty  of  Washington  that  constitutes  a 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  251 

noteworthy  landmark  in  the  history  of  Anglo- 
American  relations. 

In  the  forty-two  articles  of  the  treaty  were 
embodied  provisions  for  the  settlement  of  the 
Alabama  claims;  of  other  claims  by  British  and 
American  citizens  arising  out  of  the  Civil  War; 
of  the  various  controversies  between  the  United 
States  and  British  North  America — as  to  the 
inshore  fisheries,  navigation,  and  commerce — 
left  pending  by  the  abrogation  of  the  Reci 
procity  Treaty  in  1866;  and  finally  of  the  dis 
pute  as  to  the  ownership  of  the  island  of  San 
Juan,  at  the  far  western  end  of  the  line  fixed 
by  the  Oregon  Treaty  of  1846. 

As  to  the  Alabama  claims,  the  agreement 
embodied  in  the  treaty  signified  great  conces 
sions  on  both  sides  in  the  interest  of  an  amica 
ble  settlement.  Great  Britain  expressed  regret 
"for  the  escape,  under  whatever  circumstances, 
of  the  Alabama  and  other  vessels  from  British 
ports,  and  for  the  depredations  committed  by 
those  vessels."  In  addition  to  this  soothing 
admission  that  something  disagreeable  had  hap 
pened  to  the  United  States,  the  British  Gov 
ernment  consented  to  arbitration  in  the  full 
est  sense  in  reference  to  all  the  claims.  Three 
rules  were  laid  down  as  to  the  duties  of  a  neu- 


252  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

tral  government,  and  the  arbitral  tribunal  was 
enjoined  to  base  its  judgment  on  these  rules, 
though  the  British  Government  recognized  them, 
not  as  a  statement  of  principles  of  interna 
tional  law  in  force  in  1861-5,  but  as  prin 
ciples  that  ought  in  the  future  to  be  adopted 
by  maritime  powers,  and  that  Great  Britain 
had,  in  fact,  sought  to  live  up  to  during  the 
American  war.  The  three  rules  defined  the 
duty  of  a  neutral  government,  in  respect  to  the 
fitting  out  and  supplying  of  war-ships,  in  such 
terms  as  to  make  it  morally  certain  that  judg 
ment  would  be  adverse  to  Great  Britain  on  the 
case  of  the  Alabama,  if  not  as  to  other  of  the 
Confederate  cruisers.  The  British  Government, 
in  short,  not  only  assumed  a  somewhat  apolo 
getic  attitude  at  the  outset,  but  also  submitted 
to  be  judged  by  principles  that  were  not  obli 
gatory  as  rules  of  international  conduct  at  the 
time  of  the  acts  concerned,  and  that  insured 
an  unfavorable  decision.  A  proud  and  powerful 
nation  does  not  put  itself  in  such  a  position 
without  potent  motives.  One  such  was  obvious 
and  unconcealed :  the  general  adoption  of  rigor 
ous  rules  of  neutral  duty  would  be  very  advan 
tageous  to  Great  Britain  whenever  she  should 
become  a  belligerent.  More  influential  than 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  253 

this  selfish  interest,  however,  was  the  desire,  in 
no  small  measure  purely  sentimental,  to  be  on 
friendly  terms  with  the  United  States.  The 
American  democracy  had  proved  in  the  severest 
of  tests  its  fitness  to  survive,  and  the  homage 
of  a  people  and  a  generation  in  whom  Darwin 
ism  was  taking  deep  root  was  generously 
bestowed  on  the  people  who  so  opportunely 
illustrated  the  dogma  of  science. 

Not  all  the  concession  in  the  Treaty  of 
Washington  was  on  the  part  of  the  British. 
One  point  that  had  been  strenuously  insisted 
on  as  the  original  grievance  of  them  all  by 
Secretary  Seward  and  Mr.  Sumner  was  al 
lowed  by  Secretary  Fish  to  recede  quietly  into 
the  background.  This  was  the  premature  recog 
nition  of  the  Confederacy  as  a  belligerent.  Fish 
took  the  position  that  this  action  of  the  Brit 
ish  Government  was  evidence  of  an  unfriendly 
spirit,  but  could  in  no  sense  be  the  ground  of  a 
claim  for  compensation.  This  admission  was 
regarded  as  having  a  bearing  on  the  general 
question  of  the  national  or  indirect  claims. 
These  were  not  the  subject  of  any  reference  or 
allusion  in  the  treaty,  and  it  was  understood  by 
the  British  negotiators  that  the  American  Gov 
ernment  had  definitely  abandoned  them,  as  it 


254  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

was  known  to  have  ignored  the  demand  of 
Sumner  that  a  withdrawal  of  the  British  flag 
from  the  Western  Hemisphere  should  be  a  pre 
liminary  condition  to  any  settlement  whatever. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Americans  had  no 
desire  to  urge  the  extravagant  claims  that 
Sumner  had  made  so  conspicuous.  The  British 
commissioners,  on  their  side,  were  without  au 
thority  to  consider  them.  Yet  because  popu 
lar  feeling  was  so  sensitive  about  them  on  both 
sides  of  the  water  the  negotiators  avoided  all  ref 
erence  to  them,  and  by  this  very  excess  of  caution 
left  room  for  a  dangerous  misunderstanding. 

The  tribunal  of  arbitration  met  and  organ 
ized  at  Geneva,  Switzerland,  in  the  middle  of 
December,  1871.  It  consisted  of  five  arbitra 
tors,  appointed  respectively  by  the  govern 
ments  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  Switzerland,  and  Brazil.  The  cases  of 
the  two  contending  governments  were  at  once 
presented  in  printed  form.  That  of  the  United 
States  was  found  to  include,  in  addition  to  the 
claims  for  losses  due  to  the  destruction  of  ves 
sels  by  the  cruisers  and  to  the  pursuit  of  the 
cruisers,  claims  also  for  the  loss  involved  in  the 
transfer  of  the  merchant  marine  to  the  British 
flag,  the  increased  cost  of  insurance,  and  the 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  255 

prolongation  of  the  war.  That  is,  the  indirect 
or  national  claims  were  laid  before  the  tribunal 
along  with  the  rest.  Protests  arose  at  once 
from  every  organ  of  opinion  in  Great  Britain. 
To  admit  responsibility  for  that  kind  and  degree 
of  loss  would  mean,  it  was  declared,  national 
humiliation  and  financial  ruin.  The  govern 
ment  and  the  negotiators  contended  that  the 
wording  of  the  treaty  excluded  the  indirect 
claims  from  submission  to  the  tribunal,  and  that 
such  exclusion  had  been  agreed  to  in  conference 
by  the  American  negotiators.  The  latter  de 
nied  any  such  agreement  or  interpretation. 
Great  Britain  stood  firm  in  her  contention, 
however,  and  her  agent  was  directed  to  with 
draw  from  the  arbitration  in  case  consideration 
of  the  indirect  claims  should  be  persisted  in. 
After  many  months  of  tension  and  of  deep  dis 
tress  among  the  friends  of  peace  and  amity,  a 
way  out  of  the  impasse  was  found  that  was 
acceptable  to  both  parties.  The  tribunal  itself 
declared  that  it  did  not  consider  itself  author 
ized,  under  international  law,  to  award  money 
compensation  for  such  losses  as  those  involved 
in  the  indirect  claims.  The  American  agent 
thereupon  refrained  from  demands  upon  the 
arbiters  for  further  attention  to  these  claims. 


256  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

This  happy  outcome  of  the  dispute  was  quite 
as  pleasing  to  the  American  as  to  the  British 
Government.  Fish  and  his  coadjutors  had  no 
expectation  or  desire  that  Great  Britain  should 
be  mulcted  in  consequential  damages.  Sum- 
ner's  speech  had  created  a  surprisingly  strong 
sentiment  in  support  of  such  mulcting,  and  it 
was  problematical  whether  the  administration 
could  afford,  in  the  year  of  a  presidential  elec 
tion,  to  run  counter  to  this  sentiment.  Ani 
mosity  toward  the  Southerners  was  at  this  time 
a  strong  factor  in  the  politics  of  the  Republican 
party,  and  it  fell  in  well  with  this  feeling  to 
disparage  the  South  by  contending  that  the 
remarkable  prolongation  of  its  resistance  to  the 
North  was  due  solely  to  the  aid  it  received 
from  Great  Britain.  The  rejection  of  the  indi 
rect  claims  by  the  tribunal  of  arbitration  itself 
relieved  the  administration  of  all  responsibility 
for  abandoning  them,  and  passed  without  note 
worthy  effect  on  American  public  opinion. 

The  judgment  of  the  tribunal  needs  but  cas 
ual  mention.  In  respect  to  three  of  the  Con 
federate  cruisers,  the  Alabama,  the  Florida,  and 
the  Shenandoah,  Great  Britain  was  found  to 
have  contravened  the  three  rules  of  neutral  con 
duct  laid  down  by  the  treaty,  and  the  damages 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  257 

due  to  the  United  States  on  account  of  the 
dereliction  were  assessed  at  £15, 500,000.  Sir 
Alexander  Cockburn,  the  British  arbitrator, 
dissented  from  the  judgment  of  the  tribunal  on 
all  but  a  single  point,  namely,  that  due  dili 
gence  had  not  been  used  in  ascertaining  the 
character  of  the  Alabama  and  preventing  her 
departure  from  Liverpool.  The  dissenting  opin 
ions  of  the  Englishman  were  embodied  in  a  very 
lengthy  document,  in  which  he  expressed  with 
unjudicial  candor  his  contempt  for  the  intelli 
gence  of  his  fellow  arbitrators  and  for  the  meth 
ods  and  attainments  of  those  who  conducted 
the  American  case.  Cockburn's  caustic  crit 
icism  found  some  reflection  in  the  Tory  press, 
and  there  appeared  more  or  less  of  the  once 
familiar  diatribe  against  the  Yankees.  In  gen 
eral,  however,  the  judgment  was  acquiesced 
in  by  British  public  opinion  with  good  grace. 
Even  Cockburn  ended  his  offensive  opinion  with 
an  expression  of  the  hope  and  desire  that  the 
arbitration  would  prove  a  potent  influence  in 
maintaining  amity  between  the  two  kindred 
peoples. 

This  was  indeed  the  dominant  note  in  Great 
Britain.  The  whole  social  and  political  move 
ment  of  the  day,  with  the  now  liberalized  Glad- 


258  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

stone  in  the  lead,  was  in  the  democratic  direc 
tion.  Following  the  extension  of  the  suffrage 
to  the  lower  classes  came  the  adoption  of  the 
secret  ballot,  to  secure  the  independence  of  the 
new  voters;  and  a  great  increase  of  state  and 
rate  supported  education,  to  promote  intel 
ligence  among  them.  Aristocratic  privilege  was 
summarily  suppressed  in  one  of  its  most  cher 
ished  strongholds  by  the  abolition  of  the  pur 
chase  of  commissions  in  the  army.  Disestab 
lishment  of  the  Irish  church,  and  the  Irish  Land 
Act  of  1870,  whatever  other  factors  played  a 
part  in  their  enactment,  were  for  the  benefit  of 
the  masses  as  against  the  classes.  In  the  sup 
port  that  Mr.  Gladstone  derived  from  public 
opinion  for  all  these  great  measures  it  is  quite 
impossible  that  no  influence  was  traceable  to 
the  example  of  the  American  democracy,  now 
so  recently  triumphant  over  the  dangers  that 
had  been  considered  certain  to  insure  its  ruin. 
Conservatism  could  no  longer  point  a  warning 
finger,  as  in  the  early  days  of  the  war,  to  the 
fate  of  a  nation  that  should  follow  American 
examples.  France  also  just  at  this  time  re 
newed  her  republican  experimentation,  and 
furnished  the  world  again  with  illustrations  of 
the  working  of  popular  government.  In  En- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  259 

gland,  however,  only  the  "blind  hysterics  of  the 
Celt"  were  discernible  across  the  Channel,  and 
the  gaze  must  follow  the  trail  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  across  the  ocean  to  rest  on  anything 
really  trustworthy. 

In  the  United  States  the  announcement  of  the 
actual  award  attracted  little  attention  or  com 
ment.  It  came  in  the  midst  of  a  heated  elec 
toral  campaign,  and  was  little  available  for 
partisan  purposes.  The  Treaty  of  Washington 
had  afforded  to  the  Americans  their  most  sub 
stantial  victory  a  year  earlier,  when  Great 
Britain  expressed  her  regret  and  agreed  to  arbi 
tration.  The  carrying  out  of  the  treaty  was 
followed  with  the  somewhat  languid  interest 
of  him  who  gathers  up  the  trophies  after  the 
victory  is  won. 

Before  the  expiration  of  the  year  1872  another 
trophy  dropped  quietly  into  the  hands  of  the 
United  States.  The  Treaty  of  Washington 
provided  for  the  settlement  of  the  San  Juan 
water  boundary  by  the  arbitration  of  the  Ger 
man  Emperor.  By  the  treaty  which  ended 
the  Oregon  dispute  in  1846  it  was  provided  that 
the  line  between  the  United  States  and  British 
America  should  be  the  forty-ninth  parallel  of 
latitude  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  "the 


260  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

middle  of  the  channel  which  separates  the 
continent  from  Vancouvers  Island,  and  thence 
southerly  through  the  middle  of  the  said  chan 
nel  ...  to  the  Pacific  Ocean."  The  channel 
in  question  was  at  one  place  about  fifty  miles 
wide  and  filled  with  islands,  among  which 
several  navigable  passages  trending  southward 
were  discernible.  The  dispute  was  as  to  which 
of  these  passages  was  the  "channel"  through 
which  the  boundary  passed.  The  island  of  San 
Juan,  occupied  since  1859  by  detachments  of 
both  American  and  British  troops,  would  belong 
to  the  one  country  or  the  other  according  to 
the  result  of  the  dispute.  In  October,  1872,  the 
German  Emperor  rendered  a  decision  sustain 
ing  the  contention  of  the  United  States  and 
assigning  the  island  thus  to  the  Americans. 

Two  other  arbitral  procedures  must  be  men 
tioned  before  the  unique  achievement  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  in  this  field  is  exhausted. 
One  arose  under  the  provision  in  the  treaty  for 
the  adjudication  by  a  commission  of  all  Civil 
War  claims,  other  than  those  known  as  the 
Alabama  claims,  for  compensation  by  either 
government  for  losses  sustained  through  its 
acts  by  citizens  of  the  other.  In  the  negotia 
tion  of  this  provision  Great  Britain  agreed  that 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  261 

no  claim  based  on  the  loss  of  slaves  by  a  Brit 
ish  subject  should  be  presented.  On  the  other 
hand  it  asked  that  the  losses  sustained  by 
Canadians  through  the  Fenian  raids  should  be 
passed  upon  by  the  commission.  This  the 
Americans  refused  to  concede,  and  the  British 
withdrew  the  demand.  What  actually  came 
before  the  commission  was  chiefly  a  large  mass 
of  claims  by  British  subjects  for  the  seizure  or 
destruction  of  their  property  incidentally  to  the 
military  operations  on  land  and  to  the  blockade 
of  the  coast.  A  few  claims  against  Great  Brit 
ain  were  presented  by  Americans  for  losses  sus 
tained  in  the  operations  of  the  Confederates 
in  Canada  in  raids  across  the  frontier.  The 
commission,  on  which  the  position  of  umpire 
was  held  by  the  Italian  minister  at  Washington, 
rendered  its  final  judgment  in  September,  1873. 
All  the  claims  by  Americans  were  dismissed, 
and  out  of  the  478  claims  by  British  subjects 
181  were  allowed,  with  awards  totalling  some 
thing  over  $1,900,000. 

The  last  of  the  arbitral  proceedings  provided 
for  in  the  Treaty  of  Washington  related  to  the 
familiar  old  matter  of  the  inshore  fisheries. 
We  have  seen  that  the  much-prized  privilege 
of  fishing  within  the  three-mile  line  was  con- 


262  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

ceded  to  the  Americans  by  the  Reciprocity 
Treaty  of  1854  in  return  for  the  free  admission 
of  leading  Canadian  products  into  the  United 
States,  and  that  the  privilege  expired  with  the 
abrogation  of  the  treaty  in  1866.  Friction  be 
tween  the  American  fishermen  and  the  authori 
ties  of  the  Maritime  Provinces,  such  as  had  been 
common  and  troublesome  prior  to  1854,  made  its 
appearance  again  after  1866.  Efforts  to  read 
just  things  on  the  basis  of  tariff  concessions,  as 
in  the  Reciprocity  Treaty,  failed  before  the 
uncompromising  refusal  of  the  Americans  to 
modify  their  duties.  In  the  Treaty  of  Wash 
ington  an  agreement  was  reached  through  the 
offer  of  the  Americans  to  pay  for  the  privilege 
of  the  inshore  fishing  in  hard  cash.  This  prop 
osition  was  accepted,  but  the  negotiators  were 
quite  unable  to  get  together  on  the  amount  that 
should  be  paid.  This  question,  therefore,  was 
left  to  arbitration.  The  treaty  provided  that 
the  inshore  fisheries  should  be  open  to  the 
Americans,  and,  on  the  other  side,  that  Canadian 
fish  and  fish-oil  should  be  admitted  duty-free 
to  the  United  States.  This  arrangement  was 
to  last  for  ten  years,  after  which  it  was  subject 
to  termination  on  two  years'  notice  by  either 
party.  The  task  of  the  commission  of  arbitra- 


THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR  263 

tion  was,  therefore,  to  determine  how  much 
cash,  if  any,  in  addition  to  the  free  admission  of 
fish  and  fish-oil,  would  make  a  fair  compensa 
tion  for  the  privilege  of  the  inshore  fishing. 
The  commission  to  whom  the  matter  was  re 
ferred  made  its  decision  at  Halifax  on  Novem 
ber  23,  1877,  and  awarded  $5,500,000  in  gold 
to  Great  Britain.  This  award  was  regarded  as 
excessive  and  unfair  by  many  well-informed 
persons  in  the  United  States,  and  its  validity 
was  questioned  on  technical  grounds  by  some; 
but  the  government  duly  paid  the  sum  and 
closed  the  incident. 

This  Halifax  commission  completed  the  re 
markable  series  of  judicial  proceedings  of  an 
international  character  through  which  the  jolts 
and  displacements  caused  by  the  Civil  War  were 
corrected  and  compensated,  and  the  relations 
of  the  English-speaking  peoples  were  restored 
to  the  plane  of  official  and,  in  a  greater  degree 
than  ever  before,  of  real  amity.  The  adjust 
ment  in  respect  to  the  fisheries  was,  of  course, 
less  closely  and  exclusively  than  the  other 
arbitrations  related  to  the  Civil  War.  The 
difficulty  that  made  the  issue  was  destined  to 
remain,  as  it  had  been  for  a  century,  a  source  of 
irritation  and  disturbance  for  an  indefinite 


264  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

future.  It  afforded  at  this  time,  as  it  had  afford 
ed  earlier,  and  would  afford  later,  a  transition 
topic  from  controversies  in  which  the  mother- 
country  was  the  chief  protagonist  against  the 
United  States  to  those  in  which  the  British- 
American  provinces  held  the  leading  position. 
Not  the  least  important  of  the  results  which  are 
traceable  in  a  distinct  if  not  a  wholly  decisive 
way  to  the  influence  of  the  desperate  war  in  the 
United  States,  was  the  great  political  transfor 
mation  in  British  America  made  effective  by 
the  creation  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  in  1867. 
This  was  a  capital  event  in  the  history  of  the 
relations  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  of  the 
earth  and  to  it  our  attention  must  be  for  a  time 
directed. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  AND  ITS 
PROBLEMS 

IN  the  proceedings  that  resulted  in  the  Treaty 
of  Washington  of  1871  an  important  part  was 
played  by  two  prominent  Canadians.  Sir  John 
Rose  was  the  confidential  agent  of  the  British 
cabinet  in  the  twenty  months  of  secret  di 
plomacy  at  Washington  through  which  negotia 
tion  of  the  treaty  was  made  possible;  Sir  John 
A.  Macdonald  was  one  of  the  five  British  mem 
bers  of  the  joint  high  commission  by  which  the 
treaty  was  actually  concluded.  Rose  had  been 
until  very  recently  minister  of  finance  in  the 
Canadian  cabinet;  Macdonald  was  the  prime 
minister  of  the  Dominion.  The  participation 
of  Rose  in  the  affair  was  determined  largely  by 
his  exceptionally  wide  and  intimate  business 
and  social  connections  in  all  three  of  the  coun 
tries  concerned,  and  by  his  amiable  personality; 
the  appointment  of  Macdonald  signified  the 
formal  recognition  by  Westminster  that  the 

British-American   commonwealth    was  entitled 

265 


266       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

to  share  through  its  government  in  the  imperial 
diplomacy  that  affected  it.  Complaints  had 
always  been  made  by  the  colonials  that  their 
interests  were  lightly  regarded  in  the  adjust 
ments  reached  between  the  British  Government 
and  the  United  States.  A  Canadian  represent 
ative  in  the  negotiations  would  shield  the  gov 
ernment  against  such  complaints,  though,  as 
Sir  John  Macdonald  shrewdly  foresaw,  colonial 
wrath,  if  things  went  wrong,  would  not  again 
be  dissipated  in  long-range  fretting  against 
Westminster,  but  would  fall  with  concentration 
and  promptness  upon  his  own  devoted  head. 
Despite  the  suspicion  that  his  function  might 
be  primarily  that  of  the  scapegoat,  he  served 
on  the  joint  high  commission  with  force  and 
efficiency,  and  strengthened  pro  tanto  the  pres 
tige  at  home  and  abroad  of  the  recently  organ 
ized  Dominion  of  Canada. 

The  union  of  all  the  British  provinces  of 
North  America  in  a  single  governmental  system 
had  been  contemplated  as  possible  and  desirable 
by  thoughtful  publicists  for  many  decades. 
With  the  increase  of  population,  the  growth  of 
intercourse,  commercial  and  social,  and  the  im 
provements  in  means  of  communication,  the 
advantages  of  union  became  ever  more  percep- 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  267 

tible.  The  impulse  to  its  actual  realization 
came,  however,  as  much  from  without  as  from 
within  the  provinces.  It  was  not  a  mere  coin 
cidence  that  the  initial  steps  toward  creating 
the  Dominion  of  Canada  were  taken  during  the 
Civil  War  in  the  United  States. 

Sympathy  in  Canada  with  the  South  was 
sufficiently  common  and  sufficiently  outspoken 
during  the  war  to  evoke  much  heated  denun 
ciation  across  the  border.  With  the  rumors 
and  realities  of  extensive  operations  by  the  Con 
federates  from  a  base  in  Canada,  the  temperature 
of  Northern  comment  became  excessively  high. 
The  attitude  of  the  Canadian  authorities  re 
mained  scrupulously  correct,  and  the  excitement 
pervading  the  press  and  platform  of  the  North 
was  properly  discounted;  yet  there  remained  a 
feeling  of  uneasiness  and  foreboding  as  to  what 
was  going  to  happen  when  the  titanic  struggle 
should  end.  If  the  North  should  triumph,  a 
war  of  revenge  against  Great  Britain  and  its 
possessions  was  likely;  if  the  North  should  fail, 
an  effort  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  the  South 
by  expansion  at  the  expense  of  Great  Britain 
might  equally  be  expected.  In  either  case  it 
behooved  the  prudent  statesman  to  take  all 
possible  precautions  for  the  care  of  the  provin- 


268       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

cial  interests.  Some  kind  of  consolidation  was 
obviously  desirable  for  the  security  of  the  half 
dozen  all  but  independent  political  organisms 
that  made  up  British  North  America. 

It  so  happened  that  just  at  this  time  the 
legislative  union  by  which  Upper  Canada  and 
Lower  Canada  had  been  brought  into  harmony 
in  1841  reached  the  end  of  its  usefulness.  Party 
conflict,  turning  upon  the  antipathy  between 
the  French  and  the  English  races,  brought 
paralysis  upon  the  administration.  A  way  out 
could  not  be  found  till  a  coalition  of  the  dead 
locked  parties  was  effected  for  the  purpose  of 
instituting  a  new  constitutional  system  through 
federation.  The  specific  requirement  in  the 
internal  politics  of  Canada  was  some  readjust 
ment  that  should  satisfy  the  demands  of  the 
English  element  in  the  upper  province  for  power 
proportioned  to  their  now  superior  numbers  as 
compared  with  the  French  of  the  lower  prov 
ince.  Failure  to  satisfy  these  demands  was 
likely  at  any  moment  to  cause  a  revival  of  the 
sentiment  in  favor  of  annexation  to  the  United 
States.  The  Americans  were  manifestly  re 
solved  upon  abrogating  the  Treaty  of  Reci 
procity,  in  order  to  renew  the  commercial  pres 
sure  upon  the  Canadians,  at  the  same  time  that 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  269 

the  bitterness  of  the  war-time  was  making  a 
resort  to  arms  far  from  improbable.  Under 
these  circumstances  all  the  statesmen  and  other 
classes  who  were  devoted  to  the  British  con 
nection  were  stimulated  to  strenuous  action. 

The  Maritime  Provinces  meanwhile  had  been 
for  some  years  discussing  the  idea  of  a  union 
among  themselves.  Their  motives  were  in  some 
measure  the  same  as  those  that  were  operative 
in  Canada,  and  in  some  respects  peculiar  to 
themselves.  A  conference  on  the  subject  be 
tween  delegates  from  New  Brunswick,  Nova 
Scotia,  and  Prince  Edward  Island  took  place  in 
1864,  just  at  the  time  when  the  political  situa 
tion  in  Canada  was  most  critical.  The  Cana 
dian  ministry,  a  coalition  of  George  Brown, 
the  ablest  Radical,  and  John  A.  Macdonald,  the 
astute  Conservative  leader,  seized  the  oppor 
tunity  and  effected  the  transformation  of  the 
conference  of  the  Maritime  Provinces  into  a 
more  comprehensive  body  in  which  delegates 
from  Canada  and  Newfoundland  were  included. 
The  larger  conference  met  at  Quebec  in  October, 
1864,  and  formulated  a  series  of  resolutions  out 
of  which,  after  long  and  varied  discussion  in 
each  province  and  at  London,  was  shaped  the 
constitution  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada.  The 


270  THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

British  North  America  Act,  in  which  this  con 
stitution  found  legal  expression,  was  enacted 
by  the  British  Parliament  in  1867,  and  the  new 
system  went  into  operation  on  the  ist  of  July 
of  that  year.  The  acceptance  of  the  new  order 
by  Canada  was  prompt  and  easy.  To  the  other 
provinces,  however,  the  appeal  of  the  confedera 
tion  was  far  less  strong.  New  Brunswick  and 
Nova  Scotia  acceded  only  after  a  sharp  conflict, 
and  after  the  Fenian  forays  of  1866  accentuated 
the  arguments  of  the  reformers.  Prince  Ed 
ward  Island  held  aloof  from  the  union  until  1873, 
while  Newfoundland  persisted  permanently  in 
her  independence. 

A  strong  and  conspicuous  influence  of  the 
United  States  in  the  formation  of  the  Dominion 
was  to  be  seen  in  the  distrust  and  fear  that  the 
great  republic  inspired;  yet  this  was  by  no 
means  the  whole  of  the  part  played  by  the 
greater  nation  in  the  self-realization  of  the  less. 
The  constitutional  problems  of  federal  union 
that  confronted  the  Canadians  were  in  most 
cases  those  that  had  been  the  core  of  American 
history  since  1776.  Hence  throughout  the  de 
bates  in  which  the  constitution  of  the  Dominion 
took  form,  the  experience  of  the  United  States 
was  continuously  before  the  debaters.  Amer- 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  271 

ican  history  and  institutions  were  as  sedulously 
searched  as  those  of  the  mother-country  for 
precedent  and  for  warning.  Despite  the  un 
friendly  feelings  in  which  the  Dominion  took 
its  rise,  its  constitution  is  in  the  fullest  sense  an 
embodiment  of  the  combined  experience  of  all 
three  of  the  great  English-speaking  peoples  of 
the  day. 

In  the  project  for  the  union  of  the  British 
provinces  was  involved  the  larger  project  of  a 
national  consolidation  of  the  whole  of  the  Brit 
ish  territory  in  America  north  of  the  United 
States.  In  correspondence  with  the  expansion 
of  the  republic  across  the  continent  to  the 
Pacific,  the  new  Dominion  was  to  include  the 
whole  vast  region  westward  to  the  ocean  and  the 
Russian  boundary.  Nor  was  the  slow  and  pain 
ful  process  through  which  the  United  States  had 
acquired  its  western  area  to  be  duplicated.  The 
course  of  the  imperial  government  was  defi 
nitely  agreed  upon  before  the  British  North 
America  Act  was  passed.  In  1868  the  rights 
of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company,  in  whom  up  to 
1859  the  sole  control  of  most  of  the  region  had 
for  generations  been  vested,  were  taken  over 
by  the  Dominion.  Three  years  later  the  prov 
ince  of  Manitoba  was  organized  on  part  of  this 


272       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

territory  as  a  new  member  of  the  confederation, 
and  still  another  province,  British  Columbia,  far 
across  on  the  Pacific,  also  entered  the  Dominion. 
Thus  emulously  the  new  English-speaking  na 
tion  duplicated,  with  whatever  disproportion 
in  numbers,  the  westward  progress  of  its  great 
neighbor  on  the  south.  The  faithfulness  of  the 
duplication  unhappily  extended  to  certain  un 
savory  details  of  politico-financial  operations  in 
the  development  of  the  new  regions.  In  the 
United  States  the  first  transcontinental  railway 
was  completed  in  1869.  In  Canada  the  pledge 
of  immediate  and  energetic  prosecution  of  a 
parallel  enterprise  was  a  feature  of  the  proced 
ure  through  which  British  Columbia  became  a 
part  of  the  Dominion.  A  single  year,  1873, 
witnessed  in  its  early  months  the  ruin  of  several 
fair  political  reputations  in  the  United  States 
by  the  malodorous  exposure  of  the  Credit 
Mobilier,  and  in  its  later  months  the  downfall 
of  the  first  prime  minister  of  the  Dominion  in 
consequence  of  relations  with  the  financiers  of 
the  inchoate  Canadian  Pacific  enterprise. 

The  consolidation  of  British  North  America 
into  the  Dominion  was  in  itself  an  expression  of 
the  feeling  of  national  unity,  and  it  was  fol 
lowed  by  the  steady  unfolding  of  policies  that 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  273 

were  in  harmony  with  that  ideal.  Nationality, 
as  a  basis  of  political  organization,  has  been 
historically  a  concept  quite  free  from  the 
limitations  of  exact  definition.  Community  of 
ancestry,  of  language,  of  traditions,  of  customs, 
of  religion,  of  geographic  environment,  of  eco 
nomic  interest,  and  of  intellectual  ideals  have 
been  jointly  and  severally  set  up  as  the  essential 
justification  for  the  claim  to  the  rights  and 
privileges  of  a  nation.  No  one  of  these  could 
be  predicated  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  in 
1867.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  no 
light  undertaking  for  the  3,500,000  scattered 
people  of  the  provinces  to  set  out  on  the  way  of 
self-sufficiency.  The  initial  requirements  of  the 
enterprise  were  obviously  the  assurance  of  po 
litical  and  economic  independence  of  the  United 
States  and  the  maintenance  at  all  hazards  of 
the  connection  with  the  United  Kingdom. 
Awkward  questions  were  involved  from  the 
outset  in  these  requirements,  but  they  were 
met  with  boldness  and  success. 

The  constitution  of  the  Dominion  dealt  with 
the  most  rancorous  problems  of  race  and  relig 
ion  by  disjoining  the  two  old  provinces  of 
Canada  and  giving  to  each — Protestant  and 
English  Ontario  and  Catholic  and  French  Que- 


274       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

bee — a  complete  government  of  its  own,  sub 
ject  to  the  supremacy  of  the  government  of  the 
Dominion.  To  counteract  the  well-nigh  over 
whelming  economic  pressure  by  which  commerce 
and  industry  were  made  subject  to  the  United 
States,  every  effort  was  put  forth  to  develop 
railways  running  east  and  west.  The  Inter 
colonial  Railway,  uniting  Quebec  with  Halifax, 
a  long-projected  enterprise  of  both  economic 
and  military  importance,  was  completed  with 
imperial  aid  in  1876.  The  Canadian  Pacific, 
delayed  by  the  scandal  of  1873,  was  not  in  opera 
tion  until  nearly  ten  years  later  than  the  Inter 
colonial.  Along  with  these  great  monuments 
of  national  growth  came  the  slow  but  sure  de 
velopment  of  that  system  which  has  been  a 
feature  of  every  new  birth  of  national  spirit 
in  the  nineteenth  century — the  stimulation  of 
industry  by  a  protective  tariff.  In  1878  Sir 
John  A.  Macdonald,  after  five  years  of  exclu 
sion  from  power  following  his  downfall  on  the 
Canadian-Pacific  affair,  won  a  great  popular 
triumph  on  the  clearly  defined  issue  of  pro 
tection,  and  at  once  put  the  new  policy  into 
operation.  The  United  States  was  just  at  this 
time  emerging  from  the  fiscal  chaos  of  the  Civil 
War.  Specie  payments  superseded  the  irre- 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  275 

deemable  paper  currency,  and  the  refunding  of 
the  huge  war  debt  rendered  possible  far-reach 
ing  readjustments  in  revenue  and  taxation. 
This  situation  brought  the  question  of  the  tar 
iff  to  the  foreground  in  politics  and  demanded 
the  judgment  of  the  people  as  to  maintaining 
the  high  protection  that  had  been  established 
through  the  fiscal  exigencies  of  the  war.  Though 
the  principle  was  less  decisively  settled  for 
many  years  than  in  the  Dominion,  the  practical 
issue  was  the  same.  As  Canada  introduced  the 
protective  tariff,  the  United  States  retained  it. 
Thus  by  the  opening  of  the  ninth  decade  of 
the  century  the  two  English-speaking  peoples 
of  America  had  reverted  to  the  restrictive  com 
mercial  and  industrial  system  that  had  been 
dropped  with  much  parade  of  finality  in  the 
fifth  decade.  Economic  independence  of  Great 
Britain  was  the  chief  end  that  determined  the 
policy  of  the  United  States;  economic  independ 
ence  of  the  United  States  was  the  chief  end 
that  determined  the  policy  of  Canada.  In 
each  case  the  experiment  was  costly,  but  far 
more  so  to  the  Dominion  than  to  the  republic. 
No  small  sacrifice  to  the  national  ideal  was  re 
quired  in  resisting  the  lure  of  trade,  transporta 
tion,  and  financial  advantage  to  the  southward 


276       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

and  laboriously  building  up  a  purely  Canadian 
economy.  The  spirit  that  sustains  such  sac 
rifices,  however  noble  and  exalted  it  undoubtedly 
may  be  in  some  aspects,  is  notoriously  not  the 
spirit  that  most  promotes  cordial  friendships 
among  neighboring  peoples.  The  simultaneous 
renascence  of  protectionism  in  the  United  States 
and  Canada  had  a  very  close  relation  to  the 
friction  that  became  spectacular  in  the  eighties 
and  the  early  nineties.  The  immediate  source 
of  the  friction  was  the  very  familiar  old  ques 
tion  of  the  inshore  fisheries  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  with  later  a  less  familiar  but  no  less  troub 
lesome  dispute  over  the  seal  fisheries  of  the  far 
northwestern  ocean. 

The  Treaty  of  Washington  of  1871,  as  we 
have  seen,  admitted  Americans  to  the  inshore 
fisheries  on  the  coast  of  the  Dominion,  in  return 
for  the  admission  of  fish  and  fish-oil  free  of 
duty  to  the  United  States  and  such  additional 
compensation  as  should  be  awarded  by  arbi 
trators.  This  arrangement  went  into  effect  July 
i,  1873,  and  a  year  later  Newfoundland  became 
a  party  to  it.  The  award  of  $5,500,000  by 
the  Halifax  commission  practically  sounded  the 
knell  of  this  arrangement.  The  amount  was 
deemed  exorbitant  by  most  Americans  com- 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  277 

patent  to  judge,  the  position  officially  taken 
by  the  government  being  that  the  privilege  of 
the  inshore  fishing  was  desirable  for  Americans, 
not  at  all  for  economic  advantage,  but  merely 
to  remove  a  cause  of  international  friction. 
This  latter  purpose  was  not  wholly  achieved. 
In  1878,  at  Fortune  Bay,  Newfoundland,  an 
American  fishing  crew  was  mobbed  by  local 
residents  for  disregarding  the  prohibition  to 
ply  the  trade  on  Sunday.  The  British  Govern 
ment  ultimately  granted  an  indemnity  to  the 
Americans,  but  the  question  whether  local 
provincial  legislation  was  seriously  to  affect 
the  rights  based  on  treaties  remained  not  alto 
gether  clear. 

The  definitive  committal  of  both  Canada  and 
the  United  States  to  protectionism  confirmed 
the  fate  of  the  fisheries  arrangement.  The 
fish-packing  interests  of  New  England  entered 
strong  and  continuous  protests  against  the  sac 
rifice  of  their  rights  by  the  free  admission  of 
Canadian  fish,  while  other  products  of  the 
Dominion  were  subject  to  heavy  duties.  When 
the  ten  years  expired  for  which  the  fisheries 
articles  were  to  run,  Congress,  with  little  or  no 
opposition,  directed  the  President  to  give  the 
requisite  two  years'  notice  of  the  abrogation  of 


278       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

the  articles.  Accordingly,  they  ceased  to  be 
operative  on  July  i,  1885,  and  the  way  was 
open  for  renewal  of  the  ancient  friction.  A 
provisional  arrangement  by  which  the  Amer 
icans  were  not  to  be  molested  in  their  custom 
ary  pursuits  for  the  season  of  1885  secured 
peace  for  that  year;  but  with  the  next  fishing- 
season  troubles  promptly  developed  that  se 
verely  strained  the  resources  of  diplomacy. 
The  authorities  of  the  Dominion,  in  whose 
jurisdiction  the  police  of  the  shores  and  the 
enforcement  of  the  customs  laws  now  lay,  pro 
ceeded  to  a  merciless  enforcement  of  the  rules 
that  operated  to  hamper  the  enterprise  of  the 
American  fishermen.  Under  these  rules  fishing- 
vessels  were  forbidden  to  enter  Canadian  ter 
ritorial  waters  except  for  shelter,  repairs,  wood 
or  water.  Many  a  captain  took  the  chances  of 
trouble  by  seeking  under  cover  of  these  excep 
tions  to  renew  the  supply  of  bait  on  which  the 
success  of  his  deep-sea  fishing  depended.  The 
zeal  of  the  Canadian  guard-boats  was  as  active 
as  that  of  the  American  fishermen,  and  frequent 
seizures  were  made  of  the  alleged  offenders. 
Complaints  and  recriminations  in  the  press  and 
in  the  legislatures  of  the  two  countries  assumed 
great  scope  and  bitterness.  It  was  charged  in 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  279 

the  United  States  that  the  sole  animus  of  the 
Canadian  procedure  was  the  desire  to  force 
concessions  to  Canadian  goods  in  the  tariff.  In 
Canada,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  charged  that 
the  agitation  across  the  border  was  designed  to 
break  down  the  Canadian  tariff  in  the  interest 
of  American  manufactures.  That  there  was  an 
element  of  truth  in  both  charges  did  not  ma 
terially  relieve  the  situation. 

The  tension  due  to  this  matter  lasted  till  af 
ter  the  presidential  election  of  1888.  Only  the 
season  of  1886,  however,  presented  incidents 
of  a  really  serious  character.  As  a  consequence 
of  these  incidents  the  American  Congress,  in  its 
following  session,  enacted  a  retaliatory  law,  au 
thorizing  the  President,  in  case  of  further  ill 
treatment  of  the  fishermen,  to  exclude  from 
American  waters  and  ports  the  vessels  and  com 
modities  of  the  Dominion.  No  action  was  ever 
taken,  however,  under  the  authority  conferred 
by  this  act.  The  lessons  of  1886  produced  a 
less  militant  attitude  on  the  part  of  both  the 
American  fishermen  and  the  Canadian  revenue 
officers.  Methods  were  devised  through  which 
the  difficulties  that  arose  between  them  could 
be  and  were  promptly  adjusted.  Yet  on  ac 
count  of  the  partisan  political  conditions  pre- 


280       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

vailing,  especially  in  the  United  States,  the 
significance  of  every  frictional  episode  was 
systematically  exaggerated,  and  the  permanent 
diplomatic  settlement  of  all  the  controversies 
was  prevented.  A  treaty  was  actually  con 
cluded,  February  15,  1888,  the  terms  of  which 
provided  a  full  and  equitable  provision  for  all 
the  doubtful  points  that  had  arisen.  The 
Senate  of  the  United  States  refused  to  approve 
it,  for  reasons  which,  so  far  as  the  public  debate 
on  the  question  may  be  assumed  to  reveal  them, 
related  much  more  to  President  Cleveland's 
candidacy  for  re-election  than  to  the  merits  of 
the  fisheries  question.  Pending  the  action  of 
the  Senate,  a  modus  vivendi  for  two  years  was 
agreed  to  by  the  governments,  under  the  terms 
of  which  licenses  to  trade  for  fishing-supplies  in 
the  British  ports  were  granted  for  a  price  to  the 
American  fishermen,  and  they  were  absolved 
from  burdensome  customs  regulations.  Though 
the  treaty  failed,  the  terms  of  this  modus  con 
tinued  to  govern  the  situation  by  the  tacit 
consent  of  all  the  parties  concerned,  and  fur 
ther  trouble  was  for  the  time  avoided. 

The  friction  after  1885  over  the  fisheries  had 
far-reaching  effects.  It  contributed  to  the  de 
velopment  of  an  anti-British  sentiment  in  the 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  281 

United  States  that  reached  a  serious  climax 
a  decade  later.  The  feeling  at  first  excited  by 
the  seizure  of  the  American  fishermen  was  di 
rected  naturally  against  the  Canadians.  Later, 
despite  the  unconcealed  and  eager  efforts  of 
the  British  imperial  government  to  bring  about 
a  satisfactory  accommodation,  a  truculent  spirit 
in  respect  to  England  became  increasingly 
manifest  throughout  the  United  States.  It  was 
wide-spread  rather  than  deep,  and  it  received 
nourishment  from  a  number  of  casual  circum 
stances. 

The  home  politics  of  Great  Britain  contrib 
uted  something.  It  was  in  1886  that  Mr. 
Gladstone's  Irish  policy  wrecked  the  Liberal 
Party  and  brought  Lord  Salisbury  in  for  a  long 
tenure  of  the  premiership.  The  Parnell  move 
ment  for  home  rule  had  for  years  attracted 
much  sympathy  in  the  United  States,  even  out 
side  the  circle  of  Irish-Americans  from  whom  it 
drew  so  much  of  its  financial  support.  When 
Gladstone  gave  way  to  the  pressure  of  the 
Irish  and  introduced  his  first  Home  Rule  Bill, 
the  action  presented  itself  to  very  many  Amer 
icans  as  another  step  in  the  democratic  direc 
tion  which  he  had  followed,  notably  in  the 
extension  of  the  suffrage  in  1884.  The  failure 


282       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

of  the  bill  and  the  accession  of  the  Marquis  of 
Salisbury  to  power  appeared  to  denote  a  great 
triumph  of  reaction.  Lord  Salisbury's  reputa 
tion  in  America  was  that  of  a  case-hardened 
aristocrat,  with  no  faculty  of  aristocratic  reserve 
when  the  caustic  delineation  of  his  adversaries 
was  concerned.  His  opinions  and  expressions 
concerning  the  United  States  had  been  noto 
riously  contemptuous.  It  was  easy,  therefore, 
for  those  who  were  interested,  to  strengthen  the 
presumption  that  the  British  policy  in  the  mat 
ter  of  the  fisheries  was  but  a  manifestation  of 
the  unfriendly  spirit  which  the  prime  minister 
was  disposed  to  promote. 

The  same  disturbing  end  was  furthered  by  the 
condition  of  party  politics  in  the  United  States. 
Control  of  the  government  was  divided  between 
the  two  great  parties.  President  Cleveland 
was  a  Democrat;  the  Senate  was  by  a  small 
majority  controlled  by  the  Republicans.  In 
the  country  at  large  the  voters  were  very  evenly 
divided,  and  the  struggle  of  the  politicians  for 
the  support  of  those  whose  preferences  could 
be  influenced  by  anti-British  prejudice  was  very 
keen.  As  the  campaign  of  1888  approached, 
President  Cleveland,  in  a  dramatic  manner, 
brought  the  tariff  into  the  foreground  as  the 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  283 

chief  issue  between  the  parties,  and  committed 
the  Democrats  to  the  policy  of  abolishing  the 
protective  system.  The  Republicans,  adopt 
ing  formally  the  defence  of  protection,  strove 
with  energy  and  much  success  to  attach  to 
their  adversaries  the  odium  of  devotion  to 
"British  free  trade."  It  was  freely  asserted 
that  English  manufacturers  were  actively  as 
sisting  the  Democrats.  By  a  trick  that  any 
thing  above  infantile  sagacity  would  have 
detected,  the  British  minister  at  Washington, 
Sir  L.  S.  Sackville  West,  was  actually  induced 
to  write  a  letter  to  an  unknown  correspondent 
advising  him  to  vote  the  Democratic  ticket  as 
the  most  advantageous  to  British  interests. 
At  the  climax  of  the  campaign  the  letter  was 
published  and  was  hailed  by  the  Republicans 
as  conclusive  proof  of  their  allegations  concern 
ing  the  relations  of  the  English  with  the  Demo 
crats.  President  Cleveland  demanded  the  re 
call  of  Sackville  West.  Lord  Salisbury  refused. 
Thereupon  the  minister  received  his  passports, 
and  his  post  was  left  vacant  for  many  months 
by  his  government.  The  Republicans,  mean 
while,  triumphed  in  the  elections,  and  under  the 
presidency  of  Mr.  Harrison  entered  upon  a 
policy  of  extreme  and  aggressive  protectionism 


284  THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

through  the  enactment  of  the  famous  McKinley 
Bill. 

In  addition  to  this  policy,  the  Harrison  ad 
ministration  brought  to  the  front  a  personality 
which  gave  small  promise  of  better  relations 
with  any  foreign  power.  Mr.  James  G.  Elaine 
became  secretary  of  state.  He  brought  to 
that  office  the  reputation  of  one  who  would 
assert  with  exceptional  vigor  the  rights  and 
claims  of  the  United  States.  His  political  fol 
lowing  included  a  group  of  Irish-Americans  to 
whom  the  separation  of  Ireland  from  Great 
Britain  was  an  end  that  justified  any  means. 
His  public  career  teemed  with  incidents  that 
had  rasped  the  feelings  of  Britons  and  Cana 
dians  as  effectively  as  Lord  Salisbury  had  rasped 
the  Americans.  The  conjunction  of  these  two 
men  at  the  head  of  the  foreign  offices  boded  ill 
for  amity  among  the  English-speaking  peoples. 

It  was  expected  that  the  accession  of  the 
Harrison  administration  would  be  followed  by 
a  renewal  of  the  tension  concerning  the  north 
eastern  fisheries.  Forebodings  in  this  respect 
proved  groundless.  No  settlement  of  the  dis 
puted  questions  of  right  was  indeed  arrived  at, 
but  careful  and  considerate  conduct  by  both 
fishermen  and  authorities  made  serious  clashes 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  285 

avoidable.  On  the  other  side  of  the  continent, 
however,  in  the  waters  of  the  northern  Pacific, 
a  situation  had  arisen  in  which,  with  reversed 
roles,  Americans  and  Canadians  were  in  dan 
gerous  controversy. 

In  the  summer  of  1886,  at  the  very  time  when 
the  Canadian  revenue  cutters  were  giving  most 
trouble  to  the  cod  and  mackerel  fishermen  of 
New  England,  American  revenue  cutters  be 
gan  to  make  trouble  for  the  seal-hunters  of 
British  Columbia.  The  laws  of  the  United 
States  prohibited  the  killing  of  fur-seals  in 
Alaska  except  by  a  company  to  whom  the  right 
had  been  leased  of  taking  a  limited  number  of 
skins,  by  carefully  restricted  methods,  on  the 
Pribilof  Islands  in  Behring  Sea.  These  is 
lands  were  the  resort  of  vast  numbers  of  the 
animals  each  summer  for  breeding.  Hunting 
of  the  seals  on  the  high  seas,  beyond  the  three- 
mile  line,  was  carried  on  actively  by  vessels  of 
American,  British,  Japanese,  and  other  nation 
alities.  The  methods  employed  by  these  deep- 
sea  hunters  were  wasteful  of  seal  life,  and  were 
alleged  to  be  the  chief  cause  of  a  great  decline 
in  the  number  of  animals  frequenting  the 
breeding-grounds.  At  the  instance  of  the  com 
pany  whose  interests  were  thus  threatened, 


286       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

the  American  authorities  in  Alaska  proceeded 
to  assert  far-reaching  powers  for  controlling 
the  situation.  In  1886  three,  and  in  the  next 
summer  four,  British  sealers  were  seized  by 
American  revenue  cutters  in  Behring  Sea,  at 
distances  from  the  shore  varying  from  fifteen 
to  one  hundred  and  fifteen  miles,  on  the  charge 
of  violating  the  law  forbidding  the  killing  of 
seals  in  Alaska.  The  court  of  the  district  up 
held  the  seizures  and  inflicted  penalties  on  the 
crews  of  the  vessels,  taking  the  ground  that 
Behring  Sea  was  mare  clausum,  and  that  so 
much  of  it  as  lay  to  the  eastward  of  the  water 
boundary  described  in  the  treaty  of  cession  by 
Russia  was  subject  to  the  territorial  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States. 

Against  this  whole  procedure  the  British 
Foreign  Office  entered  vigorous  protests.  There 
was  involved  a  claim  to  control  over  a  stretch 
of  open  ocean  some  seven  hundred  miles  in 
width — and  that  by  a  government  which  was 
vehemently  objecting  to  the  exercise  on  the 
Atlantic  coast  of  like  control  over  ocean  spaces 
but  a  paltry  forty  miles  wide.  The  administra 
tion  at  Washington  refrained  from  pressing  the 
contention  on  which  the  Alaskan  court  rested, 
and  ordered  the  release  of  the  seized  vessels.  On 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  287 

other  grounds,  however,  the  preservation  of  the 
seals  from  extinction  was  taken  up  as  a  duty  of 
general  concern  to  civilized  nations,  and  on  the 
proposition  of  Secretary  Bayard  a  project  of 
joint  action  for  the  protection  of  the  seals  was 
agreed  to  in  its  general  features  by  the  British 
and  other  governments.  This  plan  looked  to  a 
prohibition  of  pelagic  sealing  in  Behring  Sea. 
Before  the  adjustment  of  the  details  could  be  per 
fected,  in  May,  1888,  the  negotiations  were 
somewhat  abruptly  suspended  by  the  British 
Government  at  the  request  of  the  Canadian 
authorities.  The  sealing  interests  of  British 
Columbia  had  by  this  time  impressed  upon  the 
Dominion  government  the  fear  that  an  impor 
tant  industry  was  about  to  be  sacrificed  for  the 
benefit  of  an  American  monopoly.  Pointblank 
issue  was  made  against  the  claim  that  the 
Pribilof  seal  herd  was  seriously  decreasing  in 
numbers,  and  it  was  stoutly  maintained  that  if 
there  was  any  perceptible  diminution,  it  was 
attributable  to  the  methods  of  the  American 
monopoly  rather  than  to  pelagic  hunting. 

To  the  disputes  as  to  the  facts  was  added, 
as  an  influence  in  the  sudden  change  of  attitude 
by  the  British,  the  coincident  rejection  by  the 
American  Senate  of  the  draft  treaty  touching 


288       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

the  northeastern  fisheries.1  Both  controversies 
thus  went  over  to  be  taken  up  by  the  successor 
of  the  Cleveland  administration.  In  this  situa 
tion  there  was  no  room  to  question  the  impor 
tance  of  the  Canadian  governmental  and  un 
official  sentiment.  Sir  Charles  Tupper,  the 
shrewd  and  experienced  associate  of  Sir  John 
Macdonald  in  the  Dominion  cabinet,  was  a 
member  of  the  commission  that  negotiated  the 
unratified  treaty  of  1888,  and  was  the  official 
through  whom  the  communication  was  made 
that  put  an  end  to  the  negotiations  as  to  the 
seals.  The  oft-reiterated  complaint  that  Cana 
dian  interests  were  sacrificed  through  failure  of 
the  imperial  government  to  make  itself  informed 
about  them  could  have  no  place  in  connection 
with  these  incidents.  On  the  contrary,  the 
Americans  manifested  from  time  to  time  im 
patience  and  even  stronger  feeling  because  of 
the  time  lost,  as  they  declared,  by  the  care  of 
the  British  Foreign  Office  to  insure  that  its 
every  step  should  receive  the  vise  of  the  Do 
minion  cabinet. 

In  the  summer  of  1889  the  activity  of  the 
revenue  cutters  in  Behring  Sea,  which  was  sus 
pended  during  the  preceding  summer,  was  re- 

1  See  above,  p.  280. 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  289 

sumed.  Nine  British  sealers  were  visited  and 
six  of  them  were  seized.  This  precipitated  a 
fervid  diplomatic  correspondence  between  Sec 
retary  Elaine  and  Lord  Salisbury.  His  Lord 
ship  stood  firm  on  the  ground  that  British  ves 
sels  must  not  be  molested  on  the  high  seas. 
The  secretary,  dropping  the  claim  of  mare 
clausum,  justified  the  action  of  the  United 
States  on  the  ground  that  pelagic  hunting  under 
the  circumstances  was  contra  bonos  mores — in 
contravention  of  the  general  interest  and  wel 
fare  of  mankind — and  was  therefore  to  be  sup 
pressed,  like  piracy,  without  regard  to  the  nor 
mal  freedom  of  the  seas.  By  degrees,  however, 
the  debate  worked  around  to  the  proposal  of 
arbitration,  with  a  provisional  cessation  of  the 
killing  of  seals.  A  modus  vivendi  was  arranged 
for  the  seasons  of  1891  and  1892,  under  which 
taking  furs  was  prohibited,  and  experts  were 
set  to  work  to  ascertain  all  the  facts  of  the 
situation.  Meanwhile  a  treaty  of  arbitration 
was  signed  February  29,  1892,  and  duly  ratified. 
The  tribunal  of  arbitration  consisted  of  two 
Americans,  two  representatives  of  Great  Britain, 
and  one  member  appointed  by  the  French,  the 
Italian,  and  the  Swedish  Governments  respect 
ively.  It  was  entirely  in  keeping  with  the 


290       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

trend  of  imperial  relations  that  one  of  the 
British  representatives  should  be  Sir  John  S.  D. 
Thompson,  Canadian  minister  of  justice,  and 
that  the  responsibilities  of  British  agent  should 
be  assigned  to  Sir  Charles  Tupper.  The  tri 
bunal  met  for  its  first  session  at  Paris  in  Feb 
ruary,  1893,  and  rendered  its  decision  on  the 
1 5th  of  August  following.  On  all  the  points 
formally  submitted  for  adjudication  the  de 
cision  was  adverse  to  the  contention  of  the 
United  States.  It  was  held  that  that  power,  in 
taking  over  Alaska  from  Russia,  acquired  no 
exclusive  jurisdiction  in  Behring  Sea  and  no 
exclusive  rights  in  the  seal  fisheries  therein; 
and  that  the  American  Government  had  no 
right  of  protection  or  property  in  the  fur-seals 
that  frequented  the  Pribilof  Islands  when  the 
animals  were  outside  the  three-mile  limit.  At 
the  same  time  the  tribunal  formulated  regula 
tions  and  restrictions  under  which,  for  the  pres 
ervation  of  the  herd,  pelagic  sealing  ought  to 
be  carried  on,  and  these  rules  were  duly  enacted 
into  law  by  both  governments  for  their  respect 
ive  subjects.  Thus  the  maintenance  of  bonos 
mores  on  the  high  seas  was  made  a  matter  of 
international  co-operation,  while  the  American 
Government,  for  its  ambitious  undertaking  to 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  291 

exercise  that  lofty  function  unaided,  was  obliged 
to  pay  something  like  half  a  million  dollars  in 
damages  to  the  seized  British  sealers. 

The  settlement  of  this  dispute  by  arbitration 
gave  much  satisfaction  to  the  special  friends 
of  peace  among  English-speaking  peoples.  Not 
that  the  controversy  over  the  seals  had  seri 
ously  threatened  war.  Feeling  in  relation  to  it, 
whether  in  governmental  circles  or  in  the  public 
at  large,  never  became  generally  bellicose  in 
either  Canada,  Great  Britain,  or  the  United 
States.  Yet  it  doubtless  did  contribute  a  share, 
however  small,  to  the  stimulation  of  the  intense 
nationalistic  susceptibilities  that  were  manifest 
in  both  the  Dominion  and  the  republic. 

Pride  of  strength  and  of  achievement  became 
peculiarly  demonstrative  in  the  United  States 
during  the  decade  of  the  eighties.  The  cause 
can  be  but  uncertainly  detected  amid  the 
obscurities  of  national  psychology,  but  the 
effects  are  patent  and  unmistakable.  Through 
press  and  pulpit  and  platform  was  revealed  a 
consuming  sense  of  power  and  a  deep  craving 
to  make  it  felt,  and  to  extort  recognition  of  it 
from  other  peoples.  For  three  decades  the  prob 
lems  of  slavery  and  civil  war  had  absorbed  the 
physical  and  intellectual  strength  of  the  nation. 


292  THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

These  had  passed  and  a  new  generation  de 
manded  new  opportunities  for  testing  its  forces. 
The  population  exceeded  50,000,000;  the  ma 
terial  resources  of  the  land  were  being  revealed 
in  ever-increasing  variety  and  volume;  by  the 
progress  of  settlement  the  vast  interior  spaces 
of  the  continent  were  peopled  and  organized, 
till  at  the  decade's  end  the  full-fledged  States 
of  the  Union  stretched  in  unbroken  series  three 
thousand  miles  from  ocean  to  ocean.  It  was 
an  imposing  political  fabric,  and  the  citizen 
who  admired  it  from  within  might  be  pardoned 
for  insisting  on  tributes  of  admiration  from 
without. 

This  national  pride  found  something  of  sat 
isfaction  during  the  eighties  in  the  beginnings 
of  a  fleet  that  should  conform  to  the  standards 
of  the  time.  Likewise  expressive  of  the  feeling 
was  the  popular  approval  of  the  policy  which 
secured  to  the  United  States,  after  a  somewhat 
acrimonious  tilt  with  Germany,  a  substantial 
foothold  in  the  far-distant  Samoan  Islands. 
This  initial  excursion  into  the  field  of  extra- 
American  dependencies  was  stimulated  by  the 
exciting  competition  during  the  preceding  years 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  for  colo 
nial  possessions.  Those  who  had  confidence  in 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  293 

the  future  expansion  of  American  commerce 
were  much  irritated  at  the  thoroughness  with 
which  the  most  promising  scenes  of  coming 
trade  and  naval  stations  for  its  protection  were 
appropriated  by  the  European  rival  powers. 
Samoa  at  least  was  insured  to  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States,  and  in  that  fact  was  a  source 
of  small  but  sufficient  comfort  for  those  to  whom 
the  future  of  the  Philippines  was  darkness. 

Additional  stimulus  to  American  sensibilities 
was  given  by  the  movement  for  imperial  fed 
eration  that  took  shape  and  became  prominent 
throughout  the  British  Empire  during  the 
eighties.  The  chief  impulse  to  this  movement 
came  obviously  enough  from  the  expanding 
activities  of  Russia  in  Asia  and  Germany  in 
Africa.  British  prestige  and  commercial  in 
terests  were  felt  to  be  imperilled.  The  Indian 
Empire  might  readily  yield  to  the  insidious 
sapping  of  the  Russians;  the  self-governing 
colonies  in  Australasia  and  Africa  might  be 
lured  to  seek  through  nominal  independence  a 
real  connection  with  Britain's  latest  commer 
cial  rival.  In  Australia  notoriously,  and  in 
other  of  the  colonies  with  no  less  certainty,  an 
active  fraction  of  public  opinion  favored  sev 
erance,  sooner  or  later,  of  the  British  tie.  In 


294       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

England  itself,  as  we  have  seen,  such  severance 
had  long  been  regarded  in  high  political  circles 
as  inevitable  and  not  wholly  undesirable.  Now, 
however,  that  the  time  seemed  to  be  approach 
ing  for  the  realization  of  this  predestined  break 
up,  opposition  became  vigorously  vocal  in  both 
colonies  and  mother-land.  The  Imperial  Feder 
ation  League,  unofficially,  and  a  succession  of 
conferences  under  the  auspices  of  the  imperial 
and  colonial  governments,  officially,  instituted 
earnest  discussion  of  the  ways  and  means  of 
maintaining  the  unity  of  the  empire. 

While  the  origin  of  this  agitation  was  in  con 
ditions  remote  from  America,  the  future  of 
Canada  and  its  relations  with  the  United  States 
became  at  once,  when  the  problem  was  fairly 
posed,  the  central  question  of  the  debate.  The 
immediate  practical  end  that  engaged  the 
attention  of  the  federationists  was  military  and 
naval  defence  of  the  widely  scattered  members 
of  the  empire.  Tariff  arrangements  that  should 
promote  a  unifying  tendency  were  also  sug 
gested.  So  soon  as  discussion  of  these  ends 
touched  Canada,  her  great  neighbor  to  the 
southward  became  the  subject  of  disquieting 
consideration.  Defensive  arrangements  for  New 
South  Wales  might  suggest  malevolent  inten- 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  295 

tions  on  the  part  of  Germany  or  France  or 
Japan;  the  tariff  of  the  Cape  Colony  might  be 
directed  against  the  intrusive  competition  of 
these  or  half  a  dozen  other  enterprising  nations : 
but  in  connection  with  the  Dominion  of  Canada 
military  and  commercial  protection  could  refer 
primarily  to  no  power  save  the  United  States. 
Hence  it  was  that  the  animated  discussion  of 
imperial  federation  acted  as  a  challenge  to  the 
militant  national  spirit  in  the  republic.  Inci 
dents  of  normal  national  development  in  which 
the  Canadians  took  justifiable  pride — the  sup 
pression  of  the  Riel  uprising  of  1885  by  Domin 
ion  forces,  the  completion  of  the  railway  line 
from  ocean  to  ocean  in  the  same  year,  the  great 
improvements  in  the  canals,  and  the  develop 
ment  of  manufactures — were  jealously  regard 
ed  by  sensitive  Americans  as  so  many  steps 
toward  the  perfection  of  an  imperial  policy  of 
hostility  toward  the  United  States. 

The  internal  party  politics  of  the  Dominion 
presented  certain  incidents  that  served  to  con 
firm  the  unfriendly  trend  in  American  opinion. 
In  the  later  eighties  systematic  agitation  was 
begun  by  a  small  group  of  able  men  for  a  policy 
of  commercial  union,  even  if  it  should  lead 
eventually  to  political  union,  between  Canada 


296       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

and  the  United  States.  The  basis  of  the  move 
ment  was  the  despair  of  ever  securing  other 
wise  such  trade  relations  with  the  powerful 
neighbor  as  would  bring  real  prosperity  to  the 
people  of  the  Dominion.  The  rejection  of 
reciprocity  of  the  old  sort  in  1888  and  the 
triumph  of  the  protectionists  in  the  presiden 
tial  elections  of  that  year  were  held  to  have 
ended  all  hope  of  escaping  the  ruthless  extinc 
tion  of  Canada's  industrial  independence.  With 
out  ill  feeling  toward  the  mother-land  and  with 
out  desire  to  sever  the  political  ties  uniting  the 
colony  to  her,  the  advocates  of  commercial 
union  frankly  declared  that  to  Canadians,  as 
conditions  had  developed,  the  economic  bur 
den  of  the  British  connection  had  become  too 
great  to  be  borne.  Goldwin  Smith,  the  lit 
erary  high  priest  of  this  creed,  sustained  it  with 
all  the  frigid  doctrinaire  logic  of  Manchesterism 
in  its  best  estate,  contending  that  geography 
made  physically  inevitable,  and  political  econ 
omy  made  morally  necessary,  the  annexation  of 
Canada  to  the  United  States.  Federation  with 
the  far-flung  fragments  of  English-speaking 
humanity  was  to  him  a  ridiculous  dream.  The 
Liberal  Party  in  the  Dominion,  with  its  tradi 
tion  of  free  trade,  showed  some  tenderness  for 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  297 

the  commercial-unionists,  while  Sir  John  Mac- 
donald,  leading  the  Conservatives,  in  his  last 
campaign,  gladly  seized  the  opportunity  to 
appeal  once  more  to  the  sentiment  of  loyalty 
to  Great  Britain.  The  elections  of  1891  gave 
him  a  final  victory,  and  showed  with  quite 
adequate  clearness  that  the  Canadian  people 
preferred  to  follow  their  feelings  in  the  British 
Empire  rather  than  their  interests  in  the  Amer 
ican  Republic. 

No  great  access  of  hostile  feeling  in  the  United 
States  toward  the  Canadians  was  manifest  as 
a  result  of  this  preference.  It  was  regarded  by 
many  Americans  as  a  natural  and  properly 
spirited  response  to  the  McKinley  tariff  of  the 
preceding  year.  This  law  administered  almost 
fatal  blows  to  certain  important  Canadian  indus 
tries,  and  it  was  accompanied  by  the  rejection, 
so  peremptory  as  to  be  almost  insulting,  of 
overtures  from  Canada  looking  to  the  renewal 
of  reciprocity  as  in  1854.  The  McKinley  Act 
in  fact  proclaimed  a  tariff  war  a  entrance  be 
tween  the  two  neighbors,  and  the  Canadian 
election  of  1891  signified  a  readiness  for  the 
struggle.  In  the  United  States,  however,  there 
was  halting  and  indecision.  The  elections  of 
1892  brought  the  Democrats  again  into  power, 


298       THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA 

and  the  result  was  a  renunciation  of  the  Mc- 
Kinley  programme,  with  the  modified  tariff  of 
1894.  This  in  turn  was  repudiated  by  the 
voters,  and  in  1897  the  Dingley  Act  brought  the 
definitive  adoption  of  protection  in  its  most 
thoroughgoing  form. 

The  shifting  phases  of  the  prolonged  and 
complex  struggle  in  the  United  States  produced 
the  results  that  are  inevitable  when  the  con 
flicts  over  trade  and  markets  that  used  to  con 
vulse  the  politics  of  monarchies  are  reproduced 
in  democratic  states.  Among  the  masses  there 
was  but  a  dim  perception  of  the  real  financial 
and  industrial  interests  that  were  at  stake  in 
the  discussions  over  the  tariff  rates.  What 
appeared  clear  to  all,  however,  was  that  for 
eigners,  especially  the  British,  were  in  some  way 
seeking  to  get  advantages  over  American  com 
petitors.  The  merits  of  the  case  not  being 
intelligible,  the  average  citizen  could  be  moved 
in  his  judgments  only  by  the  sense  of  an  insid 
ious  and  pernicious  activity  by  foreigners  di 
rected  against  his  countrymen. 

Such  was  the  contribution  made  by  the 
tariff  controversies  to  the  latent  feeling  of  hos 
tility  in  the  United  States  toward  all  things 
British  as  it  existed  in  the  later  eighties  and 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CANADA  299 

early  nineties.  The  unfavorable  decision  in 
the  fur-seal  arbitration  had  a  certain  influence 
of  the  same  nature.  Whatever  the  merits  of 
the  case  on  the  technical  claims  of  the  lawyers, 
it  was  a  game  played  in  which  the  British  won 
and  the  Americans  lost.  To  show  too  much 
chagrin  over  the  defeat  must  be  avoided;  but 
to  nourish  a  dislike  of  the  victor  and  be  vigilant 
for  a  chance  to  get  satisfaction  was  within  the 
reach  of  all. 

It  was  a  synthesis  of  the  various  elements  of 
popular  feeling  just  noticed,  supplemented  by 
the  influence  of  conspicuous  political  personali 
ties,  that  produced  the  astounding  explosion  of 
1895  in  relation  to  Venezuela. 


CHAPTER  VII 

VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

IN  June,  1895,  after  a  Liberal  interlude  of 
nearly  three  years  under  Mr.  Gladstone  and 
Lord  Rosebery,  the  British  Government  came 
once  more  into  the  hands  of  the  Marquis  of 
Salisbury,  leading  the  coalition  of  Conserva 
tives  and  Liberal-Unionists.  It  was  destined  to 
be  ten  years  before  another  change  of  party  con 
trol  should  take  place,  so  thoroughly  were  the 
Liberals  demoralized  by  the  fall  of  Parnell  and 
the  retirement  of  Gladstone. 

Lord  Salisbury  entered  upon  his  administra 
tion  with  complete  consciousness  that  the  rela 
tions  of  Great  Britain  with  the  other  powers 
of  Europe  would  require  the  most  absorbing 
attention.  The  harrying  of  the  Armenians  by 
the  Turks  was  in  full  progress,  disturbing  the 
delicate  adjustment  made  by  the  Conference  of 
Berlin  in  1878;  in  the  Far  East,  Japan,  fresh 
from  her  triumph  over  China,  was  confronting 
Russia  in  such  a  way  as  to  raise  pressing  ques 
tions  about  British  interests  in  that  region; 

300 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  301 

Africa,  from  the  Cape  to  Cairo,  teemed  with 
disquieting  problems — with  Kitchener  just  start 
ing  to  redeem  the  Soudan,  Italy  on  the  verge 
of  disastrous  war  with  Menelik  of  Abyssinia, 
France  and  Germany,  in  the  central  and  south 
ern  regions  of  the  continent,  watching  the 
promise  of  trouble  between  the  British  and  their 
Dutch  and  native  neighbors.  Intent  on  the 
possibilities  in  all  these  directions,  his  Lordship 
was  probably  much  shocked  to  be  confronted, 
only  a  few  weeks  after  taking  office,  with  a 
diplomatic  communication  that  peremptorily 
diverted  his  attention  to  affairs  in  America. 
On  August  7  Mr.  Bayard,  ambassador  of  the 
United  States,  presented  to  Lord  Salisbury  the 
celebrated  note  of  Secretary  of  State  Olney  on 
the  matter  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary. 

The  line  separating  British  Guiana  from 
Venezuela  had  never  been  determined.  Nego 
tiations  touching  the  subject  had  been  carried 
on  by  the  Venezuelan  and  British  Governments 
at  intervals  since  early  in  the  nineteenth  cen 
tury,  but  for  various  reasons  without  conclusive 
result.  Beginning  in  the  late  seventies,  Vene 
zuela  had  pressed  insistently  for  a  submission 
of  the  question  to  arbitration.  At  the  same 
time  she  had  kept  the  Government  of  the 


302  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

United  States  informed  as  to  the  situation,  and 
had  urged  upon  that  government  the  duty  of 
sustaining  the  demand  for  arbitration.  The 
Venezuelan  contention  was  that  Great  Brit 
ain,  under  cover  of  the  uncertainty  as  to  the 
boundary,  was  continually  extending  her  settle 
ments  and  her  jurisdiction  into  the  disputed 
territory,  and  was  thus  contravening  the  Mon 
roe  Doctrine.  In  the  documents  submitted  to 
the  United  States  by  the  Venezuelan  author 
ities  there  was  some  evidence  to  support  this 
view,  and  to  sustain  the  charge  that  the  British 
refusal  to  go  to  arbitration  was  animated  by 
the  purpose  to  delay  a  settlement  until  still 
larger  areas  of  rich  mineral  land  should  be  oc 
cupied  by  British  subjects. 

Successive  administrations  at  Washington  lis 
tened  with  friendly  interest  to  the  Venezuelan 
representations,  but  refrained  from  taking  up 
the  matter  with  the  British  Government,  partly 
because  it  was  the  wish  of  the  Venezuelans  that 
the  United  States  should  be  the  umpire  in  case 
of  an  arbitration,  and  this  would  be  rendered 
impracticable  if  the  United  States  should  com 
mit  herself  in  any  degree  to  the  Venezuelan 
interest  at  the  outset.  During  the  first  term 
of  President  Cleveland,  however,  when  the  ten- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  303 

sion  on  the  subject  had  become  so  acute  as  to 
result  soon  in  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  rela 
tions  between  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain, 
Secretary  Bayard  made  a  formal  tender  of  good 
offices  to  the  British  Government,  alluding  in 
his  despatch  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The 
tender  was  declined,  with  no  overwhelming 
manifestation  of  gratitude  on  the  part  of  Lord 
Salisbury,  and  with  only  the  most  vague  and 
general  indication  of  the  British  position.  A 
year  later,  in  1888,  upon  a  report  that  British 
mining  operators  were  beginning  work  in  parts 
of  the  disputed  territory  hitherto  untouched, 
Secretary  Bayard  made  another  offer  of  media 
tion,  but  with  no  more  success.  Somewhat 
later,  with  the  active  interest  of  the  American 
Government  negotiations  between  Venezuela 
and  Great  Britain  were  resumed,  but  in  1893 
they  came  to  a  full  stop  again  on  account  of  the 
old  obstacle.  Venezuela  demanded  arbitration 
on  the  full  claims  of  both  parties;  Great  Britain 
refused  absolutely,  as  she  had  done  since  the 
middle  of  the  century,  to  submit  to  an  arbiter 
her  title  to  certain  regions  that  had  long  been 
occupied  by  British  settlements.  These  regions 
were  held  to  be  sufficiently  well  determined  by 
a  line  run  by  a  surveyor  named  Schomburgk, 


304  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

and  the  territory  within  this  Schomburgk  line 
was  declared  to  be  the  irreducible  minimum  of 
the  British  possessions.  Only  what  lay  beyond 
it  could  be  made  the  subject  of  arbitration. 
Against  this  attitude  of  the  British  Government 
the  Venezuelan  Government  entered  solemn 
protests,  and  made  passionate  appeals  for  inter 
vention  to  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Cleveland  was  at  this  time  President, 
and  Mr.  Bayard  was  ambassador  of  the  United 
States  at  London.  All  the  influences  expressive 
of  the  national  self-consciousness,  as  noticed 
in  the  last  chapter,  were  obtrusively  active  in 
the  American  Republic.  At  the  very  beginning 
of  his  term  the  President  had  antagonized  the 
whole  chauvinistic  spirit  by  a  summary  reversal 
of  his  predecessor's  policy  looking  to  the  annex 
ation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  by  a  disas 
trous  attempt  to  restore  the  native  monarchy 
which  the  American  population  of  the  islands 
had  recently  overthrown.  To  the  enemies  of 
the  administration  this  somewhat  humiliating 
episode  gave  the  cue  for  incessant  iteration  of 
the  charge  that  the  President  lacked  the  virile 
spirit  that  would  give  the  nation  its  proper 
place  among  the  powers.  Various  unimpor 
tant  incidents,  which  might  have  been  magnified 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  305 

into  demonstrations  of  aggressiveness  in  foreign 
policy,  were  adjusted  without  excitement  or 
display;  and  this  again  was  used  to  strengthen 
the  idea  that  nothing  worthy  of  a  great  nation 
was  to  be  expected  of  Cleveland.  Reference 
to  the  Venezuelan  dispute  with  Great  Britain 
was  made  in  the  President's  annual  message 
to  Congress  in  December,  1894,  and  Congress 
later  responded  by  a  resolution  urging  that  the 
question  be  settled  by  arbitration;  but  the 
general  feeling  in  America  was  that,  however 
desirable  such  procedure  was,  no  action  by  the 
administration  was  to  be  expected. 

Mr.  Cleveland,  meanwhile,  reached  the  con 
clusion  that  peril  to  peace  would  result  if  the 
boundary  dispute  remained  longer  unsettled. 
Venezuelan  complaints  continued  frequent  and 
shrill;  reports  of  further  encroachments  by 
the  British  in  the  gold-mining  regions  were 
diligently  circulated;  and  ominous  indications 
appeared  in  the  American  press  of  nervousness 
lest  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  threatened  with 
infringement.  It  was  resolved  to  bring  the 
affair  to  a  head  at  once,  and  Secretary  Olney's 
despatch  above  referred  to  was  the  means 
adopted.  That  the  despatch  was  well  calcu 
lated  to  effect  the  immediate  end  in  view,  could 


306  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

hardly  be  questioned.  It  reviewed  the  course 
of  the  boundary  dispute,  in  the  sense,  for  the 
most  part,  of  the  Venezuelan  representations; 
it  asserted  the  interest  of  the  United  States  in 
the  controversy  on  the  ground,  first,  of  the 
general  principles  of  international  law,  and 
second,  of  the  long-established  and  often-pro 
claimed  policy  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine; 
it  maintained  that  the  British  refusal  to  submit 
the  question  to  arbitration  might  cover  a  process 
of  aggression  upon  Venezuela  that  the  United 
States  could  not  tolerate;  and  it  concluded 
with  a  demand  for  a  definite  decision  as  to 
whether  the  British  Government  would  or 
would  not  submit  the  boundary  question  in  its 
entirety  to  impartial  arbitration. 

The  tone  and  temper  of  this  communication 
were  unusual  and  should  have  warned  Lord 
Salisbury  of  an  impending  crisis.  In  connec 
tion  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  particular, 
Secretary  Olney's  pronouncements  were  start 
ling.  Among  its  implications  were:  that  there 
must  be  no  intrusion  by  any  European  power 
in  the  politics  of  any  state  of  either  North  or 
South  America;  that  any  permanent  political 
union  between  an  American  and  a  European 
state  is  unnatural  and  inexpedient;  that  the 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  307 

United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  the 
American  continent,  "and  its  fiat  is  law  upon 
the  subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  interposi 
tion."  The  challenge  of  such  audacious  and 
arrogant  dogmas  it  was  naturally  difficult  to 
resist,  and  Lord  Salisbury  was  not  of  the  tem 
perament  to  ignore  it.  His  response  to  Olney's 
despatch  took  the  form  of  two  notes  of  the  same 
date,  November  26,  1895.  One  was  devoted  to 
a  demonstration  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had 
no  standing  in  international  law;  that  Mr. 
Olney's  version  of  its  content  and  implications 
had  never  before  been  heard  or  dreamed  of; 
that  neither  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  nor  else 
where  could  the  United  States  find  warrant  for 
the  assertion  of  an  interest  in  every  boundary 
dispute  between  an  American  state  and  a 
European  power;  and  that  Great  Britain  would 
repel  with  emphasis  and  something  of  indigna 
tion  Secretary  Olney's  sweeping  assumption 
that  her  connection  with  her  American  colonies 
was  unnatural,  inexpedient,  and  destined  to 
cease.  In  his  second  note  Lord  Salisbury  re 
viewed  the  course  of  the  controversy  with 
Venezuela,  presenting  facts  and  considerations 
that  for  the  first  time  gave  to  the  British  case 
a  reasonable,  if  not  wholly  convincing,  founda- 


308  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

tion.  The  conclusion  of  the  note,  however, 
embodied  a  reiteration  of  the  old  decision,  not 
to  submit  to  arbitration  the  claims  to  regions 
within  the  Schomburgk  line. 

If  in  substance  and  spirit  Olney's  note  was 
startlingly  new,  the  response  of  Salisbury  was 
discouragingly  old.  If  the  changed  position 
and  aspirations  of  the  United  States  were  by 
the  one  put  in  so  high  relief  as  to  be  somewhat 
coarse  and  repulsive,  they  were  by  the  other 
left  wholly  out  of  the  modelling.  If  Olney 
brusquely  voiced  the  feeling  of  the  youth  who 
had  reached  his  majority  and  claimed  a  grown 
man's  estate,  Salisbury  sounded  the  old  Tory 
note  of  querulous  impatience  with  the  restless 
and  innovating  spirit  of  the  immature.  No 
doubt  was  left  by  the  correspondence  that  the 
two  great  English-speaking  peoples  were  diplo 
matically  at  the  point  of  most  serious  tension. 

President  Cleveland's  demand  having  been 
refused  by  the  British  Government,  he  referred 
the  whole  matter  to  Congress,  laying  before  that 
body,  on  December  17,  1895,  the  despatches 
above  referred  to,  with  a  message  announcing 
his  views  as  to  the  existing  situation  and  as  to 
the  course  that  should  be  pursued  by  the  United 
States.  With  regret  that  the  British  Govern- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  309 

ment  had  declined  to  agree  to  the  most  satis 
factory  mode  of  ending  the  controversy  with 
Venezuela,  he  declared  that  the  right,  the  duty, 
and  the  interest  of  the  United  States  required 
that  it  ascertain  in  some  way  what  the  true 
boundary  was.  Only  thus  could  there  be  cer 
tainty  that  a  strong  European  power  was  not 
encroaching  upon  and  oppressing  a  weak  Amer 
ican  republic,  and  thus  violating  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  He  asked  Congress,  therefore,  to 
provide  for  a  commission  to  investigate  the 
history  and  facts  of  the  matter,  and  report  what 
the  true  divisional  line  was  between  Venezuela 
and  British  Guiana.  The  line  thus  determined 
it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to 
maintain  as  the  lawful  boundary.  Any  appro 
priation  of  lands  or  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by 
Great  Britain  in  places  thus  decided  to  belong 
to  Venezuela  would  be,  Mr.  Cleveland  affirmed, 
a  wilful  aggression  upon  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  United  States,  to  be  resisted  by  every 
means  in  its  power.  And  this  belligerent  atti 
tude  he  confirmed  beyond  all  misapprehension 
by  the  ominous  words:  "In  making  these 
recommendations  I  am  fully  alive  to  the  respon 
sibility  incurred,  and  keenly  realize  all  the 
consequences  that  may  follow."  Yet,  he  con- 


310  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

eluded,  "there  is  no  calamity  which  a  great 
nation  can  invite  which  equals  that  which  fol 
lows  a  supine  submission  to  wrong  and  injustice 
and  the  consequent  loss  of  national  self-respect 
and  honor  beneath  which  are  shielded  and 
defended  a  people's  safety  and  greatness." 

The  shock  that  was  propagated  through  the 
English-speaking  world,  and  far  beyond  its 
bounds,  by  this  message  of  President  Cleveland 
had  no  parallel  since  the  seizure  of  Slidell  and 
Mason  a  generation  in  the  past.  Two  facts 
contributed  much  to  the  intensity  of  the  dis 
turbance.  The  existence  of  anything  like  a 
serious  difference  between  the  British  and  the 
American  Government  was  absolutely  unsus 
pected  outside  of  a  very  small  circle  of  public 
men;  and  the  President  was  believed  by  both 
his  friends  and  his  foes  to  be  so  resolutely  pacific 
in  his  attitude  that  only  the  most  imperious 
exigency  could  change  it.  The  message  re 
vealed  a  disagreement  so  grave  as  to  have  moved 
even  Mr.  Cleveland  to  thought  and  speech  of 
war.  Nor  was  anything  reassuring  to  be  found 
in  the  action  of  Congress;  for  both  houses, 
without  opposition,  adopted  the  measure  that 
the  President  recommended,  and  with  the  new 
year  a  commission  of  distinguished  Americans 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  311 

appointed  by  the  President  began  its  laborious 
task  of  determining  the  true  divisional  line  be 
tween  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana. 

It  is  agreed  by  persons  experienced  in  earth 
quakes  that  this  species  of  phenomenon  includes 
distinct  varieties,  clearly  marked  off  from  one 
another  by  physical  and  psychological  effects. 
The  most  destructive  materially  and  most  dis 
turbing  mentally  is  that  known  in  unscientific 
parlance  as  the  "twister."  President  Cleve 
land's  message  had  all  the  effects  of  the  twister. 
Materially  there  was  a  huge  displacement  of 
credits  and  securities  in  the  financial  markets. 
Psychologically  there  was  manifest  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic  great  bewilderment  and  obfusca- 
tion,  with  strange  distortions  and  incoherencies 
in  the  reasoning  processes.  American  public 
opinion  sustained  with  extraordinary  emphasis 
and  unanimity  the  President's  assertion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  and  his  belligerent  attitude 
toward  the  violation  of  it  by  Great  Britain. 
Every  latent  current  of  hostility  to  the  British 
and  all  the  springs  of  aggressive  national  con 
sciousness  united  in  an  impressive  flood  of  popu 
lar  feeling.  If  the  administration  had  had  no 
other  purpose  than  to  evoke  for  the  information 
of  the  world  the  visible  spirit  of  the  American 


312  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

democracy,  that  purpose  was  fully  achieved  in 
the  first  week  succeeding  the  Venezuelan  mes 
sage,  Then  came  the  distortions  and  confusion 
of  the  twister.  It  began  to  appear  on  calm  re 
flection  that,  despite  the  stirring  words  at  the 
end  of  Cleveland's  message,  war  with  Great 
Britain  was  neither  declared  nor  imminent. 
Whether  or  not  the  Monroe  Doctrine  applied  to 
the  boundary  dispute,  no  allegation  was  made 
that  the  treasured  doctrine  had  in  fact  been 
violated.  Peril  to  the  honor  and  interests  of 
the  United  States  was  hypothetical,  not  actual; 
and  the  warning  of  dire  results  to  follow  a  cer 
tain  contingency  was  to  be  effective  only  after 
a  body  of  historians  and  jurists  should  have 
discovered  a  boundary  line  which  in  all  proba 
bility  was  humanly  undiscoverable.  With  the 
due  realization  of  these  conditions  the  spirit  of 
militant  Americanism  receded  into  the  depths 
and,  stronger  and  more  self-confident  for  hav 
ing  been  revealed  in  its  full  proportions,  awaited 
a  more  propitious  season  for  asserting  itself. 

Among  the  English  people,  meanwhile,  Cleve 
land's  message  and  the  manifestations  of  Ameri 
can  feeling  that  followed  it  were  received  chiefly 
with  bewilderment  and  incredulity.  That  the 
two  governments  should  have  reached  in  utter 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  313 

secrecy  the  verge  of  war,  was  incomprehensi 
ble;  that  so  grave  a  situation  should  be  due 
to  an  obscure  boundary  dispute  in  one  of  the 
least  important  fragments  of  the  empire,  seemed 
grotesquely  beyond  the  limits  of  belief.  Some 
voices  from  the  lurking-places  of  ancient  Tory 
ism  were  shrill  with  resentment  and  defiance 
toward  the  new  display  of  Yankee  insolence; 
but  the  great  volume  of  opinion  sounded  the 
note  of  amazed  regret  that  tension  had  arisen, 
and  of  eager  confidence  that  its  causes  could  be 
removed.  While  responsible  politicians  were 
appropriately  reticent,  men  of  light  and  leading 
in  other  fields  pronounced  with  emphasis  and 
iteration  that  war  between  the  two  great  Eng 
lish-speaking  nations  was  unthinkable.  Au 
thors,  journalists,  ministers  of  the  Gospel,  and 
business  men  demanded  that  a  peaceful  way 
out  of  the  threatening  difficulty  should  be 
promptly  found.  The  enormous  development 
in  means  of  communication  and  thence  in  per 
sonal  relationships  between  the  two  peoples 
made  powerfully  for  amity.  Where  in  the  days 
of  the  Trent  affair  intimacies  between  English 
men  and  Americans  were  numbered  by  dozens, 
thousands  and  myriads  existed  in  1896.  Across 
the  dividing  Atlantic,  therefore,  sped  by  mail 


3H  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

and  by  cable  great  streams  of  protest  against 
rupture  in  fact  or  in  feeling.  Friendly  re 
sponses  from  America  came  promptly  in  reas 
suring  volume.  Influential  groups  on  both  sides 
of  the  ocean  demanded  that,  no  matter  how 
tight  and  tangled  the  knot  made  by  diplomacy, 
it  be  opened  by  the  methods  of  peace,  not  of 
war.  Arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  disputes 
between  the  kindred  peoples  became  within  a 
few  weeks  the  theme  of  an  extremely  energetic 
and  wide-spread  agitation,  guided  by  co-operat 
ing  leaders  of  the  intellectual  classes  of  both 
nations. 

While  this  unofficial  sentiment  was  taking 
active  shape,  there  was  much  uneasiness  lest  the 
diplomatists  should  not  see  their  way,  after  so 
peremptory  a  disagreement,  to  a  dignified  re 
sumption  of  intercourse  about  the  Venezuelan 
question.  A  counter-irritant  to  oversensitive- 
ness  on  this  ground  in  the  British  Foreign  Office 
was  found  in  the  acute  conditions  that  arose  in 
a  far  distant  part  of  the  empire  less  than  a  fort 
night  after  Cleveland's  disturbing  message  was 
published.  Jameson's  ill-starred  raid  into  the 
Transvaal  met  its  humiliating  end  on  January 
2,  1896,  and  on  the  following  day  the  German 
Emperor's  congratulatory  despatch  to  the  Boer 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  315 

President  was  made  known.  The  explosion  of 
British  wrath  over  this  incident  drove  Venezuela 
and  its  boundary  quite  out  of  the  range  of  pop 
ular  interest.  Yankee  interference  in  South 
America  excited  mild  regret;  German  inter 
ference  in  South  Africa  roused  the  fiercest  fight 
ing  passion.  Yet  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States,  however  unimportant  relatively,  could 
not  be  ignored  by  a  prudent  foreign  minister 
in  the  presence  of  threatening  conditions  nearer 
home.  For  this  reason,  perhaps,  among  others, 
Lord  Salisbury  met  more  than  half-way  the  ad 
vances  of  the  Cleveland  administration  toward 
further  negotiation. 

In  the  middle  of  January  the  American  com 
mission  applied  through  Secretary  Olney  for 
documentary  and  other  information  on  which 
Great  Britain  based  its  views  as  to  the  true 
divisional  line  between  Guiana  and  Venezuela. 
Lord  Salisbury  furnished  with  enthusiasm  all 
that  his  office  possessed.  At  the  opening  of 
Parliament  in  February  both  he  and  Mr.  Bal- 
four,  leader  of  the  Commons,  admitted  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  boundary 
question,  and  intimated  the  hope  that  diplomacy 
would  achieve  a  settlement  of  the  difficulty. 
At  the  same  time  his  Lordship  indicated  a  much 


316  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

less  intolerant  attitude  than  before  as  to  the 
efficacy  of  arbitration  in  international  differ 
ences.  In  accordance  with  the  disposition  thus 
manifested,  a  suggestion  from  Mr.  Olney  that 
negotiations  be  undertaken  at  Washington  for 
the  settlement  of  the  difficulty  with  Venezuela 
was  agreed  to  by  the  British  Government,  with 
a  voluntary  expression  of  willingness  to  take  up 
the  matter  either  with  Venezuela  or  with  the 
United  States  acting  as  her  friend.  So  full  a 
concession  to  the  American  view  could  not  fail 
to  insure  a  pacific  agreement.  The  negotia 
tions  were  begun  forthwith  between  Great  Brit 
ain  and  America.  The  British  abandoned  their 
insistence  on  a  fixed  line  as  the  irreducible  min 
imum  of  their  territory,  and  accepted  the  sub 
mission  of  the  whole  claim  of  each  power  to 
arbitration,  with  the  proviso  that  actual  occu 
pation  or  control  of  any  region  for  fifty  years 
should  give  title  to  either  party.  On  this  basis 
a  treaty  of  arbitration  between  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela  was  readily  agreed  to  and  duly 
carried  out.  With  this  the  matter  of  the 
boundary  passed  out  of  concern  in  the  rela 
tions  of  the  English-speaking  peoples. 

In  its  broad  character  as  a  diplomatic  episode 
this  whole  affair  stands  as  an  assertion  by  the 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  317 

United  States  and  a  recognition  by  Great  Brit 
ain  of  a  far  wider  interest  and  authority  be 
yond  her  borders  than  was  ever  before  definitely 
maintained  by  the  American  Republic,  whether 
as  Monroe  Doctrine  or  otherwise.  The  giant 
democracy  took  her  place  among  the  great 
powers  of  the  earth,  whether  for  weal  or  for 
woe,  and  the  British  motherland  was  the  first 
to  accord  recognition  to  the  new  position. 

More  than  this,  however,  gives  importance 
to  the  Venezuelan  boundary  controversy  in 
the  history  of  the  relations  of  English-speak 
ing  peoples.  Here  began  a  systematic  and 
comprehensive  agitation  for  the  definitive  sup 
planting  of  war  by  arbitration  as  the  last  resort 
in  the  disputes  among  nations.  The  negotia 
tion  of  the  treaty  by  which  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  was  settled  was  accompanied  by  the 
framing  of  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration  appli 
cable  for  the  future  to  controversies  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  The 
diplomats  who  in  November  and  December  of 
1895  sent  thrills  of  warlike  feeling  through  a 
hundred  million  English-speaking  people,  in 
the  spring  of  1896  were  meticulously  intent 
on  devising  the  formulas  that  should  render 
war  impossible.  So  far  as  this  situation  was  a 


318  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

result  of  the  disturbance  caused  by  the  presi 
dential  message  of  December  17,  it  impressively 
confirmed  and  justified  the  unwavering  conten 
tion  of  Mr.  Cleveland  that  that  document  was 
in  purpose  and  effect  a  powerful  factor  in  the 
maintenance  of  peace. 

On  January  n,  1897,  three  weeks  before  the 
conclusion  of  the  treaty  that  sent  the  Venezue 
lan  boundary  to  arbitration,  Secretary  Olney 
and  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote  signed  at  Washing 
ton  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration.  It  embodied 
the  closely  reasoned  conclusions  of  strong  and 
sincere  minds  as  to  the  best  practical  methods 
of  solving  the  intricate  problems  presented  by 
the  end  in  view.  All  differences  between  the 
two  governments  that  diplomacy  should  prove 
unable  to  adjust  were  to  be  sent  to  arbiters. 
Three  kinds  of  tribunals  were  provided,  among 
which  the  jurisdiction  over  the  various  classes 
of  controversies  was  distributed,  with  provi 
sions  for  appellate  and  revisory  procedure.  The 
tribunal  whose  function  it  was  to  deal  with  the 
delicate  questions  of  territorial  claims  and  of 
principles  affecting  "national  rights"  was  to 
consist  of  three  judges  from  the  higher  courts 
of  each  government,  with  no  umpire,  decisions 
to  be  valid  only  by  a  vote  of  at  least  five  to  one. 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  319 

The  provisions  of  this  treaty  proved  to  be 
in  advance  of  effective  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States.  Distrust  of  Great  Britain  could 
not  be  eliminated  so  expeditiously  from  the 
popular  as  from  the  diplomatic  mind.  The  fly 
in  the  ointment  of  Mr.  Cleveland's  pacifist 
method  became  now  unpleasantly  conspicuous; 
for  his  suggestion  that  British  policy  in  South 
America  might  involve  sinister  designs  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  became  a  fixed  idea  with 
many  sincere  patriots.  A  treaty  of  general 
arbitration  might,  they  claimed,  bring  sooner 
or  later  the  obligation  to  submit  the  validity  of 
this  doctrine  to  an  arbitral  tribunal — a  possi 
bility  that  could  not  be  contemplated  save  with 
repulsion.  An  additional  element,  moreover, 
in  the  popular  prejudice  against  Great  Britain 
had  received  much  development  in  the  revolu 
tionary  electoral  campaign  of  1896  in  the  United 
States.  This  was  the  year  in  which  the  move 
ment  for  the  free  coinage  of  silver  reached  its 
climax  and  obtained  the  support  of  the  Demo 
cratic  Party.  To  the  passionate  propagandists 
of  the  free-silver  dogma  the  immovable  attach 
ment  of  Great  Britain  to  gold  monometallism  was 
an  evidence  of  political  depravity  and  reinforced 
the  suspicion  of  inveterate  hostility  to  America. 


320  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

Under  the  influence  of  these  and  other  like 
feelings  the  opposition  to  the  arbitration  treaty 
was  strong  enough,  first  to  effect  the  amend 
ment  of  the  draft  in  its  most  essential  features, 
and  finally  to  deny  it  the  approval  of  the 
American  Senate.  The  decisive  vote,  on  May 
5,  1897,  stood  43  to  26,  less  than  two-thirds  in 
the  affirmative.  Before  this  vote  was  reached 
the  safety  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  been 
insured  by  an  amendment  requiring  a  special 
agreement  for  the  submission  of  any  difference 
"which  in  the  judgment  of  either  power  ma 
terially  affects  its  honor  or  its  domestic  or 
foreign  policy/5 

The  failure  of  this  treaty  was  the  source  of 
bitter  disappointment  to  the  friends  of  peace, 
official  and  unofficial,  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean. 
Hope  had  run  high  that  the  English-speaking 
peoples  were  about  to  pronounce  decisively  in 
favor  of  the  principle  of  unrestricted  arbitra 
tion  and  to  give  to  this  very  advanced  ideal  the 
test  of  practical  application.  Even  after  the 
Senate,  by  amending  the  draft,  had  demolished 
this  hope,  the  confidence  still  remained  that  the 
influence  of  these  two  powerful  nations  would 
be  exerted  for  peace  through  the  adoption  of 
arbitration  in  some  form.  Failure  in  this  also, 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  321 

and  by  a  margin  so  narrow  that  a  change  of 
three  votes  would  have  made  the  result  different, 
was  depressing,  if  not  wholly  discouraging.  It 
was  on  the  scroll  of  fate,  however,  that  the 
decisive  advance  toward  international  harmony 
was  to  come  in  the  wake  of  wide-spread  war. 
An  actual  agreement  on  arbitration  followed 
hostilities  in  Cuba,  in  South  Africa,  and  in  the 
Far  East. 

Whether  the  declaration  of  war  on  Spain  by 
the  United  States  in  the  spring  of  1898  was 
justifiable  and  unavoidable,  will  be  a  useful 
topic  of  debate  by  generations  of  schoolboys. 
There  can  be  no  room  for  debate,  however,  as 
to  whether  the  war  was  popular  in  the  United 
States.  Every  nerve  of  the  nation  tingled  with 
joy  that  the  great  American  democracy  had  at 
last  a  chance  to  show  the  spirit  and  power  that 
were  in  it.  Serious  and  thoughtful  classes  as 
sumed  with  due  sense  of  responsibility  the  task 
that  had  become  the  nation's  duty.  The  belli 
cose  and  reckless  classes  greeted  with  ardor 
the  opportunity  for  adventure  and  excitement. 
To  every  class,  intent  on  the  particular  aspect 
of  the  situation  that  especially  concerned  it, 
came  with  thrilling  satisfaction  the  evidence 
that  the  other  English-speaking  peoples  were 


322  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

giving  their  sympathy  and  moral  support  to 
the  Americans.  The  evidence  was  not  always 
of  so  clear  and  precise  a  character  as  to  pass 
in  a  court  of  law.  Rumor  and  gossip  and  cal 
culated  lying  played  the  part  that  is  usual  in 
times  of  stress  and  excitement.  There  was  no 
room  for  serious  doubt,  however,  that  British 
opinion  was  running  strongly  with  the  United 
States — that  an  aggressive  war  for  the  acquisi 
tion  of  Cuba  and  other  desirable  West  Indian 
islands  that  Great  Britain  had  always  been 
supposed  to  covet,  was  actually  applauded  by 
all  the  leading  elements  of  English  sentiment. 
Before  the  war  was  ended,  numerous  and  highly 
significant  incidents  confirmed  the  trend  of 
British  feeling.  Members  of  the  cabinet,  in 
cluding  even  Lord  Salisbury  himself,  publicly 
praised  the  Americans  and  their  mission  in  the 
war.  The  leaders  of  the  press,  with  a  few 
permanent  exceptions  of  the  ancient  Tory  type, 
valiantly  sustained  the  cause  of  the  United 
States  against  the  generally  violent  assaults 
of  the  Continental  editors.  At  Manila,  after 
Dewey's  victory  suddenly  raised  far-reaching 
problems  as  to  the  future  of  the  Philippines,  the 
harassed  American  commander  received  demon 
strative  moral  support  from  the  British  naval 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  323 

force  in  the  harbor.  And  when,  finally,  in  the 
treaty  of  peace  the  United  States,  with  misgiv 
ings  and  reluctance,  took  over  from  Spain  her 
Far  Eastern  dominions,  a  cordial  chorus  of 
British  approval  greeted  the  assumption  by  the 
great  English-speaking  democracy  of  so  consid 
erable  a  share  in  the  white  man's  imperialistic 
burden. 

The  effect  on  American  opinion  of  these  gen 
eral  and  emphatic  manifestations  of  sympathy 
and  support  was  revolutionary.  The  springs 
of  hostility  to  Britain  that  had  been  running  full 
volume  for  a  decade  dried  up  to  futile  and  un 
noted  tricklings.  Mere  exuberance  of  strength 
and  spirit  had  accounted  for  much  of  this  hostil 
ity,  and  the  fighting  with  Spain  had  diverted  this 
particular  current.  An  uneasy  sense  of  slighted 
vanity — of  inadequate  recognition  of  America's 
physical  and  moral  greatness — was  soothed  to 
rest  by  the  generous  British  approval  of  the 
correctness  of  American  motives  in  declaring 
war  on  Spain,  and  by  the  warm  welcome  to  the 
republic  at  its  entry  into  the  larger  world-pol 
itics.  If  British  cordiality  in  1898  had  been 
based  exclusively  on  shrewd  calculation  of  self- 
interest,  it  could  not  have  been  more  precisely 
opportune.  In  the  following  year  the  South 


324  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

African  situation  shaped  itself  into  the  war  with 
the  Boers.  It  is  not  hard  to  imagine  what  would 
have  been  the  course  of  American  feeling  if  this 
episode  had  developed  three  years  earlier.  As 
it  was,  however,  reciprocity  in  sympathy  and 
moral  support  was  imperative.  Those  who 
were  absorbed  in  the  pursuit  of  Aguinaldo  found 
little  opportunity  to  carp  at  the  harrying  of 
Kruger.  Transatlantic  strictures  therefore  were 
but  feeble  as  the  two  great  English-speaking 
peoples,  in  Africa  and  the  Philippines  respect 
ively,  ruthlessly  imposed  upon  backward  na 
tions  the  conditions  of  civilization  and  progress. 
The  unprecedentedly  cordial  relations  pro 
duced  by  the  conditions  in  1898  were  promptly 
made  use  of  by  the  foreign  offices  in  an  effort  to 
reduce  the  rather  extensive  list  of  unsettled 
differences  outstanding  between  the  two  govern 
ments.  Most  of  these  involved  Canada,  and 
internal  politics  on  both  sides  of  the  frontier 
happened  to  be  just  at  this  time  propitious  for 
adjustment.  The  Liberal  Party  won  control 
of  the  Dominion  government  in  1896,  and  Sir 
Wilfrid  Laurier,  the  prime  minister,  was  anx 
ious  to  try  again  for  a  system  of  reciprocity  with 
the  United  States.  At  the  same  time  President 
McKinley,  approving  though  he  did  the  excess- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  325 

ively  protectionist  tariff  of  1897,  was  definitely 
committed  to  the  scheme  of  reciprocal  arrange 
ments  for  which  that  tariff  act  provided.  The 
possibility  of  some  agreement  on  this  difficult 
but  familiar  subject  led  to  the  discussion  of 
other  matters,  some  equally  familiar,  others  less 
familiar  but  distinctly  more  pressing.  Among 
the  old  and  well-known  items  were  the  seal 
fisheries  of  Behring  Sea,  the  coast  fisheries  of 
the  North  Atlantic,  and,  after  long  quiescence, 
the  Rush-Bagot  arrangement  concerning  ships- 
of-war  on  the  Great  Lakes.  Of  the  novel  items 
by  far  the  most  important  was  the  Alaskan 
boundary;  for  the  discovery  of  gold  on  the 
Klondike  River  in  1896  brought  a  large  popula 
tion  at  once  to  that  remote  region  and  raised 
grave  questions  of  jurisdiction  where  the  bound 
ary  line  had  never  been  run. 

For  the  settlement  of  all  these  and  other  mat 
ters  a  joint  commission  was  constituted,  which 
met  at  Quebec  and  also  at  Washington  from 
August,  1898,  to  February,  1899.  In  the  mem 
bership  of  the  commission  the  now  established 
policy  of  leaving  Canadian  foreign  affairs 
chiefly  to  Canadians  was  again  conspicuously 
illustrated;  for  the  British  representatives  in 
cluded  five  British-Americans  and  but  one 


326  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

member,  Lord  Herschell,  from  across  the  At 
lantic.  The  five  consisted  of  the  premiers  of 
Canada  and  Newfoundland,  with  two  other 
members  of  the  Canadian  cabinet,  and  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Canadian  House  of  Commons.  The 
United  States  was  represented  by  no  less  dis 
tinguished  and  highly  qualified  persons — Sen 
ators  Fairbanks  and  Gray,  Mr.  Dingley,  ma 
jority  leader  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
and  three  experienced  diplomats.  All  the  prep 
arations  promised  well  for  a  comprehensive 
adjustment,  and  roseate  reports  of  progress 
attended  the  work  of  the  commission.  On 
February  20,  however,  a  recess  was  taken,  which 
gradually  became  recognized  as  permanent. 
The  sessions  were  never  resumed,  and  the  chief 
cause  of  this  unfortunate  outcome  was  the 
inability  of  the  two  governments  to  agree  about 
the  Alaskan  boundary. 

This  last  of  the  boundary  disputes  that  filled 
the  hundred  years  of  peace  with  contention  had 
all  the  familiar  characteristics  of  its  predeces 
sors.  The  line  dividing  Russian  from  British 
America  was  described  in  the  treaties  that  fixed 
it  as  following  the  summit  of  the  mountains 
situated  parallel  to  the  coast  between  two 
designated  points  of  latitude  and  longitude; 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  327 

where  the  mountains  should  prove  to  be  more 
than  ten  leagues  from  the  ocean,  the  line  should 
run  parallel  to  the  coast  at  a  distance  of  ten 
leagues  from  it.  Mountains  such  as  the  treaties 
called  for,  the  Americans  could  not  find;  Cana 
dian  geographers  found  them  in  adequate  abun 
dance  and  very  near  to  the  ocean.  As  to  the 
"coast"  from  which  the  ten  leagues  were  to 
be  measured,  the  difference  of  opinion  was  no 
less  marked.  To  the  Americans  the  term 
meant  continental  land,  with  all  the  sinuosi 
ties  and  indentations  with  which  the  region 
abounded,  so  that  the  boundary  should  never 
come  within  thirty  miles  of  tide-water;  to  the 
Canadians  the  coast-line  was  a  wholly  different 
thing,  to  be  run  by  the  general  trend  of  the 
land,  and  to  be  determined  on  occasion  by  the 
headlands  of  inlets,  or  by  offshore  islands,  so 
that  the  boundary  would  often  cross  consid 
erable  stretches  of  tide-water. 

There  was  no  concealment  of  the  practical 
issue  that  lay  behind  the  technical  contentions 
of  the  two  parties.  The  American  position 
excluded  Canada  absolutely  from  contact  with 
the  ocean  anywhere  on  the  Pacific  coast  north 
of  the  southernmost  point  of  Alaska;  the 
Canadian  claim  insured  to  Canada  a  seaport  on 


328  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

the  arm  of  the  ocean  that  afforded  the  most 
practicable  access  to  the  Klondike  gold-fields, 
which  were  mostly  on  Canadian  soil.  The 
interests  at  stake  were  very  great  and  the 
conflict  was  correspondingly  stubborn.  When 
agreement  became  impossible  in  the  confer 
ences  of  the  commission,  the  British  representa 
tives  offered  arbitration,  but  the  Americans 
refused  consent  to  any  form  of  tribunal  that 
left  the  decision  to  an  umpire,  and  the  British 
rejected  as  futile  any  tribunal  that  might  be 
deadlocked.  In  such  an  impasse  there  was  no 
recourse  but  to  give  up  the  matter,  since  the 
Canadians  had  consented  to  the  commission 
largely  in  the  expectation  of  a  favorable  out 
come  on  this  point,  and  had  been  ready  to  make 
substantial  concessions  in  other  directions  in 
order  to  attain  their  purpose  here. 

The  inauspicious  result  of  this  first  attempt 
to  reap  a  crop  of  adjustments  from  the  inter 
national  cordiality  produced  by  the  Spanish 
War  did  not  prevent  a  further  cultivation  of 
the  field.  Apparently  the  first  attempt  had 
been  too  ambitious — had  sought  returns  of  too 
diverse  a  character.  Taken  one  at  a  time  in 
stead  of  collectively,  the  problems  calling  for 
solution  might  be  more  successfully  handled. 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  329 

Such  seems  to  have  been  the  conclusion  reached 
by  the  British  and  American  Governments,  and 
the  procedure  in  accordance  with  which  it  was 
put  in  practice  effected  smoothly  and  harmoni 
ously  the  remarkable  series  of  agreements  that 
brought  the  century  of  peace  to  a  close  in  un 
precedented  good  feeling.  The  era  had  come 
of  a  singularly  sane  and  gifted  series  of  per 
sonalities  in  control  of  American  foreign  affairs. 
John  Hay,  after  distinguished  success  at  the 
court  of  Saint  James's,  became  in  1899  head  of 
the  Department  of  State  at  Washington.  Jo 
seph  H.  Choate  succeeded  Hay  as  ambassador 
at  London.  Elihu  Root,  after  indispensable 
service  in  other  positions,  took  over  the  Depart 
ment  of  State  at  the  death  of  Hay  in  1905. 
To  these  men  on  the  American  side,  with 
Salisbury,  Lansdowne,  and  Grey  at  the  British 
Foreign  Office,  and  Pauncefote  and  James 
Bryce  in  the  British  embassy  at  Washington, 
is  to  be  ascribed  in  a  particular  degree,  though 
without  disparagement  of  others,  the  con 
firmation  of  that  deep  amity  with  which  the 
century  of  peace  came  to  a  close. 

The  decade  following  1898  shows  a  far  larger 
total  of  diplomatic  agreements  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  than  any  other 


330  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

decade  in  history.  First,  the  disturbing  bound 
ary  of  Alaska  was  removed  from  the  fore 
ground  till  the  disagreeable  feelings  aroused  by 
it  should  have  time  to  subside.  A  modus 
vivendi  was  put  into  effect  in  October,  1899, 
fixing  a  provisional  line  at  the  points  where 
friction  was  most  imminent  and  protecting  all 
rights  and  claims  of  both  parties  pending  the 
definitive  settlement. 

Soon  followed  the  announcement  of  negotia 
tions  peculiarly  calculated  to  give  satisfaction 
to  the  Americans.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
of  1850,  hailed  as  a  momentous  triumph  of 
American  diplomacy  when  it  was  concluded,  had 
become  later  offensive  to  the  national  pride. 
It  obligated  the  United  States  to  refrain  from 
exclusive  control  of  the  proposed  Nicaragua 
Canal,  and  to  insure  the  safety  and  neutrality 
of  that  or  any  other  transisthmian  communica 
tion  only  in  association  with  Great  Britain. 
During  the  half-century  that  had  elapsed  since 
the  conclusion  of  this  treaty,  the  interests  and 
the  power  of  the  United  States  had  taken  such 
form  that  no  canal  was  likely  to  be  actually 
constructed  except  in  accordance  with  her  will. 
The  restrictions  on  this  will  embodied  in  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  agreement  were  not  only  a 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  331 

source  of  exasperation  to  American  feelings, 
but  were  also  a  grave  obstacle  to  the  construc 
tion  of  a  canal.  A  strong  sentiment  prevailed 
that  no  canal  at  all  was  preferable  to  one  over 
which  Great  Britain  should  have  joint  control. 
Especially  in  view  of  the  recent  extension  given 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  intrusion  of  a 
European  power  in  the  affairs  of  the  isthmus 
was  resented  as  intolerable. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  willingness  of 
Great  Britain  to  abandon  her  rights  under  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  a  very  great  step 
in  the  promotion  of  good  feeling.  Yet  the  mode 
of  abandonment  was  subjected  to  diligent,  not 
to  say  suspicious,  scrutiny  by  the  American 
Senate.  Secretary  Hay  and  Sir  Julian  Paunce- 
fote  concluded  a  treaty  in  February,  1900,  that 
the  Senate  refused  to  approve  except  with 
amendments.  In  this  draft  Great  Britain  re 
nounced  all  right  to  participate  in  the  construc 
tion,  ownership,  or  maintenance  of  a  canal,  but 
assumed  jointly  with  the  United  States,  and 
such  other  powers  as  should  be  willing,  respon 
sibility  for  the  neutrality  of  the  work.  Even 
tually  the  American  extremists  had  their  way, 
and  the  United  States  was  left  in  sole  control 
of  neutralization  as  well  as  of  construction 


332  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

and  maintenance.  A  new  convention  was  con 
cluded  by  Messrs.  Hay  and  Pauncefote  Novem 
ber  18,  1901,  and  duly  ratified,  under  which  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  formally  "super 
seded,"  and  the  United  States  was  left  with  an 
entirely  free  hand  in  respect  to  any  trans- 
isthmian  canal,  save  that  the  general  principle 
of  neutralization  was  declared  to  be  left  unim 
paired,  and  the  American  Government  formally 
adopted  as  the  basis  of  neutralization  the  rules 
which  were  in  force  as  to  the  Suez  Canal. 

A  little  over  a  year  after  this  notable  achieve 
ment  Secretary  Hay  and  Sir  Michael  Herbert, 
Pauncefote's  successor  at  the  embassy,  signed 
a  convention  sending  the  Alaskan  boundary 
to  arbitration.  The  tribunal  agreed  upon  was 
of  the  sort  that  the  United  States  had  been 
willing  to  accept  in  1899,  namely,  a  joint  com 
mission  of  six  jurists,  three  designated  by  each 
government.  Such  a  tribunal  was  duly  con 
stituted,  Great  Britain  being  represented  by  the 
Lord  Chief-Justice  Baron  Alverstone  and  two 
distinguished  Canadians,  the  United  States  by 
the  Secretary  of  War  Mr.  Root  and  two  prom 
inent  Senators.  A  decision  was  announced  by 
this  tribunal  October  20,  1903,  in  which  all 
the  seriously  contested  points  were  determined 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  333 

in  favor  of  the  United  States,  by  a  majority 
consisting  of  Lord  Alverstone  and  the  three 
Americans. 

Thus  passed  finally  to  rest  the  boundary 
contention  that  had  tried  the  tempers  of  the 
English-speaking  peoples  continuously  since 
the  beginning  of  their  history  as  neighbors. 
Until  some  new  and  unforeseen  acquisition  of 
territory  by  one  or  the  other  of  the  nations 
shall  take  place,  no  further  differences  of  this 
sort  seem  possible.  Every  yard  of  the  four- 
thousand-mile  line  along  which  the  British  and 
American  domains  are  contiguous,  from  the 
Bay  of  Fundy  to  the  point  where  the  I4ist 
meridian  intersects  the  shore  of  the  Arctic 
Ocean,  is  now  fixed,  and  most  of  them  marked, 
by  the  most  precise  methods  known  to  modern 
science.  Yet  eternal  vigilance  alone  can  assure 
the  maintenance  of  the  certainty  that  has  been 
provided.  It  was,  in  fact,  one  incident  of  the 
era  of  good  international  feeling  that  we  are 
describing  that  Messrs.  Bryce  and  Root  were 
able  to  conclude  in  1908  a  convention  providing 
for  the  verification  and  re-marking  of  the  line 
from  the  eastern  extremity  to  the  Pacific. 

This  annus  mirabilis  of  diplomatic  achieve 
ment  produced  also  a  convention  that  secured 


334  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

to  American  and  Canadian  officers  of  the  law 
having  prisoners  in  their  custody  reciprocal 
rights  of  transit  across  one  another's  territory, 
and  further  removed  the  rather  mediaeval  re 
strictions  imposed  by  the  customs  laws  of  the 
two  governments  upon  the  rendering  of  aid  to 
disabled  mariners,  in  waters  traversed  by  the 
international  boundary,  by  vessels  belonging 
on  the  other  side  of  the  line.  It  became  a 
new  bond  uniting  the  English-speaking  peoples, 
that  through  the  efforts  of  Messrs.  Root  and 
Bryce  a  Canadian  captain  on  Lake  Erie  might 
go  to  the  aid  of  a  disabled  ship  in  American 
water  without  exposure  to  heavy  penalties  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

Four  other  conventions  marked  this  period. 
The  only  one  that  need  detain  us  was  that 
through  which  a  definite  term  was  put  to  the 
controversies  touching  the  North  Atlantic  fish 
eries.  After  the  sharp  clash  in  the  eighties1 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  there 
followed  nearly  twenty  years  of  substantial 
calm.  Not  till  1905  was  there  a  revival  of 
trouble.  In  that  year  the  government  of  New 
foundland  gave  up  the  practice  of  licensing  the 
American  fishermen  and  assumed  toward  them 

1  See  above,  p.  278. 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  335 

an  attitude  that  raised  anew  all  the  old  con 
troversies.  The  colony  sought  to  prescribe 
regulations  for  fishing,  even  on  the  treaty  coast, 
that  were  held  by  the  Americans  to  be  wholly 
destructive  to  their  business.  Diplomacy  in 
tervened  and,  by  resort  to  a  new  modus  vivendi, 
preserved  the  peace  until  an  agreement  to  arbi 
trate  was  arrived  at.  The  procedure  of  the 
British  Government  in  this  matter  aroused 
sharp  resentment  in  Newfoundland,  and  con 
formity  by  the  colonial  authorities  to  the 
prescriptions  of  the  cabinet  at  London  was 
insured  only  by  a  threat  of  force. 

While  this  situation  was  giving  cause  for 
vexation,  Messrs.  Root  and  Bryce,  in  the  course 
of  their  treaty-making  progress,  signed  on  April 
8,  1908,  an  arbitration  convention  that  suc 
ceeded  in  winning  the  approval  of  the  American 
Senate.  It  was  no  such  broad  and  comprehen 
sive  agreement  as  that  framed  by  Olney  and 
Pauncefote  in  1897.  Yet  it  served  its  pur 
pose  in  the  trend  of  world  movement;  for  it 
took  its  form  under  the  influence  and  pre 
scription  of  The  Hague  Conference,  and  ex 
pressed  the  concurrence  of  the  English-speaking 
peoples  in  the  beneficent  work  of  that  assembly. 
By  the  treaty  a  dispute  concerning  the  inter- 


336  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

pretation  of  a  treaty  is  to  be  referred  by  a 
special  agreement  to  the  permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration  at  The  Hague.  Such  agreement 
must  in  the  United  States  be  submitted  to  the 
Senate  for  approval,  and  in  Great  Britain  may 
be  subject  to  the  concurrence  of  any  self-gov 
erning  dominion  whose  interests  are  affected 
by  the  matter  at  issue.  That  the  fisheries 
dispute  fell  within  the  provisions  of  this  arbi 
tration  treaty,  and  that  the  fact  was  keenly 
present  to  the  minds  of  the  negotiators,  may  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  under  the  same 
date  as  the  signature  of  the  treaty  a  special 
agreement  under  its  provisions  was  signed  by 
Messrs.  Root  and  Bryce,  referring  to  The  Hague 
Tribunal  the  interpretation  of  the  fisheries 
article  of  the  treaty  of  1818  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain.  This  agreement, 
put  in  effect  by  exchange  of  notes  March  4, 
1909,  insured  a  settlement  of  practically  all  the 
issues  of  this  century-old  controversy. 

The  presentation  of  the  case  to  the  tribunal 
took  place  in  the  summer  of  1910,  and  the 
decision  was  made  on  September  7  of  that 
year.  By  the  terms  of  the  arbitration  the 
judgment  of  the  tribunal  was  called  for  on 
seven  questions.  In  these  were  summed  up 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  337 

the  chief  points  in  the  long  controversies  be 
tween  the  two  governments.  The  character 
of  the  tribunal's  answers  is  a  conclusive  ref 
utation  of  the  charges,  made  throughout  the 
century  of  conflict  by  hotheads  on  each  side, 
that  its  rights  were  so  clear  as  to  leave  delib 
erate  aggression  the  only  explanation  of  the 
acts  of  the  other  side.  On  practically  every 
point  the  judgment  of  the  tribunal  was  so 
framed  as  to  recognize  merit  in  the  contention 
of  each  side. 

The  decision  on  all  the  issues  was  accepted 
with  perfect  good  temper  by  all  parties.  It  was 
decided  that  Canada  and  Newfoundland  had 
the  right  to  make  reasonable  regulations  for  the 
fishing  on  the  shores  to  which  the  Americans 
had  access  by  treaty;  but  in  case  of  dispute 
as  to  what  was  reasonable,  neither  of  the  gov 
ernments  concerned,  but  an  impartial  tribunal, 
must  have  the  authority  to  answer  the  ques 
tion.  It  was  decided  that  Americans  fishing 
on  the  treaty  shores  might  hire  natives  to  aid 
in  the  work,  but  that  the  natives  so  employed 
did  not  thereby  gain  immunity  from  the  laws 
of  the  jurisdiction,  or,  in  terms  of  the  concrete 
situation  involved:  the  American  fishermen  had 
the  right  to  man  their  ships  with  Newfound- 


338  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

landers,  as  was  the  general  practice,  and  the 
colonial  government  had  the  right  to  prohibit 
the  Newfoundlanders  to  serve  and  punish  them 
for  serving,  as  was  also  becoming  a  practice. 
It  was  decided  that  the  American  fishermen 
ought  not  to  be  subjected  to  the  custom-house 
requirements  and  harbor  dues  that  applied  to 
commercial  shipping;  that  they  were  not, 
however,  excluded  from  the  privileges  of  com 
mercial  shipping,  provided  that  they  did  not 
try  to  enjoy  the  liberty  of  fishing  and  the  priv 
ilege  of  trading  at  the  same  time.  Finally, 
on  the  very  important  question  as  to  what 
constituted  "bays,"  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
Americans  had  by  treaty  the  right  to  fish  in 
them,  it  was  decided  that  where  the  arm  of  the 
sea  did  not  exceed  ten  miles  in  width  at  its 
mouth,  the  coast-line  should  be  considered  as 
running  from  headland  to  headland,  while 
elsewhere  it  should  follow  the  sinuosities  of  the 
shore,  save  that  for  a  considerable  number  of 
indentations  the  shore  line  at  their  mouths  was 
specifically  described  in  the  decision. 

The  result  of  this  arbitration,  completed  by 
the  supplementary  proceedings  called  for,  left 
apparently  no  opportunity  for  a  renewal  of 
friction  in  connection  with  the  Atlantic  fish- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  339 

cries.  As  to  the  seals  in  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
whose  diminishing  numbers  at  the  breeding- 
places  in  the  Behring  Sea  gave  great  concern 
to  the  United  States,  an  agreement  was  reached 
in  the  summer  of  1911  by  the  four  powers 
chiefly  concerned,  Great  Britain,  the  United 
States,  Russia,  and  Japan,  prohibiting  pelagic 
hunting  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years.  This 
involved  the  temporary  extinction  of  a  large 
industry  of  British  Columbia  in  order  to  avoid 
the  utter  destruction  of  the  fur-seals. 

By  this  time  no  controverted  question  of 
right  remained  to  make  trouble  so  far  as  con 
cerned  the  relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  Commercial  policy  offered,  however, 
as  for  the  last  half-century,  inviting  opportuni 
ties  for  modifications  and  improvements.  In 
both  countries  there  were  indications  of  serious 
discontent  with  the  existing  high  tariffs.  The 
American  revision  of  1909  was  followed  by  an 
overwhelming  defeat  of  the  Republicans  in  the 
elections,  in  which  tariff  questions  played  a 
large  part.  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  prime  minister 
of  the  Dominion,  thereupon  entered  vigorously 
upon  negotiations  with  the  American  Govern 
ment  for  a  reciprocal  reduction  of  duties  on 
the  commodities  most  involved  in  the  commerce 


340  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

between  Canada  and  the  United  States.  An 
agreement  was  reached  with  astonishing  ease, 
considering  the  peremptory  rejection  of  earlier 
proposals,  and  a  very  far-reaching  reduction 
of  rates  was  scheduled,  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  respective  legislatures.  At  Washington 
this  approval  was  readily  secured;  at  Ottawa 
it  was  opposed  with  vehemence,  and  on  appeal 
to  the  constituencies  the  government  met  with 
an  overwhelming  defeat.  Canada  thus  rejected 
with  something  of  contempt  an  arrangement 
that  would  have  brought  her  enormous  economic 
benefits — an  arrangement  that  she  had  often 
sought  with  almost  humble  diligence  from  the 
United  States. 

The  decisive  factor  in  bringing  about  this 
abrupt  reversal  of  Canadian  policy  was  the 
spirit  of  nationality.  Inept  comments  by  prom 
inent  American  statesmen  on  the  situation  dur 
ing  the  electoral  campaign  were  diligently  inter 
preted  in  Canada  to  mean  that  the  ready  assent 
to  reciprocity  was  a  first  deliberate  step  towards 
annexation.  Again,  as  in  1891,  the  Canadian 
people  declared  for  political  independence  in 
preference  to  economic  ease,  as  they  conceived 
that  alternative  to  be  placed  before  them. 
Nor  did  it  lie  in  the  mouths  of  the  Americans 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  341 

to  chide  or  reproach;  for  every  argument, 
whether  sound  or  merely  silly,  that  was  used  in 
Canada  to  resist  the  demand  for  freer  trade 
with  the  United  States  had  been  used  with 
effect  in  the  United  States,  in  a  dozen  campaigns, 
to  resist  the  demand  for  freer  trade  with  Great 
Britain.  The  national  spirit  was  producing 
in  Canada  the  identical  phenomena  that  had 
attended  the  growth  of  the  United  States  to  its 
magnificent  estate  of  independence  and  power. 
Hence  no  bad  blood  was  made  by  the  failure 
of  reciprocity.  The  Americans  looked  serenely 
on  while  the  great  Dominion  displayed  the 
same  spirit,  in  maintaining  economic  independ 
ence  at  the  end  of  the  century  of  peace,  that 
the  little  Canadian  provinces  had  displayed  at 
the  beginning  of  that  century,  in  maintaining 
their  political  and  military  independence. 

The  harmony  between  Britain  and  America 
was  the  leading  factor  in  another  effort  to  pro 
mote  the  cause  of  general  arbitration.  With 
the  seriously  qualified  success  of  this  undertak 
ing  the  diplomatic  record  of  the  hundred  years 
of  peace  was  substantially  completed.  In  the 
summer  of  1911  a  form  of  agreement  was  de 
vised  which  referred  to  arbitral  procedure  all 
international  controversies  that  were  "justici- 


342  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

able."  Treaties  embodying  this  agreement  were 
concluded  by  the  United  States  with  Great 
Britain  and  also  with  France.  But  the  objec 
tions  that  found  their  home  in  the  American 
Senate  were  too  strong  to  be  overcome.  That 
body  gave  its  approval  of  the  treaties  only  after 
amending  them  so  as  to  make  each  party  for  it 
self  the  final  judge  as  to  whether  a  dispute  was 
justiciable,  and  further  excluding  altogether 
from  the  provisions  of  the  treaties  several  cat 
egories  of  differences,  notably  those  involving 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  These  amendments  left 
the  treaties  barren  of  all  the  advance  that  had 
been  hoped  for  toward  general  arbitration. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  the  centennial 
of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  drew  near.  The  sharp 
exchange  of  notes  about  the  Venezuelan  bound 
ary  in  1895  had  been  followed  by  the  estab 
lishment  of  ostentatiously  cordial  diplomatic  re 
lations  between  the  two  great  English-speaking 
nations;  and  this  had  been  followed  in  turn, 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  War,  by 
demonstrations  of  good  feeling,  both  official 
and  unofficial,  that  were  quite  unprecedented 
for  warmth  as  well  as  for  generality.  The  few 
discordant  notes — in  America  over  the  fate  of 
the  Boers,  in  Canada  over  the  outcome  of  the 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  343 

Alaskan  boundary  arbitration,  among  Irishmen 
perennially  and  everywhere — were  barely  dis 
coverable  by  the  acutest  observers  amid  the 
multifold  chorus  of  amity. 

There  was  especial  significance  in  this  sit 
uation  from  the  fact  that  it  was  accompanied 
by  a  remarkable  transformation  in  the  ideals 
and  principles  of  both  British  and  American 
political  systems.  In  the  last  quarter  of  the 
century  of  peace  his  Britannic  Majesty's  do 
minions  became  very  distinctly  a  federative 
empire,  and  the  United  States  became  no  less 
unmistakably  an  imperialistic  republic.  The 
earliest  evidence  of  a  tendency  in  these  direc 
tions  had  been  the  occasion  of  reciprocal  resent 
ment  and  hostility  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.  The  southern  and 
westward  expansion  of  the  American  Republic 
in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  caused, 
as  we  have  seen,  much  uneasiness  and  dissat 
isfaction  to  the  British  Government;  yet  the 
absorption  of  the  Spanish  dominions  in  the 
West  Indies  and  the  Far  East  at  the  century's 
end  evoked  that  government's  cordial  approval. 
So  on  the  other  side  the  earlier  steps  toward 
the  development  and  utilization  of  Canadian 
resources  for  distinctively  imperial  purposes 


344  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

was  followed  with  truculence  in  the  United 
States;  while  the  later  creation  of  the  strongest 
commercial  and  political  bonds  between  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  Dominion  has  been 
viewed  with  placid  content.  It  would  seem 
to  augur  well  for  the  perpetuity  of  peace  be 
tween  the  greatest  of  the  English-speaking 
peoples,  that  each  approves  the  policy  that 
enhances  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  other. 
The  general  causes  that  have  operated  to  pro 
duce  this  situation  are  worthy  of  brief  con 
sideration;  for  in  them  we  shall  see  again  the 
forces  that  have  from  the  beginning  of  our 
century  wrought  for  English-speaking  harmony, 
despite  all  the  temporary  influences  that  have 
from  time  to  time  prevailed  against  them. 

The  distinct  assumption  by  the  United  States 
of  the  imperialistic  character  and  responsibil 
ities  coincided  precisely  in  time  with  the  warm 
est  manifestations  of  cordiality  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain.  President  Roosevelt's  ad 
ministrations  (1901-09)  teemed  with  incidents 
announcing  the  new  role  of  the  American 
Republic.  The  Philippines  were  relentlessly 
reduced  to  order  and  subjection;  Panama  was 
"taken"  for  the  sake  of  the  world's  commerce, 
if  incidentally  for  the  specific  military  and 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  345 

commercial  advantage  of  the  taker;  Cuba  was 
summarily  denied  by  superior  force  indulgence 
in  her  long-wonted  pastime  of  civil  war — all 
these  by  virtue  of  conditions  produced  directly 
by  the  war  with  Spain.  Indirect  results  of  this 
war  were  no  less  striking.  American  troops 
joined  with  those  of  other  great  powers  in 
quelling  the  tumult  of  the  "Boxers"  in  China, 
and  American  diplomacy  wrought  effectively  to 
maintain  the  open  door  in  Chinese  trade  and 
the  very  existence  ("administrative  entity," 
Secretary  Hay  obscurely  called  it)  of  native 
government  in  China,  when  the  rivalry  of 
Russia  and  Japan  threatened  it  with  extinc 
tion.  The  terrific  clash  of  arms  between  these 
two  powers  was  brought  to  an  end  on  the  soil 
of  the  United  States  and  through  the  agency 
of  its  chief  executive.  It  became  suddenly 
apparent  to  all  the  world  that  the  American 
democracy  was  a  force  of  the  first  magnitude 
in  the  general  international  situation. 

The  effect  of  this  revelation  was  not  without 
its  humor  to  the  philosophical  observer.  In  the 
world  and  the  half-world  of  universal  politics 
rumor  and  gossip  ran  wild  over  the  possible 
results  of  the  new  phenomenon.  Veteran  dip 
lomats  saw  copious  visions  and  retired  admirals 


346  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

dreamed  horrid  dreams.  Periodical  literature 
teemed  with  speculation  as  to  the  influence  of 
the  American  position  on  the  various  ententes 
and  numerical  alliances,  dual,  triple,  quadruple, 
on  which  the  peace  of  the  world  was  supposed 
to  rest.  The  navy  of  the  United  States  was 
taken  in  hand  by  the  theoretical  experts,  and 
subjected  to  the  mathematical  scrutiny  from 
which  the  guild  derives  its  sufficient  conclu 
sions  as  to  future  relations  of  the  nations. 
Almost  before  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  was 
ratified,  the  prophets  had  the  broad  breast  of 
the  Pacific  tumultuous  with  the  rivalry  of 
America  and  Japan  and  convulsed  with  hypo 
thetical  battles.  The  results  on  the  combat 
ants  and  the  wider  effects  on  mankind  at  large 
naturally  varied  with  the  fancy  of  the  prophets, 
but  in  no  case  were  unworthy  of  the  occasion, 
or  failed  to  involve  a  startling  change  in  the 
political  equilibrium  of  the  world. 

Amid  all  the  disquiet  and  suspicion  created 
by  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  upon  its 
new  role,  there  was  no  deviation  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  from  the  attitude  of  admir 
ing  welcome  to  the  republic.  No  prognostica 
tions  of  disastrous  rivalry  wherein  the  pride 
of  Britain  would  be  humbled — and  there  was 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  347 

abundance  of  such  warnings — availed  to  stir 
up  jealousy  or  fear.  The  grounds  of  British 
complacency  were,  of  course,  manifold.  That 
the  Americans,  in  assuming  dominion  over  less 
developed  races,  would  be  forced  to  solve  some 
problems  by  the  same  methods  that  had  brought 
harsh  criticism  upon  the  British,  was  so  cer 
tain  as  to  be  a  source  of  some  natural  satisfac 
tion.  The  course  of  events  in  the  Philippines 
very  quickly  confirmed  this  feeling.  Beyond 
all  such  reasons,  however,  the  source  of  British 
approval  of  American  policy  was  a  genuine 
joy  that  through  it  English  institutions  and 
traditions,  however  modified  by  transmission 
through  the  United  States,  were  to  be  extended 
still  further  in  their  remarkable  progress  over 
the  world. 

Meanwhile  this  progress  was  reacting  in  a 
noteworthy  manner  on  the  complex  political 
aggregate  known  as  the  British  Empire.  Till 
the  ninth  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century  it 
remained  the  basic  conviction  of  reflecting 
politicians  in  England  that  the  destiny  of  the 
self-governing  colonies  was  independence.  The 
grip  of  Cobden's  dogma  was  strong  twenty 
years  after  he  himself  had  passed  away.  No 
way  of  escape  from  disintegration  of  the  empire 


348  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

could  be  thought  of  that  did  not  involve  un 
thinkable  readjustments  in  the  government  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  as  to  structure  or  policy 
or  both.  In  the  eighties,  however,  conditions 
in  both  foreign  and  domestic  affairs  brought 
the  unthinkable  peremptorily  under  consid 
eration.  Germany's  colonial  ambitions  and 
Russia's  advance  on  India  suggested  sickening 
possibilities  as  to  the  fate  of  an  Australasian 
state  that  should  lack  the  protection  of  the 
British  navy;  Gladstone's  proposal  of  home 
rule  for  Ireland  made  the  remodelling  of  the 
British  Government  a  staple  of  daily  debate. 
Under  these  circumstances  a  demand  for  some 
strengthening  of  the  bonds  uniting  colonies 
and  motherland  became  vigorously  manifest 
throughout  her  Majesty's  dominions. 

The  formula  of  this  demand  in  the  eighties 
was  "imperial  federation,"  on  behalf  of  which 
an  imposing  agitation  was  carried  on  for  some 
years.  Official  support  for  this  particular  form 
of  union  was  for  various  practical  reasons  slow 
and  scanty,  and  the  movement  under  this 
name  lost  its  force  in  the  early  nineties,  not 
without  having  contributed,  however,  a  great 
impulse  to  the  cause  of  preserving  the  empire 
intact.  Meanwhile  a  procedure  for  the  discus- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  349 

sion  and  solution  of  pressing  concrete  problems 
opened  a  way  through  which,  more  Britannico, 
the  broad  considerations  of  constitutional  theory 
were  sidetracked  and  imperial  consolidation  was 
approached  by  the  slow  but  sure  pathway  of 
extra-constitutional  experiment.  In  1887,  on 
the  occasion  of  Queen  Victoria's  jubilee,  a  con 
ference  of  colonial  representatives  was  held  at 
London  under  the  auspices  of  the  colonial 
secretary.  Its  consultations  were  of  little  ef 
fect  save  in  revealing  a  basis  of  common  in 
terest  in  the  widely  scattered  members  of  the 
empire.  As  was  prophesied  by  Lord  Salisbury, 
however,  this  meeting  became  "the  parent  of  a 
long  progeniture";  for  such  conferences  have 
become  an  established  feature  of  the  imperial 
system,  assembling  every  four  years,  and  act 
ing  under  a  well-defined  constitution.  This 
imperial  conference  is,  in  fact,  a  new  and  sig 
nificant  organ  of  policy  and  administration  for 
his  British  Majesty's  dominions.  In  its  de 
liberations  have  taken  shape  the  policies  which 
in  recent  years  have  done  so  much  to  increase 
the  force  of  the  British  Empire.  The  obstacles 
to  be  overcome,  in  the  shape  of  conflicting 
interests  and  the  spirit  of  local  independence, 
have  not  availed  to  thwart  the  trend  toward 


350  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

imperial  unity.  A  general  system  of  naval  and 
military  organization  and  action  has  been  put 
into  operation;  tariff  preferences,  varying  in 
scope  and  volume,  have  been  generally  estab 
lished  in  reciprocity  among  the  subordinate 
members  of  the  empire,  with  the  United  King 
dom  enjoying  in  most  cases  a  unilateral  ad 
vantage;  a  great  impulse  has  been  given  to 
exclusively  British  lines  of  communication  and 
transportation.  These  and  many  other  in 
stances  of  consolidating  activity  reveal  the 
widely  scattered  dominions  of  the  British  crown, 
though  geographically  so  discontinuous,  as  a 
very  effective  unity. 

In  the  process  through  which  imperial  unity 
has  been  practically  realized  there  has  been 
a  mighty,  if  subtle,  reaction  of  the  colonial 
spirit  upon  the  motherland.  Canada,  South 
Africa,  Australia,  New  Zealand  are  democratic 
in  their  social  structure  and  their  political 
ideals.  Two  of  them  embody  the  most  ad 
vanced  democracies  in  the  world.  An  im 
perial  council  in  which  a  leading  part  is  played 
by  the  chosen  representatives  of  such  com 
munities  must  inevitably  take  color  in  its 
resolutions  from  the  programme  of  radicalism. 
The  colonial  secretary  who  goes  from  a  dis- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  351 

cussion  in  the  imperial  conference  to  a  debate 
on  social  legislation  in  the  House  of  Commons 
can  hardly  fail  to  carry  with  him  some  infection 
of  the  ideas  that  are  current  coin  in  Australia. 
Wherever  the  delegates  from  beyond  the  seas 
are  brought  in  contact  unofficially  with  the 
political  issues  most  agitated  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  it  is  not  the  conservative  views  that 
are  supported  by  the  recitals  of  experience  in 
the  colonies.  What  to  the  English  radical  is 
ultimate  ideal,  to  the  colonial  conservative  is  a 
commonplace  of  actuality.  Even  Irish  home 
rule,  that  smacks  so  perilously  of  disintegra 
tion  to  many  of  the  wisest  minds  of  England, 
offers  nothing  of  terror  to  the  colonial;  for  he 
sees  autonomy  and  unity  reconciled  in  diverse 
but  sufficient  ways,  in  the  Dominion  of  Canada, 
the  Commonwealth  of  Australia,  and  the  Union 
of  South  Africa.  Popular  self-government  is 
so  fundamental  in  the  political  philosophy  of 
the  English  beyond  the  seas  that  the  full  appli 
cation  of  the  principle  to  the  United  Kingdom 
appears  only  normal.  A  Canadian  or  an  Aus 
tralian  is  not  likely  to  see  anything  alarming  in 
a  project  for  the  transformation  of  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  federal 
sense;  while  the  union  of  all  parts  of  the  British 


352  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

world  under  something  in  the  nature  of  a 
federative  bond  makes  a  strong  appeal  to  every 
English-speaking  group  that  treasures  the  tra 
ditions  and  achievements  of  the  race. 

By  every  step  toward  the  closer  union  of  the 
scattered  parts  of  the  British  Empire  the  more 
general  solidarity  of  the  English-speaking  peo 
ples  has  been  brought  nearer.  For  every  such 
step  signalizes  the  democratizing  pro  tanto  of 
social  and  political  ideals  and  institutions  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  realization  thus 
of  conditions  that  promote  harmony  with  the 
American  Republic.  An  intimate  like-minded- 
ness  is,  as  was  said  at  the  beginning  of  this 
review,  the  indispensable  factor  in  permanent 
international  amity.  The  whole  trend  of  mod 
ern  development  in  civilization  is  strongly 
toward  the  widespread  working  of  this  factor. 
Its  influence  is  most  marked,  however,  where 
historical  identity  of  language  and  tradition 
clears  the  way.  The  people  of  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  people  of  the  United  States 
are  drawing  nearer  each  other  daily  in  both  the 
material  and  the  spiritual  aspects  of  life.  What 
has  been  expected  to  retard,  has  in  fact  accel 
erated  the  movement.  Nervous  Britons  strike 
out  for  a  closer  union  of  all  the  parts  of  the 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  353 

empire,  to  check  the  influence  of  the  United 
States — and  the  result  is  an  access  of  democ 
racy  from  Australia  that  makes  American  ideas 
inviting  by  comparison.  Americans  rush  into 
war  to  uphold  the  cause  of  humanity  and  in 
dependence  for  oppressed  peoples — and  find 
themselves  struggling  to  carry,  in  the  most  ap 
proved  British  manner,  the  burden  of  distant 
and  barbarous  dependencies.  But  the  federa 
tive  empire  of  the  Britons  and  the  imperialistic 
republic  of  the  Americans  are  more  neighborly 
after  than  before  their  transforming  experiments. 

The  hundred  years  of  peace  for  which  John 
Quincy  Adams  politely,  if  not  very  hopefully, 
prayed  after  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  De 
cember  24,  1814,  have  become  realized  his 
tory.  The  gates  of  Janus,  closed  at  Ghent, 
have  not  been  opened  for  a  century.  The 
pacific  years  have  brought  changes,  however, 
more  amazing  than  could  have  been  wrought 
by  the  desolating  arts  of  war.  It  is  not  so 
clear  in  the  twentieth  as  it  was  in  the  nine 
teenth  century  that  the  nerve  centre  of  the 
English-speaking  world  is  in  Great  Britain. 
The  United  Kingdom,  with  its  45,000,000  of 
population,  is  a  wonderful  aggregate  of  ma- 


354  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

terial  and  spiritual  forces.  Yet  it  does  not 
stand  out  so  incontestably  the  chief  reservoir 
of  such  forces  as  was  the  case  a  century  earlier, 
when  it  numbered  but  19,000,000  souls.  Then 
it  dominated  the  English-speaking  peoples  of 
the  earth  commercially,  industrially,  intellec 
tually,  and,  save  the  United  States,  polit 
ically.  Its  dependencies  were  already  vast  in 
extent,  but  none  contained  more  inhabitants 
of  British  origin  than  Canada,  where  there 
were  hardly  250,000.  To-day  the  dependen 
cies  include,  in  addition  to  Canada,  with  its 
7,500,000  people,  Australia,  with  some  4,500,- 
ooo,  New  Zealand,  with  1,000,000,  and  South 
Africa,  with  another  1,000,000  of  whites,  among 
whom  the  English  type  is  somewhat  modified 
by  the  Dutch.  The  reaction  of  these  great 
progressive  communities  upon  the  mother-land 
is  altogether  too  significant  to  be  disregarded, 
and  it  is  growing  from  year  to  year.  Domi 
nation,  in  any  such  sense  as  was  accurate  in 
1814,  cannot  be  predicated  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  It  is  now  but  the  most  powerful 
member  of  a  larger  unity,  the  British  Empire, 
already  in  fact,  and  rapidly  becoming  in  name, 
a  federation  of  English-speaking  states. 

Outside  of  this  political  and  cultural  aggre- 


VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER  355 

gate  the  English-speaking  world  presents  only 
the  American  Republic.  Its  population,  nearly 
100,000,000,  includes  probably  three-fifths  of 
the  English-speaking  people  of  the  earth,  fifty 
per  cent  more  than  inhabit  the  British  Empire. 
Geographically  the  United  States  presents  the 
most  striking  contrast  with  that  empire — the 
one  territorially  continuous,  the  other  a  series 
of  widely  scattered  areas.  Socially,  econom 
ically,  and  politically  the  contrasts,  while 
apparently  great,  shrink  remarkably  on  close 
examination.  Institutions  that  characterize  the 
old,  wealthy,  and  highly  developed  society  of 
England  have  appeared,  at  least  in  rudimen 
tary  form,  in  many  of  the  first-settled,  richer, 
and  more  prosperous  States  of  the  American 
Union.  The  institutions,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  are  typical  of  the  sparse  and  primitive 
communities  of  Canada,  Australia,  and  South 
Africa  have  their  perfect  counterpart  on  the 
plains  and  arid  plateaus  in  the  western  half  of 
the  United  States.  Between  the  American 
people  and  the  people  of  the  British  Empire  as 
a  whole  there  are  the  political  and  cultural 
conditions  of  a  complete  understanding  and 
sympathy.  History  and  traditions,  when  prop 
erly  interpreted,  must  contribute  to  the  same 


356  VENEZUELA— AND  AFTER 

end.  There  seems  no  reason,  therefore,  to  sup 
pose  that  the  next  hundred  years  will  show  less 
progress  than  the  last  in  cordial  relations  among 
the  English-speaking  peoples. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
CONCLUSION 

THE  discussion  of  international  relations  is 
almost  invariably  tainted  with  the  fallacy  of 
too  sweeping  generalization.  This  is  as  true 
of  historical  as  of  argumentative  discussion. 
It  has  been  copiously  illustrated  in  the  events 
narrated  in  the  preceding  chapters.  It  may 
doubtless  be  found  illustrated  by  the  narrative 
itself;  for  the  vice  inheres  in  the  very  structure 
and  function  of  language.  A  crisis  or  a  policy 
of  vital  import  to  the  English-speaking  peoples 
has  more  than  once  had  its  origin  in  some 
jaunty  judgment  that  Great  Britain  despised  the 
United  States,  or  that  Canada  was  enamoured 
of  annexation,  or  that  America  hated  the 
English,  when  in  truth  the  emotions  referred 
to  could  be  predicated  only  of  some  individual 
or  group  in  the  respective  nations.  The  editor 
of  the  London  Times  or  The  Saturday  Review 
has  been  taken  for  Great  Britain,  Goldwin 
Smith  for  Canada,  and  any  one  of  a  dozen 

357 


358  CONCLUSION 

politicians  of  Celtic  extraction  or  sympathies 
for  America.  These  and  similar  identifica 
tions  have  figured  largely  in  the  historical  writ 
ings  of  the  century,  with  distracting  results. 
There  has  been  on  the  whole  overemphasis  on 
the  evidences  of  ill  feeling  among  the  English- 
speaking  peoples.  The  influence  of  the  episodes 
that  gave  rise  to  diplomatic  friction  has  been 
exaggerated.  Forces  that  worked  unceasingly 
and  powerfully  for  good  feeling  have  been 
ignored.  An  ingrained  diplomatic  policy,  a 
strong  and  popular  personality,  an  expedient 
of  party  strategy  or  a  demand  of  an  insistent 
economic  interest  has  been  treated  as  a  con 
clusive  index  of  the  national  spirit,  whereas 
such  spirit  is  justly  discoverable  only  in  a  care 
ful  synthesis  of  these  elements.  Surveyed  with 
proper  reference  to  this  fact,  our  review  of  the 
century  of  peace  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
The  hundred  years  fall  into  four  fairly  well 
distinguishable  periods.  In  the  first,  1814-1835, 
the  key  to  Anglo-American  relations  is  to  be 
found  in  Great  Britain's  foreign  policy  in  Eu 
rope  and  her  internal  politics.  In  the  second, 
1836-1860,  the  controlling  feature  is  the  growth 
of  the  United  States  in  population  and  terri 
tory.  The  third,  1861-1885,  takes  its  character 


CONCLUSION  359 

from  the  American  Civil  War.  The  fourth, 
1886-1914,  turns  on  the  projection  of  American 
and  British  interests  and  influence  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 

In  the  first  period  there  was  a  gradual  prog 
ress  from  the  bitterness  that  the  war  made 
intense  in  America  and  Canada  to  a  condition 
of  general  amity.  The  Treaty  of  Ghent  put 
an  end  to  flagrant  war;  it  did  little  or  nothing 
for  the  promotion  of  lasting  peace.  It  did  not 
weaken  the  conviction  in  the  minds  of  many 
Americans  that  a  leading  principle  of  British 
policy  was  to  bully  and  dragoon  the  United 
States  into  a  condition  of  dependence  as  near 
as  possible  to  that  which  had  been  thrown  off 
in  1776;  it  did  not  extinguish  the  fear  among 
the  English  in  Canada  that  the  United  States 
was  resolutely  bent  on  conquering  and  annex 
ing  them;  it  did  not  qualify  the  belief  wide 
spread  among  the  ruling  aristocracy  in  England 
that  the  American  democracy  was  a  barbarous, 
brawling  political  organism,  whose  growth  was 
to  be  restricted  by  all  possible  means  in  the 
interest  of  civilization.  For  each  of  these 
various  beliefs  there  was  not  lacking  a  certain 
foundation  in  fact;  and  the  progress  toward 


360  CONCLUSION 

amity  was  measured  by  the  transformation  of 
the  facts. 

The  diplomacy  of  this  period  made  some 
important  contributions  to  the  perpetuation 
of  the  peace  secured  at  Ghent.  The  Rush- 
Bagot  arrangement  was  the  chief  of  them.  An 
influential  element  of  American  opinion  was  con 
ciliated  by  the  limited  access  to  the  inshore 
fisheries  conceded  by  Great  Britain  in  1818, 
though  the  concession  embodied  potentialities 
of  trouble.  So  far  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
may  be  regarded  as  a  product  of  diplomacy,  it 
must  stand  high  in  the  records  of  this  period. 
Whether  its  function  was  pacific,  or  ever  will 
be  so,  is  doubtful.  At  the  time  of  its  announce 
ment,  however,  it  unquestionably  promoted 
good  feeling  between  the  British  and  the  Amer 
ican  peoples.  A  like  effect  was  produced  by 
the  modification  in  commercial  policy  through 
which  the  bars  were  let  down  for  the  American 
traders  in  the  West  Indies.  On  the  other  side 
was  felt  throughout  the  period  the  exasperat 
ing  operation  of  the  failure  to  get  together  on 
the  right  of  search  and  in  respect  to  the  north 
eastern  boundary  of  the  United  States.  No 
amount  of  concession  by  the  British  Govern 
ment  on  other  points  could  keep  down  the 


CONCLUSION  361 

American's  gorge  at  the  thought  that  the 
right  was  still  claimed  to  inflict  on  American 
vessels  and  seamen  the  humiliations  that  were 
common  before  1815.  This  feeling  in  the 
United  States  and  the  irritation  in  Canada  and 
New  Brunswick  over  what  was  felt  to  be  the 
unfounded  claims  of  the  Americans  as  to  the 
boundary  were  the  chief  factors  of  popular 
ill  feeling  that  survived  to  the  end  of  this  first 
period.  The  spectacular  triumphs  of  the  Whigs 
over  the  Tories  in  the  United  Kingdom  tended 
greatly  to  reduce  the  springs  of  animosity 
among  the  Americans  in  reference  to  the 
British  in  general. 

Our  second  period  began  with  trouble,  and 
trouble  among  the  English-speaking  peoples 
was  continuous  almost  to  the  end.  There  was 
insurrection  in  Canada  and  exasperating  bor 
der  incidents.  The  northeastern  boundary  pro 
duced  a  grist  of  friction  and  popular  excite 
ment.  Antislavery  authorities  in  the  British 
West  Indies  took  doubtful  liberties  with  Amer 
ican  slaves  and  ships.  The  singular  sequence 
of  serious  controversies  dissipated  the  general 
friendliness  and  introduced  a  persistent  con 
dition  of  distrust  and  acrimony.  Webster  and 
Ashburton  succeeded  in  settling  the  north- 


362  CONCLUSION 

eastern  boundary  and  some  other  points  of 
contention,  but  many  were  left,  including  the 
right  of  search.  The  American  democracy 
was  fully  embarked  on  its  career  of  expansion. 
Led  by  the  men  of  the  mighty  West,  it  pro 
ceeded  to  realize  its  "manifest  destiny"  in 
Texas,  in  Oregon,  and  in  California.  Half  the 
total  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  half  the 
total  Pacific  coast  of  North  America  were  the 
modest  limits  of  its  demands.  Great  Britain, 
congenital  mistress  of  the  seas  and  sovereign 
over  Canada  and  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company, 
had  necessarily  to  take  notice  of  these  pro 
ceedings.  She  saved  part  of  Oregon,  but  her 
projects  for  Texas  and  California  gave  way 
before  the  resolute  aggression  of  Polk.  Through 
the  war  with  Mexico  the  United  States  realized 
its  alleged  destiny.  In  the  very  month  in 
which  peace  was  concluded  the  golden  secret 
of  the  Sierras  was  disclosed  at  Sutter's  Mill, 
and  the  adventurous  of  all  the  earth  started 
for  California.  At  once  the  Central  American 
isthmus  became  one  of  the  greatest  highways 
of  the  world,  and  as  promptly  appeared  the 
clash  between  British  and  American  claims  and 
interests  in  Nicaragua.  The  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  and  ten  years  of  harassing  negotia- 


CONCLUSION  363 

tion  to  determine  what  it  meant,  followed  this 
development. 

The  events  on  which  these  two  decades  of 
diplomacy  turned  were  replete  with  incidents 
that  stirred  the  passions  of  the  peoples  and 
made  much  bad  blood  between  them.  At  the 
same  time  other  events  in  the  national  life 
of  all  concerned  worked  clearly  for  friendship 
and  good  feeling.  Free  trade  became  the  com 
mercial  policy  of  both  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  The  whole  democratic  spirit 
of  Cobden  and  Bright  became  influential  in 
British  politics  and  won  the  approval  of  Amer 
icans.  Palmerston's  foreign  policy  after  1848, 
whatever  its  inconsistencies,  was  at  least  favor 
able  to  the  Liberals  of  the  Continent.  In  this 
again  American  opinion  was  conciliated.  The 
exiled  heroes  of  unsuccessful  revolt  on  the 
Continent — Kossuth,  Garibaldi,  Schurz — found 
equal  welcome  in  England  and  the  United 
States;  and  those  who  gave  the  welcome 
could  not  but  feel  drawn  to  each  other.  Com 
mon  sympathy  with  Magyars  and  Italians  and 
Germans  tended  somewhat  to  counteract  the 
effect  of  the  wide  divergence  of  sympathies 
in  respect  to  the  Irish.  Canadians  and  Amer 
icans,  whose  antipathies  rose  high  at  the  be- 


364  CONCLUSION 

ginning  of  this  period,  were  at  its  close  once 
more  on  cordial  terms  through  the  Reciprocity 
Treaty  of  1854.  There  was  indeed,  in  1860, 
a  general  spirit  of  trans-Atlantic  friendliness 
among  the  English-speaking  peoples,  to  which 
the  visit  of  the  youthful  Prince  of  Wales  in  the 
United  States  and  Canada  was  a  witness.  The 
American  Republic  itself  was,  however,  per 
meated  with  the  animosities  of  the  sections, 
and  the  fiercest  antipathies  that  ever  divided 
English-speaking  peoples  were  about  to  be 
manifested  in  the  conflict  between  North  and 
South. 

The  period  of  the  American  Civil  War  was 
one  of  utter  distraction,  as  to  both  feeling 
and  convictions,  among  the  English-speaking 
peoples.  From  the  outset  there  was  in  both 
the  warring  sections  as  much  fear  and  distrust 
of  Great  Britain  as  hatred  of  each  other. 
British  sentiment  was  at  the  same  time  almost 
as  badly  divided  as  American.  No  assertion 
could  be  more  inaccurate  than  that  the  British 
in  general  favored  the  South.  There  was  a 
large  and  influential  body  of  Southern  sympa 
thizers,  moved  by  the  conviction  that  the 
secession  rested  on  a  just  claim  to  independence 
and  self-government.  There  was  an  equally 


CONCLUSION  365 

convinced  body  of  Northern  sympathizers, 
moved  by  hatred  of  slavery  and  hope  that  it 
would  be  extinguished.  In  both  these  bodies 
alike  the  prevailing  expectation  was,  till  late 
in  the  course  of  the  struggle,  that  the  dis 
ruption  of  the  American  Republic  would  be 
permanent.  This  expectation,  rather  than  sym 
pathy  with  the  South,  was  the  basis  of  Glad 
stone's  declaration,  proclaimed  with  such  shock 
ing  indiscretion  at  Newcastle,  that  Jefferson 
Davis  had  created  a  nation,  and  of  Edward  A. 
Freeman's  famous  title-page,  "History  of  Fed 
eral  Government  ...  to  the  Disruption  of 
the  United  States."  Satisfied  that  but  one 
outcome  was  possible,  the  great  mass  of  Brit 
ish  sentiment  watched  with  but  the  sightseer's 
interest  the  course  of  events  through  which  the 
inevitable  end  was  to  be  reached.  This  atti 
tude  was  the  substantial  foundation  of  the  gov 
ernment's  policy  of  neutrality.  The  good  faith 
of  Palmerston  and  Russell  in  the  assumption 
of  this  policy  is  now  beyond  question;  the  lack 
of  entire  success  in  its  execution  is  equally 
clear.  The  South  complained  as  bitterly  as 
the  North  of  British  policy;  only  the  victo 
rious  North  got  satisfaction.  If  the  South  had 
established  its  independence,  Great  Britain 


366  CONCLUSION 

might  have  had  double  grievances  to  settle  for. 
As  it  was,  she  settled  with  more  grace  than 
could  fairly  be  anticipated  the  cost  of  her 
errors  in  respect  to  the  North.  Whatever 
grounds  she  had  for  contesting  the  claims  of  the 
United  States,  her  position  was  almost  hope 
lessly  weakened  from  the  outset  by  the  staring 
fact  that  the  result  of  the  American  war  was 
precisely  that  which  highly  respected  leaders  of 
British  opinion  had  assumed  to  be  impossible. 

The  Treaty  of  Washington  of  1871,  with  the 
arbitrations  that  followed,  signified  the  recog 
nition  by  the  other  English-speaking  peoples 
that  the  American  Republic  was  a  new  and 
permanent  species  of  political  organism.  It 
signified  the  acceptance  of  democracy  as  a 
respectable  mode  of  national  existence.  It 
marked  the  transition  in  British  politics  from 
the  regime  of  Whigs  and  Tories  to  that  of 
Liberals  and  Conservatives,  from  Palmerston 
and  Russell  to  Gladstone  and  Bright,  from 
Aberdeen  and  Derby  to  Disraeli  and  Salisbury. 
Throughout  the  English-speaking  world  the 
democratic  spirit  was  visibly  transforming  in 
stitutions.  In  the  United  Kingdom  it  gave 
the  suffrage  to  a  million  hitherto  excluded  men 
of  the  working  class,  made  education  more 


CONCLUSION  367 

accessible  to  the  poor,  began  the  transfer  of 
the  land  of  Ireland  from  the  aristocracy  to  the 
Irish  tenant  farmers.  In  the  United  States 
it  raised  four  millions  of  negroes  from  chattel 
slavery  to  civil  and  political  equality  with  their 
former  masters.  In  Australia  and  British  Amer 
ica  it  dominated  in  every  respect  the  great 
expansion  of  these  communities  that  charac 
terized  the  period.  The  Dominion  of  Canada 
was  established,  to  parallel  on  the  north  of  the 
United  States  the  development  of  free  institu 
tions  across  the  continent.  With  whatever 
disparity  of  population  and  resources,  the  new 
Dominion  exhibited  as  distinctly  as  its  great 
neighbor  the  qualities  of  a  progressive,  inde 
pendent,  and  self-sufficient  democracy. 

Our  fourth  period  opens  with  friction  be 
tween  the  two  neighbors  in  North  America. 
Both  peoples  were  in  the  course  of  marvellous 
internal  development.  The  two  oceans  were 
bound  together  by  railways  and  the  vast  in 
terior  spaces  of  the  continent  were  becoming 
peopled  and  prosperous  on  both  sides  of  the 
astronomical  line  that  alone  marked  them  off 
as  distinct.  Along  all  the  thousands  of  miles 
of  this  line  no  incident  occurred  to  arouse  the 
concern  of  the  governments,  but  the  tide-water 


368  CONCLUSION 

at  each  end  of  it  was  in  the  eighties  stirred  with 
conflict.  On  the  Atlantic  the  inshore  fisheries 
again  caused  trouble;  on  the  Pacific  the  fur- 
seals  of  Alaska.  Both  disputes  were  duly  set 
tled  by  rational  administration  and  finally  by 
arbitration.  Then  came  the  successive  man 
ifestations  of  American  self-consciousness  in 
connection  with  Samoa,  Hawaii,  Chile,  Cuba. 
A  restless,  sensitive  condition  of  the  popular 
mind  was  discernible  to  an  acute  observer. 
The  British  Foreign  Office  for  some  reason  failed 
to  note  this  phenomenon.  Likewise  unno 
ticed  was  the  coincidence  of  a  high-strung  and 
irritable  chief  executive  at  Washington  with  a 
cynical  quondam  Saturday  Review  essayist  as 
foreign  minister  in  Downing  Street.  The  in 
ternal  politics  of  both  nations  contributed  con 
ditions  that  favored  an  explosion,  and  the 
explosion  duly  occurred. 

Cleveland's  policy  as  to  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  announced  to  the  world,  with  seismic 
suddenness  and  violence,  that  the  American 
democracy  was  of  age.  Its  cherished  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  declared  the  basis  of  much  the 
same  authority  that  European  powers  were 
assuming  in  Africa  and  Asia  through  the  doc 
trines  of  Hinterland  and  "sphere  of  influence." 


CONCLUSION  369 

Once  recovered  from  the  shock  caused  by  the 
occasion  and  manner  of  the  announcement,  the 
British  Government  and  the  British  people  were 
the  first  to  recognize  the  new  situation  and  to 
welcome  it.  The  maintenance  of  peace  and 
amity  between  the  English-speaking  nations 
became  the  goal  of  official  and  unofficial  effort 
on  both  sides  of  the  ocean.  With  the  Spanish- 
American  War  came  the  convincing  demonstra 
tions  of  good  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  British 
for  the  United  States.  From  this  event  dates 
unbroken  cordiality  to  the  end  of  the  hun 
dred  years  of  peace.  Diplomacy,  directly  or 
through  arbitration,  settled  all  the  old  disputes 
that  threatened  tension.  Progress  was  made 
toward  the  comprehensive  substitution  of  pa 
cific  for  warlike  means  in  dealing  with  all  kinds 
of  controversies.  Canada  waxed  great  and 
prosperous  on  the  frontier  of  the  United  States, 
and  proclaimed  an  unmistakable  purpose  to 
remain  the  rival  rather  than  become  in  any 
sense  the  appendage  of  the  republic;  Aus 
tralia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa  developed 
into  progressive  democratic  commonwealths; 
and  all  these  powerful  political  societies  moved 
steadily  toward  closer  union  with  the  United 
Kingdom  in  an  earth-girdling  federative  em- 


3/0  CONCLUSION 

pire.  Each  step  in  the  consolidation  of  this 
mighty  structure  has  received  in  the  United 
States  the  same  degree  of  cordial  approval  that 
Great  Britain  displayed  when  the  United 
States  set  forth  on  its  imperialistic  career 
among  the  ruins  of  the  Spanish  dominion. 

The  century  of  peace  ends  with  the  English- 
speaking  world  comprehended  in  two  great 
political  aggregates,  differing  much  from  each 
other  in  obvious  characteristics,  but  permeated 
in  the  subtler  arteries  of  their  social  life  with 
forces  that  make  for  like  feeling  and  like 
thinking.  The  same  basic  conceptions  of  de 
mocracy,  liberty,  and  law  prevail  in  both  these 
organisms  and  determine  the  direction  of  con 
scious  progress;  the  growing  parallelism  of 
economic  conditions,  the  long-established  finan 
cial  and  commercial  relationships,  the  intimate 
solidarity  of  intellectual  life,  assure  that  the 
lines  of  unconscious  progress  will  be  the  same 
in  both.  Everything  seems  to  promise  the 
absence  of  all  but  friendly  rivalry  in  reciprocal 
benefits  and  in  contribution  to  the  welfare  of 
the  race. 

Our  historical  review  has  shown  that  in  the 
relation  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  there 
has  been  much  misconception,  distrust,  suspi- 


CONCLUSION  371 

cion,  and  general  incompatibility  of  temper — 
that  these  peoples  have  been  in  a  high  degree 
human.  But  it  has  also  shown  that  they  have 
exhibited,  on  a  steadily  growing  scale,  that 
loftiest  of  human  attributes — the  will  to  adjust 
the  frictions  of  social  life  by  reason,  the  faculty 
that  President  Butler  has  so  well  designated,  in 
its  broadest  aspect,  as  "the  international  mind." 
Our  review  has  shown  finally,  if  it  has  been  ade 
quate  and  truthful,  that  there  has  persisted  in 
the  consciousness  of  these  peoples,  often  enough 
obscurely,  but  none  the  less  certainly,  the  feel 
ing  that  some  special  fiat  of  God  and  nature  en 
joins  enduring  peace  among  those  whose  blood 
or  language  or  institutions  or  traditions,  or 
all  together,  go  back  historically  to  the  snug 
little  island  of  Britain. 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Lord,  105,  106,  122-124, 
131,  132,  136,  137,  147,  163, 
366. 

Abyssinia,  225,  ^oi. 
Adams,  Charles  Francis,  206,  208, 
215,  219,  226,  233-239,  242,  244, 

245. 

Adams,  Professor  E.  D.,  56. 
Adams,  John  Quincy,  I,  2,  9,  12- 

18,  24,  35,  46,  54,  57-59,  212, 

353- 

Africa,  293,  301. 
Aguinaldo,  324. 
Alabama,  the,  218-220,  224,  233 

et  seq. 

Alabama  claims,  the,  233-257,  260. 
Alaska,  134,  286,  290. 
Alaskan   boundary   dispute,    325- 

328,    330;    settlement    of,    332, 

333;  343- 

Alverstone,  Lord,  332,  333. 
Ambrister,   Robert,  execution  of, 


Andrew,  Governor,  211. 
Anti-Corn  Law  League,  the,  86, 

loo,  144-146. 
Arbitration,     Alaskan    boundary, 

332,  333;  inshore  fisheries,  261- 

264,  334-338;  seal  fisheries,  289- 

291;   treaty  of    1897,   318-320; 

treaty  of  1911,  341,  342. 
Arbitration,   Geneva   tribunal  of, 

254-257;    permanent    court   of, 

336. 

Arbuthnot,  execution  of,  36-39. 
Argyll,  Duke  of,  227. 
Aroostook  River  war,  102,  103. 
Ashburton,    Lord,     12,     106-108, 

116-119,  361. 
Asia,  293. 


Astoria,  125. 

Australia,  192,  193,  221,  293,  350, 

3Si,  354,  355,  369- 
Austria,  48,  231. 

Bagot,  Charles,  16-19,  55- 

Bahamas,  the,  218. 

Balfour,  Mr.,  315. 

Bank  destroyed  by  Jackson,  78,  79. 

Baring,  Alexander,  12,  106. 

Bathurst,  Lord,  15. 

Bayard,  Secretary,  287,  301,  303, 

304. 

Behring  Sea,  285-290,  339. 
Belgium,  232. 
Belize,  160-162. 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  42. 
Benthamite  school,  the,  43. 
Berlin,  Conference  of,  300. 
Bermudas,  the,  169,  218. 
Bismarck,  231. 
Blaine,  James  G.,  284,  289. 
Blockade-running,  218-220. 
Brazil,  55. 
Bright,  John,  I45-H7,  152,  205, 

206,  228-230,  248,  363,  366. 
British  Columbia,  272,  285,  287, 

339- 

British  Guiana,  301,  309,  311. 
British  North  American  Act,  the, 

270,  271. 

Brougham,  67,  100. 
Brown,  George,  269. 
Bryce,  Lord,  329,  333~336. 
Buchanan,  President,  129-131, 163, 

166,  170,  171,  242. 
Bull  Run,  209. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  158,  160,  165. 
Butler,  President,  371. 
Buxton,  71. 


373 


374 


INDEX 


California,  1 20;  acquisition  of, 
134-139;  155,  162,  362. 

Canada,  7;  anti- American  feeling 
in,  10,  n;  British  views  as  to 
future  of,  u,  12;  political  strife 
in,  88  et  seq.,  173  et  seq.\  insur 
rections  in,  92,  93 ;  raids  on  fron 
tier,  93,  107,  261;  Lord  Dur 
ham's  report  concerning,  97-100; 
constitution  of  1841,  uniting 
Upper  and  Lower,  100,  173; 
boundary  dispute,  loi-ui;  ad 
vance  of  democracy  in,  174; 
French  and  English  interests  in, 
174-176;  industrial  depression 
in,  175-178;  effect  on,  of  free- 
trade  policy,  176-178,  187;  an 
nexation  agitation  in,  178-184, 
296;  importance  to,  of  trade 
with  United  States,  187;  refuge 
given  by,  to  Confederate  agents, 
220;  ill  feeling  between  United 
States  and,  222;  invaded  by 
Irish  army,  224;  231;  Dominion 
of,  established,  264,  266-273, 
367;  influence  of  United  States 
in  formation  of  Dominion,  270; 
extent  of  Dominion  of,  271; 
participation  in  negotiating 
Treaty  of  Washington,  265,  266; 
effect  of  Civil  War  in,  267;  race 
antipathy  in,  268;  problem  of 
national  unity  in,  272,  273;  pro 
tectionism  adopted  in,  274-276; 
fisheries  dispute,  276-291;  agita 
tion  for  commercial  union  with 
United  States,  295,  296;  efforts 
to  settle  differences  with  United 
States,  324-340;  proposal  for 
reciprocity  rejected  by,  339,  340; 
national  spirit  in,  340,  341;  pop 
ulation,  354;  355,  361,  364,  369. 

Canadian  Pacific  Railway  scandal, 
272,  274. 

Canning,  George,  19;  personality 
and  policies  of,  46-48;  action  to 
thwart  intervention  in  behalf  of 
Spain,  49-52;  dissatisfaction 


with  Monroe's  message,  53,  54; 

fear  of  American  alliance  against 

Europe,  55-57;  58,  60, 62,  63, 66, 

104,  154,  212. 
Caroline,  the,  destruction  of,  93- 

95,  108. 

Cass,  Secretary  of  State,  170,  171. 
Castlereagh,  Lord,  9,  14-16,  18- 

20,  38,  39,  4-6,  47,  58,  62,  212. 
Catholic  emancipation,  66-68. 
Central    America,    155-166,    172, 

362. 
Century  of  peace,  four  periods  of, 

358-371. 

Chartists,  the,  87,  150,  151. 

China,  345. 

Choate,  Joseph  H.,  329. 

Civil  service,  "spoils  system"  in, 
79-81. 

Civil  War,  the  arguments  for  and 
against  secession,  200-204;  Brit 
ish  favor  for  the  South,  203, 
204;  influence  of  British  anti- 
slavery  leaders,  205,  206;  neu 
trality  proclaimed  by  Great 
Britain,  207-209;  the  Trent  af 
fair,  210-216;  effect  of  blockade- 
running,  218,  219;  grievances  of 
the  North  and  South  at  close 
of,  220,  221;  British  recognition 
of  Confederacy  as  a  belligerent, 
221,  233-236,  241-243,  253;  ef 
fects  in  Great  Britain  of  North 
ern  triumph,  227-230;  absorbing 
nature  of  domestic  problems 
after,  231,  232;  settlement  of 
Alabama  claims,  233  ft  seq.;  ar 
bitration  of  other  claims,  260, 
261;  general  disturbance  of  good 
feeling  during,  364-366. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  153,  168,  249. 

Clay,  Henry,  10,  13,  58,  75,  76. 

Clayton,  Secretary  of  State,  157, 
158,  160,  165. 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  the,  158- 
165,  330-332,  362. 

Cleveland,  President,  280,  282, 
283;  foreign  policy  of,  302-305; 


INDEX 


375 


message  suggesting  war,  308- 
3145315,  368. 

Cobden,  Richard,  views  of,  84,  85, 
100;  and  the  Anti-Corn  Law 
League,  I4S-H7J  152,  183,  185, 
205,  206,  228,  248,  347,  363. 

Cockburn,  Alexander,  257. 

Colonial  conference  of  1887  at 
London,  349. 

Colonization,  53. 

Columbia  River,  96,  126,  127,  130, 

133- 

Commerce  and  industry  in  Great 
Britain,  63-66;  in  United  States, 

39-44- 
Commerce  and  navigation,  treaty 

of,  39-42. 
Commercial   convention  of    1815, 

13- 

Congress  of  Vienna,  9. 

Convention  of  1818,  London,  20- 
29. 

Cooper,  Fenimore,  197. 

Corn  Act,  Canada,  177. 

Corn  laws,  British,  65,  66,  85;  re 
peal  of,  142-146. 

Cotton,  England's  dependence  on 
America  for,  193;  famine  in  Lan 
cashire,  209,  218. 

Crampton,  dismissal  of,  167-169. 

Credit  Mobilier,  the,  272. 

Creek  Indians,  35. 

Creole,  the,  mutiny  on,  118,  119. 

Crimean  War,  the,  153,  163,  166, 
167,  169. 

Cuba,  56,  165,  321,  322,  345. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  365. 
Delimitation  of  territory  in  1818, 

27-30. 
Democracy,  American,  5-7,  73 ,  77- 

81,  138,  201,  203,  253. 
Democratic     Party,     anti-British 

feeling  in,  166. 
Denmark,  231,  232. 
Derby,  Earl  of,  171,  229,  230,  241, 

366. 
Dewey,  Admiral,  322. 


Dickens,  Charles,  197,  198. 
Dingley,  Mr.,  326. 
Dingley  Act,  the,  298. 
Disarmament  on  the  Great  Lakes, 

12-17. 
Disraeli,   146,   152,  183,  229,  230, 

366. 

Don  Pacifico  debate,  the,  152. 
Durham,  Earl  of,  his  mission  and 

report   as   to   Canada,   97-100; 

174. 

Dutch,  301. 
Duties,  discriminating,  41. 

Edinburgh  Review,  the,  82. 

Elgin,  Earl  of,  174,  175,  180,  184, 

222. 
Emancipation  Proclamation,   the, 

228. 

Emerson,  197. 
Europe,  American  alliance  against, 

feared,  55,  56. 
Everett,  no. 
Expatriation,  right  of,  226,  242. 

Fairbanks,  Senator,  326. 
Federalists,  New  England,  5. 
Fenians,  the,  223-226,  246,  249, 

261,  270. 

Ferdinand  VII,  53. 
Filibustering,  165-167. 
Fish,    Secretary    Hamilton,    248, 

249,  253,  256. 
Fisheries,  inshore,  22-26,  188-190, 

223,  261-264,  276-282,  284,  288, 

334-33^ 

Fleet-building,  rivalry  in,  14,  15. 
Florida,  Indian  troubles  in,  34-38. 
Florida,  the,  218,  256. 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  the,  237, 

239- 

Forster,  206. 
Forsythe,  104. 
France,  48,  49,  51,  149,  150,  203, 

232,  258,  301,  342. 
Franco-Prussian  War,  the,  250. 
Franklin,  Benjamin,  109. 


INDEX 


Freeman,  Edward  A.,  365. 
Free-trade,  143,  176-178,  182-185, 

187,  204,  363. 
French  in  Canada,  89  et  seq.,  98, 

99,  174-176,  180,  181,  268. 
French  Revolution,  5,  42,  61. 
Fur-traders  in  Oregon,  125,  126. 

Gallatin,  13,  24,  57,  58. 

Gambier,  Lord,  I. 

Garibaldi,  363. 

Geneva  Tribunal,  the,  254-257. 

George  III,  200. 

George  IV,  53. 

German  immigration,  150. 

Germany,  232,  292,  293,  301,  315, 
348. 

Ghent,  Treaty  of,  I,  2;  terms  of,  8; 
9,  13,  20,  23,  24,  30,  192,  194; 
centennial  of,  342;  359. 

Gladstone,  152,  183,  194,  228- 
230,  248,  249,  257,  258,  281,  300, 
348,  365,  366. 

Gold  discovery,  California,  139, 
149,  ISS,  362;  Klondike,  325, 
328. 

Grain-raisers,  British,  65. 

Grant,  President,  244,  250. 

Grattan's  Parliament,  143. 

Gray,  Senator,  326. 

Great  Britain,  power  and  impor 
tance  of,  in  1815,  2,  3;  slight  in 
terest  of,  in  Treaty  of  Ghent,  9; 
cordial  feeling  toward  United 
States,  1 8,  33,  39;  restrictive  sys 
tem  of  commerce  in,  39-42;  eco 
nomic  and  political  reform  in, 
42-45;  Whig  reform  in,  46  et 
seq.;  commerce  with  Spain,  49; 
economic  and  general  reform  in, 
60  et  seq.;  widening  of  political 
interest,  69,  70;  public  opinion 
in,  concerning  Americans,  81- 
86;  indignation  at  McLeod  af 
fair,  95;  attitude  toward  slave- 
trade,  115,  116;  opposition  to 
annexation  of  Texas,  120-124; 
claims  in  Oregon,  124-134;  pol 


icy  of,  as  to  California,  135,  137; 
industry  and  commerce  of,  de 
pendent  on  United  States,  140; 
danger  of  famine  in,  141;  free- 
trade  in,  143-146,  182-185; 
claims  in  Central  America,  155- 
163;  enlists  recruits  in  United 
States,  167,  168;  abandons  claim 
to  right  of  search,  171,  172;  pro 
tective  tariff  in,  176;  attitude 
toward  Canadian  independence, 
182-186;  population,  1860,  192; 
economic  leadership,  193;  move 
ment  toward  democracy,  194, 
195;  feeling  in,  toward  the 
South,  202-204;  hostility  to 
slavery,  204-206;  influence  of 
slavery  on  feeling  toward  North 
and  South,  199,  204;  proclama 
tion  of  neutrality  of,  207-209, 
218;  attitude  toward  Southern 
demand  for  recognition,  209; 
toward  Confederate  envoys,  217, 
218;  indignation  over  Trent  af 
fair,  211,  212;  treatment  of  nat 
uralized  Irishmen  in,  226;  ef 
fects  in,  of  Northern  victory, 
227-230;  sentiment  in,  against 
Russell's  attitude  toward  Ala 
bama  claims,  240;  democratic 
tendencies  in,  257,  258;  move 
ment  for  imperial  federation, 
293-295;  Liberal-Unionist  min 
istry  of  1895,  300;  treaty  with 
Venezuela,  316;  sympathy  with 
Americans  in  war  with  Spain, 
322,  323;  willingness  to  abandon 
rights  in  isthmian  canal,  331; 
transformation  of  political  sys 
tems,  343, 344;  American  imperi 
alism  approved  by,  346,  347;  im 
perial  consolidation  of,  347-352, 
369,  370;  democratic  reaction  of 
colonies  on,  350,  351;  popula 
tion,  1815  and  1915,  353,  354; 
influences  toward  amity  with 
United  States,  357-371;  demo 
cratic  spirit  in,  363,  366. 


INDEX 


377 


Great    Lakes,    disarmament    on, 

12-17. 

Grey,  Earl,  60,  67. 
Greytown,  155,  157,  162,  163. 

Hague  Tribunal,  the,  335-338. 
Halifax  commission,  the,  263,  276. 
Hanover,  232. 
Hapsburgs,  the,  151. 
Harrison,  President,  283,  284. 
Hawaiian  Islands,  304. 
Hay,  Secretary,  329,  331,  332,  345. 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  331,  332. 
Herbert,  Sir  Michael,  332. 
Herschell    commission,    the,    325, 

326. 

Hinterland,  368. 
Hise,  157,  158. 

Hohenzollern  monarchy,  the,  231. 
Holland,  232. 
Holy  Alliance,  the,  52. 
Home  Rule  Bill,  Irish,  281. 
Honduras,  treaty  with,  156,  157; 

160,  162,  164. 
Hudson's  Bay  Company,  125-127, 

271,  362. 
Hume,  loo. 
Huskisson,  58,  63,  66,  186. 

Immigration  to  United  States,  86, 

87,  ISO,  195,  196- 
Imperial  conferences,  British,  349- 

3SI'. 

Imperial  Federation  League,  the, 

294. 

Impressment  of  seamen,  20-22,  73, 

116,  117,  169,  170. 
India,  348. 
Indians,  British  alliance  with,  34, 

35;  in  Florida,  35-38. 
Intercolonial  Railway,  the,  274. 
Ireland,  67,  141;  the  great  famine 

in,  146-148;  150,  225,  226;  home 

rule,  348,  351;  367. 
Irish-Americans,  143,  223,224,  281, 

284. 
Irish  immigration,  150,  195,  196. 


Irish  Land  Act,  the,  258. 

Irish,  naturalized,  in  Great  Britain, 
226,  227. 

Irish  Parliament,  O'Connell's  agi 
tation,  for,  142,  143. 

Irish  Repealers,  the,  151. 

Irving,  Washington,  197. 

Isthmian  canal  question,  155  et 
seq.,  330-332. 

Italians,  the,  151,  363. 

Italy,  301. 

Iturbide,  55. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  8,  34-38,  59,  77- 

79,  88,  103. 
Jacksonian  democracy,  75,  77,  79, 

81. 

Jameson's  raid,  314. 
Japan,  339,  345,  346. 
Jay's  treaty,  30. 
Jefferson,  50. 
Johnson,  Andrew,  244. 
Johnson,  Reverdy,  242. 
Johnson-Clarendon      convention, 

the,  242-244. 

King  of  the  Netherlands,  32,  101, 

109. 

Kitchener,  Lord,  301. 
Klondike  River,  the,  325,  328. 
Kossuth,  363. 
Kruger,  324. 

Laird,  227. 

Lake  of  the  Woods,  the,  27,  29, 

31- 

Lancashire,  209,  218. 

Lansdowne,  329. 

Latin  America,  155  et  seq. 

Laurier,  Sir  Wilfrid,  324,  339. 

Lewis,  Sir  George  Cornewall,  227. 

Liberal  Party,  in  Great  Britain, 
1 86,  194,  281,  366;  in  Canada, 
174,  175,  1 80,  324;  on  the  Conti 
nent,  150,  363. 

Liberal-Unionists,  the,  300. 

Liberalism,  150,  186. 


378 


INDEX 


Lincoln,  President,  200,  20 1,  205, 
206,  212,  213,  219;  death  of, 
230,  231;  236. 

Literature,  British,  81-86,  197, 
198;  growth  and  influence  of 
American,  197. 

Lopez,  filibustering  expeditions  of, 
165. 

Louis  Philippe,  149,  151. 

Louisiana,  130. 

Lower  Canada,  89;  political  as 
pect  in,  91,  92;  97,  98,  175,  176, 
268. 

Loyalists,  Canadian,  10-12,  90. 

Lyons,  Lord,  213. 

Macdonald,  Sir  John  A.,  265,  266, 

269,  274,  288,  297. 
McDonough,  8. 

Mackenzie,  insurrection  of,  93, 173. 
McKinley,  President,  324. 
McKinley  Bill,  the,  284,  297,  298. 
McLeod,  Alexander,  arrest  of,  95, 

96,  103,  105,  106,  108. 
Madison,  50,  212. 
Magyars,  the,  151,  363. 
Maine  boundary  dispute,  96,  101- 

110,  1 20. 

Maiden,  Michigan,  35. 
Malmesbury,  Lord,  171. 
Manchesterism,  152,  176,  229,  296. 
Manila,  322. 
Manitoba,  271. 
Manufacturing   reforms   in  Great 

Britain,  64. 

Marcy,  Secretary  of  State,  168. 
Maritime  Provinces,  the,  220,  269. 
Martineau,  Harriet,  83. 
Mason,  James  M.,  210-218,  310. 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society, 

Proceedings  of,  quoted,  56. 
Melbourne,  Lord,  88,  103. 
Mexico,    55,    120,    121,    123;  war 

with,  134-139;  H9,  154,  362- 
Mill,  206. 

Mississippi  valley,  anti-British  feel 
ing  in,  34;  influence  in  American 

Government,  77. 


Monroe,  President,  16,  46,47;  mes 
sage  as  to  intervention  and  col 
onization,  50-54;  132. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  46  et  seq.;  situa 
tion  that  produced,  48,  49;  132, 
161,  302-307,  309,  311,  312,  317, 
319,320,331,  342,360,  368. 

Montreal,  175,  176;  manifesto  is 
sued  at,  178,  179. 

Morrill  tariff  of  1861,  204. 

Mosquito  Indians,  155,  161,  163. 

Motley,  197. 

Napier,  Lord,  169,  171. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  9,  10. 

Napoleon  III,  151,  166,  221. 

Napoleonic  empire,  revival  of,  150. 

Navigation  laws,  British,  63;  re 
peal  of,  1 86. 

Neutrality,  "three  rules"  regard 
ing,  251,  252,  256. 

New  Brunswick,  boundary  dis 
pute,  96,  loi-no,  361;  269,  270. 

Newfoundland,  269,  270;  fisheries 
dispute  with,  276,  277,  334-338. 

New  Granada,  treaty  with,  156. 

New  Zealand,  350,  354,  369. 

Nicaragua  dispute,  the,  155  et 
seq.;  treaty  with,  164;  362. 

Nicaragua  route,  the,  155-158. 

North  American  Review,  the,  82. 

Northwest  Company,  the,  125. 

Nova  Scotia,  269,  270. 

O'Connell,  Daniel,  66-68,  91,  142, 

H3,  145- 

Olney-Pauncefote  Treaty,  335. 

Olney,  Secretary  of  State,  301, 
305-308,  315,  316,  <?i8. 

Ontario,  273. 

Oregon,  joint  occupation  of,  27- 
29,  59;  96,  120;  immigration  to, 
126-129;  dispute  concerning, 
124-134,  140,  147;  treaty,  133, 
134,  251,  259,  362. 

Oregon  Trail,  the,  126,  129. 

Oswald's  map,  no,  in. 


INDEX 


379 


Pakenham,  130,  131. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  104,  105,  108, 
121,  147;  foreign  policy  of,  151- 
154;  contrasted  with  Polk,  153, 
154;  157,  158,  163,  171,  194,  206, 
208,  212,  227,  228;  death  of,  229; 
248,  365,  366. 

Panama,  156,  344. 

Papineau,  insurrection  of,  92,  173. 

Paris,  arbitration  tribunal  at,  290. 

Parliamentary  reform  in  Great 
Britain,  68-73. 

Parnell,  281. 

Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian,  318,  329, 

331,332. 
Peel,  Sir  Robert,  67,  129,  142-144, 

146,  147,  152,  173,  176,  177,  183. 
Pensacola,  Florida,  35,  37. 
Philippines,  the,  293,  322,  324,  344, 

347- 

Pierce,  166. 

Poe,  Edgar  Allan,  197. 

Polk,  President,  124,  128;  attitude 
toward  the  Oregon  question, 
130-133;  toward  acquisition  of 
California,  134,  135;  contrasted 
with  Palmerston,  153,  154;  156, 
362. 

Prescott,  197. 

Press,  the  British,  81,  82. 

Pribilof  Islands,  285,  287,  290. 

Prince  Edward  Island,  269,  270. 

Prince  of  Wales,  364. 

Protectionism,  76,  77. 

Protective  tariff,  in  the  United 
States,  76,  77,  222;  abolition  of 
British,  143,  144,  176,  185. 

Prussia,  48,  231. 

Quarterly  Review,  the,  8 1. 
Quebec,  269,  273,  325. 
Queen's  proclamation  of  neutral 
ity,  234. 

Radical  party,  43,  52,  61,  62,  70, 

81,91,  loo,  144. 
Reciprocity  treaty,  190,  191,  222, 

223,  251,  262,  268,  364. 


Reform  Bill,  British,  of  1832,  68- 

70;  of  1867,  230. 
Riel  uprising,  the,  295. 
Robinson,  Frederick  John,  39,  58. 
Roebuck,  100,  227. 
Roosevelt,  President,  344. 
Root,  Secretary,  329,  332-336. 
Root-Bryce  conventions,  333-338. 
Rose,  Sir  John,  265. 
Rosebery,  Lord,  300. 
Rouse's  Point,  fortress  at,  32. 
Rush,  Richard,  17,  18,  20,  21,  24, 

38,  39,  49- 

Rush-Bagot  arrangement,  17,  222, 
325,  360. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  147,  152,  153; 
on  Canadian  independence,  183- 
186;  194,  206,  214,  215,  217,  219, 
229,  230,  232,  234;  attitude  re 
garding  Alabama  claims,  236- 
240;  243,  248,  365,  366. 

Russia,  48;  Pacific  coast  claims  of, 
S3-SS;  war  with,  169;  290,  293, 
300,  339,  345,  348. 


Saint  Croix  River,  the,  29-31. 
Saint  Mark's,  seizure  of,  36,  37. 
Salisbury,     Lord,     281-284;     289, 

300,  301,  303,  306-308,  315,  329, 

349,  366. 

Samoan  Islands,  the,  292,  293. 
San  Jacinto,  210. 
San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  155,  156. 

162. 
San  Juan  Island,  ownership  of,  251, 

259,  260. 

Saturday  Review,  London,  368. 
Schomburgk    line,   the,  303,   304, 

308. 

Schurz,  363. 
Seal-fisheries    dispute,    276,    285- 

291,  299,  325,  329. 
Search,  right  of,  20-22,  39,  72,  73, 

105;  discussions  concerning,  112- 

119;  169-172. 

Secession,  Southern,  200-204. 
Seminole  Indians,  36. 


INDEX 


Seward,  Secretary,  208,  215-217, 

222,  226,  233,  234,  240,  241,  244, 

245,  249,  253. 
Shenandoah,  the,  221,  256. 
Silver,  free  coinage  of,  3 19. 
"Six  Acts,"  the,  61,  62. 
Slavery,  73,  74,  165,  365;  British 

hostility  to,  204-206. 
Slave-trade,   African,  71-75,   105, 

107,  112-119,  170-172,  205. 
Slidell,  John,  210-217,  310. 
Smith,  Adam,  42,  63,  144. 
Smith,  Gold  win,  296,  357. 
Smith,  Sydney,  82. 
South  Africa,  321,  324,  350,  351, 

354,  355,  369- 

South  Pass,  the,  discovery  of,  126. 

Spain,  weakness  of  authority  of, 
in  Florida,  35,  36;  request  for  in 
tervention  in  behalf  of,  in  Amer 
ican  colonies,  48-51. 

Spanish- American  War,   321-323, 

342,  369- 

Spoils  system,  the,  79-81. 
Squier,  Mr.,  157,  158. 
Stanley,  Lord,  173,  241,  243. 
Suez  Canal,  332. 
Sumner,    Charles,    206,    245-250, 

253,  254,  256. 
Sutter's  mill,  362. 

Tariff,  protective,  in  the  United 
States,  75-77,  283,  297-299,  325, 
339;  in  Canada,  274,  275;  abol 
ished  in  Great  Britain,  143,  144, 
176,  185. 

Taylor,  President,  157. 

Tecumseh,  34,  35. 

Texas,  96;  annexation  of,  120-124; 
132,  134-137,  362. 

Theodore,  King,  225. 

Thompson,  Sir  John  S.  D.,  290. 

Tigre,  island  of,  157,  158. 

Times,  the  London,  216. 

Tocqueville,  83. 

Tories,  views  of,  as  to  Americans, 
6,  7;  43,  48,  49,  52,  59-62,  65-68, 
81,  87,  142,  144,  146,  173-175; 


Canadian,  178,  180,  181;  183, 
194,  229,  230,  322,  361,  366. 

Transvaal,  the,  314. 

Treaty,  of  1783,  8,  29;  of  arbitra 
tion,  of  1911,  341,  342;  Clayton- 
Bulwer,  158-165,  330-332,  362; 
commerce  and  navigation,  39- 
42,  59;  Ghent,  1814,  i,  2,  8,  9, 
13,  20,  23,  24,  30,  192,  194,  342, 
359;  between  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela,  316;  Hay-Paunce- 
fote,  331;  with  Honduras,  157, 
164;  inshore  fisheries  draught, 
280,  288;  Johnson-Clarendon, 
242-244;  London,  1818,  20-29; 
with  New  Granada,  156;  with 
Nicaragua,  164;  Olney-Paunce- 
fote,  318-320;  Oregon  boundary, 
132-134, 25 1, 259;  of  Portsmouth, 
346;  Reciprocity,  190,  191,  364; 
Root-Bryce,  333-338;  seal  fish 
eries  arbitration,  289-291 ;  Texan 
independence,  121;  of  Washing 
ton,  250-254,  259-262,  265,  276, 
366;  Webster-Ashburton,  107- 

113- 

Trent  affair,  the,  210-216,  218,  313. 
Trevelyan,    his     "Life    of    John 

Bright"  cited,  228. 
Trollope,    Mrs.,    her    "Domestic 

Life  of  the  Americans,"  84. 
Tupper,  Sir  Charles,  288,  290. 
Tyler,  President,  124,  130. 

United  Empire  Loyalists,  the,  91, 
174. 

United  States,  weakness  and  in 
significance  of,  in  1812,  3,  4;  de 
mocracy  in,  5-7;  rejoicing  over 
Treaty  of  Ghent  in,  8;  difficul 
ties  as  to  northwestern  bound 
ary  of,  27-32,  130;  northeastern 
boundary  dispute,  110-112,  120, 
242,  361;  commercial  interests 
of,  39,  40;  industrial  and  polit 
ical  freedom  in,  43,  44;  Jack- 
sonian  democracy  in,  46  et  seq.; 
policy  of,  in  West  India  trade 


INDEX 


controversy,  57-59;  resentment 
at  British  attitude  toward 
slavery,  74;  predominant  char 
acteristics  of  people,  78;  public 
opinion  in,  concerning  Great 
Britain,  86,  87;  territorial  ex 
pansion,  120  et  seq.,  139,  154, 
l6S,  343>  362;  growth  of  popu 
lation,  1840,  139,  140;  popular 
sentiment  in,  in  Irish  agitation, 
142,  143;  Irish  and  German  im 
migration  to,  148,  150;  signifi 
cance  of  the  year  1848,  149  et 
seq.;  indifference  to  Canadian 
annexation,  181,  182;  reciprocity 
with  Canada,  187-191,  340;  pop 
ulation  in  1860,  192;  immigrants 
in  1860,  195,  196;  influence  of 
Irish  in,  196,  226;  dislike  of  Brit 
ish  caused  by  Trent  affair,  216; 
sense  of  growth  and  power  in,  in 
the  eighties,  291-293 ;  creation  of 
a  modern  fleet,  292;  war  with 
Spain  popular  in,  321;  cordial  re 
lations  with  Great  Britain  in 
1898,  322-324;  controversies 
with  Canada,  324-340;  diplo 
matic  agreements  with  Great 
Britain,  1898-1908,  329  et  seq.; 
transformation  of  political  sys 
tems,  343,  344;  activity  in  world 
politics,  345;  imperialism  in, 
344-347;  home  of  most  of  En 
glish-speaking  people,  355;  con 
trasted  with  British  Empire, 
355;  influences  toward  amity 
with  Great  Britain,  357-371. 


United  States  Bank,  the,  78,  79. 
Upper  Canada,  10-13,  16;  political 

aspect  in,  90,  91;  99,  174,  175, 

268. 


Van  Buren,  President,  59,  88,  103. 

Vaughan,  53. 

Venezuela  boundary  controversy, 

299,301-318,342,368. 
Victoria,  Queen,  88,  349. 
Visitation,  right  of,  171,  172. 

Walker's  filibusters,  163,  165. 

War  of  1812,  139. 

Webster,  Daniel,  95;  in  boundary 
settlement,  105-112,  361;  in  de 
bate  over  right  of  search,  116- 
119. 

Webster-Ashburton  Treaty,  the, 
107-113. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  2,  60,  66,  67. 

West  Indies,  commerce  with,  57- 
59;  abolition  of  slavery  in,  71, 
74;  155,  322,  360,  361. 

West,  Sir  L.  S.  Sackville,  283. 

Whaling  fleet,  destruction  of,  221. 

Whigs,  views  of,  as  to  Americans, 
6,  7;  43,  49,  52;  reforms  of,  60, 
62,  67,  70,  81,  83;  87,  88,  91,  92, 
103,  105,  144,  147,  173,  183,  186, 
194,  202,  229,  361,  366. 

Wilberforce,  71. 

Wilkes,  Captain,  210-216. 

William  IV,  88. 

Yeo,  Sir  James,  14, 


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